2020.11 DOJ Office of Professional Responsibility Report.pdf

 
 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 
 
 
 
 
 
OFFICE OF 
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 
 
 REPORT 
 
Investigation into the  
U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Florida’s  
Resolution of Its 2006–2008 Federal Criminal Investigation of  
Jeffrey Epstein and Its Interactions with Victims during the Investigation 
 
November 2020 
 
 
 
NOTE:  THIS REPORT CONTAINS SENSITIVE, PRIVILEGED, AND PRIVACY 
ACT PROTECTED INFORMATION.  DO NOT DISTRIBUTE THE REPORT OR 
ITS CONTENTS WITHOUT THE PRIOR APPROVAL OF THE OFFICE OF 
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY.  
 
 
 

No text extracted

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
The Department of Justice (Department) Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) 
investigated allegations that in 2007-2008, prosecutors in the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the 
Southern District of Florida (USAO) improperly resolved a federal investigation into the criminal 
conduct of Jeffrey Epstein by negotiating and executing a federal non-prosecution agreement 
(NPA).  The NPA was intended to end a federal investigation into allegations that Epstein engaged 
in illegal sexual activity with girls.1  OPR also investigated whether USAO prosecutors committed 
professional misconduct by failing to consult with victims of Epstein’s crimes before the NPA was 
signed or by misleading victims regarding the status of the federal investigation after the signing.   
I. 
OVERVIEW OF FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
The Palm Beach (Florida) Police Department (PBPD) began investigating Jeffrey Epstein 
in 2005, after the parents of a 14-year-old girl complained that Epstein had paid her for a massage.  
Epstein was a multi-millionaire financier with residences in Palm Beach, New York City, and 
other United States and foreign locations.  The investigation led to the discovery that Epstein used 
personal assistants to recruit girls to provide massages to him, and in many instances, those 
massages led to sexual activity.  After the PBPD brought the case to the State Attorney’s Office, a 
Palm Beach County grand jury indicted Epstein, on July 19, 2006, for felony solicitation of 
prostitution in violation of Florida Statute § 796.07.  However, because the PBPD Chief and the 
lead Detective were dissatisfied with the State Attorney’s handling of the case and believed that 
the state grand jury’s charge did not address the totality of Epstein’s conduct, they referred the 
matter to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in West Palm Beach for a possible federal 
investigation.  
The FBI brought the matter to an Assistant U.S. Attorney (AUSA), who opened a file with 
...

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NPA required Epstein to plead guilty in state court to the then-pending state indictment against 
him and to an additional criminal information charging him with a state offense that would require 
him to register as a sexual offender—specifically, procurement of minors to engage in prostitution, 
in violation of Florida Statute § 796.03.  The NPA required Epstein to make a binding 
recommendation that the state court sentence him to serve 18 months in the county jail followed 
by 12 months of community control (home detention or “house arrest”).  The NPA also included 
provisions designed to facilitate the victims’ recovery of monetary damages from Epstein.  In 
exchange, the USAO agreed to end its investigation of Epstein and to forgo federal prosecution in 
the Southern District of Florida of him, four named co-conspirators, and “any potential 
co-conspirators.”  Victims were not informed of, or consulted about, a potential state resolution or 
the NPA prior to its signing.         
The signing of the NPA did not immediately lead to Epstein’s guilty plea and incarceration, 
however.  For the next nine months, Epstein deployed his extensive team of prominent attorneys 
to try to change the terms that his team had negotiated and he had approved, while simultaneously 
seeking to invalidate the entire NPA by persuading senior Department officials that there was no 
federal interest at issue and the matter should be left to the discretion of state law enforcement 
officials.  Through repeated communications with the USAO and senior Department officials, 
defense counsel fought the government’s interpretation of the NPA’s terms.  They also sought and 
obtained review by the Department’s Criminal Division and then the Office of the Deputy Attorney 
General, primarily on the issue of federal jurisdiction over what the defense insisted was “a 
quintessentially state matter.”  After reviewing submissions by the defense and the USAO, on 
June 23, 2008, the Office of t...

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Soon after he was incarcerated, Epstein applied for the Palm Beach County Sheriff’s work 
release program, and the Sheriff approved his application.  In October 2008, Epstein began 
spending 12 hours a day purportedly working at the “Florida Science Foundation,” an entity 
Epstein had recently incorporated that was co-located at the West Palm Beach office of one of 
Epstein’s attorneys.  Although the NPA specified a term of incarceration of 18 months, Epstein 
received “gain time,” that is, time off for good behavior, and he actually served less than 13 months 
of incarceration.  On July 22, 2009, Epstein was released from custody to a one-year term of home 
detention as a condition of community control, and he registered as a sexual offender with the 
Florida Department of Law Enforcement.  After victims and news media filed suit in Florida courts 
for release of the copy of the NPA that had been filed under seal in the state court file, a state judge 
in September 2009 ordered it to be made public.   
By mid-2010, Epstein reportedly settled multiple civil lawsuits brought against him by 
victims seeking monetary damages, including the two petitioners in the CVRA litigation.  During 
the CVRA litigation, the petitioners sought discovery from the USAO, which made substantial 
document productions, filed lengthy privilege logs in support of its withholding of documents, and 
submitted declarations from the AUSA and the FBI case agents who conducted the federal 
investigation.  The USAO opposed efforts to unseal various records, as did Epstein, who was 
permitted to intervene in the litigation with respect to certain issues.  Nevertheless, the court 
ultimately ordered that substantial records relating to the USAO’s resolution of the Epstein case 
be made public.  During the course of the litigation, the court made numerous rulings interpreting 
the CVRA.  After failed efforts to settle the case, the parties’ cross motions for summary judgment 
remained pending...

iv 
 
abuse of minors.  The Miami Herald report led to public outrage and media scrutiny of the 
government’s actions.4    
On February 21, 2019, the district court granted the CVRA case petitioners’ Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment, ruling that the government violated the CVRA in failing to advise the 
victims about its intention to enter into the NPA.5  The court also found that letters the government 
sent to victims after the NPA was signed, describing the investigation as ongoing, “mislead [sic] 
the victims to believe that federal prosecution was still a possibility.”  The court also highlighted 
the inequity of the USAO’s failure to communicate with the victims while at the same time 
engaging in “lengthy negotiations” with Epstein’s counsel and assuring the defense that the NPA 
would not be “made public or filed with the court.”  The court ordered the parties to submit 
additional briefs regarding the appropriate remedies.  After the court’s order, the Department 
recused the USAO from the CVRA litigation and assigned the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the 
Northern District of Georgia to handle the case for the government.  Among the remedies sought 
by the petitioners, and opposed by the government, was rescission of the NPA and federal 
prosecution of Epstein.     
On July 2, 2019, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York obtained 
a federal grand jury indictment charging Epstein with one count of sex trafficking of minors and 
one count of conspiracy to commit sex trafficking of minors.  The indictment alleged that from 
2002 until 2005, Epstein created a vast network of underage victims in both New York and Florida 
whom he sexually abused and exploited.  Epstein was arrested on the charges on July 6, 2019.  In 
arguing for Epstein’s pretrial detention, prosecutors asserted that agents searching Epstein’s 
Manhattan residence found thousands of photos of nude and half-nude females, including at least 
one believed to be a minor....

v 
 
Secretary of Labor.  In a brief oral statement, Acosta explained that continued media attention on 
his handling of the Epstein investigation rather than on the economy was unfair to the Labor 
Department.   
On August 10, 2019, Epstein was found hanging in his cell and was later pronounced dead.  
The New York City Chief Medical Examiner concluded that Epstein had committed suicide.   
As a result of Epstein’s death, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of  
New York filed a nolle prosequi to dismiss the pending indictment against Epstein.  On  
August 27, 2019, the district court held a hearing at which more than a dozen of Epstein’s 
victims—including victims of the conduct in Florida that was addressed through the NPA—spoke 
about the impact of Epstein’s crimes.  The court dismissed the Epstein indictment on  
August 29, 2019.  
After Epstein’s death, the federal district court in Florida overseeing the CVRA litigation 
denied the petitioners their requested remedies and closed the case as moot.  Among its findings, 
the court concluded that although the government had violated the CVRA, the government had 
asserted “legitimate and legally supportable positions throughout this litigation,” and therefore had 
not litigated in bad faith.  The court also noted it expected the government to “honor its 
representation that it will provide training to its employees about the CVRA and the proper 
treatment of crime victims,” as well as honoring its promise to meet with the victims.   
On September 30, 2019, CVRA petitioner “Jane Doe 1” filed in her true name a petition 
for a writ of mandamus in the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, seeking 
review of the district court’s order denying all of her requested remedies.  In its responsive brief, 
the government argued that “as a matter of law, the legal obligations under the CVRA do not attach 
prior to the government charging a case” and thus, “the CVRA was not triggered in [the...

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an investigation into the matter and would review the USAO’s decision to resolve the federal 
investigation of Epstein through the NPA.6  
 
After the district court issued its ruling in the CVRA litigation, on February 21, 2019, OPR 
included within the scope of its investigation an examination of the government’s conduct that 
formed the basis for the court’s findings that the USAO violated the CVRA in failing to afford 
victims a reasonable right to confer with the government about the NPA before the agreement was 
signed and that the government affirmatively misled victims about the status of the federal 
investigation. 
 
During the course of its investigation, OPR obtained and reviewed hundreds of thousands 
of records from the USAO, the FBI, and other Department components, including the Office of 
the Deputy Attorney General, the Criminal Division, and the Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys.  
The records included emails, letters, memoranda, and investigative materials.  OPR also collected 
and reviewed materials relating to the state investigation and prosecution of Epstein.  OPR also 
examined extensive publicly available information, including depositions, pleadings, orders, and 
other court records, and reviewed media reports and interviews, articles, podcasts, and books 
relating to the Epstein case.      
In addition to this extensive documentary review, OPR conducted more than 60 interviews 
of witnesses, including the FBI case agents, their supervisors, and FBI administrative personnel; 
current and former USAO staff and attorneys; current and former Department attorneys and senior 
managers, including a former Deputy Attorney General and a former Assistant Attorney General 
for the Criminal Division; and the former State Attorney and former Assistant State Attorney in 
charge of the state investigation of Epstein.  OPR also interviewed several victims and attorneys 
representing victims, and reviewed written submissions from victims, concerni...

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carefully considered the comments and made changes, or noted comments, as OPR deemed 
appropriate; OPR did not, however, alter its findings and conclusions.      
Finally, OPR reviewed relevant case law, statutes, regulations, Department policy, and 
attorney professional responsibility rules as necessary to resolve the issues presented in this case 
and to determine whether the subjects committed professional misconduct. 
As part of its investigation, OPR examined the interactions between state officials and the 
federal investigators and prosecutors, but because OPR does not have jurisdiction over state 
officials, OPR did not investigate, or reach conclusions about, their conduct regarding the state 
investigation.7  Because OPR’s mission is to ensure that Department attorneys adhere to the 
standards of professional conduct, OPR’s investigation focused on the actions of the subject 
attorneys rather than on determining the full scope of Epstein’s and his assistants’ criminal 
behavior.  Accordingly, OPR considered the evidence and information regarding Epstein’s and his 
assistants’ conduct as it was known to the subjects at the time they performed their duties as 
Department attorneys.  Additional evidence and information that came to light after June 30, 2008, 
when Epstein entered his guilty plea under the NPA, did not affect the subjects’ actions prior to 
that date, and OPR did not evaluate the subjects’ conduct on the basis of that subsequent 
information.   
OPR’s investigation occurred approximately 12 years after most of the significant events 
relating to the USAO’s investigation of Epstein, the NPA, and Epstein’s guilty plea.  As a result, 
many of the subjects and witnesses were unable to recall the details of events or their own or 
others’ actions occurring in 2006-2008, such as conversations, meetings, or documents they 
reviewed at the time.8  However, OPR’s evaluation of the subjects’ conduct was aided significantly 
by extensive, contemp...

viii 
 
investigate, litigate, or provide legal advice.9    OPR also has jurisdiction to investigate allegations 
of misconduct against Department law enforcement agents when they relate to a Department 
attorney’s alleged professional misconduct.   
In its investigations, OPR determines whether a clear and unambiguous standard governs 
the challenged conduct and whether a subject attorney violated that standard.  Department 
attorneys are subject to various legal obligations and professional standards in the performance of 
their duties, including the Constitution, statutes, standards of conduct imposed by attorney 
licensing authorities, and Department regulations and policies.  OPR finds misconduct when it 
concludes by a preponderance of the evidence that a subject attorney violated such a standard 
intentionally or recklessly.  Pursuant to OPR’s analytical framework, when OPR concludes that 
(1) no clear and unambiguous standard governs the conduct in question or (2) the subject did not 
intentionally or recklessly violate the standard that governs the conduct, then it concludes that the 
subject’s conduct does not constitute professional misconduct.  In some cases, OPR may conclude 
that a subject attorney’s conduct does not satisfy the elements necessary for a professional 
misconduct finding, but that the circumstances warrant another finding.  In such cases, OPR may 
conclude that a subject attorney exercised poor judgment, made a mistake, or otherwise acted 
inappropriately under the circumstances.  OPR may also determine that the subject attorney’s 
conduct was appropriate under the circumstances.10   
IV. 
ISSUES CONSIDERED 
 
In this investigation, OPR considered two distinct sets of allegations.  The first relates to 
the negotiation, execution, and implementation of the NPA.  The second relates to the USAO’s 
interactions with Epstein’s victims and adherence to the requirements of the CVRA.  The two sets 
of issues are described below and are analyzed...

ix 
 
of immunity, or (6) the deportation of criminal aliens.  The potentially applicable standards that 
OPR considered as to each of these issues are identified and discussed later in this Report.  OPR 
also examined whether the evidence establishes that any of the subjects were influenced to enter 
into the NPA, or to include in the NPA terms favorable to Epstein, because of an improper motive, 
such as a bribe, political consideration, personal interest, or favoritism.  OPR also examined and 
discusses in this Report significant events that occurred after the NPA was negotiated and signed 
that shed additional light on the USAO’s handling of the Epstein investigation. 
B. 
The District Court’s Conclusion That the USAO Violated the CVRA 
 
To address the district court’s adverse judicial findings, OPR assessed the manner, content, 
and timing of the government’s interactions with victims both before and after the NPA was 
signed, including victim notification letters issued by the USAO and the FBI and interviews 
conducted by the USAO.  OPR considered whether any of the subject attorneys violated any clear 
and unambiguous standard governing victim consultation or notification.  OPR examined the 
government’s lack of consultation with the victims before the NPA was signed, as well as the 
circumstances relating to the district court’s finding that the USAO affirmatively misled Epstein’s 
victims about the status of the federal investigation after the NPA was signed. 
V. 
OPR’S FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
OPR evaluated the conduct of each subject and considered his or her individual role in 
various decisions and events.  Acosta, however, made the pivotal decision to resolve the federal 
investigation of Epstein through a state-based plea and either developed or approved the terms of 
the initial offer to the defense that set the beginning point for the subsequent negotiations that led 
to the NPA.  Although Acosta did not sign the NPA, he participated in its drafti...

x 
 
initiate a federal prosecution of Epstein was within the scope of his authority, and OPR did not 
find evidence that his decision was based on corruption or other impermissible considerations, 
such as Epstein’s wealth, status, or associations.  Evidence shows that Acosta resisted defense 
efforts to have the matter returned to the state for whatever result state authorities deemed 
appropriate, and he refused to eliminate the incarceration and sexual offender registration 
requirements.  OPR did not find evidence establishing that Acosta’s “breakfast meeting” with one 
of Epstein’s defense counsel in October 2007 led to the NPA, which had been signed weeks earlier, 
or to any other significant decision that benefited Epstein.  The contemporaneous records show 
that USAO managers’ concerns about legal issues, witness credibility, and the impact of a trial on 
the victims led them to prefer a pre-charge resolution and that Acosta’s concerns about the proper 
role of the federal government in prosecuting solicitation crimes resulted in his preference for a 
state-based resolution.  Accordingly, OPR does not find that Acosta engaged in professional 
misconduct by resolving the federal investigation of Epstein in the way he did or that the other 
subjects committed professional misconduct through their implementation of Acosta’s decisions.   
Nevertheless, OPR concludes that Acosta’s decision to resolve the federal investigation 
through the NPA constitutes poor judgment.  Although this decision was within the scope of 
Acosta’s broad discretion and OPR does not find that it resulted from improper factors, the NPA 
was a flawed mechanism for satisfying the federal interest that caused the government to open its 
investigation of Epstein.  In Acosta’s view, the federal government’s role in prosecuting Epstein 
was limited by principles of federalism, under which the independent authority of the state should 
be recognized, and the federal responsibility in this situ...

xi 
 
interactions with victims that ultimately led to public and court condemnation of the government’s 
treatment of the victims, reflected poorly on the Department as a whole, and is contradictory to the 
Department’s mission to minimize the frustration and confusion that victims of a crime endure.  
 
OPR determined that none of the subjects was responsible for communications sent to 
certain victims after the NPA was signed that described the case as “under investigation” and that 
failed to inform them of the NPA.  The letters were sent by an FBI administrative employee who 
was not directly involved in the investigation, incorporated standard form language used by the 
FBI when communicating with victims, and were not drafted or reviewed by the subjects.  
Moreover, the statement that the matter was “under investigation” was not false because the 
government in fact continued to investigate the case in anticipation that Epstein would not fulfill 
the terms of the NPA.  However, the letters risked misleading the victims and contributed to victim 
frustration and confusion by failing to provide important information about the status of the 
investigation.  The letters also demonstrated a lack of coordination between the federal agencies 
responsible for communicating with Epstein’s victims and showed a lack of attention to and 
oversight regarding communication with victims.     
After the NPA was signed, Acosta elected to defer to the State Attorney the decision 
whether to notify victims about the state’s plea hearing pursuant to the state’s own victim’s rights 
requirements.  Although Acosta’s decision was within his authority and did not constitute 
professional misconduct, OPR concludes that Acosta exercised poor judgment when he failed to 
make certain that the state intended to and would notify victims identified through the federal 
investigation about the state plea hearing.  His decision left victims uninformed about an important 
proceeding that reso...

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that the victims were not treated with the forthrightness and sensitivity expected by the 
Department.   
VI. 
ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT 
 
The Report is divided into three chapters.  In Chapter One, OPR describes the relevant 
federal, state, and local law enforcement entities involved in investigating Epstein’s criminal 
conduct, as well as the backgrounds of the five subjects and their roles in the events in question.  
OPR provides a brief profile of Epstein and identifies the defense attorneys who interacted with 
the subjects.     
In Chapter Two, OPR sets forth an extensive account of events relating to the federal 
investigation of Epstein.  The account begins with the initial complaint in March 2005 by a young 
victim and her parents to the local police—a complaint that launched an investigation by local law 
enforcement authorities—and continues through the mid-2006 opening of the federal 
investigation; the September 2007 negotiation and signing of the NPA; Epstein’s subsequent 
efforts to invalidate the NPA through appeals to senior Department officials; Epstein’s June 2008 
guilty plea in state court; and, finally, efforts by the AUSA to ensure Epstein’s compliance with 
the terms of the NPA during his incarceration and until his term of home detention ended in July 
2010.  After describing the relevant events, OPR analyzes the professional misconduct allegations 
relating to the decisions made regarding the development and execution of the NPA.  OPR 
describes the relevant standards and sets forth its findings and conclusions regarding the subjects’ 
conduct.  
Chapter Three concerns the government’s interactions with victims and the district court’s 
findings regarding the CVRA.  OPR describes the relevant events and analyzes the subjects’ 
conduct in light of the pertinent standards.    
OPR sets forth the extensive factual detail provided in Chapters Two and Three, including 
internal USAO and Department communications, because doing so is n...

xiii 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................................. i 
I. 
OVERVIEW OF FACTUAL BACKGROUND ................................................................. i 
II. 
THE INITIATION AND SCOPE OF OPR’S INVESTIGATION ......................................v 
III. 
OVERVIEW OF OPR’S ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK ............................................. vii 
IV. 
ISSUES CONSIDERED .................................................................................................. viii 
 
A. 
The Negotiation, Execution, and Implementation of the NPA ............................ viii 
 
B. 
The District Court’s Conclusion That the USAO Violated the CVRA ................. ix 
V. 
OPR’S FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS ...................................................................... ix 
A. 
Findings and Conclusions Relating to the NPA .................................................... ix 
B. 
Findings and Conclusions Relating to the Government’s Interactions  
with Victims .............................................................................................................x 
VI. 
ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT ............................................................................. xii 
CHAPTER ONE:  SIGNIFICANT ENTITIES AND INDIVIDUALS .......................................... 1 
I. 
 
THE FEDERAL AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES ............................. 1 
 
A. 
The Department of Justice, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the  
Southern District of Florida, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation ....................1 
 
B. 
The State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies ....................................................4 
II.  
THE SUBJECT ATTORNEYS AND THEIR ROLES IN THE EPSTEIN CASE ............. 4 
III.  
JEFFREY EPSTEIN AND HIS DEFENSE ATTORNEYS ................................................ 8 
 
A. 
Jeffrey Epstein ...............................................

xiv 
 
III. 
THE FBI AND THE USAO INVESTIGATE EPSTEIN, AND THE  
DEFENSE TEAM ENGAGES WITH THE USAO .......................................................... 16 
 
A. 
May 2006 – February 2007:  The Federal Investigation Is Initiated,  
and the USAO Opens a Case File ..........................................................................16 
 
1. 
The PBPD Presents the Matter to the FBI and the USAO .........................17 
 
2. 
May 2006:  The USAO Accepts the Case and Opens a Case File .............18 
 
3. 
July 14, 2006:  Villafaña Informs Acosta and Sloman about the Case......18 
 
4. 
Late July 2006:  The State Indicts Epstein, and the USAO  
Moves Forward with a Federal Investigation ............................................20 
 
5. 
October 2006 – February 2007:  Epstein’s Defense Counsel  
Initiate Contact with Villafaña, Lourie, and Sloman, and  
Press for a Meeting ....................................................................................22 
 
6. 
February 2007:  Defense Counsel Meet with Lourie and  
Villafaña and Present the Defense Objections to a Federal Case ..............24 
 
B. 
February – May 2007:  Villafaña and the FBI Continue to Investigate;  
Villafaña Drafts a Prosecution Memorandum and Proposed Indictment  
for USAO Managers to Review .............................................................................24 
 
C. 
May – June 2007:  Miami Managers Consider the Prosecution Memorandum  
and Proposed Charges ............................................................................................27 
 
D. 
Defense Counsel Seek a Meeting with Senior USAO Managers, which  
Villafaña Opposes ..................................................................................................30 
 
E. 
June 2007:  Villafaña Supplements the Prosecution Memorandum ......................33 
 
F. 
The June 26, 2007 Meeting with Defense Counsel ...............................................33 
IV. 
ACOSTA DECIDES TO OFFER EPSTE...

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2. 
The Subjects’ Explanations for the Decision to Offer Epstein  
a Sentence with a Two-Year Term of Incarceration ..................................49 
 
E. 
Villafaña Drafts a “Term Sheet” Listing the Requirements of a Potential 
Agreement with the Defense ..................................................................................51 
V. 
THE USAO PRESENTS EPSTEIN WITH KEY TERMS OF A DEAL:  PLEAD 
GUILTY TO STATE CHARGES REQUIRING A TWO-YEAR TERM OF 
INCARCERATION AND SEXUAL OFFENDER REGISTRATION, AND AGREE 
TO A MEANS FOR THE VICTIMS TO OBTAIN MONETARY DAMAGES ............. 53 
 
A. 
July 31, 2007:  The USAO Presents Its Proposal to the Defense Team,  
which Makes a Counteroffer ..................................................................................54 
 
B. 
In an August 3, 2007 Letter, the USAO States That a Two-Year Term of 
Imprisonment Is the Minimum That Will Vindicate the Federal Interest .............55 
 
C. 
August – September 2007:  Epstein Hires Additional Attorneys, Who  
Meet with Acosta ...................................................................................................59 
 
1. 
Acosta Agrees to Meet with Epstein’s New Attorneys .............................59 
 
2. 
Leading to the Meeting with Defense Counsel, Investigative  
Steps Are Postponed, and the Defense Continues to Oppose  
Villafaña’s Efforts to Obtain the Computer Evidence ...............................60 
 
3. 
September 7, 2007:  Acosta, Other USAO Attorneys, and  
FBI Supervisors Meet with Epstein Attorneys Starr, Lefkowitz,  
and Sanchez ...............................................................................................62 
VI. 
SEPTEMBER 2007:  THE PLEA NEGOTIATIONS INTENSIFY, AND IN THE 
PROCESS, THE REQUIRED TERM OF IMPRISONMENT IS REDUCED ................. 63 
 
A. 
The Incarceration Term Is Reduced from 24 Months to 20 Months .....................63 
 
B. 
September 12, 2007:  The USAO and Defense Counsel Meet with  
the Stat...

xvi 
 
 
I. 
The Defense Rejects the Federal Plea Agreement, Returns to the NPA 
“State-Only” Resolution, and Begins Opposing the Sexual Offender  
Registration Requirement ......................................................................................78 
 
J. 
The USAO Agrees Not to Criminally Charge “Potential Co-Conspirators” .........79 
 
K. 
The USAO Rejects Defense Efforts to Eliminate the Sexual Offender  
Registration Requirement ......................................................................................81 
 
L. 
The Defense Adds a Confidentiality Clause ..........................................................83 
VII. 
SEPTEMBER 24, 2007:  ACOSTA MAKES FINAL EDITS, AND THE  
NPA IS SIGNED ............................................................................................................... 84 
VIII. POST-NPA NEGOTIATIONS .......................................................................................... 87 
 
A. 
September – October 2007:  Sloman’s Concerns about Selection of an  
Attorney Representative Lead to a Proposed NPA Addendum .............................87 
 
B. 
October 12, 2007:  Acosta and Defense Attorney Lefkowitz  
Meet for Breakfast .................................................................................................89 
 
C. 
Acosta Agrees to the Defense Request to Postpone Epstein’s Guilty Plea;  
the Parties Continue to Negotiate Issues concerning the Attorney  
Representative and Finally Reach Agreement on the NPA Addendum ................91 
 
D. 
Epstein Further Delays His Guilty Plea .................................................................94 
 
E. 
Epstein Seeks Departmental Review of the NPA’s § 2255 Provision  
Relating to Monetary Damages for the Victims ....................................................94 
 
F. 
Despite Affirming the NPA, Defense Counsel Intensify Their Challenges  
to It and Accuse Villafaña of Improper Conduct ..............................................

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B. 
May – June 23, 2008:  Review by the Office of the Deputy  
Attorney General ..................................................................................................108 
X. 
JUNE 2008 – JUNE 2009:  EPSTEIN ENTERS HIS PLEAS AND  
SERVES HIS CUSTODIAL SENTENCE ...................................................................... 110 
 
A. 
June 30, 2008:  Epstein Enters His Guilty Pleas in State Court ..........................111 
 
B. 
Epstein Is Placed on Work Release .....................................................................113 
XI.  
POST-RELEASE DEVELOPMENTS ............................................................................ 117 
PART TWO:  APPLICABLE STANDARDS ............................................................................ 119 
I. 
 
OPR’S ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK ........................................................................ 119 
II.  
APPLICABLE STANDARDS OF CONDUCT .............................................................. 120 
 
A. 
The United States Attorneys’ Manual..................................................................120 
 
1. 
USAM Provisions Relating to the Initiation and Declination  
of a Federal Prosecution...........................................................................120 
 
2. 
USAM § 9-2.031:  The Petite Policy .......................................................122 
 
3. 
USAM Provisions Relating to Plea Agreements .....................................123 
 
4. 
USAM Provisions Relating to Non-Prosecution Agreements .................124 
 
5. 
USAM Provisions Relating to Grants of Immunity .................................125 
 
6. 
USAM/C.F.R. Provisions Relating to Financial Conflicts of Interest .....125 
 
B. 
Other Department Policies ...................................................................................125 
 
1. 
Department Policies Relating to the Disposition of Charges...................125 
 
2. 
Department Policy Relating to Deport...

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III. 
OPR FOUND THAT NONE OF THE SUBJECTS VIOLATED A CLEAR AND 
UNAMBIGUOUS STATUTE, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY RULE OR 
STANDARD, OR DEPARTMENT REGULATION OR POLICY, IN  
NEGOTIATING, APPROVING, OR ENTERING INTO THE NPA ............................ 134 
 
A. 
U.S. Attorneys Have Broad Discretion to Resolve Investigations or  
Cases as They Deem Appropriate, and Acosta’s Decision to Decline  
to Prosecute Epstein Federally Does Not Constitute Professional  
Misconduct ...........................................................................................................135 
 
B. 
No Clear and Unambiguous Standard Precluded Acosta’s Use of a 
Non-Prosecution Agreement to Resolve the Federal Investigation  
of Epstein .............................................................................................................136 
 
C.  
The NPA’s Individual Provisions Did Not Violate Any Clear and  
Unambiguous Standards ......................................................................................137 
 
1. 
Acosta Had Authority to Approve an Agreement That Required  
Epstein to Plead to Offenses Resulting in an 18-Month Term of 
Incarceration ............................................................................................137 
 
2. 
The USAO’s Agreement Not to Prosecute Unidentified “Potential 
Co-Conspirators” Did Not Violate a Clear and Unambiguous  
Department Policy ...................................................................................139 
 
3. 
The NPA Did Not Violate Department Policy Relating to  
Deportation of Criminal Aliens ...............................................................140 
IV. 
THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT ESTABLISH THAT THE SUBJECTS WERE 
INFLUENCED BY IMPROPER MOTIVES TO INCLUDE IN THE NPA  
TERMS FAVORABLE TO EPSTEIN OR TO OTHERWISE EXTEND  
BENEFITS TO EPSTEIN................................................................................................ 140 
 
A. 
OPR Found No Evidence of Crimin...

xix 
 
 
D. 
OPR Does Not Find That the Subjects’ Preexisting Relationships with  
Defense Counsel, Decisions to Meet with Defense Counsel, and Other  
Factors Established That the Subjects Acted from Improper Influences or 
Provided Improper Benefits to Epstein ................................................................150 
 
1. 
The Evidence Does Not Establish That the Subjects Extended  
Any Improper Benefit to Epstein because of Their Preexisting  
Relationships with His Attorneys ............................................................150 
 
2. 
The Subjects Asserted That Their Relationships with Defense  
Counsel Did Not Influence Their Actions ...............................................151 
 
E. 
The Evidence Does Not Establish That the Subjects’ Meetings with  
Defense Counsel Were Improper Benefits to Epstein .........................................155 
 
1. 
The Evidence Shows That the Subjects’ Decisions to Meet with  
Epstein’s Legal Team Were Warranted by Strategic Considerations ......155 
 
2. 
The Evidence Does Not Establish That Acosta Negotiated a  
Deal Favorable to Epstein over Breakfast with Defense Counsel ...........160 
 
F. 
Villafaña’s Emails with Defense Attorney Lefkowitz during the NPA 
Negotiations Do Not Establish That Villafaña, or Other Subjects,  
Intended to Give Epstein Preferential Treatment or Were Motivated by  
Favoritism or Other Improper Influences ............................................................163 
 
G. 
The Evidence Does Not Establish That Acosta, Lourie, or Villafaña  
Agreed to the NPA’s Provision Promising Not to Prosecute “Potential  
Co-conspirators” in Order to Protect Any of Epstein’s Political, Celebrity,  
or Other Influential Associates ............................................................................166 
 
H. 
OPR’s Investigation Did Not Reveal Evidence Establishing That Epstein 
Cooperated in Other Federal Investigations or Received Special Treatment  
on That Basis...........

xx 
 
CHAPTER THREE:  ISSUES RELATING TO THE GOVERNMENT’S INTERACTIONS 
AND COMMUNICATIONS WITH VICTIMS ......................................................................... 189 
PART ONE:  FACTUAL BACKGROUND .............................................................................. 189 
I. 
 
OVERVIEW .................................................................................................................... 189 
II.  
THE CVRA, 18 U.S.C. § 3771 ........................................................................................ 189 
 
A. 
History..................................................................................................................189 
 
B. 
Enumerated Rights ...............................................................................................191 
III. 
THE DEPARTMENT’S INTERPRETATION OF THE CVRA’S DEFINITION OF 
“CRIME VICTIM” AT THE TIME OF THE EPSTEIN INVESTIGATION ................ 192 
 
A. 
April 1, 2005 Office of Legal Counsel “Preliminary Review” ............................192 
 
B. 
2005 Attorney General Guidelines for Victim and Witness Assistance ..............193 
IV. 
USAO AND FBI VICTIM/WITNESS NOTIFICATION PRACTICE AT THE  
TIME OF THE EPSTEIN INVESTIGATION ................................................................ 194 
 
A. 
USAO Training ....................................................................................................194 
 
B. 
The Automated Victim Notification System .......................................................195 
 
C. 
FBI Victim Notification Pamphlets .....................................................................196 
V.  
THE INTRODUCTORY USAO AND FBI LETTERS TO VICTIMS........................... 196 
 
A. 
August 2006:  The FBI Victim Notification Letters ............................................196 
 
B. 
August 2006:  The USAO’s Letters to Victims ...................................................198 
 
C. 
USAO and FBI Letters Are Hand D...

xxi 
 
 
A. 
September – October 2007:  The Case Agents Notify Some Victims about  
the NPA, but Stop When the Case Agent Becomes Concerned about  
Potential Impeachment.........................................................................................207 
 
B. 
October 2007:  Defense Attorneys Object to Government Victim  
Notifications .........................................................................................................210 
 
C. 
October – November 2007:  The FBI and the USAO Continue to  
Investigate, and the FBI Sends a Notice Letter to One Victim Stating  
That the Case is “Under Investigation” ...............................................................211 
 
D. 
The USAO Informs the Defense That It Intends to Notify Victims by  
Letter about Epstein’s State Plea Hearing and the Resolution of the Federal  
Investigation, but the Defense Strongly Objects to the Notification Plan ...........212 
 
E. 
December 19, 2007:  Acosta Advises the Defense That the USAO Will  
Defer to the State Attorney the Decision Whether to Notify Victims of the  
State Plea Hearing, but the USAO Would Notify Them of the Federal  
Resolution, “as Required by Law”.......................................................................216 
 
F. 
January – June 2008:  While the Defense Presses Its Appeal to the  
Department in an Effort to Undo the NPA, the FBI and the USAO  
Continue Investigating Epstein ............................................................................220 
 
1. 
Villafaña Prepares to Contact Victims in Anticipation That  
Epstein Will Breach the NPA ..................................................................220 
 
2. 
The FBI Uses VNS Form Letters to Re-Establish Contact with  
Victims .....................................................................................................221 
 
3. 
Villafaña, the FBI, and the CEOS Trial Attorney Interview Victims ......224 
 
4. 
February – March 2008:  Villafaña Takes Additi...

xxii 
 
 
B. 
July 7, 2008:  The CVRA Litigation Is Initiated .................................................236 
 
C. 
July 2008:  Villafaña Prepares and Sends a Victim Notification Letter  
to Listed Victims ..................................................................................................237 
 
D. 
July – August 2008:  The FBI Sends the Victim Notification Letter to  
Victims Residing Outside of the United States....................................................238 
 
E. 
August – September 2008:  The Federal Court Orders the USAO to  
Disclose the NPA to Victims, and the USAO Sends a Revised Victim  
Notification Letter ................................................................................................239 
 
F. 
2010 – 2011:  Department and Congressional Actions Regarding  
Interpretation of the CVRA .................................................................................241 
 
G. 
The CVRA Litigation Proceedings and Current Status .......................................242 
PART TWO:  APPLICABLE STANDARDS ............................................................................ 247 
I. 
 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS ......................................................................................... 247 
 
A. 
The CVRA, 18 U.S.C. § 3771 .............................................................................247 
 
B. 
The Victims’ Rights and Restitution Act of 1990 (VRRA), 34 U.S.C. § 20141, 
Services to Victims (formerly cited as 42 USCA § 10607) .................................248 
II. 
DEPARTMENT POLICY:  THE 2005 ATTORNEY GENERAL GUIDELINES  
FOR VICTIM AND WITNESS ASSISTANCE (2005 GUIDELINES) ......................... 249 
III.  
FLORIDA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT .................................................. 253 
 
A. 
FRPC 4-4.1 – Candor in Dealing with Others .....................................................253 
 
B. 
FRPC 4-8.4 – Conduct Prejudicial to the Administration of Justice .............

xxiii 
 
 
B. 
Because the Federal Investigation Continued after the NPA Was Signed,  
the FBI Letters Were Accurate but Risked Misleading Victims regarding  
the Status of the Federal Investigation .................................................................263 
IV. 
ACOSTA’S DECISION TO DEFER TO THE STATE ATTORNEY’S  
DISCRETION WHETHER TO NOTIFY VICTIMS ABOUT EPSTEIN’S STATE 
COURT PLEA HEARING DID NOT VIOLATE A CLEAR OR UNAMBIGUOUS 
STANDARD; HOWEVER, ACOSTA EXERCISED POOR JUDGMENT BY  
FAILING TO ENSURE THAT VICTIMS IDENTIFIED IN THE FEDERAL 
INVESTIGATION WERE ADVISED OF THE STATE PLEA HEARING ................. 265 
 
A. 
Acosta’s Decision to Defer to the State Attorney’s Discretion Whether  
to Notify Victims about Epstein’s State Court Plea Hearing Did Not  
Violate Any Clear or Unambiguous Standard .....................................................265 
 
B. 
Acosta Exercised Poor Judgment When He Failed to Ensure That  
Victims Identified in the Federal Investigation Were Informed of the  
State Plea Hearing ................................................................................................269 
V. 
VILLAFAÑA DID NOT COMMIT PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT IN HER  
ORAL COMMUNICATIONS TO VICTIMS AND VICTIMS’ ATTORNEYS, IN 
WHICH SHE DESCRIBED THE CASE AS “UNDER INVESTIGATION”  
BUT DID NOT DISCLOSE THE EXISTENCE OF THE NPA TO SOME  
VICTIMS .........................................................................................................................273 
VI. 
THE GOVERNMENT FAILED TO TREAT VICTIMS FORTHRIGHTLY AND  
WITH SENSITIVITY WHEN IT FAILED TO TIMELY PROVIDE VICTIMS  
WITH IMPORTANT INFORMATION ABOUT THE RESOLUTION OF THE 
FEDERAL INVESTIGATION ........................................................................................ 280 
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................... 283 
METHODOLOGY ...............................................

xxiv 
 
[Page Intentionally Left Blank]

 
 
 
CHAPTER ONE 
SIGNIFICANT ENTITIES AND INDIVIDUALS 
 
I. 
THE FEDERAL AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES 
A. 
The Department of Justice, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District 
of Florida, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
The Department of Justice (Department) is a cabinet-level executive branch department 
headed by the United States Attorney General.  The stated mission of the Department is to enforce 
federal law and defend the interests of the United States; ensure public safety; provide federal 
leadership in preventing and controlling crime; seek just punishment for those guilty of unlawful 
behavior; and ensure the fair and impartial administration of justice.  The Department enforces 
federal criminal law through investigations and prosecutions of violations of federal criminal 
statutes.  It also engages in civil litigation.  During the period relevant to this Report, the 
Department had approximately 110,000 employees in 40 components.  The Department’s 
headquarters are in Washington, D.C., and it conducts most of its work through field locations 
around the nation and overseas. 
The prosecution of federal criminal laws is handled primarily through 94 U.S. Attorney’s 
Offices, each headed by a presidentially appointed (with advice and consent of the U.S. Senate) 
U.S. Attorney who has independent authority over his or her office but is overseen by the Attorney 
General through the Deputy Attorney General.1  The Department’s Criminal Division, headed by 
an Assistant Attorney General, includes components with specialized areas of expertise that also 
prosecute cases, assist in the prosecutions handled by U.S. Attorney’s Offices, and provide legal 
expertise and policy guidance.  Among the Criminal Division components mentioned in this 
Report are the Appellate Section, the Office of Enforcement Operations, the Computer Crime and 
Intellectual Property Section, and, most prominently, the Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section 
(...

 
2 
 
or other divisions having responsibility for specific criminal enforcement, such as the Civil Rights 
Division.  In this Report, OPR applies the USAM provisions in effect at the relevant time.     
During the period most relevant to this Report, the Attorney General was Michael 
Mukasey, the Deputy Attorney General was Mark Filip, and the Assistant Attorney General for 
the Criminal Division was Alice Fisher.  The Chief of CEOS was Andrew Oosterbaan.    
 
The U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Florida (USAO) handles federal 
matters in the Southern District of Florida judicial district, which covers the counties of Miami-
Dade, Broward, Monroe, Palm Beach, Martin, St. Lucie, Indian River, Okeechobee, and 
Highlands, an area of over 15,000 square miles.  During the period relevant to this Report, the 
USAO had a staff of approximately 200 Assistant U.S. Attorneys (AUSAs) and 200 support 
personnel.  The main office is in Miami; staffed branch offices are located in Fort Lauderdale, 
West Palm Beach (covering Palm Beach County), and Fort Pierce; and an unstaffed branch office 
is located in Key West.  The West Palm Beach USAO office is approximately 70 miles from the 
Miami office.  The USAO is headed by the U.S. Attorney; the second-in-command is the First 
Assistant U.S. Attorney (FAUSA), who serves as principal advisor to the U.S. Attorney and 
supervises all components of the USAO, including the Criminal, Civil, and Appellate Divisions, 
each of which is headed by a Chief.  During the period relevant to this Report, the West Palm 
Beach office consisted of two criminal sections and was headed by a Managing AUSA.    
 
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is the principal federal law enforcement agency 
and is part of the Department.  It maintains field offices that work with U.S. Attorney’s Offices.  
The FBI field office in Miami, headed by a Special Agent in Charge, has satellite offices, known 
as Resident Agencies, one of which is...

I 
~ 
SOLIOTOR 
GENERAL 
SOL10T1 
GEN 
I l 
OFFICE OF TH£ 
SOLICITOR 
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OFFICE 
SOLICI 
GEN 
OFFICE OF 
JUSTICE 
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COMMUNITY 
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--
INFORMATION 
DMSION 
AND PRIVACY 
FOREIGN Cl.AIMS 
--
SETTl.EMENT 
TAX DIVISION 
COMMJSSION 
Off'ICEOf 
VIOLENCE 
AGAINST 
WOMEN 
--
CIVIL DIVISION 
EHVIRONMEHT 
--
AND NATlJRAL 
RfSOURCfi 
DIVISION 
COMMUNITY 
--
RELATIONS 
SERVICE 
U.S. Department of Justice 
2006- 2008 
Attorney 
General 
Deputy 
Attorney General 
OFFICE OF 
OFFICE OF 
LEGAL POLICY ..... 
PUBLIC 
AFFAIRS 
OFFICE OF 
OFFICE OF 
LEGISLATIVE --
LEGAL 
AFFAIRS 
COUNSEL 
Off'ICE OF INTl'R• 
GOVERNMENTAL 
AND PUBLIC 
UASON 
3 
R:DfRAL --
CRIMINAL 
IIUUAUOI' 
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DIVISION 
DRUG 
BUREAU OF 
tNFCRClMENT --
AOMlfflSTRATION 
PRISONS 
EXEQITlVE 
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UNITED STATl'S 
MARSHALS 
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ATTOIINEYS 
UNITED 
U.S.NATIONAL 
STATES --
CENTIIAL 
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FEDERAL 
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EXPLOSIVES 
TRUSTEE 
NATIONAL 
SECURITY --
DIVISION 
OFFICE OF THE 
INSPECTOR --
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DIVISION 
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O"IOEFOR --
IMIVIGRATION 
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O"ICEOf 
PRORSSIONAL 
RfSPONSlBIUTY 
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Ol'RCE 

 
4 
 
B. 
The State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies 
Florida state criminal prosecutions are primarily managed by an Office of State Attorney 
in each of the state’s 20 judicial circuits, headed by a State Attorney who is elected to a four-year 
term.  Palm Beach County constitutes the 15th Judicial Circuit.  Barry Krischer was the elected 
State Attorney for that circuit from 1992 until January 2009.  During the period relevant to this 
Report, the Palm Beach County State Attorney’s Office, based in the City of West Palm Beach, 
had more than 100 attorneys and several investigators, and a Crimes Against Children Unit headed 
by Assistant State Attorney Lanna Belohlavek.     
The incorporated Town of Palm Beach occupies the coastal barrier island off the city of 
West Palm Beach.  Its law enforcement agency is the Palm Beach Police Department (PBPD).  
Michael Reiter, who joined the PBPD in 1981, served as PBPD Chief from 2001 to February 2009. 
The Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Office (PBSO), based in the City of West Palm Beach, is 
the largest law enforcement agency in the county.  Through its Department of Corrections, the 
PBSO operates the Main Detention Center and, during the period relevant to this Report, housed 
minimum-security detainees, including those on work release, at its Stockade facility.  The current 
Sheriff has served continuously since January 2005. 
II. 
THE SUBJECT ATTORNEYS AND THEIR ROLES IN THE EPSTEIN CASE 
 
R. Alexander Acosta was appointed Interim U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of 
Florida in June 2005, at age 36.  In June 2006, President George W. Bush formally nominated 
Acosta, and after Senate confirmation, Acosta was sworn in as the U.S. Attorney in October 2006.   
After graduating from law school, Acosta served a federal appellate clerkship; an 18-month 
term as an associate at the firm of Kirkland & Ellis in Washington, D.C.; approximately four years 
as a policy fellow and law school lecturer; and nearly two years ...

 
5 
 
Kirkland & Ellis, which was representing Epstein, because Acosta had begun discussions with the 
firm about possible employment.    
After leaving the USAO in June 2009, Acosta became the Dean of the Florida International 
University College of Law.  In April 2017, Acosta became the U.S. Secretary of Labor, but he 
resigned from that post effective July 19, 2019, following public criticism of the USAO’s handling 
of the Epstein case.   
 
Jeffrey H. Sloman joined the USAO in 1990 as a line AUSA.  In 2001, he became Deputy 
Chief of the USAO’s Fort Lauderdale branch office Narcotics and Violent Crimes Section, and in 
2003, became the Managing AUSA for that branch office.  In early 2004, Sloman was appointed 
Chief of the USAO’s Criminal Division.  In October 2006, Sloman became the FAUSA, and 
Sloman’s office was located with Acosta’s in the Miami office’s executive suite.   
 
As FAUSA, Sloman was responsible for supervising the Civil, Criminal, and Appellate 
Divisions, and he was part of the supervisory team that oversaw the Epstein investigation.  
Although Sloman had relatively little involvement in the decisions and negotiations that led to the 
NPA and did not review it before it was signed, he personally negotiated an addendum to the NPA, 
which he signed on behalf of the USAO in October 2007.  After subordinates Matthew Menchel 
and Andrew Lourie left the USAO, Sloman directly engaged with the line AUSA, Marie Villafaña, 
on Epstein matters, and participated in meetings and other communications with defense counsel.  
After Acosta was formally recused from the Epstein matter in December 2008, Sloman became 
the senior USAO official supervising the matter.  When Acosta left the USAO, Sloman became 
the Acting U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Florida, and in January 2010, the Attorney 
General appointed Sloman to be the Interim U.S. Attorney for the district.  Sloman left the USAO 
to enter private practice in June 2010. 
 
Matthew I. Menchel...

 
6 
 
for the Department’s Criminal Division, a position in which he served as Chief of Staff to Assistant 
Attorney General Alice Fisher.  Lourie left the Department in February 2008 to enter private 
practice.  
 
Ann Marie C. Villafaña joined the USAO in September 2001 as a line AUSA.  She served 
in the Major Crimes Section in Miami until January 2004, when she transferred to the West Palm 
Beach branch office.  Villafaña handled the majority of the child exploitation cases in West Palm 
Beach, along with other criminal matters.  In 2006, she was designated as the USAO’s first 
coordinator for Project Safe Childhood, a new Department initiative focusing on child sexual 
exploitation and abuse.2   
In 2006, Villafaña assumed responsibility for the Epstein investigation.  As the line AUSA, 
Villafaña handled all aspects of the investigation.  Villafaña determined the lines of inquiry to 
pursue, identified the witnesses to be interviewed, conducted legal research to support possible 
charges, and sought guidance from others at the USAO and in the Department.  Villafaña, along 
with the FBI case agents and the FBI Victim Specialist, had direct contact with Epstein’s victims.  
She handled court proceedings related to the investigation.  She drafted a prosecution 
memorandum, indictment, and related documents, and revised those documents in response to 
comments from those in her supervisory chain of command.  Villafaña participated in meetings 
between members of the USAO and counsel for Epstein, and prepared briefing materials for 
management in preparation for those meetings and in response to issues raised during those 
meetings.  Although Acosta made the decision to utilize a non-prosecution agreement to resolve 
the federal investigation and approved the terms of the NPA, Villafaña was the primary USAO 
representative negotiating with defense counsel and drafting the language of the NPA, under her 
supervisors’ direction and guidance, and she signed the NPA o...

7
United States Attorney 
First Assistant 
United States Attorney 
Criminal Chief 
Managing Assistant 
United Stales Attorney 
West Palm Beach Office 
Assistant 
United States Attorney 
-
-
-
--
May 23, 2006 i"' 
USAO opens federal 
• 
'-)~i:t~·tt:ier~~: 
F1IIiia 
USAO Roles and Responsibilities in Epstein Investigation 
Mid-2006 through Mid-2009 
2007 
2008 
Alexander Acosta 
.Jeff Sloman 
Jeff Sloman 
Matthew I\Ienchel 
Sept 24, 2007 -
NPA is signed 
June 30, 2008 -
Epstein pleads guilty in 
state court 
mnm 
Jeff Sloman (Acting) 
July 22, 200? :-
Epsrein is released from 
• fncarceration 

 
8 
 
III. 
JEFFREY EPSTEIN AND HIS DEFENSE ATTORNEYS 
A. 
Jeffrey Epstein 
Jeffrey Epstein was born in Brooklyn, New York, in 1953.4  Although he did not graduate 
from college, he taught physics and mathematics to teens at an elite private school in Manhattan 
from 1974 until 1976.  Through connections made at the school, he was hired at the Wall Street 
firm of Bear Stearns, where he rose from junior assistant to a floor trader to become a limited 
partner before leaving in 1981.  An enigmatic individual whose source of wealth was never clear, 
Epstein reportedly provided wealth management and advisory services to a business entrepreneur 
through whom Epstein acquired a mansion in midtown Manhattan, where he resided.  In the early 
1990s, Epstein acquired a large residence in Palm Beach, Florida.  He also owned a private island 
in the U.S. Virgin Islands, a ranch in New Mexico, and a residence in Paris, France.  He traveled 
among his residences in a private Boeing 727 jet.   
Epstein reportedly was an investor, founder, or principal in myriad businesses and other 
entities, in numerous locations.  Although frequently referred to as a billionaire, the sources and 
extent of his wealth were never publicly established during his lifetime.5  He associated with 
prominent and wealthy individuals from business, political, academic, and social circles, and 
engaged in substantial philanthropy.  Epstein maintained a large corps of employees, including 
housekeeping staff and pilots, as well as numerous female personal assistants, several of whom 
traveled with him.    
B. 
Epstein’s Defense Attorneys 
Jeffrey Epstein employed numerous criminal defense attorneys in responding to the 
allegations that he had coerced girls into engaging in sexual activity with him at his Palm Beach, 
Florida estate.  As different law enforcement entities became involved in investigating the 
allegations, he added attorneys having particular relevant knowledge of, or connections with, tho...

 
9 
 
whose law firm website cites his “national reputation for the aggressive defense” of “high-profile 
defendants in criminal matters.”      
In late 2006, after the USAO opened its investigation, Epstein hired Miami criminal 
defense attorneys who were former AUSAs.  One, Guy Lewis, had also served as the U.S. 
Attorney for the Southern District of Florida and as Director of the Department’s Executive Office 
for United States Attorneys, the component charged with providing close liaison between the 
Department and the U.S. Attorneys.  Another, Lilly Ann Sanchez, had served in the USAO and 
as a Deputy Chief in the Major Crimes Section before leaving in 2005.  In August 2007, 
immediately after the USAO offered the terms that ultimately led to the NPA, two attorneys from 
the firm of Kirkland & Ellis, one of the largest law firms in the country, contacted the USAO on 
Epstein’s behalf:  Kenneth Starr, former federal judge and Solicitor General, who was serving as 
Dean of Pepperdine University School of Law while of counsel to the firm; and Jay Lefkowitz, a 
litigation partner who had served in high-level positions in the administrations of Presidents 
George H.W. Bush and George W. Bush.  They were joined by nationally prominent Boston 
criminal defense attorney Martin Weinberg.  After the NPA was signed, former U.S. Attorney 
Joe D. Whitley joined the defense team, as did the former Principal Deputy Chief of CEOS and 
another former U.S. Attorney, who was also a retired federal judge. 
 
 

 
10 
 
[Page Intentionally Left Blank] 
 

 
11 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
THE NON-PROSECUTION AGREEMENT  
PART ONE:  FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
 
I. 
OVERVIEW 
In the following sections in this chapter, the Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) 
details the significant events leading to, and during, the federal investigation of Epstein; the 
negotiation and signing of the NPA; and the defense’s subsequent nine-month effort to stop the 
NPA from taking effect.  OPR also describes more briefly the events occurring after Epstein pled 
guilty in state court, as the USAO sought to hold him to the terms of the agreement.  In describing 
events, OPR relies heavily on contemporaneous documents, particularly emails.  In many 
instances, the emails not only describe meetings and identify the participants, but also set forth the 
issues under discussion, the alternatives considered, and the basis for certain decisions.  When 
helpful to explain the actions taken by the subjects, OPR also includes the subjects’ explanations 
as provided in their written responses to, or interviews with, OPR, or explanations provided by 
witnesses. 
A timeline of key events is set forth on the following page. 
II. 
MARCH 2005 – MAY 2006:  EPSTEIN IS INVESTIGATED BY THE PALM 
BEACH POLICE DEPARTMENT AND THE PALM BEACH COUNTY STATE 
ATTORNEY’S OFFICE 
A. 
The Initial Allegations and the PBPD Investigation 
In March 2005, the parents of a 14-year-old girl reported to the PBPD that a man had paid 
their daughter $300 to give him a massage in his Palm Beach home.6  The PBPD began 
investigating Epstein, identified as the recipient of the massage, and two of his personal assistants, 
who were also implicated by the complainant.  The investigation soon expanded beyond the initial 
claim, to encompass allegations that during 2004 and 2005, Epstein, through his female assistants   
                                                 
6  
As previously noted, “girls” refers to females under the age of 18.  Epstein’s contacts with girls and young 
women previous...

12 
Timeline of Key Events for Federal Epstein Investigation - May 2006 through October 2008 
May~., - V1llafaiia opens 
federal mwsugat10n into 
Jeffrey Epstein 
■ 
July 14 - \'11lataiia 
first bnefing to 
Acosta and Sloman 
■■ 
2006 
Oct ~ - Sloman becomes 
First Assistant L:mted 
States Attorney: Menchcl 
becomes Crunmal Chief 
-
~ -
~ -. ~ -
~ -
June 26 - Sloman, Mencbel, 
Lourie, Villafaila, and FBI meet 
with Epstein's counsel 
July 26 - V11lafat1a learns from Menchel 
that Acosta decided to offer Epstein a 
two-year state-based resolution 
July 31 - Sloman, Menchel, Lourie, Villafada. 
and FBI agents meet with Epstein's counsel to 
propose two-year stale-based resoluuon 
Sept 7 - Acosta. Sloman, Villafaful 
[+others] meet with Epstein's counsel 
Sept 12 - Lourie, Villafana (+others) 
meet with Epstein's counsel and the 
State Attorney's Office to discuss 
state-based resolution 
Sept 24 - NPA is signed. Lourie 
leaves USAO for position in 
DOJ Crinunal Division 
Ott 
No,· 
Ott 
Jan 
Frb 
\tlr 
Apr 
Feb 25-29 - OOJ 
Crurunal O1vmon1CEOS 
begins review 
).fay 15 - Criminal Division letter 
to Epstein's counsel supporting 
federal Epstein prosecution 
May 19 - F.pstein ·s counsel sends 
letter lo Deputy Attorney General's 
Office requesting review 
June 23 - Deputy Attorney 
General's Otlice sends letter 
to Epstein's counsel 
dee I ining 10 intervene 
•••• 

 
13 
 
and some of the victims as well, regularly recruited local high-school-age girls to give him 
massages in his home that, in some cases, led to sexual activity.    
Through their interviews with victims, the police learned more about Epstein’s conduct.  
Some girls had only one encounter with Epstein, while others had many encounters with him.  The 
nature of the massages varied.  According to victims, some girls remained fully clothed while they 
massaged Epstein, some wore only their underwear, and some were fully nude.  Victims stated 
that during these massages, Epstein masturbated himself.  Some victims alleged that he touched 
them during the massage, usually fondling their breasts or touching their vaginas directly or 
through their clothing.  Some victims reported that Epstein used a vibrator to masturbate them, and 
some stated that he digitally penetrated them.  Some victims who stated that they saw him more 
often alleged that Epstein engaged in oral and vaginal sex with them.  According to one victim, an 
Epstein female assistant participated, on at least one occasion, in sexual activity with the victim at 
Epstein’s direction.7   
Although the allegations varied in the specific details, for the most part they were consistent 
in describing a general pattern of conduct by Epstein and several of his assistants.  According to 
the information provided to, and evidence gathered by, the PBPD, Epstein’s assistants scheduled 
up to three massage appointments each day, often contacting the girls to make an appointment 
while Epstein was en route to Palm Beach from one of his other residences.  Typically, when a girl 
arrived at Epstein’s home for a massage, she was taken upstairs to the master bedroom and 
bathroom area by one of Epstein’s assistants, who set up a massage table and massage oils.  When 
the assistant left the room, Epstein entered, wearing only a robe or a towel.  After removing his 
clothing, Epstein lay face down and nude on the massage...

 
14 
 
they found computer monitors and keyboards in the home, as well as disconnected surveillance 
cameras, but the computer equipment itself—including video recordings and other electronic 
storage media—were gone.  Nonetheless, the PBPD retrieved some evidence from Epstein’s home, 
including notepads on which Epstein’s assistants documented messages from many girls over a 
two-year span returning phone calls to confirm appointments.  The police also found numerous 
photographs of naked young females of indeterminate age.  Police photographs taken of the interior 
of Epstein’s home corroborated the victims’ descriptions to police of the layout of the home and 
master bedroom and bathroom area.  The police also found massage tables and oils, one victim’s 
high school transcript, and items the police believed to be sex toys.  
B. 
The State Attorney’s Office Decides to Present the Case to a State Grand Jury 
State Attorney Barry Krischer explained to OPR that the Epstein case was unusual in that 
police brought the case to his office without having made an arrest.  Krischer was unfamiliar with 
Epstein, and the case was assigned to the Crimes Against Children Unit.  PBPD Chief Michael 
Reiter stated in a 2009 civil deposition that when the PBPD initially brought the case to the State 
Attorney’s Office in 2005, Krischer was supportive of the investigation and told Reiter, “Let’s go 
for it,” because, given the nature of the allegations, Epstein was “somebody we have to stop.”  
Krischer told OPR, however, that both the detectives and the prosecutors came to recognize that 
“there were witness problems.”   
Assistant State Attorney and Crimes Against Children Unit Chief Lanna Belohlavek told 
OPR that she and an experienced Assistant State Attorney who initially worked with her on the 
case “were at a disagreement” with the PBPD “over what the state . . . could ethically charge.”  
According to Belohlavek, she did not believe the evidence the police presented would...

 
15 
 
told OPR that Epstein’s local counsel brought attorney Alan Dershowitz to see Krischer and the 
Assistant State Attorney, but Dershowitz was “overly aggressive” and threatened, “We’re going 
to destroy your witnesses; don’t go to court because we’re going to destroy those girls.”  According 
to Krischer, Dershowitz so “tainted the waters” that Epstein also hired local attorney Jack 
Goldberger, with whom Krischer had “a working relationship.”  Because the husband of the 
Assistant State Attorney was Goldberger’s law partner, Belohlavek recused the Assistant State 
Attorney to remove “even the appearance of any kind of conflict” of interest, and Belohlavek took 
over the case.  Goldberger, together with Gerald Lefcourt, a nationally known New York criminal 
defense attorney also representing Epstein, then directed their efforts at Belohlavek and Krischer 
to dissuade the office from prosecuting Epstein, largely by attacking the credibility of the victim 
witnesses.   
Meanwhile, the State Attorney’s Office took the unusual step of preparing to present the 
case to a grand jury.  Krischer told OPR that under state law as it existed until changed in 2016, 
his office prosecuted minors as young as 14 for prostitution.10  The possibility that Epstein’s 
victims themselves could have been prosecuted caused “great consternation within the office,” and 
according to Krischer, resulted in the decision to put the case before the grand jury.11  Belohlavek 
told OPR that her office took the allegations against Epstein “seriously, because . . . it was an 
organized scheme to involve young girls by offering them money. And I wouldn’t say that we . . . 
thought they were prostitutes . . . [but] I think there was solicitation.”  However, she said, although 
Epstein’s “behavior was reprehensible, . . . I’m limited by . . . the state statutes as to what I can 
charge.”  Krischer told OPR, “There were so many issues involving the victim-witnesses that to 
my mind, in consultat...

 
16 
 
other things, prohibit anyone from being present while grand jurors deliberate and vote, and 
proscribe the release of the notes, records, and transcripts of a grand jury.15             
D. 
PBPD Chief Reiter Becomes Concerned with the State Attorney’s Office’s 
Handling of the State Investigation and Seeks a Federal Investigation  
In 2006, PBPD Chief Reiter perceived that Krischer’s attitude had changed and, according 
to Reiter’s statements in his 2009 deposition, Krischer said that he did not believe the victims were 
credible.  Reiter was disturbed when Krischer suggested that the PBPD issue a notice for Epstein 
to appear in court on misdemeanor charges, leading Reiter to begin questioning Krischer’s 
objectivity and the State Attorney’s Office’s approach to the case.  As Reiter explained in his 
deposition: 
This was a case that I felt absolutely needed the attention of the State 
Attorney’s Office, that needed to be prosecuted in state court.  It’s 
not generally something that’s prosecuted in a federal court.  And I 
knew that it didn’t really matter what the facts were in this case, it 
was pretty clear to me that Mr. Krischer did not want to prosecute 
this case. 
 
On May 1, 2006, Reiter submitted to Krischer probable cause affidavits and a case filing 
package relating to Epstein, one of his personal assistants, and a young local woman whom Epstein 
first victimized and then used to recruit other girls.  In his transmittal letter, which was later made 
public, Reiter criticized Krischer, noting that he found the State Attorney’s Office’s “treatment of 
these cases [to be] highly unusual.”16  Reiter urged Krischer “to examine the unusual course that 
your office’s handling of this matter has taken” and to consider disqualifying himself from 
prosecuting Epstein.17   
III. 
THE FBI AND THE USAO INVESTIGATE EPSTEIN, AND THE DEFENSE 
TEAM ENGAGES WITH THE USAO 
A. 
May 2006 – February 2007:  The Federal Investigation Is Initiated, and the 
USAO Open...

 
17 
 
charge.  Villafaña suggested meeting with the PBPD, but the case agent explained that before 
formally presenting the case to the FBI, the PBPD wanted to see how the State Attorney’s Office 
decided to charge Epstein. 
1. 
The PBPD Presents the Matter to the FBI and the USAO 
 
In May 2006, the lead Detective handling the state’s investigation met with Villafaña and 
the FBI case agent to summarize for them the information learned during the state’s 
investigation.18  At the time, neither Villafaña nor the case agent had heard of Epstein or had any 
knowledge of his background.   
 
According to Villafaña, during this meeting, the Detective expressed concern that “pressure 
had been brought to bear on . . . Krischer by Epstein’s attorneys,” and he and Chief Reiter were 
concerned the state would charge Epstein with only a misdemeanor or not at all.19  The Detective 
explained that the defense had hired private investigators to trail Reiter and the Detective, had 
raised claims of various improprieties by the police, and, in the view of the PBPD, had orchestrated 
the removal of the Assistant State Attorney initially assigned to handle the matter, who was viewed 
as an aggressive prosecutor, by hiring a defense attorney whose relationship with the Assistant 
State Attorney created a conflict of interest for the prosecutor.  Further, given the missing computer 
equipment and surveillance camera videotapes, the Detective believed Epstein may have been 
“tipped off” in advance about the search warrant.   
 
During the meeting, Villafaña reviewed the U.S. Code to see what federal charges could 
be brought against Epstein.  She focused on 18 U.S.C. §§ 2422 (enticement of minors into 
prostitution or other illegal sexual activity and use of a facility of interstate or foreign commerce 
to persuade or induce a minor to engage in prostitution or other illegal sexual activity) and 2423 
(travel for purposes of engaging in illegal sexual conduct).  As they discussed th...

 
18 
 
2. 
May 2006:  The USAO Accepts the Case and Opens a Case File   
On May 23, 2006, Villafaña prepared the paperwork to open a USAO case file.  Villafaña 
told OPR that several aspects of the case implicated federal interests and potentially merited a 
federal prosecution:  (1) the victimization of minors through the use of facilities of interstate 
commerce (the telephone and airports); (2) the number of victims involved; (3) the possibility that 
Epstein had been producing or possessing child pornography (suggested by the removal of the 
computer equipment from his residence); and (4) the possibility that improper political pressure 
had affected the State Attorney Office’s handling of the case.  The investigation was named 
“Operation Leap Year” because the state investigation had identified approximately 29 girls as 
victims of Epstein’s conduct.20   
 
Villafaña told OPR that from the outset of the federal investigation, she understood that 
the case would require a great deal of time and effort given the number of potential victims and 
Epstein’s financial resources.  Nonetheless, Villafaña was willing to put in the effort and believed 
that the FBI was similarly committed to the case.  Villafaña discussed the case with her immediate 
supervisor, who also “thought it would be a good case” and approved it to be opened within the 
USAO’s file management system, and on May 23, 2006, it was formally initiated.   
3. 
July 14, 2006:  Villafaña Informs Acosta and Sloman about the Case 
Because Villafaña was not familiar with Epstein, she researched his background and 
learned that he “took a scorched earth approach” to litigation.  Villafaña was aware that Epstein 
had hired multiple lawyers to interact with the State Attorney’s Office in an effort to derail the 
state case, and she believed he would likely do the same in connection with any federal 
investigation.   
Therefore, Villafaña arranged to meet with U.S. Attorney Alexander Acosta and Jeffrey 
Sloma...

 
19 
 
Epstein massages that were sexual in nature, and that Epstein had used “various types of pressure” 
to avoid prosecution by the state, including hiring attorneys who had personal connections to the 
State Attorney.  Villafaña said that part of her goal in speaking to Acosta and Sloman at the outset 
of the federal investigation was to sensitize them to the tactics Epstein’s legal team would likely 
employ.  Villafaña explained, “When you have a case that you know people are going to be getting 
calls about . . . you just want to make sure that they know about it so they don’t get . . . a call from 
out of the blue.”  According to Villafaña, she told Acosta and Sloman that the FBI was willing to 
put the necessary resources into the case, and she was willing to put in the time, but she “didn’t 
want to get to the end and have [the] same situation occur” with a federal prosecution as had 
occurred with the state.  She told OPR, “I remember specifically saying to them that I expected 
the case would be time and resource-intensive and I did not want to invest the time and the FBI’s 
resources if the Office would just back down to pressure at the end.”  According to Villafaña, 
Acosta and Sloman promised that “if the evidence is there, we will prosecute the case.”  In a later 
email to Lourie and her immediate supervisor, Villafaña recounted that she spoke with Acosta and 
Sloman because she “knew that what has happened to the state prosecution can happen to a federal 
prosecution if the U.S. Attorney isn’t on board,” but Acosta and Sloman had given her “the green 
light” to go forward with the Epstein investigation.   
 
Both Acosta and Sloman told OPR that they did not recall the July 2006 meeting with 
Villafaña.  Each told OPR that at the time the federal investigation was initiated, he had not 
previously heard of Epstein.22   
Acosta told OPR that he understood from the outset that the case involved a wealthy man 
who was “doing sordid things” with girls, a...

 
20 
 
4. 
Late July 2006:  The State Indicts Epstein, and the USAO Moves 
Forward with a Federal Investigation 
Several days after Villafaña spoke with Acosta and Sloman, on July 19, 2006, Assistant 
State Attorney Belohlavek presented the case to the state grand jury.23  Krischer told OPR that 
“the whole thing” was put before the grand jury.  According to a statement made at the time by the 
State Attorney’s Office spokesman, the grand jury was presented with a list of charges from highest 
to lowest, without a recommendation by the prosecutor, and deliberated with the prosecutor out of 
the room.24  The state grand jury returned an indictment charging Epstein with one count of felony 
solicitation of prostitution, in violation of Florida Statute § 796.07, a felony under state law because 
it alleged three or more instances of solicitation.25  The indictment did not identify the person or 
persons solicited and made no mention of the fact that Epstein had solicited minors.26  On July 23, 
2006, Epstein self-surrendered to be arrested on the indictment, but was not detained, and the 
charges were made public.   
Villafaña told OPR that she decided to move forward with the federal investigation at that 
point because she believed the State Attorney’s Office would permit Epstein to enter a plea to a 
reduced misdemeanor charge and that once he entered a guilty plea, the Department’s Petite policy 
might preclude a federal prosecution.27  Villafaña told OPR that at the time, she “definitely 
believed that we were going to proceed to [a federal] indictment, assuming that . . . we had 
sufficient evidence.” 
                                                 
23  
Villafaña and the FBI obtained and examined records of the state grand jury proceeding, and Lourie reviewed 
them.  Because the grand jury records have not been ordered released publicly, OPR does not discuss their substance 
in this Report.   
24  
Larry Keller, “Police say lawyer tried to discredit teenage g...

 
21 
 
 
On July 24, 2006, Villafaña alerted Sloman, who informed Acosta, that the State Attorney’s 
Office had charged and arrested Epstein.28  On that same day, the FBI in West Palm Beach formally 
opened the case, assigning the case agent and, later, a co-case agent, to investigate it.  Villafaña 
told Sloman that the FBI agents “are getting copies of all of the evidence and we are going to 
review everything at [the] FBI on Wednesday,” and she noted that her target date for filing federal 
charges against Epstein was August 25, 2006.  Acosta emailed Sloman, asking whether it was 
“appropriate to approach [State Attorney Krischer] and give him a heads up re where we might 
go?”  Sloman replied, “No for fear that it will be leaked straight to Epstein.”29   
 
Although Lourie learned of the case at this point from Sloman, and eventually took a more 
active role in supervising the investigation, Villafaña continued to update Acosta and Sloman 
directly on the progress of the case.30  Villafaña’s immediate supervisor in West Palm Beach had 
little involvement in supervising the Epstein investigation, and at times, Villafaña directed her 
emails to Sloman, Menchel, and Lourie without copying her immediate supervisor.  In the 
immediate supervisor’s view, however, “Miami” purposefully assumed all the “authority” for the 
case, which the immediate supervisor regarded as “highly unusual.”31   
 
By late August 2006, Villafaña and the FBI had identified several additional victims and 
obtained “some flight manifests, telephone messages, and cell phone records that show the 
communication and travel in interstate commerce” by Epstein and his associates.  Villafaña 
reported to her supervisors that the State Attorney’s Office would not provide transcripts from the 
state grand jury voluntarily, and that she would be meeting with Chief Reiter “to convince him to 
relinquish the evidence to the FBI.”  Villafaña also told her supervisors that she expected “a 
number of fights...

 
22 
 
also informed Sloman and Lourie that the FBI was re-interviewing victims who had given taped 
statements to the PBPD, to ensure their stories “have not changed,” and that “[a]ny discrepancies 
will be noted and considered.”  She conceded that “[g]etting them to tell their stories in front of a 
jury at trial may be much harder,” but expressed confidence that the two key victims “will stay the 
course.”  She acknowledged that the case “needs to be rock solid.”   
The case agent told OPR that in this initial stage of the investigation, the FBI “partnered 
up very well” with the USAO.  She recalled that there was little higher-level management oversight 
either from the FBI or the USAO, and “we were allowed to do what we needed to do to get our 
job done.”  This included continuing to identify, locate, and interview victims and Epstein 
employees, and obtaining records relating to Epstein’s travel, communications, and financial 
transactions.  The case agent viewed the case as “strong.”   
5. 
October 2006 – February 2007:  Epstein’s Defense Counsel Initiate 
Contact with Villafaña, Lourie, and Sloman, and Press for a Meeting 
 
Just as Epstein had learned of the PBPD investigation at its early stage, he quickly became 
aware of the federal investigation, both because the FBI was interviewing his employees and 
because the government was seeking records from his businesses.  One of Epstein’s New York 
attorneys, Gerald Lefcourt, made initial contact with Villafaña in August 2006.  As the 
investigation progressed, Epstein took steps to persuade the USAO to decline federal 
prosecution.32  As with the state investigation, Epstein employed attorneys who had experience 
with the Department and relationships with individual USAO personnel.33  One of Epstein’s 
Miami lawyers, Guy Lewis, a former career AUSA and U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of 
Florida, made an overture on Epstein’s behalf in early November 2006.34  Lewis telephoned 
Villafaña, a call that...

 
23 
 
“‘anything’ she wanted” without the necessity of legal process.  Lewis asked to meet with Villafaña 
and Sloman to discuss the Epstein investigation, but Villafaña declined.   
 
Shortly thereafter, Lilly Ann Sanchez, a former AUSA, contacted Sloman and advised him 
that she also represented Epstein.  Sanchez was employed by the USAO from 2000 to September 
2005 and had been a Deputy Chief of the USAO’s Major Crimes section at the time Menchel was 
the Chief.  According to Sloman’s contemporaneous email recounting the conversation, when 
Sanchez indicated to him that his participation in Lewis’s call with Villafaña led the defense team 
to believe that the matter had been “elevated” within the USAO, Sloman tried to “disabuse” her of 
that notion.  Sanchez said that Epstein “wanted to be as transparent and cooperative as possible” 
in working with the USAO.  Despite the fact that Lewis had already made contact with the USAO 
on Epstein’s behalf, Sanchez sent a letter to Villafaña on November 15, 2006, in which she asserted 
that she and Gerald Lefcourt were representing Epstein and asked that the USAO direct all contact 
or communications about Epstein to them.  In response, Villafaña requested that the defense 
provide documents and information pertinent to the federal investigation, including the documents 
and information that Epstein had previously provided to the State Attorney’s Office, and 
“computers, hard drives, CPUs [computer processing units], and any other computer media” 
removed from Epstein’s home before the PBPD executed its search warrant in October 2005.  In 
January 2007, Sanchez contacted Villafaña to schedule a meeting, but Villafaña responded that 
she wanted to receive and review the documents before scheduling a meeting with Sanchez.   
 
Immediately after receiving Villafaña’s response, Sanchez bypassed Villafaña and phoned 
Lourie, with whom she had worked when she was an AUSA, to press for a meeting.  Lourie agreed 
to meet with Sa...

 
24 
 
disagreed with her position.  Villafaña and a West Palm Beach AUSA with whom she was 
consulting about the investigation, and who served for a time as her co-counsel, both recalled 
meeting with Lourie in his office to express their concerns about meeting with defense counsel.  
They perceived Lourie to be dismissive of their views.35  According to Villafaña, Lourie believed 
that a meeting with the defense attorneys would be the USAO’s chance to learn the defense’s legal 
theories and would position the USAO to arrange a debriefing of Epstein, through which the USAO 
might learn information helpful to a prosecution.  Villafaña told OPR, however, that while this 
strategy might make sense in a white-collar crime case, she did not believe it was appropriate or 
worthwhile in a child exploitation case, in which the perpetrator would be unlikely to confess to 
the conduct.  Villafaña also told OPR that she did not believe the USAO could extract information 
about the defense legal theories without telling the defense the precise crimes the USAO intended 
to charge, which Villafaña did not want to reveal.   
6. 
February 2007:  Defense Counsel Meet with Lourie and Villafaña and 
Present the Defense Objections to a Federal Case 
 
At the February 1, 2007 meeting with Lourie and Villafaña, Sanchez and Lefcourt set out 
arguments that would be repeated throughout the months-long defense campaign to stop the federal 
investigation.  In support of their arguments, the defense attorneys provided a 25-page letter, along 
with documents the defense had obtained from the state’s investigative file and potential 
impeachment material the defense had developed relating to the victims.    
In the letter and at the meeting, defense counsel argued that (1) the allegations did not 
provide a basis for the exercise of federal jurisdiction; (2) the evidence did not establish that 
Epstein knew girls who provided him with massages were minors; (3) no evidence existed proving 
tha...

 
25 
 
of the state’s victim interviews and partial transcripts provided by defense counsel.36  Villafaña 
also pursued other investigative steps, which included working with the FBI to locate an expert 
witness to testify about the effect of sexual abuse on victims.  She also continued collecting records 
relating to Epstein’s business entities, in part to help establish the interstate nexus of Epstein’s 
activity.  On several occasions, Villafaña sought guidance from CEOS, which had considerable 
national expertise in child exploitation cases, about legal issues relating to the case, such as 
whether charges she was considering required proof that the defendant knew a minor victim’s age.  
USAO procedures generally required that a proposed indictment be accompanied by a 
prosecution memorandum from the AUSA handling the case.  The prosecution memorandum was 
expected to explain the factual and legal bases for the proposed charges and address any significant 
procedural, factual, and legal issues of which the AUSA was aware; witness-related issues; 
expected defenses; and sentencing issues.  Routine prosecutions could be approved by lower-level 
supervisors, but in high-profile or complex cases, proposed indictments might require review and 
approval by the Criminal Division Chief, the FAUSA, or even the U.S. Attorney.  
Accordingly, Villafaña drafted an 82-page prosecution memorandum directed to Acosta, 
Sloman, Menchel (who had replaced Sloman as the USAO’s Criminal Division Chief the previous 
October, when Sloman became the FAUSA), Lourie, and her immediate supervisor, dated May 1, 
2007, supporting a proposed 60-count indictment that charged Epstein with various federal crimes 
relating to sexual conduct with and trafficking of minors.  The prosecution memorandum set forth 
legal issues and potential defenses relating to each proposed charge; explained why certain other 
statutes were rejected as proposed charges; described the evidence supporting each count ...

 
26 
 
forward with charges in this case.  Lourie forwarded a copy of the prosecution memorandum to 
Menchel.  Lourie’s transmittal message read: 
Marie did a 50 [sic] page pros memo in the Epstein case.  I am going 
to start reading it tonight. . . .  It’s a major case because the target is 
one of the richest men in the country and it has been big news.  He 
has a stable of attorneys, including Dershowitz, [Roy] Black, 
Lefcourt, Lewis, and Lily [sic] Sanchez.  Jeff Sloman is familiar 
with the investigation.  The state intentionally torpedoed it in the 
grand jury so it was brought to us.  I am going to forward the pros 
memo to you so you can start reading it at the same time I do.  The 
FBI is pushing to do it in Mid [sic] May, which I think is not critical, 
but we might as well get a jump on it.  I have some ideas about the 
indictment (needs to be ultra lean with only clean victims), so I am 
not sending that yet. 
Lourie explained to OPR that by “clean” victims, he meant those for whom the defense did not 
have impeachment evidence to use against them.   
A few days later, Lourie emailed Menchel, asking if Menchel had read the prosecution 
memorandum.  Lourie directed Menchel’s attention to particular pages of the prosecution 
memorandum, noting that the “keys” were whether the USAO could prove that Epstein traveled 
for the purpose of engaging in sexual acts, and the fact that some minor victims told Epstein they 
were 18.37  Lourie asked for Menchel’s “very general opinion as to whether this is a case you think 
the office should do,” and reminded Menchel that the State Attorney’s Office “went out of their 
way to get a no-bill on this . . . and thus only charged adult solicitation, which they would bargain 
away to nothing.”   
During his OPR interview, Menchel said that Lourie’s email transmitting the prosecution 
memorandum was his “official introduction” to the case and at that point in time, he had never 
heard of Epstein and had no information abou...

 
27 
 
recalled generally having conversations with Sloman and Menchel about the Epstein case, but he 
could not recall with specificity when those conversations took place or the details of the 
discussions.   
Sloman told OPR that because of his broad responsibilities as FAUSA, he left it to 
Menchel, as a highly experienced trial attorney and the Criminal Division Chief, to work directly 
with Acosta, and Sloman recalled that it was Menchel and Lourie who conducted a “granular 
review” of the charging package.  Acosta confirmed to OPR that Sloman and Menchel “were a 
team” who became involved in issues as needed, and if Sloman perceived that Menchel was taking 
the lead on the Epstein matter, Sloman may have deferred to Menchel.   
C. 
May – June 2007:  Miami Managers Consider the Prosecution Memorandum 
and Proposed Charges 
When she submitted the prosecution memorandum, Villafaña intended to file charges by 
May 15, 2007, and the FBI planned to arrest Epstein immediately thereafter. Villafaña, however, 
had not obtained authorization to indict on that schedule.  The managers in Miami wanted time to 
analyze the lengthy prosecution memorandum and consider the potential charges and charging 
strategy. Just a few days after he received the prosecution memorandum, and after learning that 
the FBI was planning a press conference for May 15, Sloman advised Villafaña that “[t]his Office 
has not approved the indictment.  Therefore, please do not commit us to anything at this time.”38    
 
On May 10, 2007, with Menchel’s concurrence, Lourie sent a copy of Villafaña’s 
prosecution memorandum to CEOS Chief Andrew Oosterbaan, who in turn sent it to his deputy 
and another CEOS attorney, asking them to assess the legal issues involved in the case and 
describing it as a “highly sensitive” case involving “a high profile, very rich defendant.”39  After 
CEOS reviewed the materials, Oosterbaan responded to Lourie with an email stating that the 
memorandum was “exhaustive” a...

 
28 
 
the FBI squad supervisor on May 9, 2007, to explain that charges against Epstein would not be 
quickly approved, he reported to Menchel that the FBI was “not happy” about the delay, adding, 
“I did not even tell them I think we should bring [Epstein] in, once we decide to charge him, and 
offer a pre-indictment deal, figuring a judge might never agree to such a deal post indictment.  That 
would have sent them thru the roof.”  Lourie explained to OPR that he thought a judge, after seeing 
an indictment charging the full nature and scope of Epstein’s conduct, might not agree to a plea 
involving substantially less time or to dismiss substantive charges.41   
Lourie told OPR that despite Oosterbaan’s favorable opinion of the case, “[t]his was . . . a 
bit of uncharted territory,” involving facts that were unlike the case law Oosterbaan had cited.  
Although Lourie had some concerns about the legal issues and about the witnesses, he “probably” 
did not see any impediment to going forward with the case; in fact, Lourie “was not in favor of 
walking away, which is what the defense wanted [the USAO] to do.”  But while Lourie “thought 
we could have won and we could have prevailed through appeal,” he “didn’t think the odds were 
nearly as good as you want in a criminal case, and . . . the things that we had to gain [through a 
plea agreement] were much more than [in] a normal criminal case,” in which the only cost of a 
loss would be that the defendant did not go to jail.  Lourie told OPR that to the best of his 
recollection, he thought a plea agreement would be a good result, and although the government 
might have to “give up some jail time,” there were other benefits to a plea, such as the ability to 
require Epstein to register as a sex offender and the availability of monetary damages for the 
victims.  Lourie recalled “thinking that this case should settle and we should set it up so we can 
settle it” by, for example, charging Epstein by complaint and then n...

 
29 
 
Lourie followed up his email to Villafaña with one to Menchel, in which Lourie reiterated 
the potential benefits of a pre-indictment plea, explaining that he and Villafaña believed “the best 
thing to do is charge Epstein by complaint, assuming we decide to charge him. . . .  The 
[sentencing] guidelines will be in the 20 year range, so we would need to plead him to one or two 
conspiracies to cap him and there is no telling if a judge would go for that once we indict.”43  
Menchel responded that he and Acosta would read the prosecution memorandum and “[w]e can 
discuss after that.”   
Later that afternoon, Villafaña sent Lourie an email, which Lourie forwarded to Menchel, 
explaining that a “conservative calculation” of Epstein’s potential sentencing exposure under the 
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines would be 168 to 210 months, and that in her view, the facts warranted 
an upward departure from that range.  Villafaña told OPR that although Lourie proposed some 
changes to the draft indictment, at that point no one had told her that the evidence was insufficient 
to support the proposed charges or that the office did not want to go forward with the case. 
 
In an email to Acosta and Menchel on May 11, 2007, Lourie recommended charging 
Epstein by complaint and seeking a pre-indictment plea: 
My current thoughts are that we should charge him.  Not sure that I 
agree with the charging strategy as it is now, but at this point I think 
we only need to get on the same page as to whether the statutes cover 
the conduct and whether the conduct is the type we should charge.  
I think the answer to both is yes, although there is some risk on some 
of the statutes as this is uncharted territory to some degree.  We can 
decide later what the [charging document] should look like precisely 
and which victims should be charged. 
I also think if we choose to go forward, we should start with a 
complaint, arrest him, detain him . . . and then try to see if he wants 
a pre-indi...

 
30 
 
he is comfortable before proceeding.”  Menchel told Villafaña he had “trouble understanding” why 
she was in a “rush” “given how long this case has been pending.”44    
OPR questioned Lourie, Menchel, Sloman, and Acosta about the timeline for reviewing 
the prosecution memorandum and the proposed charges.  Acosta and Menchel believed Villafaña’s 
timeline was unrealistic from the start.  Acosta told OPR that Villafaña was “very hard charging,” 
but her timeline for filing charges in the case was “really, really fast.”  Menchel described Villafaña 
as “out over her skis a little bit” and “ahead of” Acosta in terms of his analysis of the case.45  
Menchel said it was clear to him that Acosta “was going to be the one making the call” about 
whether to go forward with charges, and Acosta needed more time to make a decision.  Menchel 
told OPR, “This [was] not a case [we were] going to review in two weeks and make a decision 
on.”  Sloman told OPR that although he did not conduct a “granular review” of the proposed 
charges, he believed Menchel and Lourie had done so and “obviously” had concluded that “the 
facts and the law didn’t suggest that the right thing to do was to automatically indict.”  Lourie told 
OPR that he believed “the case was moving ahead.”   
Villafaña continued to seek direction from her managers.  On May 15, 2007, she emailed 
Sloman, noting that “[i]t seemed from our discussion yesterday that pestering Alex [Acosta] will 
not do any good.  Am I right about that?”  Sloman responded, “Yes.”  On May 21, 2007, three 
weeks after submitting the prosecution memorandum, Villafaña emailed Sloman and Menchel 
asking for “a sense of the direction where we are headed–i.e., approval of an indictment something 
like the current draft, a complaint to allow for pre-indictment negotiations, an indictment 
drastically different from the current draft?”  Sloman responded only, “Taken care of.”46  
D. 
Defense Counsel Seek a Meeting with Senior USAO Managers, ...

 
31 
 
we are contemplating so Dershowitz can tell us why they don’t apply.”47  Lourie told Menchel, “I 
don’t see the downside,” but added, “Marie is against it.”  Menchel responded that it was 
“premature” to provide the information.  During his OPR interview, Menchel could not specifically 
recall why he believed it was “premature” to provide the defense with the requested information, 
but speculated that it was too soon after the prosecution memorandum had been circulated for 
Acosta to have made a decision about how he wanted to proceed.  This recollection is consistent 
with the May 2007 emails reflecting that Acosta wanted time to consider the proposed prosecution.   
 
On May 22, 2007, defense counsel Lefcourt emailed Lourie a letter to “confirm” that 
Epstein’s attorneys would be given an opportunity to meet with Lourie before the USAO reached 
a final decision on charging Epstein.  Lourie forwarded the letter to Menchel and Sloman, but 
noted that Epstein’s defense team was “really ready for the next level,” rather than another meeting 
with him.  Lourie suggested that Menchel meet with defense counsel, adding, “Whether Alex 
would be present or grant them another meeting after that is his call.”  Lourie also emailed 
Lefcourt, clarifying that Lourie had not promised to call Epstein’s counsel before filing charges, 
and suggesting that Epstein’s counsel make their next presentation to Menchel.   
 
Although Lourie’s emails show that he had no objection to more senior USAO managers 
meeting with defense counsel, Villafaña opposed such a meeting.  Several emails indicate that 
Menchel traveled to West Palm Beach to meet with Lourie and Villafaña on the afternoon of 
May 23, 2007.48  On that same date, Villafaña drafted an email, which she planned to send to 
Sloman and Menchel, expressing her disagreement with meeting with defense counsel.  Although 
the email was written for Sloman and Menchel, Villafaña sent it as a draft only to her immediate 
superviso...

 
32 
 
opposition to these meetings, but we are simply looking at this case 
as a violent crime prosecution involving stiff penalties rather than as 
a white collar or public corruption case where the parties can 
amicably work out a light sentence.49 
With respect to the “policy reasons” that Lefcourt wants to discuss, 
those were already raised in his letter (which is part of the indictment 
package) and during his meeting with Andy and myself.  Those 
reasons are:  (1) he wants the Petit [sic] policy to trump our ability 
to prosecute Epstein, (2) this shouldn’t be a federal offense, and 
(3) the victims were willing participants so the crime shouldn’t be 
prosecuted at all.  Unless the Office thinks that any of those 
arguments will be persuasive, a meeting will not be beneficial to the 
prosecution, it will only benefit the defense.  With respect to 
Lefcourt’s promised legal analysis, that also has already been 
provided.  The only way to get additional analysis is to expose to the 
defense the other charges that we are considering.  In my opinion 
this would seriously undermine the prosecution. 
The defense is anxious to have a meeting in order to delay the 
investigation/prosecution, to find out more about our investigation, 
and to use political pressure to stop the investigation. 
I have no control over the Office’s decisions regarding whether to 
meet with the defense or to whom the facts and analysis of the case 
will be disclosed.  However, if you all do decide to go forward with 
these meetings in a way that is detrimental to the investigation, then 
I will have to ask to have the case reassigned to an AUSA who is in 
agreement with the handling of the case. 
After receiving this draft, the immediate supervisor cautioned Villafaña, “Let’s talk before 
this is sent, please.”50  Villafaña told OPR that the supervisor counseled Villafaña not to send the 
email to Sloman or Menchel because Villafaña could be viewed as insubordinate.  She also told 
Villaf...

 
33 
 
for meetings was to cause delay, but “the people in my office either couldn’t see that or didn’t 
want to see that,” perhaps because of “their lack of experience with these types of cases” or a 
misguided belief “that [Epstein’s] attorneys would not engage in this behavior.”  Villafaña told 
OPR that she “could not seem to get [her supervisors] to understand the seriousness of Epstein’s 
behavior and the fact that he was probably continuing to commit the behavior, and that there was 
a need to move with necessary speed.”  Nonetheless, Villafaña followed the guidance of her 
immediate supervisor and did not send the email.    
 
Like Lourie, Menchel told OPR that he believed meeting with defense counsel was good 
practice.  Menchel told OPR that he saw “no downside” to hearing the defense point of view.  
Defense counsel might make a persuasive point “that’s actually going to change our mind,” or 
alternatively, present arguments the defense would inevitably raise if the case went forward, and 
Menchel believed it would be to the USAO’s advantage to learn about such arguments in advance.  
Menchel also told OPR that he did not recall Villafaña ever articulating a concern that Epstein was 
continuing to offend, and in Menchel’s view, Epstein was “already under a microscope, at least in 
Florida,” and it would have been “the height of stupidity” for Epstein to continue to offend in those 
circumstances. 
E. 
June 2007:  Villafaña Supplements the Prosecution Memorandum  
 
While Villafaña’s supervisors were considering whether to go forward with the proposed 
charges, Villafaña took additional steps to support them.  On June 14, 2007, she supplemented the 
prosecution memorandum with an addendum addressing “credibility concerns” relating to one of 
the victims.  In the email transmitting the addendum to Lourie, Menchel, Sloman, and her 
immediate supervisor, Villafaña reported, “another Jane Doe has been identified and interviewed,” 
and the “different strategie...

 
34 
 
On that same day, Villafaña emailed Lourie, Menchel, Sloman, and her immediate supervisor 
complaining that she had received no reply to her query about making changes to the proposed 
indictment and asking again for feedback.  During his OPR interview, Lourie observed that 
Villafaña’s request for feedback reflected her desire to “charge this case sooner than . . . everybody 
else,” but Acosta was still considering what strategy to pursue.  Sloman told OPR that he did not 
know whether Villafaña received any response to her request, but he believed that at that point in 
time, Menchel and Lourie were evaluating the case to make a decision about how to proceed. 
 
The day before the June 26 meeting, defense counsel Lefcourt transmitted to the USAO a 
19-page letter intended to provide “an overview of our position and the materials we plan to present 
in order to demonstrate that none of the statutes identified by you can rightly be applied to the 
conduct at issue here.”  Reiterating their prior arguments and themes, defense counsel strongly 
contested the appropriateness of federal involvement in the matter.  Among other issues, Lefcourt’s 
letter argued: 
x Voluntary sexual activity involving “young adults–16 or 17 years of age”–was 
“strictly a state concern.” 
x Federal statutes were not meant to apply to circumstances in which the defendant 
reasonably believed that the person with whom he engaged in sexual activity was 
18 years of age. 
x One of the chief statutes the USAO had focused upon, 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b), was 
intended to address use of the internet to prey upon child victims through “internet 
trolling,” but Epstein did not use the internet to lure victims. 
x The “travel” statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b), prohibits travel “for the purpose of” 
engaging in illicit sexual conduct, but Epstein traveled to Florida to visit family, 
oversee his Florida-based flight operations, and “engage in the routine activities of 
daily living.” 
Lefcourt also argu...

 
35 
 
Lourie opined that the government could argue “that over time [Epstein] set up a network of illegal 
high school massage recruits that would be difficult to duplicate anywhere else,” which supported 
the conclusion that the massages must have been a motivating purpose of his travel, if not the sole 
purpose.  However, Lourie expressed concern about “getting to the jury” on this issue and noted 
that he had not found a legal case factually on point.  Villafaña told OPR that she disagreed with 
Lourie’s analysis of the purpose of travel issue and had discussed the matter with him.53  Villafaña 
also recalled that there were aspects of the defense submissions she and her colleagues considered 
“particularly weak.”    
On June 26, 2007, Sloman, Menchel, Lourie, Villafaña, the case agent, and the West Palm 
Beach squad supervisor met at the Miami USAO with Epstein attorneys Dershowitz, Black, 
Lefcourt, and Sanchez.  Dershowitz led the defense team’s presentation.  From the USAO 
perspective, the meeting was merely a “listening session.”54  Echoing the arguments made in 
Lefcourt’s letter, Dershowitz argued that the USAO should permit the state to handle the case 
because these were “traditionally state offenses.”  The case agent recalled being uncomfortable 
that the defense was asking questions in an attempt to gain information about the federal 
investigation, including the number of victims and the types of sexual contact that had been 
involved.   
 
Villafaña told OPR that when Epstein’s attorneys left the meeting, they appeared to be 
“under the impression that they had convinced us not to proceed.”  But Menchel told OPR, “[T]hey 
obviously did not persuade” the USAO because “we . . . didn’t drop the investigation.”  According 
to Villafaña, Lourie, and Menchel, during a short post-meeting discussion at which Lourie 
expressed concern about the purpose of travel issue and Menchel raised issues related to general 
credibility of the victims, the prevailing ...

 
36 
 
damages.55  During a two-month period, the subject attorneys were involved to varying degrees in 
converting the broad outline into specific terms, resulting in the NPA signed by Epstein on 
September 24, 2007.  The subjects, including Acosta, were generally able to explain to OPR both 
the larger goals and the case-related factors they likely considered during the process of 
conceptualizing, negotiating, and finalizing this resolution.  However, the contemporaneous emails 
and other records do not reflect all of the conversations among the decision makers, and their 
deliberative and decision-making process is therefore not entirely clear.  In particular, Menchel 
and Acosta had offices located near each other and likely spoke in person about the case, but 
neither had a clear memory of their conversations.  Therefore, OPR could not determine all of the 
facts surrounding the development of the two-year state plea resolution or the NPA.      
In the following account, OPR discusses the initial key decision to resolve the federal 
investigation through state, rather than federal, charges, and sets forth many of the numerous 
communications that reflect the negotiations between the parties that led to the final NPA.  OPR 
questioned each of the subjects about how the decision was reached to pursue a state resolution, 
and OPR includes below the subjects’ explanations.  The subjects’ memories of particular 
conversations about this topic were unclear, but from their statements to OPR, a general consensus 
emerged that there were overlapping concerns about the viability of the legal theories, the 
willingness of the victims to testify, the impact of a trial on the victims, the overall strength of the 
case that had been developed at that time, and the uncertainty about the USAO’s ability to prevail 
at trial and through appeal.  In addition, Acosta was concerned about usurping the state’s authority 
to prosecute a case involving an offense that was traditional...

 
37 
 
include concurrent time.”  The email primarily concerned other issues, and Villafaña did not 
explain what the resolution she had in mind would entail.57  Villafaña requested to be advised, 
“[i]f anyone has communicated anything to Epstein’s attorneys that is contrary to this.”  Villafaña, 
who was aware that Menchel and Lourie had been in direct contact with defense counsel about the 
case, explained to OPR that she made this request because “people were communicating with the 
defense attorneys,” and she suspected that those communications may have included discussions 
about a possible plea.   
 
In response to Villafaña’s email, Menchel notified Villafaña that he had told Sanchez “a 
state plea [with] jail time and sex offender status may satisfy the [U.S. Attorney],” but Sanchez 
had responded that it “was a non-starter for them.”58  During his OPR interview, Menchel had no 
independent recollection of his conversation with Sanchez and did not remember why the defense 
deemed the proposal a “non-starter.”  However, Menchel explained that he would not have made 
the proposal to Sanchez without Acosta’s knowledge.  He also pointed out that in numerous emails 
before the June 26, 2007 meeting, he repeatedly noted that Acosta was still deciding what he 
wanted to do with the Epstein case.  Acosta agreed, telling OPR that although he did not remember 
a specific conversation with Menchel concerning a state-based resolution, Menchel would not have 
discussed a potential resolution with Sanchez “without having discussed it with me.”   
1. 
Acosta’s Explanation for His Decision to Pursue a State-based 
Resolution 
 
Subsequent events showed that the decision to resolve the case through state charges was 
pivotal, and OPR extensively questioned Acosta about his reasoning.  In his OPR interview, Acosta 
explained the various factors that influenced his decision to pursue a state-based resolution.  Acosta 
said that although he, Sloman, and Menchel “believed the ...

 
38 
 
[The prosecution] was going forward on the part of the state, and so 
here is the big bad federal government stepping on a sovereign . . . 
state, saying you’re not doing enough, [when] to my mind . . . the 
whole idea of the [P]etite policy is to recognize that the []state . . . 
is an independent entity, and that we should presume that what 
they’re doing is correct, even if we don’t like the outcome, except 
in the most unusual of circumstances.   
Acosta told OPR that “absent USAO intervention,” the state’s prosecution of Epstein would have 
become final, and accordingly, it was “prudent” to employ Petite policy analysis.  As Acosta 
explained in a public statement he issued in 2011, “the federal responsibility” in this unique 
situation was merely to serve as a “backstop [to] state authorities to ensure that there [was] no 
miscarriage of justice.”60  Furthermore, Acosta saw a distinction between a case that originated as 
a federal investigation and one that had already been indicted by the state but was brought to the 
federal government because of a perception that the state charge was inadequate.  In the latter 
circumstance, Acosta viewed the USAO’s role only as preventing a “manifest injustice.”61  Acosta 
explained that “no jail time” would have been a manifest injustice.  But it was his understanding 
that if Epstein had pled guilty to state charges and received a two-year sentence to a registrable 
offense, “it would never have come to the office in the first place,” and therefore would not be 
viewed as a manifest injustice. 
Acosta also told OPR he was concerned that a federal prosecution in this case would result 
in unfavorable precedent, because the Epstein case straddled the line between “solicitation” or 
“prostitution,” which Acosta described as a traditional state concern, and “trafficking,” which was 
an emerging matter of federal interest.  Acosta contended that in 2006, “it would have been 
extremely unusual for any United States At...

 
39 
 
I do think it’s important to look back on this, and try to be in the 
shoes of the thought process in 2006 and ’07 when trafficking 
prosecutions were fairly new, when . . . more so than today, some 
jurors may have looked at this as prostitution, and . . . [a] judge’s 
tolerance for victim shaming may have . . . caused more hesitation 
on the part of victims . . . .63 
Finally, Acosta told OPR that a state-based resolution offered more flexibility in fashioning 
a sentence, because he believed prosecutors would have difficulty persuading a federal district 
court in the Southern District of Florida to approve a federal plea for a stipulated binding sentence 
that differed from the otherwise applicable federal sentencing guidelines range.64  
In summarizing his thinking at the time, Acosta told OPR, 
The way the matter came to the office was, the state wasn’t doing 
enough.  It didn’t provide for prison time. It didn’t provide for 
registration, and then you had the restitution issue.  There were legal 
issues . . . . There were witness issues.  And . . . we could go to trial 
. . . and we may or may not prevail.  Alternatively, we could look at 
a pre-indictment resolution, and at various points, the office went 
back and forth between a federal pre-indictment resolution, and a 
state pre-indictment resolution.  
Acosta told OPR that, in the end, “there was a preference for deferring to the state” because, in 
part, the facts of the Epstein case at the time appeared to constitute solicitation or prostitution 
rather than trafficking, and a federal prosecution would be “uncharted territory.”  Acosta explained 
that he did not view it as problematic to defer resolution of the case to the state, although as the 
Epstein case played out, the federal role became “more intrusive” than he had anticipated, because 
the defense tried to get the state to “circumvent and undermine” the outcome.   
                                                 
Attorney’s Office cou...

 
40 
 
 
Menchel could not recall who initially suggested a state plea, but noted to OPR that his 
own “emails . . . make clear that this course of action was ultimately decided by Alex Acosta.”  He 
referenced, among others, his May 14, 2007 email to Villafaña informing her that Acosta was 
deciding how he wanted to handle the case.  Menchel surmised that a state resolution accomplished 
two things that Acosta viewed as important:  first, it resolved any Petite policy concerns, and 
second, it afforded more flexibility in sentencing than a federal plea would have allowed.  Menchel 
told OPR that the state plea proposal did not reflect any minimization of Epstein’s conduct and 
that any state plea would have been to an offense that required sexual offender registration.  He 
told OPR, “I don’t think anybody sat around and said, you know, it’s not that big a deal.  That was 
not the reaction that I think anybody had from the federal side of this case.”  Rather, Menchel said, 
“The concern was if we charge him [as proposed], there’s going to be a trial.” 
2. 
July 2007:  Villafaña and Menchel Disagree about the Proposed State 
Resolution  
Villafaña told OPR that she was angry when she received Menchel’s July email explaining 
that he had proposed to Sanchez resolving the federal investigation through a state plea.  In 
Villafaña’s view, the proposed state resolution “didn’t make any sense” and “did not correspond” 
to Department policy requiring that a plea offer reflect “the most serious readily provable 
offense.”65  In her view, a plea to a state charge “obviously” would not satisfy this policy.  Villafaña 
also told OPR that in her view, the USAM required the USAO to confer with the investigative 
agency about plea negotiations, and Villafaña did not believe the FBI would be in favor of a state 
plea.  Villafaña also believed the CVRA required attorneys for the government to confer with 
victims before making a plea offer, but the victims had not been consulted ...

 
41 
 
 
In light of these concerns, Villafaña emailed Menchel, expressing her strong disagreement 
with the process: 
[I]t is inappropriate for you to enter into plea negotiations without 
consulting with me or the investigative agencies, and it is more 
inappropriate to make a plea offer that you know is completely 
unacceptable to the FBI, ICE [Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement], the victims, and me.  These plea negotiations violate 
the Ashcroft memo, the U.S. Attorney[s’] Manual, and all of the 
various iterations of the victims’ rights legislation.  Strategically, 
you have started the plea negotiations as though we are in a position 
of weakness, anxious to make the case go away, by telling the 
defense that we will demand no federal conviction.  We left the 
meeting on June 26th in a stronger position than when we entered, 
and your statement that a state resolution would satisfy us takes 
away that advantage.  If you make it seem like the U.S. Attorney 
doesn’t have faith in our investigation, Epstein has no incentive to 
make a deal.   
Second, your discussion makes it appear that my investigation is for 
“show” only and completely undermines my ability to deal with 
Epstein’s attorneys directly. . . . 
 
. . . . 
I would like to make a presentation to the U.S. Attorney, Jeff 
[Sloman], Andy [Lourie], and you with our side of the investigation 
and a revised indictment.  The presentation will address the points 
raised by Epstein’s counsel and will convince you all of the strength 
of the case. 
In the meantime, please direct all communications from Epstein’s 
counsel to me. 
 
Menchel told OPR he realized Villafaña was “very anxious” to file charges in the case.  
Villafaña had put a “tremendous” amount of effort into the investigation, and Menchel “was not 
unsympathetic at all to her desires” to pursue a federal case.  However, as Menchel told OPR, 
Villafaña’s supervisors, including Acosta, were “trying to be a little bit more dispassionate,” and 
...

 
42 
 
 
Menchel’s reply email began with a rebuke: 
Both the tone and substance of your email are totally inappropriate 
and, in combination with other matters in the past, it seriously calls 
your judgment into question. 
As you well know, the US Attorney has not even decided whether 
to go forward with a prosecution in this matter, thus you should have 
respected his position before engaging in plea negotiations. 
Along that same line, despite whatever contrary representations you 
made to the agents in this matter, it was made clear to you by the US 
Attorney and the First Assistant from the time when you were first 
authorized to investigate Mr. Epstein that the office had concerns 
about taking this case because of petit [sic] policy and a number of 
legal issues.  Despite being told these things, you prepared a pros 
memo and indictment that included a definitive date for indictment.  
It has come to my attention that you led the agents to believe that 
the indictment of this matter was a foregone conclusion and that our 
decision to put off that date and listen to the defense attorneys’ 
concerns is indicative of the office having second thoughts about 
indicting.  As you well knew, you were never given authorization 
by anyone to seek an indictment in this case.66   
In the email, Menchel went on to explain the circumstances of his conversation with 
Sanchez and respond to Villafaña’s complaints:   
Lilly Sanchez called me before, not after, the June 26th meeting.  It 
was an informal discussion and not in the nature of an official plea 
offer but rather a feeling out by both sides as to what it might take 
to resolve the matter.  As you are also well aware, the only reason 
why this office even agreed to look into the Epstein matter in the 
first instance was because of concerns that the State had not done an 
adequate job in vindicating the victims’ rights.  As you and the 
agents conceded, had Epstein been convicted of a felony that 
resulted in a jail ...

 
43 
 
on the defense team believes that the federal investigation in this 
matter has been for show. 
Nor are your arguments that I have violated the Ashcroft memo, the 
USAM or any other policy well taken.  As Chief of the Criminal 
Division, I am the person designated by the US Attorney to exercise 
appropriate discretion in deciding whether certain pleas are 
appropriate and consistent with the Ashcroft memo and the USAM 
– not you. 
As for your statement that my concerns about this case hurting 
Project Safe Childhood are unfounded, I made it clear to you that 
those concerns were voiced by the US Attorney.67  Whether or not 
you are correct, matters of policy are always within his purview and 
any decisions in that area ultimately rest with him. 
Finally, you may not dictate the dates and people you will meet with 
about this or any other case.  If the U.S. Attorney or the First 
Assistant desire to meet with you, they will let you know.  Nor will 
I direct Epstein’s lawyers to communicate only with you.  If you 
want to work major cases in the district you must understand and 
accept the fact that there is a chain of command – something you 
disregard with great regularity. 
Villafaña acknowledged to OPR that as Criminal Division Chief, Menchel had authority to 
deviate from the Ashcroft Memo requiring that guilty pleas be to the most serious readily provable 
offense.  She disagreed, however, with his representation about her initial meeting with Acosta 
and Sloman regarding the Epstein investigation, noting that Menchel had not been at that 
meeting.68  Villafaña told OPR that no one had communicated to her the “concerns” Menchel 
mentioned, and she had not been given an opportunity to respond to those concerns.69     
 
A week later, Villafaña replied to Menchel’s email, reiterating her concerns about the 
process and that filing charges against Epstein was not moving forward: 
Hi Matt -- My trial is over, so I now have [ ] time to focus back on 
this cas...

 
44 
 
e-mail that I would like to address, and I also would like to address 
where we are in the case. 
First, I wanted to address the comment about jumping the chain of 
command.  After that concern was brought to my attention several 
months ago, I have tried very hard to be cognizant of the chain of 
command. . . .  If there is a particular instance of violating the chain 
of command that you would like to discuss, I would be happy to 
discuss it with you. 
 
. . . . 
The statement that I have not respected Alex’s position regarding 
the prosecution of the case demonstrates why you hear the 
frustration in the tone of my e-mail.  For two and a half months I 
have been asking about what that position is.  I have asked for 
direction on whether to revise the indictment, whether there are 
other issues that Alex wants addressed prior to deciding, whether 
there is additional investigation that needs to be done, etc.  None of 
that direction has been forthcoming, so I am left with . . . victims, 
and agents all demanding to know why we aren’t presenting an 
indictment.  Perhaps that lack of direction is through no fault of 
yours, but I have been dealing with a black box, so I do not know to 
whom I should address my frustration.  My recollection of the 
original meeting with Alex and Jeff is quite different than your 
summary.  In that meeting, I summarized the case and the State 
Attorney’s Office’s handling of it.  I acknowledged that we needed 
to do work to collect the evidence establishing a federal nexus, and 
I noted the time and money that would be required for an 
investigation.  I said that I was willing to invest that time and the 
FBI was willing to invest the money, but I didn’t want to get to the 
end and then have the Office be intimidated by the high-powered 
lawyers.  I was assured that that would not happen.  Now I feel like 
there is a glass ceiling that prevents me from moving forward while 
evidence suggests that Epstein is continuing to engag...

 
45 
 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of Epstein’s criminal culpability.  
Lastly, I was not trying to “dictate” a meeting with the U.S. Attorney 
or anyone else.  I stated that I “would like” to schedule a meeting, 
asking to have the same courtesy that was extended to the defense 
attorneys extended to the FBI and an Assistant in the Office.  With 
respect to your questions regarding my judgment, I will simply say 
that disagreements about strategy and raising concerns about the 
forgotten voices of the victims in this case should not be classified 
as a lapse in judgment.  This Office should seek to foster spirited 
debate about the law and the use of prosecutorial discretion . . . . 
[M]y first and only concern in this case (and my other child 
exploitation cases) is the victims.  If our personality differences 
threaten their access to justice, then please put someone on the case 
whom you trust more, and who will also protect their rights. 
In the meantime, I will be meeting with the agents on Monday to 
begin preparing a revised indictment package containing your 
suggestions on the indictment and responding to the issues raised by 
Epstein’s attorneys. . . .  If there are any specific issues that you or 
the U.S. Attorney would like to see addressed, please let me know.70 
 
Villafaña did not get the meeting with Acosta that she requested.  She viewed Menchel’s 
message as a rejection of her request to make a presentation to Acosta, and she told OPR that even 
though she regarded Sloman as a friend, she did not feel she could reach out even to him to raise 
her concerns.71  Menchel, however, told OPR that he did not “order” Villafaña to refrain from 
raising her concerns with Acosta, Sloman, or Lourie, and he did not believe his email to Villafaña 
foreclosed her from meeting with Acosta.  Rather, “the context of this exchange is, she is running 
roughshod over the U.S. Attorney, and what I am saying to her is, there is a process.  You’re not 
in charge of...

 
46 
 
Early in the federal investigation, Villafaña recognized the potential significance of 
obtaining the missing computer equipment.  Villafaña told OPR that she and the FBI agents went 
through every photograph found in Epstein’s house, but found none that could be characterized as 
child pornography.  Nevertheless, Villafaña told OPR that investigators had learned that Epstein 
used hidden cameras in his New York residence to record his sexual encounters, and she believed 
he could have engaged in similar conduct in his Palm Beach home.  In addition, the computer 
equipment potentially contained surveillance video that might have corroborated victim statements 
about visiting Epstein’s home.  More generally, in Villafaña’s experience, individuals involved in 
child exploitation often possessed child pornography.72  Villafaña’s co-counsel, who had 
substantial experience prosecuting child pornography cases, similarly told OPR, “Epstein was a 
billionaire.  We knew his house was wired with video, it would be unusual [for] someone with his 
capabilities not to be video recording” his encounters.   
As the investigation continued, Villafaña took various steps to acquire the computer 
equipment removed from Epstein’s Palm Beach residence.  As noted previously in this Report, in 
her initial request to Epstein’s counsel for documents, she asked defense counsel to provide “[t]he 
computers, hard drives, CPUs, and any other computer media (including CD-ROMs, DVDs, 
floppy disks, flash drives, etc.) removed from” the residence.  Although Lourie subsequently 
narrowed the government’s request for documents, the request for computer equipment remained.  
The defense, however, failed to comply with the request.   
 
Villafaña learned that the computer equipment was in the possession of a particular 
individual.  After consulting the Department’s Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section 
and Office of Enforcement Operations about the appropriate legal steps to obt...

 
47 
 
equipment.74  After further communications on this issue involving Black, Sanchez, Villafaña, and 
Lourie, Black took legal action that effectively halted production of the computer equipment to the 
USAO until the issue could be decided by the court—which, as explained below, never happened 
because the parties entered into the NPA. 
C. 
July 2007:  The Defense Continues Its Efforts to Stop the Federal Investigation 
In addition to their efforts to stop the government from obtaining the computer equipment, 
defense counsel also sent letters to the USAO, dated July 6, 2007, and July 25, 2007, reiterating 
their objections to a federal investigation of Epstein.  The July 25, 2007 letter included a lengthy 
“case analysis chart” purporting to support the defense argument that Epstein had committed no 
federal offense.  The July 25 letter also noted that the defense had been consulting with the former 
Principal Deputy Chief of CEOS, reporting that she “supports our position without reservation that 
this is not a matter upon which the federal statu[t]es should be brought to bear.”75   
While the defense was reiterating its objections to the federal investigation, CEOS 
expressed its endorsement of Villafaña’s legal analysis and proposed charges.  On July 18, 2007, 
CEOS Chief Oosterbaan emailed Sloman, Menchel, and Lourie, stating that he had read 
Villafaña’s prosecution memorandum “closely,” and noting that “[s]he did a terrific job.  As we 
opined to Andy [Lourie] back in May, [CEOS] agree[s] with her legal analysis.  Her charging 
decisions are legally sound.”  Oosterbaan observed: 
I have also reviewed the arguments contained in the letters from 
defense counsel.  Their legal analysis is detailed and comprehensive, 
but I find none of their arguments persuasive.  That is not to say that 
all the arguments are completely devoid of merit.  I expect the judge 
to consider some of the arguments closely.  Nevertheless, while the 
law applicable here is not alw...

 
48 
 
D. 
Acosta Decides on a Resolution That Includes a Two-Year Term of 
Incarceration 
 
The next critical step in the development of the NPA was the decision to propose a two-
year term of imprisonment.  Although presented to the defense as the “minimum” the USAO would 
accept, in actuality the two-year proposal became only the starting point for the negotiations, with 
the result that the defense continued to chip away at it as the negotiations continued.  The 
contemporaneous emails make no mention of any rationale for the decision to propose two years 
as the government’s beginning negotiating position, and nobody with whom OPR spoke was able 
to recall how the decision was made.  As discussed below, Acosta did offer OPR an explanation, 
but OPR was unable to find contemporaneous evidence supporting it.76      
 
While the defense was communicating its objections to the federal investigation to 
Villafaña, Lourie, Menchel, and Sloman, Villafaña continued moving toward filing charges.  On 
July 19, 2007, the day after receiving Oosterbaan’s email supporting a potential prosecution, 
Villafaña emailed Lourie and Menchel seeking approval to take further investigative steps 
regarding three of Epstein’s assistants.  However, Menchel directed Villafaña to “hold off . . . until 
we decide what course of action we are going to take on [E]pstein which should happen next 
week.”  Menchel told OPR that he did not specifically recall why he asked Villafaña to wait, but 
he assumed it was because Acosta was deciding what course of action to take on the case.   
 
On Monday, July 23, 2007, Menchel submitted a resignation notice to Acosta, stating that 
he would be leaving the USAO effective August 6, 2007.77   
1. 
The July 26, 2007 Meeting in Miami 
Early on the morning of Thursday, July 26, 2007, Villafaña informed Menchel that she was 
preparing a new draft indictment containing revisions he had suggested, including removal of all 
but three of the “travel counts” an...

 
49 
 
Villafaña, Menchel left the meeting after almost no discussion, leaving Villafaña “shocked and 
stunned.”   
Menchel told OPR that he did not recall the July 26, 2007 meeting.  Nonetheless, he 
strongly disputed Villafaña’s description of events, asserting that it would have been “directly at 
odds with his management style” to convene such a meeting, announce Acosta’s decision, and 
leave without discussion.  Acosta told OPR that he had “decided and endorsed this resolution at 
some point,” but he did not recall being aware that Menchel was going to announce the decision 
at the July 26 meeting; in addition, although Acosta did not recall the circumstances of Menchel’s 
relaying of that decision, he said it “would have been consistent with” his decision for Menchel to 
do so.  Neither Sloman nor Lourie recalled the meeting.  The FBI case agent recalled attending a 
meeting at the USAO in Miami with her co-case agent and supervisors, together with Villafaña, 
Lourie (by telephone), Menchel, and Sloman, at which they discussed how to proceed with the 
Epstein case.  According to the case agent, at this meeting the FBI insisted that Epstein be 
registered for life as a sexual offender, and the co-case agent advocated for waiting until the court 
had ruled on the USAO’s ability to obtain Epstein’s computer equipment.   
Regardless of exactly how Acosta’s decision regarding the two-year term was 
communicated to Villafaña and the FBI agents, and regardless of who initially proposed the 
specific term, the record shows that Acosta ultimately made the decision to offer Epstein a 
resolution that included a two-year term of imprisonment, as he acknowledged.78   
2. 
The Subjects’ Explanations for the Decision to Offer Epstein a Sentence 
with a Two-Year Term of Incarceration 
Villafaña asserted that she was not consulted about the specific two-year term before the 
decision was made.79  Villafaña told OPR that she had worked hard to develop a strong case, and 
none...

 
50 
 
Sloman also told OPR that he did not know how the decision to offer a two-year plea offer 
was reached, but he believed that Acosta made the decision based on recommendations from 
Menchel, Lourie, and Villafaña.  He opined to OPR that the decision was likely based on an 
assessment by Menchel and Lourie of the litigation risks presented by the case.81  Sloman added 
that he did not know how a two-year sentence might have related to specific charges or to either 
state or federal sentencing guidelines.  Lourie likewise told OPR he did not recall how the two-year 
term was decided upon, or by whom, but he speculated that it may have been presented by the 
defense as the most Epstein would accept, and that the decision would have been reached by 
Acosta following “extended consideration, research, and discussion,” among Acosta, Sloman, 
Menchel, Lourie, and Villafaña.82 
 
Menchel told OPR that he did not recall discussing a two-year plea deal with Acosta or 
who reached the decision that two years was an appropriate sentence.  Menchel also told OPR, 
however, that he recalled believing that if the USAO had filed the contemplated federal charges, 
Epstein would have felt he had “nothing to lose” and “undoubtedly” would have chosen to take 
the case to trial.  Menchel recalled believing there was a real risk that the USAO might lose at trial, 
and in so doing, might cause more trauma to the victims, particularly those who were reluctant to 
testify.  Menchel told OPR that he did not believe that anyone at the time looked at two years “as 
a fair result in terms of the conduct.  I think that was not the issue.  The issue was whether or not 
if we took this case to trial, would we risk losing everything,” and “if we . . . felt we could have 
gotten more time, we would have, without having to press it to the trial.” 
 
Acosta told OPR that “I had decided and endorsed” the two-year resolution “at some 
point,” and that it resulted from “back and forth” discussion “...

 
51 
 
understood that the PBPD would not have asked the FBI to investigate Epstein if the state had 
pursued the appropriate charges.  In other words, in Acosta’s view, “[T]his was, rightly or wrongly, 
an analysis that distinguished between what is necessary to prevent manifest injustice, versus what 
is the appropriate federal outcome to that.”  Acosta told OPR that he believed he had discussed his 
concerns about the case with Lourie, Sloman, or Menchel, although he could not recall any specific 
conversation with them. 
E. 
Villafaña Drafts a “Term Sheet” Listing the Requirements of a Potential 
Agreement with the Defense 
A meeting with defense counsel was scheduled for Tuesday, July 31, 2007.  Villafaña told 
OPR that between July 26 and July 30, 2007, she had “some sort of discussion” with her 
supervisors that resulted in her creation of a “term sheet” identifying the proposed terms for 
resolving the federal investigation through state charges.  Sometime during that period, Villafaña 
left a voicemail message for Menchel.  During their OPR interviews, neither Villafaña nor 
Menchel could recall what Villafaña said in that message.  On July 30, 2007, Menchel emailed 
Villafaña: 
I received your voicemail this morning.  I don’t see any reason to 
change our approach.  I think telling them that unless the state 
resolves this in a way that appropriately vindicates our interests and 
the interests of the victims, we will seek [federal charges] conveys 
that we are serious.  While Lilly [Sanchez] has represented in the 
past that this would likely not happen, I never conveyed it in quite 
these terms before.  In any event, this is the course of action that the 
US Attorney feels comfortable taking at this juncture.   
The following day, July 31, 2007, Villafaña emailed a one-page “Terms of Epstein 
Non-Prosecution Agreement” to Sloman, Menchel, and Lourie.  Villafaña told OPR she had never 
before seen or heard of a non-prosecution agreement and that it was a ...

 
52 
 
as a “non-prosecution agreement” came from Acosta, although Menchel may have communicated 
that terminology to her.  According to Villafaña, she asked that it include a mechanism for the 
victims to be provided monetary compensation through 18 U.S.C. § 2255 in lieu of the restitution 
that would have been available if Epstein were pleading guilty to federal charges.86  Acosta told 
OPR that he “developed and approved” the term sheet.”   
Before the document was presented to defense counsel, two terms were dropped from 
Villafaña’s draft—one providing that the agreement would apply only to already-identified 
victims, and another requiring the deal to be accepted, and Epstein to plead guilty, within the 
month.  The final term sheet was as follows: 
                                                 
to plea agreements, which involve the formal conviction of a corporation in a 
court proceeding.   
Memorandum from Acting Deputy Attorney General Craig S. Morford to Heads of Departmental Components and 
United States Attorneys at n.2 (Mar. 7, 2008), available at https://www.justice.gov/archives/jm/criminal-resource-
manual-163-selection-and-use-monitors.  Villafaña did not have significant experience prosecuting corporate entities.  
86  
A civil remedy for personal injuries suffered by victims of certain crimes is provided for in the federal 
criminal code at 18 U.S.C. § 2255.  Subsection (a) of the statute, as in effect from July 27, 2006, to  
March 6, 2013, provided as follows:  
Any person who, while a minor, was a victim of a violation of section 
2241(c), 2242, 2243, 2251, 2251A, 2252, 2252A, 2260, 2421, 2422, or 2423 of 
this title and who suffers personal injury as a result of such violation, regardless 
of whether the injury occurred while such person was a minor, may sue in any 
appropriate United States District Court and shall recover the actual damages such 
person sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee.  Any 
perso...

53
V.
THE USAO PRESENTS EPSTEIN WITH KEY TERMS OF A DEAL:
PLEAD 
GUILTY TO STATE CHARGES REQUIRING A TWO-YEAR TERM OF 
INCARCERATION AND SEXUAL OFFENDER REGISTRATION, AND AGREE 
TO A MEANS FOR THE VICTIMS TO OBTAIN MONETARY DAMAGES
Although the USAO term sheet was presented to Epstein’s defense team on July 31, 2007, 
it took almost another two months to reach a final agreement in the form of the NPA.  The 
contemporaneous emails show that over the course of those two months, defense counsel offered 
multiple counter-proposals to the USAO’s stated terms, and alternated between working out the 
state plea disposition and seeking an alternative federal plea arrangement.  The emails make clear 
that as the negotiations intensified in September 2007, the prosecutors became increasingly 
frustrated, particularly with what they perceived as the defense tactic of agreeing to terms and 
provisions but then backtracking or altering the agreed-upon terms in subsequent communications.  
It is apparent that the defense persistence achieved some measure of success, at least concerning 
CONFIDENTIAL PLEA NEGOTIATIONS 
TERMS OF EPSTEIN NON-PROSECUTION AGREEMENT 
■ 
Epstein pleads guilty (not nolo contendere) to an Infonnation filed by the 
Palm Beach County State Attorney's Office charging him with: 
(a) 
lewd and lascivious batte1y on a child, in violation of Fl. Stat. 
800.04(4); 
(b) 
solicitation of minors to engage in prostitution, in violation of Fl. 
Stat. 796.03; and 
(c) 
engaging in sexual activity with minors at least sixteen years of age, 
in violation of Fl. Stat. 794.05. 
■ 
Epstein and the State Attorney's Office make a joint, binding 
recommendation that Epstein serve at least two years in prison. without any 
opportunity for withholding adjudication or sentencing; and without 
probation or community control in lieu of imprisonment. 
■ 
Epstein agrees to waive all challenges to the information filed by the State 
and the right to appeal. 
■ 
Epstein agrees that. if...

 
54 
 
the period of imprisonment, because the USAO failed to hold firm to its proposal of “at least two 
years in prison.”  The USAO did, however, consistently reject defense proposals to change other 
terms, particularly the requirement that Epstein register as a sexual offender.     
A. 
July 31, 2007:  The USAO Presents Its Proposal to the Defense Team, which 
Makes a Counteroffer 
Menchel, Sloman, Lourie, Villafaña, and the case agents met with Epstein attorneys 
Lefcourt, Sanchez, and Black on July 31, 2007, with Menchel “leading the meeting” for the 
USAO.87   The USAO presented the term sheet, and Villafaña distributed a federal sentencing 
guidelines calculation showing that if prosecuted federally, Epstein faced a sentencing range of 
188 to 235 months’ incarceration.    
Villafaña recalled that during the meeting, Epstein’s attorneys opposed the requirement of 
sexual offender registration, argued that Epstein would not be safe in prison, suggested that Epstein 
serve a sentence of home confinement or “community control”88 in lieu of incarceration, and 
emphasized that a state resolution provided greater sentencing flexibility.89  Villafaña told OPR 
that when Epstein’s attorneys expressed concern during the meeting about Epstein’s security in a 
state prison and argued for a home confinement sentence, Menchel suggested Epstein plead to a 
federal charge so that he could serve his time in a federal facility.  A few days after the meeting, 
Villafaña emailed Menchel, stating that she had “figured out a way to do a federal plea with a 2-1/2 
year cap.”   
Although Acosta had authorized a plea to state charges, emails and other correspondence 
show that during the negotiations, the parties also considered structuring a plea around federal 
                                                 
87  
Villafaña was the only witness with whom OPR spoke who had a substantive memory of this meeting. 
88  
According to the Florida Department of Corrections fact sheet f...

 
55 
 
charges in addition to state charges.  On behalf of the defense team, Sanchez followed up on the 
July 31, 2007 meeting with an August 2, 2007 letter to Menchel:  
We welcomed your recognition that a state prison sentence is neither 
appropriate for, nor acceptable to, Mr. Epstein, as the dangers of the 
state prison system pose risks that are clearly untenable.  We 
acknowledge that your suggestion of a plea to two federal 
misdemeanors was an attempt to resolve this dilemma.  Our 
proposal is significantly punitive, and if implemented, would, we 
believe, leave little doubt that the federal interest was demonstrably 
vindicated.90 
Sanchez added, “We must keep in mind that Jeffrey Epstein is a 54-year-old man who has never 
been arrested before.  He has lived an otherwise exemplary life.”   
The “significantly punitive” proposal described in the defense letter involved no period of 
mandatory incarceration.  Instead, Sanchez suggested two years of home confinement, with regular 
reporting to and visits from a community control officer; payment of restitution, damages, court 
and probationary costs, and law enforcement costs; random drug testing; community service; 
psychological counseling; and a prohibition on unsupervised contact with the victims.  The letter 
specifically referred to the victim damages-recovery procedure that the government had proposed 
under 18 U.S.C. § 2255 and represented that Epstein was “prepared to fully fund the identified 
group of victims which are the focus of the [USAO] – that is, the 12 individuals noted at the 
meeting on July 31, 2007.”  Under the defense proposal, the state would incarcerate Epstein only 
if he failed to comply with the terms of supervised custody.  Sanchez also advised that the defense 
team was seeking a meeting with Acosta. 
B. 
In an August 3, 2007 Letter, the USAO States That a Two-Year Term of 
Imprisonment Is the Minimum That Will Vindicate the Federal Interest 
 
Villafaña told OPR that she and h...

 
56 
 
 
Menchel made several substantive changes to Villafaña’s draft letter.  He specified that “a 
two-year term of state imprisonment” was the minimum sentence that would satisfy the federal 
interest in the case.  (Emphasis added.)  With regard to the option of a federal plea, Menchel wrote 
that the USAO “would be willing to explore a federal conviction” and retained the reference to a 
Rule 11(c) plea.  Menchel also removed the reference to the specific state offenses to which Epstein 
would be required to plead guilty.  Menchel forwarded the redraft to Acosta, suggesting that they 
speak about it the next morning, as well as to Sloman, Lourie, and Villafaña. 
 
The final letter, as shown on the following pages, was identical to Menchel’s redraft, except 
that it omitted all reference to a federal plea under Rule 11(c).91 
 
 
                                                 
91  
Menchel told OPR that he did not disfavor Rule 11(c) pleas but knew that the USAO believed the judges 
were generally averse to them.  He did not recall why the provision was dropped from the letter, but “assumed” it was 
a decision by Acosta.  In a September 6, 2007 email, Villafaña told Sloman that she and Menchel had discussed a 
Rule 11(c) plea, but she opined that Menchel “must have asked Alex about it and it was nixed.”  Villafaña told OPR 
that Lourie, too, had told her Acosta did not want to do a Rule 11(c) plea.      

57
R. ALEXANDE/f A'COSTA 
UNITED STATP..'i A ITORNf-:Y 
Re: 
Jeffrey Epstein 
Dear Lilly: 
U.S. Department of Justice 
United Stares Allorney 
Southern District of Florida 
99 N.£ -I Sktti 
Mia..i. FLJJIJ1 
(JOJ) 96/.9/00. TtkpltOM 
(JOJ) SJl-6'" . FoaUlllk 
August 3, 2007 
Than.le you for your letter of August 2'' regarding your proposal on how to resolve the 
Epstein matter. 
As we explained at our meeting on July 31, 2007, the Office believes thatthe federal 
interest will not be vindicated in the absence of a two-year term of state imprisonment for 
Mr. Epstein. That offer was not meant as a starting point for negotiations, it is th.e minimum 
term of imprisonment that will obviate the need for federal prosecution. The Office has 
never agreed that a state prison sentence is not appropriate for Mr. Epstein. Rather we 
simply stated that if Mr. Epstein preferred to serve his sentence in a federal pcnctcntiary, we 
would be w:illing to explore a federal conviction that may allow that in lieu of any state 
resolution. Further, as I made clear in our follow up telephone conversation after the 
meeting, a plea to two federal misdemeanors was never extended or meant as an offer. 
We also would reiterate that the agreement to Section 2255 liability applies to all of 
the minor girls identified during the federal investigation, not just the 12 that form the basis 
of an initial p lanned charging instrument 
As you know, the ability to engage in flexible plea negotiations is drnmatically 
changed upon the return of an indictment. Once an indictment is returned, the Office does 
ttot intend to file a Superseding Information containing a lesser charge or to dismiss the case 
in favor of state prosecution. 

58
Menchel told OPR that in his view, the two-year sentence established a “floor” for 
negotiations and if Epstein rejected the offer, subsequent offers would require him to accept more 
jail time rather than less.  Menchel told OPR that the USAO was “leaving our options open” by 
retaining the option of a federal plea because he thought the defense was “trying . . . to get him 
into a federal penitentiary.”  The letter’s deadline of August 17, 2007, for acceptance of the 
government’s offer was intended to accommodate Villafaña’s request that the deadline provide 
her with enough time to go to New York, pursue investigative steps involving two of Epstein’s 
assistants, do witness interviews, and take additional legal steps to obtain Epstein’s computers if 
Epstein rejected the deal.  Menchel told OPR he considered August 17 to be a firm deadline:  “[I]f 
you tell someone they have two weeks, it should be two weeks.”  Menchel signed and sent the 
letter on Friday, August 3, 2007, which was his last day at the USAO before joining a private law 
firm.92
The following Monday, August 6, 2007, Villafaña contacted Menchel by email at his new 
firm to inquire whether the letter to Epstein’s counsel had gone out on Friday.  Villafaña explained 
92
Menchel told OPR that the timing of the letter to Sanchez was a “total coincidence,” and had nothing to do 
with his impending departure from the USAO.
LILLY 
A 
DEZ, ESQ. 
AUGUST 3, 2007 
PAG 2 
Please let us know yourclieat's decis·oa byno later than August l 7. l hav,e oopfcrttd 
w:ith U.S .. Attorney . costa • h has • ked :me to communi-cate that ·the two-y ar t rm of 
i nca,ceratioa is a non-aegotiabl·e minimum to vmdicate a federal interest. and, at this time, 
he is not :i[Jclined to meet wilh counsel for Mr. • pstein. 
cc: 
Ro,y Black 
Gera1d B. Lefooun: 
R. Alexander Acosta 
Jeffrey Slo:man 
Andrew Lomk: 
A. Marie 
illafana 
-incer-ely. 
R. texaJ'ider Acosta 
niited tates A:ttomcy 
~ 
Matithew Me:nche1 
Chief, Crimina Di ...

 
59 
 
to OPR that she “wanted to know whether this letter went out.  Because . . . if the letter didn’t go 
out we can make this all go away and restart.”  Menchel confirmed to her that he had sent the letter 
out by email.   
Later that day, the West Palm Beach FBI squad supervisor told Sloman that he understood 
Epstein had rejected the USAO’s proposal, and he asked when Epstein would be charged.  
Villafaña told OPR that the squad supervisor “yelled at” Sloman about the USAO’s decision not 
to prosecute Epstein federally.  Sloman similarly told OPR that the squad supervisor “like 
[Villafaña] . . . [a]nd the agents felt very strongly about the case.”93 
C. 
August – September 2007:  Epstein Hires Additional Attorneys, Who Meet 
with Acosta 
1. 
Acosta Agrees to Meet with Epstein’s New Attorneys  
 
Villafaña told OPR that Epstein’s team was “incensed” that Acosta would not meet with 
them and that the USAO had set such a short deadline to respond to its offer.  Around this time, 
Epstein added to his team Kenneth Starr and Jay Lefkowitz, two prominent attorneys from the law 
firm Kirkland & Ellis, whom Acosta knew from his employment a decade earlier as an associate 
at the firm.94  On the evening of August 6, 2007, Sloman emailed Acosta:  “Just saw Menchel.  I 
didn’t know Kirkland made a call into you.  You were right.  Unbelievable.”  During their OPR 
interviews, neither Acosta nor Sloman remembered the call from Kirkland & Ellis and could 
provide no additional information about the contact.95  A reply email from Acosta to Sloman 
indicates that the Kirkland & Ellis attorneys were considering elevating to the Department their 
objections to the USAO’s involvement in the Epstein matter.  In that email, Acosta stated, “They 
are likely to go to DC.  We should strategize a bit.  We are not changing positions, and that should 
be made clear.”   
The next day, Acosta wrote to Sloman: 
[Epstein’s] attorneys want to go to DC on the case, on the grounds 
of a proc...

 
60 
 
jurisdiction), while making clear that we are not talking about the 
details of the case, and (ii) asking [CEOS Chief] Oosterba[an] to 
participate by teleconference, thereby intercepting the DC meeting. 
Thoughts? 
Acosta told OPR that he had no concern about Departmental “scrutiny of the NPA scheme” and 
that “[i]f anything,” he was concerned whether the Department might direct the USAO to “drop 
this case.”96 
2. 
Leading to the Meeting with Defense Counsel, Investigative Steps Are 
Postponed, and the Defense Continues to Oppose Villafaña’s Efforts to 
Obtain the Computer Evidence 
 
On August 8, 2007, Villafaña informed Acosta that she had spoken with Oosterbaan, who 
was willing to join a meeting with the defense; although he could not do so in person until after 
August 21, he was willing to participate by phone in order “to stay firm on our August 17th 
deadline.”  Villafaña also reiterated that she wanted to contact Epstein’s assistants in New York 
and to interview some of Epstein’s colleagues and former employees there.  Noting that “there was 
some concern about [taking the proposed investigative steps] while we are trying to negotiate a 
plea,” Villafaña asked Acosta for guidance.  Lourie also emailed Acosta and Sloman, asking that 
the USAO “stick to our deadline if possible.”  Lourie pointed out that CEOS “has no approval 
authority” and opined it was “a bit extreme to allow the defense to keep arguing this [case] to 
different agencies.”  Acosta replied, “This will end up [at the Department] anyhow, if we don’t 
meet with them.  I’d rather keep it here.  Brin[g]ing [the Chief of CEOS] in visibly does so.  If our 
deadline has to slip a bit . . . it’s worth it.” 
 
As a result, the investigative steps were postponed.  On August 10, 2007, Villafaña emailed 
Lourie inquiring whether she could “still go ahead” with the New York trip and whether she could 
oppose Black’s request to stay the litigation concerning the government’s efforts to obtain 
...

 
61 
 
She believed that access to the computer evidence would strengthen the government’s negotiating 
position, but that her supervisors “did not seem to recognize that.”  Villafaña said she did not 
understand why her supervisors were uninterested in determining what the computers contained.  
Instead, they instructed Villafaña to “keep calling the judge” to ask for a delay in the litigation 
proceedings.  
Sloman told OPR that he recalled an issue about the computers, but did not recall “what 
the thinking was at the time” about pursuing that evidence or why Villafaña was “ordered to stand 
down.”  Acosta, Menchel, and Lourie all told OPR that they did not recall Villafaña’s effort to 
obtain the computer evidence or that there had been litigation relating to it.  Lourie, however, told 
OPR that the computers might have contained “very powerful evidence” that possibly “could have 
changed our advice to [Acosta], or his decision making.”  In his OPR interview, Menchel was 
uncertain whether the computer evidence would have been useful, but also acknowledged to OPR, 
“You always want more as a prosecutor.” 
 
On August 31, 2007, in preparation for the upcoming September 7, 2007 meeting with 
defense counsel that he planned to attend, CEOS Chief Oosterbaan traveled to West Palm Beach 
to meet with Villafaña and the case agents and to examine the case file.  He explained to OPR that 
he wanted to see the file before meeting with the defense so that he could best “represent[] the 
interests of the prosecution team,” and that he was in favor of going forward with the case.  
According to Villafaña, during his review of the file, Oosterbaan told her that the case was “really 
good” and offered to assist Villafaña at trial.   
 
On September 6, 2007, the day before the meeting with defense counsel, Sloman sent 
Villafaña an email asking, “Please refresh my recollection.  What is the ‘deal’ on the table?”  
Sloman told OPR that his question reflected the fact that in hi...

 
62 
 
Villafaña added that the PBPD Chief had alerted the FBI that an upcoming news article would 
report that Epstein was “going to plead to a state charge” and the PBPD Chief “wanted to know if 
the victims had been consulted about the deal.”  Sloman forwarded Villafaña’s email to Acosta 
with a note that read simply, “fyi.”   
Later that evening, Villafaña circulated to Sloman, Lourie, and Oosterbaan two alternative 
documents:  a draft federal plea agreement and a draft NPA.100  The draft federal plea agreement, 
following the USAO’s standard format, called for Epstein to plead guilty to a five-year conspiracy 
under 18 U.S.C. § 371 to entice minors to engage in prostitution, an offense requiring registration 
as a sexual offender, with a Rule 11(c) binding sentence of two years’ imprisonment.  The draft 
NPA contained the terms presented to the defense team on July 31, 2007, and called for Epstein to 
enter a state plea by September 28, 2007.  Villafaña told OPR that because she had never seen a 
non-prosecution agreement before, she relied on a template she found either using USAO or the 
Department’s internal online resources, but she did not do any additional research regarding the 
use of non-prosecution agreements.101 
3. 
September 7, 2007:  Acosta, Other USAO Attorneys, and FBI 
Supervisors Meet with Epstein Attorneys Starr, Lefkowitz, and 
Sanchez 
On Friday, September 7, 2007, Acosta, Sloman, Villafaña, Villafaña’s co-counsel, 
Oosterbaan, and one or two supervisory FBI agents met at the USAO’s West Palm Beach office 
with defense attorneys Sanchez and, for the first time, Starr and Lefkowitz.102  This was Acosta’s 
first meeting with Epstein’s defense team.  Villafaña understood the purpose of this meeting was 
to afford Epstein’s counsel an opportunity to “make a pitch” as to why the case should not be 
prosecuted federally.  Villafaña recalled that at a “pre-meet” before defense counsel arrived, 
Acosta did not express concern about the viability ...

 
63 
 
forward, that either there is this pre-indictment resolution, or we go forward with an indictment.  
The September meeting did not alter or shift our position.”103 
 
Villafaña told OPR that after hearing the defense argument, Acosta reiterated that the 
federal interest in the case could be vindicated only by a state plea to an offense that required 
sexual offender registration, resulted in a two-year term of incarceration, and was subject to the 
18 U.S.C. § 2255 process for providing compensation to the victims.  When defense counsel 
objected to the registration requirement, Acosta held firm, and he also rejected the defense proposal 
for a sentence of home confinement.  In a subsequent email exchange with Criminal Division 
Deputy Assistant Attorney General Sigal Mandelker, who supervised CEOS, Oosterbaan reported 
that the meeting was “non-eventful,” noting that defense counsel argued “federalism” and might 
approach Criminal Division Assistant Attorney General Alice Fisher to present that argument 
directly to her.  
VI. 
SEPTEMBER 2007:  THE PLEA NEGOTIATIONS INTENSIFY, AND IN THE 
PROCESS, THE REQUIRED TERM OF IMPRISONMENT IS REDUCED  
 
Acosta had dispensed with the August 17, 2007 plea deadline specified in Menchel’s 
August 3, 2007 letter, in order to allow the defense to meet with him.  After that meeting, and 
although Villafaña continued to plan to file charges on September 25, no new plea deadline was 
established, and the negotiations continued through most of September.   
The defense used that time to push the USAO to make concessions.  Because Acosta was 
not willing to compromise on the issue of sexual offender registration or providing a means 
through which the victims could seek monetary damages, the negotiations focused on the term of 
imprisonment.  As the contemporaneous emails show, the USAO did not hold to its position that 
a two-year term of imprisonment was “the minimum” that the USAO would accept.  To reach an 
agreement wit...

 
64 
 
noted that the revised charges involved 19 victims, so the defense proposal for a 15-month sentence 
amounted to less than one month per victim.  Villafaña requested that “whatever the U.S. Attorney 
decides to do,” the agreement with Epstein should “follow . . . a version of my written non-
prosecution agreement” in order to “avoid any state shenanigans and . . . keep the defense on a 
strict timeline.” 
 
Later that day, Villafaña circulated to Acosta and Sloman a revised NPA that called for a 
20-month jail sentence to be followed by 10 months of home confinement.  This redrafted NPA 
contained a provision that specified, “With credit for gain time, Epstein shall serve at least  
17 months in a state correctional institution.”104  Acosta reviewed the revised NPA and amended 
it to include a statement clarifying that it was Epstein’s obligation “to undertake discussions with 
the State of Florida to ensure compliance with these procedures.”  Villafaña sent her version of the 
revised NPA to Lefcourt that afternoon and forwarded Acosta’s proposed change to him the 
following day, after she learned of it.    
 
On September 11, 2007, the court contacted Villafaña to inquire whether the USAO would 
be prepared to proceed with the litigation concerning the computers the following day.  At 
Sloman’s direction, Villafaña asked the court to delay the hearing, and the court rescheduled it for 
the following week.  At the same time, anticipating that plea negotiations would fail, Villafaña 
circulated a revised indictment to her co-counsel and Oosterbaan, seeking their feedback before 
sending it “through the chain of command.”  Villafaña also sent Oosterbaan the revised NPA and 
told him she was “still shooting for 9/25” to bring charges, assuming the defense declined the 
USAO’s offer.  Oosterbaan responded, “The counter-offering is unfortunate, but I suppose it’s 
understandable.”105   
 
That afternoon, Lourie asked Villafaña, “What is our latest offer?”  Villa...

 
65 
 
Villafaña told OPR that during the meeting, the group discussed the draft NPA, but she did 
not think they gave a copy to Krischer and Belohlavek.  Neither Krischer nor Belohlavek expressed 
concern about proceeding as the USAO was proposing.  According to Villafaña, Belohlavek 
explained that a plea to the three state counts identified in the draft NPA would affect the state’s 
sentencing guidelines, and that it would be better for the guidelines calculation if Epstein pled 
guilty to just one of the three counts.  Villafaña recalled that when Belohlavek confirmed that 
Epstein would be required to register as a sexual offender if he pled to any one of the three charges, 
Lourie, speaking for the USAO, agreed to allow Epstein to enter his plea to just one state charge 
in addition to the pending state indictment, and the defense attorneys selected the charge of 
procurement of minors to engage in prostitution.106  Lourie, however, disputed Villafaña’s 
recollection that he made the final decision, stating that it was “illogical” to conclude that he had 
the authority to change the terms of agreement unilaterally.107   
During the meeting, defense counsel raised concerns about Epstein serving time in state 
prison.  Villafaña also told OPR that Lourie, the other supervisor, and she made clear during the 
meeting that they expected Epstein to be incarcerated 24 hours a day, seven days a week, during 
the entirety of his sentence, and they did not “particularly care” whether it was in a state or local 
facility.  Belohlavek explained to OPR that in order for Epstein to serve his time in a county 
facility, rather than state prison, his sentence on each charge could be no more than 12 months, so 
that, for example, consecutive terms of 12 months and 6 months—totaling 18 months—could be 
served in the county jail.  Villafaña told OPR: 
Our thing was incarceration 24 hours a day.  So during this meeting, 
I remember [the defense] talking about . . . a one year co...

 
66 
 
going to become a registered sex offender, and he was going to go actually do time—which he 
hadn’t done up to this point.”  Krischer asked, “Why would I turn that down?”  Krischer also noted 
that at that time, sexual offender registration “was not the norm” in Florida, and he recognized that 
“it was clearly something that was important to the U.S. Attorney’s Office.”108       
Acosta told OPR that he did not recall if he learned what transpired at the September 12 
meeting, nor did he recall why the USAO team agreed to permit Epstein to plead guilty to only 
one charge.  Acosta told OPR, however, that he recognized that Villafaña and Lourie needed “some 
degree of discretion to negotiate”; that “in the give and take” of negotiations, they might propose 
a concession; and he was comfortable with the concession as long as the charge to which Epstein 
ultimately pled “captured the conduct” in an “appropriate” way.     
 
Although Epstein’s attorneys expressed interest in Epstein serving his time in a county 
facility (rather than state prison), one of Epstein’s attorneys alternatively expressed interest in 
Epstein serving his time in a federal facility, and along with discussions about the possible state 
resolution, the USAO and Epstein’s counsel also discussed a possible federal plea with a sentence 
running concurrently to the sentence Epstein would receive on the already indicted state charge.  
Later that day, Villafaña sent Lefkowitz an email advising that she and Lourie had talked with 
Acosta and Sloman, and they were “all satisfied in principle with the agreement.”109  The next day, 
September 13, 2007, Villafaña sent an email to Acosta, Sloman, Lourie, and two other supervisors, 
identifying potential federal offenses that would yield a two-year sentence.  Villafaña also emailed 
defense counsel, stating that she had been “spending some quality time with Title 18”—referring 
to the code of federal criminal statutes—to make sure there would be a “f...

 
67 
 
having directly with Alex Acosta, and Alex Acosta agreed to 18 
months. 
Villafaña further explained to OPR: 
Regarding going from 24 months to 20 months, I recall a discussion 
that 24 months of federal time was really 20 months after gain time, 
so Epstein should be allowed to plead to 20 months’ in the state.  
Epstein’s counsel represented that he wouldn’t get gain time like 
that in the [s]tate, and someone above me agreed.  Later, of course, 
as shown in the agreements, Epstein’s counsel (Jay Lefkowitz) got 
Alex to agree that Epstein should be allowed to earn gain time in the 
[s]tate, so the 20 months in the state became at least 17 months.   
Regarding going from 20 months’ to 18 months, . . . this came from 
a negotiation between Epstein’s counsel and Andy or Alex where 
the federal statutory max could only be 24 or 18, so 18 was agreed 
to.  I also recall that, after Epstein’s counsel decided that they 
wanted to proceed with an NPA and only a state guilty plea, I asked 
Alex why we didn’t return to 20 months because the reason why we 
went to 18 months was because that was the only way to end up with 
a federal statutory maximum.110 
 
However, a subsequent account of the history of negotiations with Epstein’s attorneys, 
drafted by Villafaña for Acosta several weeks after the September 12, 2007 meeting with the State 
Attorney’s Office, stated that “a significant compromise” reached at the meeting “was a reduction 
in the amount of jail time – from [the originally proposed] twenty-four months down to eighteen 
months, which would be served at the Palm Beach County Jail rather than a state prison facility.” 
Acosta also noted to OPR that Villafaña was engaged in a “tough negotiation,” and he was willing 
to allow her the discretion to reduce the amount of incarceration time without him “second-
guessing” her.  Acosta acknowledged that he “clearly approved it at some point.” 
Based on this record, OPR could not definitively determine when, how, or...

 
68 
 
D. 
The Parties Continue to Negotiate but Primarily Focus on a Potential Plea to 
Federal Charges 
During the remainder of September, Villafaña conducted plea negotiations and drafted the 
final NPA, mainly with Epstein attorney Jay Lefkowitz.  In a September 13, 2007 email to CEOS 
Chief Oosterbaan, Villafaña reported that the plea negotiations were “getting fast and furious.”  
She said that the defense wanted to establish a “victim’s fund” through which Epstein could make 
payments to the victims, rather than having the victims file individual § 2255 court actions for 
damages, which she speculated was “to keep this stuff out of the public [c]ourt files.” 
 
According to the email documentation, by Friday, September 14, 2007, the parties had 
moved toward a “hybrid” federal plea agreement, incorporating a plea to state charges, which 
would allow Epstein to serve his sentence for all the charges concurrently in a federal prison.  
Villafaña informed Acosta, Sloman, Lourie, and other colleagues that negotiations with Lefkowitz 
had resulted in a tentative agreement for Epstein to plead to two federal charges:  harassment to 
prevent a witness from reporting a crime (18 U.S.C. § 1512(d)(2), which was then a one-year 
misdemeanor), and simple assault on an airplane (18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(5), a six-month 
misdemeanor).  Villafaña reported that Lefkowitz “put in a pitch for only 12 months, I put in a 
pitch that [Epstein] plead to 24 with a 20-month recommendation, and we decided that we would 
be stuck with the 18 months.”   
Later that day, Villafaña sent to Lefkowitz a draft “hybrid” plea agreement and information 
mirroring the agreement in principle she had described to her supervisors, but which she noted had 
“not yet been blessed” by them.  The agreement provided that Epstein would plead guilty to the 
two federal charges for which the parties would jointly recommend that he be sentenced to the 
statutory maximum penalty of 18 months’ imprisonment followe...

 
69 
 
to the assault charge” and suggesting a different factual scenario to support a federal charge.112  At 
this point, Sloman left on vacation, and he informed Acosta and Villafaña that in his absence 
Lourie had agreed “to help finalize this.”  Lourie spent the following work week at his new post 
at the Department in Washington, D.C., but communicated with his USAO colleagues by phone 
and email.  
 
In a Sunday, September 16, 2007 email, Villafaña informed Lefkowitz that she had drafted 
a factual proffer to accompany a revised “hybrid” federal plea proposal.  In that email, Villafaña 
also noted that she was considering filing charges in the federal district court in Miami, “which 
will hopefully cut the press coverage significantly.”  This email received considerable attention 12 
years later when it was made public during the CVRA litigation and was viewed as evidence of 
the USAO’s efforts to conceal the NPA from the victims.  Villafaña, however, explained to OPR 
that she was concerned that news media coverage would violate the victims’ privacy.  She told 
OPR, “[I]f [the victims] wanted to attend [the plea hearing], I wanted them to be able to go into 
the courthouse without their faces being splashed all over the newspaper,” and that such publicity 
was less likely to happen in Miami, where the press “in general does not care about what happens 
in Palm Beach.”     
 
Lefkowitz responded to Villafaña with a revised version of her latest proposed “hybrid” 
plea agreement, in a document entitled “Agreement.”  Significantly, this defense proposal 
introduced two new provisions.  The first related to four female assistants who had allegedly 
facilitated Epstein in his criminal scheme.  The defense sought a government promise not to 
prosecute them, as well as certain other unnamed Epstein employees, and a promise to forego 
immigration proceedings against two of the female assistants: 
Epstein’s fulfilling the terms and conditions of the Agreement also 
p...

 
70 
 
evidence of a violation of the agreement.  Epstein and his counsel 
agree that the computers that are currently under [legal process] will 
be safeguarded in their current condition by Epstein’s counsel or 
their agents until the terms and conditions of the Agreement are 
fulfilled. 
 
Later that day, Villafaña sent Lefkowitz a lengthy email to convey two options Lourie had 
suggested:  “the original proposal” for a state plea but with an agreement for an 18-month sentence, 
or pleas to state charges and two federal obstruction-of-justice charges.  Villafaña also told 
Lefkowitz she was willing to ask Acosta again to approve a federal plea to a five-year conspiracy 
with a Rule 11(c) binding recommendation for a 20-month sentence.  Villafaña explained: 
As to timing, it is my understanding that Mr. Epstein needs to be 
sentenced in the state after he is sentenced in the federal case, but 
not that he needs to plead guilty and be sentenced after serving his 
federal time.  Andy recommended that some of the timing issues be 
addressed only in the state agreement, so that it isn’t obvious to the 
judge that we are trying to create federal jurisdiction for prison 
purposes.   
With regard to prosecution of individuals other than Epstein, Villafaña suggested standard 
federal plea agreement language regarding the resolution of all criminal liability, “and I will 
mention ‘co-conspirators,’ but I would prefer not to highlight for the judge all of the other crimes 
and all of the other persons that we could charge.”  Villafaña told OPR that she was willing to 
include a non-prosecution provision for Epstein’s co-conspirators, who at the time she understood 
to be the four women named in the proposed agreement, because the USAO was not interested in 
prosecuting those individuals if Epstein entered a plea.  Villafaña told OPR, “[W]e considered 
Epstein to be the top of the food chain, and we wouldn’t have been interested in prosecuting anyone 
else.”  She did not co...

 
71 
 
for them to be deported.”114  As to whether the foreign nationals would be removable by virtue of 
having committed crimes, Villafaña told OPR she did not consider her role as seeking removal 
apart from actual prosecution. 
 
Villafaña concluded her email to Lefkowitz by expressing disappointment that they were 
not “closer to resolving this than it appears that we are,” and offering to meet the next day to work 
on the agreement: 
Can I suggest that tomorrow we either meet live or via 
teleconference, either with your client or having him within a quick 
phone call, to hash out these items?  I was hoping to work only a 
half day tomorrow to save my voice for Tuesday’s hearing . . . , if 
necessary, but maybe we can set a time to meet.  If you want to meet 
“off campus” somewhere, that is fine.  I will make sure that I have 
all the necessary decision makers present or “on call,” as well.115 
Villafaña told OPR that she offered to meet Lefkowitz away from the USAO because conducting 
negotiations via email was inefficient, and Villafaña wanted “to have a meeting where we sat down 
and just finalized things. And what I meant by off campus is, sometimes people feel better if you 
go to a neutral location” for a face-to-face meeting. 
 
On the morning of Monday, September 17, 2007, the USAO supervisor who was taking 
over Lourie’s duties as manager of the West Palm Beach office asked Villafaña for an update on 
the plea negotiations, and she forwarded to him the email she had sent to Lefkowitz the previous 
afternoon.  Villafaña told the manager, “As you can see . . . there are a number of things in their 
last draft that were unacceptable.  All of the loopholes that I sewed up they tried to open.”   
Shortly thereafter, Villafaña alerted the new manager, Acosta, and Lourie that she had just 
spoken with Lefkowitz, who advised that Epstein was leaning towards a plea to state charges under 
a non-prosecution agreement, and she would be forwarding to Lefkowitz “...

 
72 
 
we go that route, would you intend to make the deferred [sic] prosecution agreement public?”  
Villafaña replied that while a federal plea agreement would be part of the court file and publicly 
accessible, the NPA “would not be made public or filed with the Court, but it would remain part 
of our case file.  It probably would be subject to a FOIA [Freedom of Information Act] request, 
but it is not something that we would distribute without compulsory process.”116  Villafaña told 
OPR that she believed Epstein did not want the NPA to be made public because he “did not want 
people to believe him to have committed a variety of crimes.”  As she explained to OPR, Villafaña 
believed the NPA did not need to be disclosed in its entirety, but she anticipated notifying the 
victims about the NPA provisions relating to their ability to recover damages. 
E. 
The Parties Appear to Reach Agreement on a Plea to Federal Charges 
 
Negotiations continued the next day, Tuesday, September 18, 2007.  Responding to 
Villafaña’s revised draft of the NPA, Lefkowitz suggested that Epstein plead to one federal charge 
with a 12-month sentence, followed by one year of supervised release with a requirement for home 
detention and two years of state probation, with the first six months of the state sentence to be 
served under community control.  Villafaña replied, “I know that the U.S. Attorney will not go 
below 18 months of prison/jail time (and I would strongly oppose the suggestion).”  Shortly 
thereafter, Villafaña emailed Acosta, Lourie, and the incoming West Palm Beach manager: 
Hi all – I think that we may be near the end of our negotiations with 
Mr. Epstein, and not because we have reached a resolution.  As I 
mentioned yesterday, I spent about 12 hours over the weekend 
drafting Informations, changing plea agreements, and writing 
factual proffers.  I was supposed to receive a draft agreement from 
them yesterday, which never arrived.  At that time, they were 
leaning t...

 
73 
 
twelve months, with six served in home confinement, to run 
consecutively. 
I just received an e-mail asking if Mr. Epstein could just do 12 
months imprisonment instead. 
As you can see, Mr. Epstein is having second thoughts about doing 
jail time.  I would like to send Jay Lefkowitz an e-mail stating that 
if we do not have a signed agreement by tomorrow at 5:00, 
negotiations will end.  I have selected tomorrow at 5:00 because it 
gives them enough time to really negotiate an agreement if they are 
serious about it, and if not, it gives me one day before the Jewish 
holiday to get [prepared] for Tuesday . . . [September 25] , when I 
plan to [file charges], and it gives the office sufficient time to review 
the indictment package. 
Do you concur? 
A few minutes later, the incoming West Palm Beach manager emailed Lourie, suggesting that 
Lourie “talk to Epstein and close the deal.”118   
 
Within moments, Lourie replied to the manager, with a copy to Villafaña, reporting that he 
had just spoken with Lefkowitz and agreed “to two fed[eral] obstruction[] charges (24 month cap) 
with nonbinding recommendation for 18 months.  When [Epstein] gets out, he has to plead to state 
offenses, including against minor, registrable, and then take one year house arrest/community 
confinement.”  By reply email, Villafaña asked Lourie to call her, but there is no record of whether 
they spoke. 
F. 
Defense Counsel Offers New Proposals Substantially Changing the Terms of 
the Federal Plea Agreement, which the USAO Rejects 
Approximately an hour after Lourie’s email reporting the deal he had reached with 
Lefkowitz, Lefkowitz sent Villafaña a revised draft plea agreement.  Despite the agreement Lourie 
believed he and Lefkowitz had reached that morning, Lefkowitz’s proposal would have resulted 
in a 16-month federal sentence followed by 8 months of supervised release served in the form of 
home detention.  Lefkowitz also inserted a statement in his proposal explicitly prohib...

 
74 
 
and had added language waiving the preparation of a presentence investigation (PSI) “so he can 
keep all of his information confidential.  I have already told Jay that the PSI language . . . was 
unacceptable to our office.”   Of even greater significance, in a follow-up email, Villafaña noted 
that the defense had removed both the requirement that Epstein plead to a registrable offense and 
the entire provision relating to monetary damages under 18 U.S.C. § 2255.   
In the afternoon, Villafaña circulated her own proposed “hybrid” plea agreement, first 
internally to the management team with a note stating that it “contains the 18/12 split that Jay and 
Andy agreed to,” and then to Lefkowitz.  Regarding the prosecution of other individuals, she 
included the following provision:  “This agreement resolves the federal criminal liability of the 
defendant and any co-conspirators in the Southern District of Florida growing out of any criminal 
conduct by those persons known to the [USAO] as of the date of this plea agreement,” including 
but not limited to the conspiracy to solicit minors to engage in prostitution. 
In her email to Lefkowitz, transmitting the plea agreement, Villafaña wrote:  
Could you share the attached draft with your colleagues.  It is in 
keeping with what Andy communicated to me was the operative 
“deal.”  The U.S. Attorney hasn’t had a chance to review all of the 
language, but he agrees with it in principle.  
  
. . . . 
[The West Palm Beach manager] and I will both be available at 2:00. 
. . .  One of my suggestions is going to be (again) that we all sit down 
together in the same room, including Barry [Krischer] and/or Lanna 
[Belohlavek], so we can hash out the still existing issues and get a 
signed document. 
Villafaña also emailed Acosta directly, telling him she planned to meet with Epstein’s 
attorneys to work on the plea agreement, and asking if Acosta would be available to provide final 
approval.  Acosta replied, “I don’t thi...

 
75 
 
message, “That is fine.  [The West Palm Beach manager] and I will nail everything down, we just 
want to get a final blessing.”   
 
Negotiations continued throughout the day on Wednesday, September 19, 2007, with 
Villafaña and Lefkowitz exchanging emails regarding the factual proffer for a plea and the 
scheduling of a meeting to finalize the plea agreement’s terms.   During that exchange, Villafaña 
made clear to Lefkowitz that the time for negotiating was reaching an end: 
I hate to have to be firm about this, but we need to wrap this up by 
Monday.  I will not miss my [September 25 charging] date when this 
has dragged on for several weeks already and then, if things fall 
apart, be left in a less advantageous position than before the 
negotiations.  I have had an 82-page pros memo and 53-page 
indictment sitting on the shelf since May to engage in these 
negotiations.  There has to be an ending date, and that date is 
Monday. 
Early that afternoon, Lourie—who was participating in the week’s negotiations from his 
new post at the Department in Washington, D.C.—asked Villafaña to furnish him with the last 
draft of the plea agreement she had sent to defense counsel, and she provided him with the “18/12 
split” draft she had sent to Lefkowitz the prior afternoon.  After reviewing that draft, Lourie told 
Villafaña it was a “[g]ood job” but he questioned certain provisions, including whether the 
USAO’s agreement to suspend the investigation and hold all legal process in abeyance should be 
in the plea agreement.  Villafaña told Lourie that she had added that paragraph at the “insistence” 
of the defense, and opined, “I don’t think it hurts us.”   Villafaña explained to OPR that she held 
this view because “Alex and people above me had already made the decision that if the case was 
resolved we weren’t going to get the computer equipment.” 
 
At 3:44 p.m. that afternoon, Lefkowitz emailed a “redline” version of the federal plea 
agreement showing his new r...

 
76 
 
G. 
Villafaña and Lourie Recommend Ending Negotiations, but Acosta Urges 
That They “Try to Work It Out” 
 
In the late afternoon of Wednesday, September 19, 2007, Villafaña expressed her 
increasing frustration to her supervisors.  She emailed the defense redline version of the plea 
agreement to Lourie and the incoming West Palm Beach manager, identifying all of the provisions 
she had “specifically discussed with [the defense team] and rejected, that they have re-inserted into 
the agreement.”  (Emphasis in original).  Villafaña opined, “This is NOT good faith negotiations.”  
Lourie responded that he would “reach out to Alex to discuss.”   
 
Lourie immediately emailed Acosta the following: 
I looked at the latest draft from Jay [Lefkowitz] and I must agree 
with Marie.  Based on my own conversations with him, his draft is 
out of left field.  He claims to orally agree to our terms and then 
sends us a document that is the opposite.  I suggest we simply tell 
him that his counter offer is rejected and that we intend to move 
forward with our case. 
Acosta replied: 
Why don’t we just call him.  Tell him 
1. 
You agree, and then change things. 
2. 
That’s not acceptable, and is in bad faith.  Stop it or we’ll 
 
indict. 
3. 
Try to work it out. 
It seems that we are close, and it[’]s worth trying to overcome what 
has to be painfully . . . annoying negotiating tactics. 
Acosta explained to OPR that he recognized,  
[t]his negotiation was a pain, but if it was the right position, the fact 
that you’ve got annoying counsel on the other side doesn’t it make 
it less of a right position.  You tell them stop being annoying, you 
try to work it out, and if not, then you indict. 
In response to Acosta’s instruction, Lourie responded, “Ok will do.”  He also forwarded to 
Acosta the latest version of the USAO draft “hybrid” plea agreement that Villafaña had sent to 
Lefkowitz the previous day, which Lourie had requested and obtained from Villafaña earlier that 
aft...

 
77 
 
everything, but I really do not think that Mr. Epstein is going to engage in serious negotiations 
until he sees the Indictment and shows up in mag [federal magistrate judge] court.”  She suggested 
charging Epstein on a federal conspiracy charge, and if he refused to plead to that offense, 
superseding with additional charges and going to trial.  She complained that after seven weeks of 
negotiations, “we are just spinning our wheels.”  Her proposed email to Lefkowitz detailed all of 
the objectionable provisions in his draft, and concluded, “If you or your client insists on these, 
there can be no plea agreement.”   
H. 
Acosta Edits the Federal Plea Agreement, and Villafaña Sends a Final Version 
to the Defense 
 
The next day, Thursday, September 20, 2007, Villafaña emailed Assistant State Attorney 
Belohlavek and informed her: 
Our deadline is Monday evening for a signed agreement and 
arraignment in the federal system.  At this time, things don’t look 
promising anyway, but I will keep you posted.  In their latest draft, 
they changed what they agreed to plead to in the state from 
solicitation of minors for prostitution (a registrable offense) to 
forcing adults into prostitution (a non-registrable offense).  We will 
not budge on this issue, so it is looking unlikely that we will reach a 
mutually acceptable agreement.  If that changes, I will let you know. 
 
Acosta sent Lourie “[s]ome thoughts” about the USAO version of the proposed “hybrid” 
federal plea agreement he had received from Lourie the evening before, commenting that “it seems 
very straightforward” and “we are not changing our standard charging language” for the 
defense.120  Noting that the draft was prepared for his signature, Acosta told Lourie that he did not 
typically sign plea agreements and “this should not be the first,” adding that the USAO “should 
only go forward if the trial team supports and signs this agreement.”121  Lourie forwarded the email 
to Villafaña with a transmi...

 
78 
 
I. 
The Defense Rejects the Federal Plea Agreement, Returns to the NPA 
“State-Only” Resolution, and Begins Opposing the Sexual Offender 
Registration Requirement 
 
After having spent days negotiating the federal charges to be included in a plea agreement, 
by the afternoon of September 20, 2007, the defense rejected the federal plea option, and the parties 
resumed negotiations over the details of an NPA calling for Epstein to plead to only state charges.  
Through multiple emails and attempts (some successful) to speak directly with Acosta and other 
supervisors, defense attorneys vigorously fought the USAO’s insistence that Epstein plead to a 
state charge requiring sexual offender registration.     
After receiving the federal plea agreement, Lefkowitz spoke with Villafaña.  She reported 
to Acosta and Lourie that Lefkowitz told her the defense was “back to doing the state-charges-
only agreement” and wanted until the middle of the following week to work out the details, but 
that she had told defense counsel that “we need a signed agreement by tomorrow [Friday] or we 
are [filing charges] on Tuesday.”   
Lefkowitz emailed Villafaña about the draft NPA that she had sent to him, pointing out 
that it called for a 20-month jail sentence followed by 10 months of community control, rather than 
18 months in jail and 12 under community control, and to ask if the USAO had “any flexibility” 
on the § 2255 procedure.  Villafaña responded: 
The 18 and 12 has already been agreed to by our office, so that is 
not a problem.  On the issue about 18 [U.S.C. §] 2255, we seem to 
be miles apart.  Your most recent version not only had me binding 
the girls to a trust fund administered by the state court, but also 
promising that they will give up their [§] 2255 rights.  
I reviewed the e-mail that I sent you on Sunday with the comments 
on some of your other changes.  In the context of a non-prosecution 
agreement, the office may be more willing to be specific about not...

 
79 
 
I think Jay [Lefkowitz] will try to talk you out of a registrable 
offense.  Regardless of the merits of his argument, in order to get us 
down in time they made us an offer that included pleading to an 
offense against a minor (encouraging a minor into prostitution) and 
touted that we should be happy because it was registrable.  For that 
reason alone, I don’t think we should consider allowing them to 
come down from their own offer, either on this issue or on time of 
incarceration. 
Lefkowitz attempted to reach Acosta that night, but Acosta directed Villafaña to return the 
call, and told Lourie that he did not want to open “a backchannel” with defense counsel.  Lourie 
instructed Villafaña, “U can tell [J]ay that [A]lex will not agree to a nonregistration offense.” 
 
On the morning of Friday, September 21, 2007, Villafaña emailed Acosta informing him 
that “it looks like we will be [filing charges against] Mr. Epstein on Tuesday,” reporting that the 
charging package was being reviewed by the West Palm Beach manager, and asking if anyone in 
the Miami office needed to review it.  Villafaña also alerted Lourie that she had spoken that 
morning to Lefkowitz, who “was waffling” about Epstein pleading to a state charge that required 
sexual offender registration, and she noted that she would confer with Krischer and Belohlavek 
“to make sure the defense doesn’t try to do an end run.”   
That same morning, Epstein attorney Sanchez, who had not been involved in negotiations 
for several weeks, emailed Sloman, advising, “[I] want to finalize the plea deal and there is only 
one issue outstanding and [I] do not believe that [A]lex has read all the defense submissions that 
would assist in his determination on this point . . . [U]pon resolution, we will be prepared to sign 
as soon as today.”  From his out-of-town vacation, Sloman forwarded the email to Acosta, who 
replied, “Enjo[y] vacation.  Working with [M]arie on this.”  Sloman also forwarded Sanchez’s 
em...

 
80 
 
precluding the government from requesting, initiating, or recommending immigration proceedings 
against the two assistants who were foreign nationals. 
At this point, Lefkowitz again sought to speak to Acosta, who replied by email:  “I am 
happy to talk.  My caveat is that in the middle of negotiations, u try to avoid[] undermining my 
staff by allowing ‘interlocutor[]y’ appeals so to speak so I’d want [M]arie on the call[.]  I’ll have 
her set something up.” 
 
Villafaña sent to Lefkowitz her own revised NPA, telling him it was her “attempt at 
combining our thoughts,” but it had not “been approved by the office yet.”  She inserted solicitation 
of minors to engage in prostitution, a registrable offense, as the charge to which Epstein would 
plead guilty; proposed a joint recommendation for a 30-month sentence, divided into 18 months 
in the county jail and 12 months of community control; and amended the § 2255 provision.123  
Villafaña’s revision retained the provision suspending the investigation and holding all legal 
process in abeyance, and she incorporated the non-prosecution provision while slightly altering it 
to apply to “any potential co-conspirator of Epstein, including” the four named assistants, and 
deleting mention of the corporate entity employees.  Finally, Villafaña deleted mention of 
immigration proceedings, but advised in her transmittal email that “we have not and don’t plan to 
ask immigration” proceedings to be initiated.124   
 
Later that day, Villafaña alerted Lourie (who had arrived in Florida from Washington, D.C. 
early that afternoon) and the new West Palm Beach manager (copying her first-line supervisor and 
co-counsel) that she had included language that defense counsel had requested “regarding 
promises not to prosecute other people,” and commented, “I don’t think it hurts us.”  There is no 
documentation that Lourie, the West Palm Beach manager, or anyone else expressed disagreement 
with Villafaña’s assessment.  Rather, ...

 
81 
 
federal court.  Sloman similarly said that he had the impression that the non-prosecution provision 
was meant to protect named co-conspirators who were also victims, “in a sense,” of Epstein’s 
conduct.  Although later press coverage of the Epstein case focused on Epstein’s connection to 
prominent figures and suggested that the non-prosecution provision protected these individuals, 
Sloman told OPR that it never occurred to him that the reference to potential co-conspirators was 
directed toward any of the high-profile individuals who were at the time or subsequently linked 
with Epstein.125  Acosta did not recall the provision or any discussions about it.  He speculated 
that if he read the non-prosecution provision, he likely assumed that Villafaña and Lourie had 
“thought this through” and “addressed it for a reason.”  The West Palm Beach manager, who had 
only limited involvement at this stage, told OPR that the provision was “highly unusual,” and he 
had “no clue” why the USAO agreed to it. 
Villafaña told OPR that, apart from the women named in the NPA, the investigation had 
not developed evidence of “any other potential co-conspirators.  So, . . . we wouldn’t be 
prosecuting anybody else, so why not include it? . . .  I just didn’t think that there was anybody 
that it would cover.”  She conceded, however, that she “did not catch the fact that it could be read 
as broadly as people have since read it.” 
 
K. 
The USAO Rejects Defense Efforts to Eliminate the Sexual Offender 
Registration Requirement  
On the afternoon of Friday, September 21, 2007, State Attorney Krischer informed 
Villafaña that Epstein’s counsel had contacted him and Epstein was ready to agree “to all the 
terms” of the NPA—except for sexual offender registration.  According to Krischer, defense 
counsel had proposed that registration be deferred, and that Epstein register only if state or federal 
law enforcement felt, at any point during his service of the sentence, that he nee...

 
82 
 
 
At some point that day, Acosta spoke with Lefkowitz by phone regarding the need for 
Epstein to plead to a registrable offense.  Throughout the weekend, with Villafaña’s Monday 
deadline looming, defense counsel pressed hard to eliminate the sexual offender requirement.  On 
Saturday, September 22, 2007, Sanchez sent a series of emails to Lourie.  In the first, she provided 
details from a press report about a Florida public official who the previous day had pled guilty to 
child sex abuse charges and was sentenced to a term of probation.  She noted that she “spoke to 
[M]att [Menchel]” and asked Lourie to call her.  Two hours later she sent Lourie a second, lengthy 
email, strongly objecting to the registration requirement, and outlining “all arguments against 
registration [as a sexual offender] in this case.”  In this email, Sanchez claimed that there had been 
a “miscommunication” during the September 12, 2007 meeting, and that “we only agreed to the 
solicitation with minors because we believed and [Krischer] and [Belohlavek] confirmed it was 
NOT registrable.”  Sanchez complained that lifetime sexual offender registration was a “life 
sentence” that was “uncalled for,” “does not make sense,” and was “inappropriate” to impose 
“simply [because] the FBI wants it, in return for all there [sic] efforts.”  She listed numerous 
reasons why Epstein should not have to register, including his lack of a prior record or history of 
sexual offenses; the lack of any danger of recidivism; the ease with which he could be “tracked” 
without registering; and that it would be “virtually impossible to comply” with four separate state 
registration requirements.  A few minutes later, Sanchez sent Lefcourt’s phone number to Lourie 
“in case you want to speak to him directly.” 
In another email sent less than two hours later, Sanchez told Lourie she was writing again 
because “you are a very fair person.  This resolution in the Epstein case is not reasonable.  [I]t is a 
...

 
83 
 
Lefkowitz set forth arguments similar to those Sanchez had presented to Lourie, as to why 
registration “based on the facts alleged in this case . . . simply does not make sense.”  In the event 
that Acosta did not agree to their proposed charges, Lefkowitz offered as an alternative “to stipulate 
that the state offense” would “constitute a prior sexual offense for purposes of enhanced recidivist 
sentencing” should Epstein ever again commit a federal sex offense against minors.  As Lefkowitz 
further argued, “By accepting this option, you would be substituting the certainty of recidivist 
sentencing for the humiliation of registration.”  Emails reflect that, early that afternoon, Acosta, 
Lourie, and Villafaña discussed the matter in a conference call.   
Lefkowitz also sent a revised version of the NPA to Villafaña that omitted identification of 
the charge to which Epstein would plead guilty.  Later that day, Lefkowitz emailed Acosta: 
I got a call from [M]arie who said you had rejected our proposal. 
Does that mean you are not even prepared to have [Epstein] commit 
now to plead to the registerable offense near the end of his 18 month 
sentence and then be sentenced to 12 month[s] community control 
for that charge?  I thought that was exactly what you proposed 
[F]riday (although you wanted, but were not able, to do it with some 
kind of federal charge).   
But that still gives you a registerable sex offense, 30 months total, 
and 18 in jail.   
How can that not satisfy you—while still ensuring that [E]pstein is 
not unduly endangered in jail? 
Acosta responded, “I do not mean to be difficult, but our negotiations must take place with the 
AUSAs assigned to the case.”  Acosta added that he had spoken with Lourie and Villafaña, and 
they had “discretion to proceed as they believe just and appropriate.”  Acosta copied Villafaña, 
and she emailed Acosta to thank him “for the support.”   
L. 
The Defense Adds a Confidentiality Clause 
 
Throughout that Sund...

 
84 
 
The parties anticipate that this agreement will not be made part of 
any public record.  If the United States receives a Freedom of 
Information Act request or any compulsory process commanding 
the disclosure of the agreement, it will provide notice to Epstein 
before making that disclosure.128 
VII. 
SEPTEMBER 24, 2007:  ACOSTA MAKES FINAL EDITS, AND THE NPA IS 
SIGNED 
 
The contemporaneous emails show that Villafaña continued to update Acosta as the parties 
negotiated the final language and that Acosta reviewed and edited the NPA.  Shortly after midnight 
on Monday, September 24, 2007, Acosta sent Villafaña “[s]mall edits” to the “final” NPA she had 
sent to him.  Among his changes was language modifying provisions that appeared to require the 
State Attorney’s Office or the state court to take specific actions, such as requiring that Epstein 
enter his guilty plea by a certain date.  Acosta explained in his email, “I’m not comfortable with 
requiring the State Attorney to enter into a [joint sentencing] recommendation” or “requiring a 
State court to stick with our timeline” for entry of the guilty plea and sentencing.  Accordingly, 
Acosta substituted language that required Epstein alone to make a binding sentencing 
recommendation to the state court, and required Epstein to use his “best efforts” to enter his guilty 
plea and be sentenced by the specified dates.  Acosta also instructed Villafaña to restore a reference 
to Epstein’s wish “to reach a global resolution of his state and federal criminal liabilities.”  Lourie, 
who had returned to the Department in Washington, D.C., had a phone conversation with 
Lefkowitz and sent additional comments on the final draft to Acosta and Villafaña.  Villafaña sent 
a new revision, incorporating edits from Acosta and Lourie, to Lefkowitz later that morning.   
 
On the afternoon of September 24, 2007, Villafaña circulated the new “final” version of 
the NPA to Acosta, Sloman, Lourie, and other supervisors, and...

 
85 
 
agreement.  I know that Andy promised Chief Reiter an update when 
a resolution was achieved. . . .  [The West Palm Beach manager] is 
calling, but [he] knows not to tell Chief Reiter about the money 
issue, just about what crimes Mr. Epstein is pleading guilty to and 
the amount of time that has been agreed to.  [He] also is telling Chief 
Reiter not to disclose the outcome to anyone. 
OPR questioned Villafaña about this email.  She explained that she generally kept 
confidential the terms of the resolution of any case.  She understood that “the way that the [Epstein] 
case was resolved” needed to remain confidential, but the victims could be informed about what 
happened because by the NPA’s terms, they needed to know what the agreement was about.  
Villafaña emailed the West Palm Beach manager, asking him to tell PBPD Chief Reiter 
“the good news” but “leave out the part about damages,” and explained that she wanted to meet 
with the victims herself to explain how the damages provision would work.  Villafaña also told 
him that Lourie had asked that Reiter share information about the NPA only with the PBPD 
Detective who had led the state investigation of Epstein.129  Villafaña forwarded to Acosta, Lourie, 
and the West Palm Beach manager Lefkowitz’s email asking that the USAO try to keep the NPA 
from becoming public.  Acosta responded that the agreement “already binds us not to make public 
except as required by law under [the Freedom of Information Act],” and asked, “[W]hat more does 
he want?”  Villafaña replied, “My guess is that if we tell anyone else (like the police chief or FBI 
or the girls), that we ask them not to disclose.”  Soon thereafter, Acosta emailed Lourie, Villafaña, 
and the West Palm Beach manager to set up a call to discuss “who we tell and how much,” adding, 
“Nice job with a difficult negotiation.” 
The final NPA, as signed by Epstein, his attorneys Lefcourt and Sanchez, and Villafaña, 
contained the following pertinent provision...

 
86 
 
it had identified as victims.131  The USAO, with the good faith approval of 
Epstein’s counsel, would select an attorney representative for the victims, 
whom Epstein would pay. 
 
Timing: 
Epstein would make his best efforts to enter his guilty plea and be sentenced 
by October 26, 2007.  The USAO had no objection to Epstein self-reporting 
to begin serving his sentence by January 4, 2008. 
Immunity: 
The USAO would not initiate criminal charges against “any potential 
co-conspirator of Epstein,” including four named personal assistants. 
Other:   
Epstein was obligated to undertake discussions with the State Attorney’s 
Office to ensure compliance with this agreement.  
  
 
 
Epstein waived his right to appeal.  
Epstein agreed that he would not be afforded any benefits with respect to 
gain time or other rights, opportunities, and benefits not available to any 
other inmate. 
The federal investigation would be suspended and all pending legal process 
held in abeyance unless and until Epstein violated any term of the 
agreement.  Evidence “requested by or directly related to” the pending legal 
process, “including certain computer equipment,” would be kept inviolate 
until all the NPA terms had been satisfied.   
Breach: 
The USAO would be required to notify Epstein of any alleged breach of the 
agreement within 90 days of the expiration of the term of home 
confinement, and would be required to initiate prosecution within 60 days 
thereafter. 
Disclosure: 
The parties “anticipate[d]” that the agreement would not be made part of 
any public record, and if the USAO received a Freedom of Information Act 
request or compulsory process commanding disclosure of the agreement, it 
would provide notice to Epstein before making any disclosure.132 
 
That evening, Lefkowitz emailed Lourie to express concern about the notification he 
understood would be given to Chief Reiter, stating, “I am very concerned about leaks unduly 
prejudicing Jeffrey [Epstein] in the me...

 
87 
 
this matter.”  Lourie responded with an assurance that the Reiter notification was only “so he does 
not find out about it in the paper,” and he concluded:  “I enjoyed it as well.  Mr. Epstein was 
fortunate to have such excellent representation.”  
VIII. POST-NPA NEGOTIATIONS 
Almost immediately after the NPA was signed, conflicts arose about its terms, and the 
difficult negotiation process began anew.  The USAO quickly realized that there were numerous 
issues concerning the monetary damages provision that were not resolved in the NPA, and the 
parties differed in their interpretations of the § 2255 provision, in particular the role and duties of 
the attorney representative for the victims.  As negotiations regarding the damages provision 
continued, the defense was able to delay having Epstein enter his guilty plea in state court.   
A. 
September – October 2007:  Sloman’s Concerns about Selection of an 
Attorney Representative Lead to a Proposed NPA Addendum 
 
The first controversy centered on the appointment of an attorney representative for the 
victims.  Initially, Villafaña reached out to a private attorney who was one of several suggested to 
her for that role.  Villafaña notified Lefkowitz that she was recommending the attorney to serve as 
the victims’ representative and suggested a phone conference to discuss what information the 
USAO could disclose to the attorney about the case.  Villafaña told Lefkowitz that she had never 
met the attorney, but he had been recommended by “a good friend in our appellate section” and by 
one of the district judges in Miami.134  Over the next few days, Villafaña exchanged messages with 
the attorney about the possibility of his serving as the attorney representative.  She also exchanged 
emails with Lefkowitz, passing along procedural questions raised by the attorney.   
 
By this time, Lourie had fully transitioned to his detail at the Department’s Criminal 
Division.  Sloman, who had been on vacation during...

 
88 
 
a proposal regarding the special master’s responsibilities, along with a draft letter to send to the 
special master explaining the procedure for selecting an attorney representative.   
 
Lefkowitz objected to this proposal in a letter to Villafaña, pointing out that the NPA did 
not provide for the appointment of a special master.  More importantly, Lefkowitz used the 
discussion of the special master as an opening to press for other alterations to the language of the 
NPA or, at least, to its interpretation.  Focusing on the attorney representative, Lefkowitz argued 
that the attorney’s role should be viewed as limited to negotiating settlements and that the attorney 
was precluded from filing lawsuits on behalf of victims who could not reach a negotiated 
settlement with Epstein.  Lefkowitz proposed: 
[T]he selected attorney should evaluate the claims of each identified 
individual, negotiate a total fund amount with Mr. Epstein, then 
distribute the monies based on the strength of each case.  For those 
identified individuals who elect not to settle with Mr. Epstein, they 
may proceed on their own, but by doing so, they would not be suing 
under § 2255 as contemplated by [the NPA] and therefore may not 
continue to be represented by the selected attorney. 
Lefkowitz also objected to Villafaña’s draft letter to the special master, asserting that it was 
essential for the defense to participate in crafting a “mutually acceptable communication” to the 
victims.  Going further, Lefkowitz claimed that any contact between the USAO and the victims 
about the § 2255 provision would violate the agreement’s confidentiality provision.  Lefkowitz 
admonished the government not to contact the victims “to inform them of the resolution of the 
case, including [the] appointment of the selected attorney and the settlement process.”   
 
Villafaña forwarded Lefkowitz’s letter to Sloman, complaining that the defense 
interpretation of the § 2255 procedure violated the cle...

 
89 
 
that Epstein pay the victims’ legal fees incurred from contested litigation would “trigger profound 
ethical problems,” in that the attorney representative would have an incentive to reject settlement 
offers in order to incur more fees.  In addition, Lefkowitz rejected Villafaña’s view that Epstein 
had waived the right to challenge § 2255 liability as to victims who did not want to settle their 
claims, and contended that any such victims “will have to prove, among other things, that they are 
victims under the enumerated statutes.”  Finally, Lefkowitz again argued that the USAO should 
not discuss the settlement process with the victims who were to be identified as eligible for 
settlement under § 2255: 
Ms. Villafaña proposes that either she or federal agents will speak 
with the [victims] regarding the settlement process.  We do not think 
it is the government’s place to be co-counsel to the [victims], nor 
should the FBI be their personal investigators.  Neither federal 
agents nor anyone from your Office should contact the [victims] to 
inform them of the resolution of the case, including appointment of 
the attorney representative and the settlement process.  Not only 
would that violate the confidentiality of the Agreement, but 
Mr. Epstein also will have no control over what is communicated to 
the [victims] at this most critical stage.  We believe it is essential 
that we participate in crafting a mutually acceptable communication 
to the [victims].  We further believe that communications between 
your Office or your case agents and the [victims] might well violate 
Rule 6(e)(2)(B) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.  The 
powers of the federal grand jury should not, even in appearance, be 
utilized to advance the interests of a party to a civil lawsuit.137 
Lefkowitz concluded, “I look forward to resolving these open issues with you during our 4:30 call 
today.”138   
Villafaña was at that time on sick leave, and Sloman and Acosta exchang...

 
90 
 
However, as with Villafaña’s publicly released emails to Lefkowitz, this meeting between 
Acosta and Lefkowitz drew criticism when the media learned of it during the CVRA litigation.  It 
was seen either as further evidence of the USAO’s willingness to meet with Epstein’s attorneys 
while simultaneously ignoring the victims, or as a meeting at which Acosta made secret 
agreements with the defense.  
Two letters written later in 2007 refer to the breakfast meeting.  In a December 2007 letter 
to Sanchez, Acosta stated that he had “sua sponte proposed the Addendum to Mr. Lefkowitz at an 
October meeting in Palm Beach . . . . in an attempt to avoid what I foresaw would likely be a 
litigious selection process.”139  In an October 23, 2007 letter from Lefkowitz to Acosta, less than 
two weeks after the breakfast meeting, Lefkowitz represented that during the meeting, Acosta  
assured me that [the USAO] would not intervene with the State 
Attorney’s Office regarding this matter; or contact any of the 
identified individuals, potential witnesses, or potential civil 
claimants and their respective counsel in this matter; and that neither 
[the USAO] nor the [FBI] would intervene regarding the sentence 
Mr. Epstein receives pursuant to a plea with the State, so long as the 
sentence does not violate state law.140 
However, two days after receiving this letter, Acosta revised a response letter drafted by 
Sloman, adding the term “inaccurate” to describe Lefkowitz’s claims that Acosta had promised 
not to intervene with the State Attorney’s Office, contact individual witnesses or claimants, or 
intervene regarding Epstein’s sentence.141  The draft response stated, “[S]uch a promise equates to 
the imposition of a gag order.  Our Office cannot and will not agree to this.”142   
Acosta told OPR that he did not remember the breakfast meeting, but he speculated that 
the meeting may have been prompted by defense complaints that Villafaña had recommended “her 
boyfriend’s p...

 
91 
 
Lefkowitz’s description of their breakfast meeting discussion, Acosta told OPR that there were 
“several instances” in which Lefkowitz and other defense counsel mischaracterized something he 
or an AUSA said, in a way that was misleading.   
Emails show that, immediately after the breakfast, Acosta phoned Sloman, who then 
emailed to Lefkowitz a revision to the Addendum language they had been negotiating and who 
also later reported to Villafaña that Lefkowitz’s “suggested revision has been rejected.”  Other 
emails show that the parties continued to be at odds about the proposed language for the NPA 
addendum for several days after the breakfast meeting.   
C. 
Acosta Agrees to the Defense Request to Postpone Epstein’s Guilty Plea; the 
Parties Continue to Negotiate Issues concerning the Attorney Representative 
and Finally Reach Agreement on the NPA Addendum  
 
A week after his breakfast meeting with Acosta, Lefkowitz—citing a scheduling conflict— 
sent Acosta an email seeking his agreement to postpone Epstein’s entry of his guilty plea in state 
court from October 26, 2007, the date agreed to in the NPA, to November 20, 2007.  In his email, 
Lefkowitz reported that the State Attorney’s Office had agreed to the postponement, and he noted 
that Acosta had said during the breakfast meeting that he “didn’t want to dictate a schedule to the 
state.”145  Acosta solicited input from Sloman, who later that day emailed Lefkowitz and agreed 
to the postponement.   
 
With Lourie having departed from the USAO, Sloman became more involved in 
negotiating the NPA addendum than he had been in the negotiations leading to the NPA, and he 
quickly came up against the problem Villafaña and Lourie had faced: the defense attorneys 
continued to negotiate provisions to which they had seemingly already agreed.  Between October 
12 and 19, 2007, in a series of email exchanges and phone conversations, Acosta, Sloman, 
Villafaña, and Lefkowitz continued working on language for t...

 
92 
 
 
On October 22, 2007, Sloman responded to the issues Lefkowitz had raised, rejecting some 
defense proposals but agreeing to modify certain language in the proposed addendum to “satisfy 
your concern.”146  Noting that the addendum and a revised letter to the special master were 
attached, Sloman ended by stating, “[T]his needs to be concluded.  Alex and I believe that this is 
as far as we can go.  Therefore, please advise me whether we have a deal no later than COB 
tomorrow . . . .” 
Nonetheless, the next day, Lefkowitz sent Acosta a three-page letter reiterating the Epstein 
team’s disagreements with the USAO’s interpretation of the NPA.  Lefkowitz noted, however, that 
Epstein had “every intention of honoring the terms of [the NPA] in good faith,” and that the defense 
letter was not intended to be “a rescission or withdrawal from the terms of the [NPA].”  Lefkowitz 
added: 
I also want to thank you for the commitment you made to me during 
our October 12 meeting in which you promised genuine finality with 
regard to this matter, and assured me that your Office would not 
intervene with the State Attorney’s Office regarding this matter; or 
contact any of the identified individuals, potential witnesses, or 
potential civil claimants and their respective counsel in this matter; 
and that neither your Office nor the [FBI] would intervene regarding 
the sentence Mr. Epstein receives pursuant to a plea with the State, 
so long as that sentence does not violate state law.  Indeed, so long 
as Mr. Epstein’s sentence does not explicitly violate the terms of the 
Agreement, he is entitled to any type of sentence available to him, 
including but not limited to gain time and work release. 
Sloman forwarded the letter to Villafaña, commenting, “Wait [until] you see this one.”  
Villafaña replied: 
Welcome to my world.  I love the way that they want to interpret 
this agreement.  
. . . .  
It also looks like they are planning to ask for and receive a sentence 
far...

 
93 
 
 
. . . .  
Why don’t we agree to mutual recission [sic] and indict him? 
Acosta also weighed in, sending both Villafaña and Sloman an email with a subject line 
that read “This has to stop,” in which he stated: 
Just read the letter. 
1. 
We specifically refused to include the provision saying that 
we would not communicate.  If I recall the conference call, we told 
him we could not agree to a gag order using those words. 
2.  
The purpose of the agreement was not an out of court 
settlement.  Seems that they can’t take no.  Let’s talk re how to 
proceed.  I’m not sure we will ever agree on a letter [to the special 
master about how to select an attorney representative] at this point. 
Notwithstanding Acosta’s assessment and prediction, after Sloman sent to Lefkowitz a new 
draft addendum and they spoke by phone, the parties reached agreement on the addendum’s 
terms.147   
On October 25, 2007, Sloman sent a letter to the person whom the USAO had selected to 
serve as special master, outlining the special master’s duties.  A few days later, on October 29, 
2007, Epstein and his attorneys Lefcourt and Sanchez signed the NPA addendum.148  Villafaña’s 
name was printed as the USAO representative, but at Villafaña’s request, Sloman signed the 
addendum for her on behalf of the USAO.   
Villafaña later emailed Sloman thanking him for “the advice and the pep talk,” which 
apparently related to the defense attorneys’ allegation of impropriety concerning her initial 
selection of the private attorney to assist the victims.  Villafaña explained to Sloman: 
The funny thing is that I had never met (and still haven’t met) or 
spoken to [the private attorney] before I asked him if he would be 
willing to take on this case. . . . But as soon as you mentioned the 
appearance problem, I saw where the problem would arise and 
agreed that the Special Master would be a safer route.  I just worry 
that the defense’s attacks on me could harm the victims. 
Sloman responded that...

 
94 
 
D. 
Epstein Further Delays His Guilty Plea 
 
The addendum did not bring the case to conclusion.  Instead, the matter entered a new, 
protracted phase, which involved the upper echelons of the Department of Justice.  Despite the 
fact that Epstein and his attorneys had signed the NPA, they pursued a new strategy of appealing 
to senior Department managers with the goal of setting aside the NPA entirely.  Although 
ultimately unsuccessful, the strategy delayed the entry of Epstein’s guilty plea by months.  
On October 29, 2007, Villafaña emailed Sloman, raising several issues that she wanted 
Sloman to address with Lefkowitz.  Among other things, Villafaña pointed out that the NPA 
required Epstein to use his “best efforts” to comply with the agreement, but he had failed to comply 
with the timeline established by the NPA when he sought and obtained a plea hearing 
postponement from October 26 to November 20.  Responding to Lefkowitz’s attempts to limit the 
USAO’s communications with various entities and individuals, Villafaña noted that the USAO 
needed to be able to communicate with the State Attorney’s Office and the victims’ attorney “to 
[e]nsure that Epstein is abiding by the terms of the agreement.”   
That same day, Assistant State Attorney Belohlavek informed Sloman that the state judge 
assigned to the case had scheduled Epstein’s plea and sentence in early January 2008.  Belohlavek 
assured Sloman that the “plea and sentence will definitely occur before the January 4th date that 
was agreed on by all for the sentencing.”149  Nonetheless, emails over the course of the next month 
show that the USAO, the State Attorney’s Office, and defense counsel continued to communicate 
regarding the date of the guilty plea, with the USAO asserting that a proposed January 7, 2008 
date for the entry of Epstein’s guilty plea was “unacceptable,” while the defense contended that 
Epstein had not agreed to any date.  Finally, after multiple communications referring ...

 
95 
 
not recall for OPR the substance of his conversation with Starr, other than that it was likely about 
Epstein’s wish to have the Department review the case.152   
 
On November 28, 2007, Starr requested, by letter, a meeting with Fisher.  In his letter, Starr 
argued that the USAO improperly had compelled Epstein to agree to pay civil damages under 
18 U.S.C. § 2255 as part of a state-based resolution of a criminal case.  On the same day, Lefkowitz 
emailed Sloman, complaining about the USAO’s plan to notify victims about the § 2255 provision 
and alerting Sloman that Epstein’s counsel were seeking a meeting with the Assistant Attorney 
General “to address what we believe is the unprecedented nature of the section 2255 component” 
of the NPA.  After Lourie sent to Sloman a copy of the Starr letter, Sloman forwarded it to 
Villafaña, asking her to prepare a chronology of the plea negotiations and how the § 2255 provision 
evolved.  Villafaña responded that she was “going through all of the ways in which they have tried 
to breach the agreement to convince you guys to let me indict.” 
 
In Washington, D.C., Lourie consulted with CEOS Chief Oosterbaan, asking for his 
thoughts on defense counsel’s arguments.  At the same time, at Lourie’s request, Villafaña sent 
the NPA and its addendum to Lourie and Oosterbaan.  Oosterbaan responded to Lourie that he was 
“not thrilled” about the NPA; described Epstein’s conduct as unusually “egregious,” particularly 
because of its serial nature; and observed that the NPA was “pretty advantageous for the defendant 
and not all that helpful to the victims.”  He opined, however, that the Assistant Attorney General 
would not and should not consider or address the NPA “other than to say that she agrees with it.”  
During her OPR interview, Fisher did not recall reading Starr’s letter or discussing it with 
Oosterbaan, but believed the comment about her “agree[ing] with it” referred to a federal 
prosecution of Epstein, which sh...

 
96 
 
[S]ince the signing of the September 24th agreement, more than two 
months[] ago, it has become clear that several attorneys on your 
legal team are dissatisfied with that result. 
 
. . . . 
[You], Professor Dershowitz, former Solicitor [General] Starr, 
former United States Attorney Lewis, Ms. Sanchez and Messrs. 
Black, Goldberger and Lefcourt previously had the opportunity to 
review and raise objections to the terms of the Agreement.  The 
defense team, however, after extensive negotiation, chose to adopt 
the Agreement.  Since then counsel have objected to several steps 
taken by the U.S. Attorney’s Office to effectuate the terms of the 
Agreement, in essence presenting collateral challenges to portions 
of the Agreement. 
It is not the intention of this Office ever to require a defendant to 
enter a plea against his wishes.  Your client has the right to proceed 
to trial.  If your client is dissatisfied with his Agreement, or believes 
that it is unlawful or unfair, we stand ready to unwind the 
Agreement. 
 
In a separate, seven-page letter to Starr, with Villafaña’s and Sloman’s input, Acosta 
responded to the substance of Starr’s November 28 letter to Assistant Attorney General Fisher.  
Fisher told OPR that she did not recall why Acosta, rather than her office, responded to the letter, 
but she conjectured that “probably I was trying to make sure that somebody responded since [the 
Criminal Division wasn’t] going to respond.”153   
In his seven-page letter, sent to Starr on December 4, 2007, Acosta wrote: 
The Non-Prosecution Agreement entered into between this Office 
and Mr. Epstein responds to Mr. Epstein’s desire to reach a global 
resolution of his state and federal criminal liability.  Under this 
Agreement, this District has agreed to defer prosecution for 
enumerated sections of Title 18 in favor of prosecution by the State 
of Florida, provided . . . Mr. Epstein satisfies three general federal 
interests:  (1) that Mr. Epstein plead guilt...

 
97 
 
provision, recounted the history of NPA negotiations, and described the post-signing efforts by 
Epstein’s counsel to challenge portions of the NPA.  Acosta’s letter concluded: 
Although it happens rarely, I do not mind this Office’s decision 
being appealed to Washington, and have previously directed our 
prosecutors to delay filings in this case to provide defense counsel 
with the option of appealing our decisions.  Indeed, although I am 
confident in our prosecutors’ evidence and legal analysis, I 
nonetheless directed them to consult with the subject matter experts 
in [CEOS] to confirm our interpretation of the law before approving 
their [charges].  I am thus surprised to read a letter addressed to 
Department Headquarters that raises issues that either have not been 
raised with this Office previously or that have been raised, and in 
fact resolved, in your client’s favor. 
I am troubled, likewise, by the apparent lack of finality in this 
Agreement.  The AUSAs who have been negotiating with defense 
counsel have for some time complained to me regarding the tactics 
used by the defense team.  It appears to them that as soon as 
resolution is reached on one issue, defense counsel finds ways to 
challenge the resolution collaterally.  My response thus far has been 
that defense counsel is doing its job to vigorously represent the 
client.  That said, there must be closure on this matter.  Some in our 
Office are deeply concerned that defense counsel will continue to 
mount collateral challenges to provisions of the Agreement, even 
after Mr. Epstein has entered his guilty plea and thus rendered the 
agreement difficult, if not impossible, to unwind. 
 
. . . . 
I would reiterate that it is not the intention of this Office ever to force 
the hand of a defendant to enter into an agreement against his 
wishes.  Your client has the right to proceed to trial.  Although time 
is of the essence . . . I am directing our prosecutors not to issue 
victim notific...

 
98 
 
the defense “[f]irst and foremost” reaffirmed the NPA and that Epstein “has no intention of 
unwinding the agreement.”   
On December 7, 2007—the deadline set by Acosta in his December 4, 2007 letter to Starr—
the defense transmitted to the USAO a one-sentence “Affirmation” of the NPA and its addendum, 
signed by Epstein.154  
F. 
Despite Affirming the NPA, Defense Counsel Intensify Their Challenges to It 
and Accuse Villafaña of Improper Conduct 
1. 
December 7 and 11, 2007:  Starr and Lefkowitz Send to Acosta Letters 
and “Ethics Opinions” Complaining about the Federal Investigation 
and Villafaña 
On the same day that the defense team sent Epstein’s “Affirmation” to the USAO, Starr 
and Lefkowitz sent to Acosta two “independent ethics opinions”—one authored by prominent 
criminal defense attorney and former U.S. Attorney Joe Whitley, which assessed purported 
improprieties in the federal investigation of Epstein, and the other, by a prominent retired federal 
judge and former U.S. Attorney, arguing against the NPA’s use of the civil damages recovery 
provision under 18 U.S.C. § 2255 “as a proxy for traditional criminal restitution.”   
Days later, on December 11, 2007, Starr sent a letter to Acosta transmitting two lengthy 
submissions authored by Lefkowitz presenting substantive challenges to the NPA and to the 
“background and conduct of the investigation.”  These submissions repeated arguments previously 
raised by the defense but also asserted new issues.  In one submission, 20 pages long, Lefkowitz 
addressed the “improper involvement” of federal authorities in the investigation and criticized 
Villafaña for a number of alleged improprieties, including having engaged in “unprecedented 
federal overreaching” by seeking to prosecute Epstein federally, “insist[ing]” that the State 
Attorney’s Office “charge Mr. Epstein with violations of law and recommend a sentence that are 
significantly harsher than what the State deemed appropriate,” and requiring t...

 
99 
 
Notwithstanding these voluminous submissions, Lefkowitz added that Epstein 
“unconditionally re-asserts his intention to fulfill and not seek to withdraw from or unwind” the 
NPA. 
2. 
As a Result of the Starr and Lefkowitz Submissions, the New USAO 
Criminal Chief Begins a Full Review of the Evidence, and Acosta 
Agrees to Meet Again with Defense Counsel 
 
After reviewing Starr’s and Lefkowitz’s letters, Sloman notified Villafaña that “in light of 
the recent Kirkland & Ellis correspondence” he had asked Robert Senior, who had succeeded 
Menchel as Chief of the USAO’s Criminal Division, to review de novo the evidence underlying 
the proposed revised indictment, and Sloman asked Villafaña to provide Senior with all the state 
and FBI investigative materials.   
In the meantime, Acosta agreed to meet with Starr and other Epstein defense attorneys to 
discuss the defense complaints raised in Lefkowitz’s December 11, 2007 submissions.156  The 
meeting took place in Miami on December 14, 2007.  The defense team included Starr, 
Dershowitz, Lefcourt, and Boston attorney Martin Weinberg.  The USAO side included Acosta, 
Sloman, Villafaña, and another senior AUSA, with the Miami FBI Special Agent in Charge and 
Assistant Special Agent in Charge also present.  In addition to previously raised arguments, during 
this meeting, Epstein’s attorneys raised a new argument—that the state charge to which Epstein 
had agreed to plead guilty did not apply to the facts of the case.   
3. 
The Defense Notifies Acosta That It May Pursue a Department Review 
of the USAO’s Actions  
 
Shortly after the December 14, 2007 meeting, Lefkowitz notified Acosta that if the issues 
raised at the meeting could not be resolved promptly, the defense team may “have no alternative 
but to seek review in Washington.”  Acosta notified Assistant Attorney General Fisher that the 
defense team might make an appeal to her, and he asked her to grant such a request for review and 
“to in fact review ...

 
100 
 
4. 
Acosta Attempts to Revise the NPA § 2255 Language concerning 
Monetary Damages, but the Defense Does Not Accept It 
Acosta undertook to respond to defense counsel’s continuing concern about the § 2255 
provision.  He sent to Deputy Assistant Attorney General Sigal Mandelker language that he 
proposed including in a revision to the NPA’s § 2255 implementation section.  Mandelker 
forwarded the language to her counterpart in the Civil Division, who responded to Mandelker and 
Acosta that he did not have “any insight” to offer.  On December 19, 2007, after Acosta and 
Sloman had a phone conversation with Starr and Lefkowitz, Acosta sent to Sanchez a letter 
proposing to resolve “our disagreements over interpretation[]” by replacing the existing language 
of the NPA relating to § 2255 with a provision that would read: 
Any person, who while a minor, was a victim of a violation of an 
offense enumerated in Title 18, United States Code, Section 2255, 
will have the same rights to proceed under Section 2255 as she 
would have had, if Mr. Epstein [had] been tried federally and 
convicted of an enumerated offense.  For purposes of implementing 
this paragraph, the United States shall provide Mr. Epstein’s 
attorneys with a list of individuals whom it was prepared to 
name . . . as victims of an enumerated offense by Mr. Epstein.  Any 
judicial authority interpreting this provision, including any authority 
determining which evidentiary burdens if any a plaintiff must meet, 
shall consider that it is the intent of the parties to place these 
identified victims in the same position as they would have been had 
Mr. Epstein been convicted at trial.  No more; no less.  
Acosta also noted that he had resisted his prosecutors’ urging to declare the NPA breached by the 
defense delays.157 
Lefkowitz responded by letter a few days later, suggesting that Acosta’s proposal raised 
“several troubling questions” and that “the problem arises from the incongruity that exists w...

 
101 
 
scheduled January 4, 2008 plea hearing.  As soon became apparent, Acosta was unable to achieve 
an expedited review so that Epstein could plead guilty and be sentenced by  
January 4, 2008, and the plea and sentencing date was rescheduled.  On January 2, 2008, Sloman 
spoke with Assistant State Attorney Belohlavek, who confirmed that the change of plea hearing 
had been postponed.  In an email reporting this to Acosta and Villafaña, Sloman said that Epstein’s 
local defense attorney Goldberger had told Belohlavek the postponement was because the facts 
“did not fit the proposed state charge,” and that Belohlavek told Sloman she agreed with that 
assessment.159  The next day, Villafaña sent to Acosta and Sloman a local newspaper article 
reporting that Epstein’s state plea hearing was reset for March and in exchange for it the federal 
authorities would drop their investigation of him.  Acosta also sent to Sloman and Villafaña an 
email memorializing a statement made to him by Lefkowitz in a phone call that day:  “‘I 
[Lefkowitz] may have made a mistake 6 months ago.  [Belohlavek] told us solicitation [is] not 
registrable.  It turns out that the actual offense charged is.’”160 
5. 
January 7, 2008:  Acosta and Sloman Meet with Sanchez, Who Makes 
Additional Allegations of USAO Misconduct 
 
On January 7, 2008, Acosta and Sloman met with defense attorney Sanchez at her request.  
According to meeting notes made by Sloman, among other things, Sanchez alleged that the 
USAO’s media spokesperson had improperly disclosed details of the Epstein case to a national 
news reporter, and Sanchez “suggested that the USAO could avoid any potential ugliness in DC 
by agreeing to a watered-down resolution for Epstein.”  After Acosta excused himself to attend 
another meeting and Sloman refused to speak further with Sanchez “without a witness present,” 
she left.  Later that day, Acosta and Sloman spoke by phone with Starr, Lefkowitz, and Sanchez, 
who expressed concern ab...

 
102 
 
that it was to establish whether, if the plea fell apart, he, as Chief, would agree “that we can go 
forward with” the charges.  He did recall being concerned, after completing the review, that “we 
did not have . . . a lot of victims . . . lined up and ready to testify” and that some victims might “not 
be favorable for us.”  Nevertheless, he concluded that the proposed charges were sound, and he 
told Acosta that he would approve proceeding with a federal case.   
6. 
Acosta Asks CEOS to Review the Evidence 
 
Notwithstanding Senior’s favorable review, Acosta and Sloman told Starr and Lefkowitz 
that they “appreciate[d]” that the defense wanted a “fresh face” to conduct a review, and noted that 
the Criminal Chief had not undertaken the “in-depth work associated with the issues raised by the 
defense.”  They told the defense team that Acosta had asked CEOS to “come on board” and that 
CEOS Chief Oosterbaan would designate an attorney having “a national perspective” to conduct 
a fresh review in light of the defense submissions.  Oosterbaan assigned a CEOS Trial Attorney 
who Villafaña understood was to review the case and prepare for trial in the event Epstein did not 
“consummate” the NPA.  The CEOS Trial Attorney traveled to Florida to review the case 
materials, and to meet with Villafaña to discuss the case and interview some of the victims.  After 
one such meeting, Villafaña wrote to Acosta and Sloman: 
We just finished interviewing three of the girls.  I wish you could 
have been there to see how much this has affected them. 
One girl broke down sobbing so that we had to stop the interview 
twice within a 20 minute span.  She regained her composure enough 
to continue a short time, but she said that she was having nightmares 
about Epstein coming after her and she started to break down again, 
so we stopped the interview. 
The second girl . . . told us that she was very upset about the 18 
month deal she had read about in the paper.  She said that ...

 
103 
 
these victim issues as insurmountable but, based on these alone, the CEOS Trial Attorney 
considered a potential prosecution of Epstein to be a “crap shoot.”  In addition, she told OPR that 
there were novel legal issues in the case that also presented difficulties, although she believed these 
difficulties could be overcome.  Shortly after the CEOS Trial Attorney met with the victims, 
however, “things just stopped” when Oosterbaan instructed her to cease her involvement in the 
case and CEOS engaged in the Criminal Division review sought by Epstein’s defense team.   
IX. 
FEBRUARY – JUNE 2008:  THE DEPARTMENT’S REVIEW 
Epstein’s defense attorneys sought a broad review from the Department, one that would 
encompass the defense complaints about federal jurisdiction, specific terms in the NPA, and the 
various allegations of professional misconduct by USAO attorneys and other personnel.  The 
Department, however, only reviewed the issue of federal jurisdiction and never reviewed the NPA 
or any specific provisions.162  Nonetheless, the process took several months as the defense 
appealed first to CEOS and the Department’s Criminal Division, and then to the Office of the 
Deputy Attorney General.  The chart set forth on the following page shows the positions and 
relationships among the individuals in those offices involved in communicating with the USAO 
or defense beginning in November 2007 or in those offices’ reviews, which continued through 
June 2008. 
 
 
 
                                                 
162  
On February 28, 2008, USAO Criminal Division Chief Senior sent to the Civil Rights Division written 
notification of the USAO’s “ongoing investigation of a child exploitation matter” involving Epstein and others “that 
may result in charges of violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1591.”  USAM § 8-3.120 required a U.S. Attorney to notify the 
Civil Rights Division, in writing, “[a]t the outset of a criminal investigation . . . that may implicate federal cr...

Criminal Division 
*until late Feb. 2008 
Alice Fisher 
Assistant Attorney 
General 
Andrew Lourie * 
Principal Deputy 
Assistant Attorney 
General 
Sigal Mandelker 
Deputy Assistant 
Attorney General 
Andrew 
Oosterbaan 
Chief, CEOS 
Office of the Deputy 
Attorney General 
Mark Filip 
Deputy Attorney 
General 
John Roth 
Senior Associate 
Deputy Attorney 
General 
A. 
February - May 15, 2008: Review by CEOS and the Criminal Division 
On Febrnaiy 21, 2008, soon after the CEOS Trial Attorney met with victims, Oosterbaan 
spoke with Lefkowitz about CEOS's role. fu a subsequent email to Villafana, Sloman, and Senior, 
Oosterbaan explained: 
I told [Lefkowitz] that all I want to do is help the process move 
fo1ward, and if they think we best help the process by taking a fresh 
and objective look at the case and their arguments [then] that is what 
I want to do. I told him that if that's what they want - if that is what 
will help the process to move fo1ward - then I don't think it's 
advisable for CEOS to partner with the USAO on the case. He wants 
to think about that (and probably talk to his co-counsel about 
104 

 
105 
 
whether it is better to have us partnered in the case or just serve a 
review function) and he said he’d get back to me later today. 
Oosterbaan told OPR that this email reflects that he likely told Acosta that he intended to 
limit CEOS’s role to review only, and Acosta asked him to “make sure the defense is okay with 
that,” to preempt a possible defense complaint about CEOS’s involvement in the review.  
Oosterbaan explained to OPR that “the defense ke[pt] bringing up new arguments and new 
problems and [the USAO was saying] look if we’re going to do this, if you’ve got a problem with 
it, tell us now.”   
By February 25, 2008, Lefkowitz told Oosterbaan, who informed Sloman, that the CEOS 
role should be “review only.”  Lourie had just then left the Department to enter private practice, 
and Oosterbaan continued to keep his direct supervisor, Deputy Assistant Attorney General 
Mandelker, informed of the defense team contacts.  Sloman emailed Lefkowitz that CEOS was 
“ready to proceed immediately” with a review of the matter.  Sloman advised Lefkowitz that “in 
the event CEOS decides that a federal prosecution should not be undertaken against Mr. Epstein, 
this Office will close its investigation,” but that, “should CEOS disagree with Mr. Epstein’s 
position, Mr. Epstein shall have one week to abide by [the NPA].”  Sloman forwarded this email 
to Villafaña, who responded, “Why would we possibly let him keep the same deal after all he has 
put us through?  And after we have discovered 6 new girls . . . .” 
 
The defense soon signaled that the CEOS review would not end Epstein’s requests for the 
Department’s involvement.  On February 29, 2008, Lefkowitz requested a defense meeting with 
Oosterbaan on March 12, 2008.163  Starr spoke to Assistant Attorney General Fisher and “made it 
clear that [the defense team would] want an audience with her if [CEOS] decid[ed] to support the 
prosecution.”  On March 6, 2008, Acosta alerted Sloman and Oosterbaan that Star...

 
106 
 
appeal an adverse determination by him within the DOJ.  Ken [Starr] 
and I appreciate that you understand this and have no objection to 
our seeking appellate review within DOJ. 
 
Starr, Lefkowitz, and Martin Weinberg attended the March 12, 2008 meeting, as well as 
the former Principal Deputy Chief of CEOS, who had joined the Epstein defense team.  
Oosterbaan, Mandelker, and a current CEOS Deputy Chief represented the Department.  The 
current CEOS Deputy Chief told OPR that it was primarily a “listening session” with Starr doing 
most of the presentation.  Oosterbaan told OPR that he recalled “some back and forth” because the 
defense team was saying “some outrageous things.”  Both Oosterbaan and his Deputy Chief were 
disturbed that the former CEOS Principal Deputy Chief, who had been an aggressive advocate for 
child exploitation prosecutions, was supporting the defense position, although according to the 
CEOS Deputy Chief, the former Principal Deputy Chief gave only a “weak pitch” that was not 
effective. 
After the meeting, Starr and Lefkowitz made multiple written submissions to the Criminal 
Division.  One submission provided a lengthy list of USAO actions that “have caused us serious 
concern,” including the following: 
“Federal involvement in a state criminal prosecution without any 
communication with state authorities”;164  
the issuance of legal process and document requests for items that 
“had no connection to the conduct at issue”; 
the nomination “of an individual closely associated with one of the 
Assistant United States Attorneys involved in this case” to serve as 
the victims’ attorney representative; 
the “insistence” on a victim notification letter inviting the victims to 
make sworn statements at Epstein’s sentencing; and 
the purported existence of a “relationship” between Sloman and a 
law firm representing several of the alleged victims in civil suits 
against Epstein.165 
                                                 
164  ...

 
107 
 
In another letter, Starr renewed the defense accusation that the USAO improperly disclosed 
information about the case to the media, and accused Sloman and Villafaña of “encouraging civil 
litigation” against Epstein.  Finally, in a letter to Assistant Attorney General Fisher on  
May 14, 2008, Starr thanked her for having spoken with him the previous day, reiterated the 
defense team’s various complaints, and asked her to meet with him, Lefkowitz, and Whitley.    
Meanwhile, Oosterbaan’s Deputy Chief drafted a decision letter to be sent from Oosterbaan 
to Lefkowitz, and over the course of several weeks, it was reviewed by and received input from 
Deputy Assistant Attorney General Mandelker and Assistant Attorney General Fisher, as well as 
the Criminal Division’s Appellate Section (regarding certain legal issues) and Office of 
Enforcement Operations (regarding the Petite policy).  Oosterbaan told OPR that, notwithstanding 
the defense submissions on a wide variety of issues and complaints, CEOS’s review was limited 
to determining whether there was a basis for a federal prosecution of Epstein.    
Oosterbaan’s letter, sent to Lefkowitz on May 15, 2008, notified the defense team that 
CEOS had completed its independent evaluation of whether prosecution of Epstein for federal 
criminal violations “would contradict criminal enforcement policy interests.”  The letter specified 
that CEOS’s review addressed the “narrow question” of whether a legitimate basis existed for a 
federal prosecution, and that CEOS did not conduct a de novo review of the facts, analyze issues 
relating to federal statutes that did not pertain to child exploitation, or review the terms of the NPA 
or the prosecutorial misconduct allegations.  The letter stated that based on its examination of the 
material relevant to its limited review of the matter, CEOS had concluded that “federal prosecution 
in this case would not be improper or inappropriate” and that Acosta “could properly use ...

 
108 
 
federal prosecution is not appropriate in this case.”168  Lefkowitz alluded to the possibility of 
seeking further review of the matter by the Deputy Attorney General or Attorney General, should 
the defense be unable to “resolve this matter directly with” Acosta.   
 
Acosta declined the request to respond personally and directed Lefkowitz to communicate 
with the “trial team.”  That same day, Sloman sent Lefkowitz a letter asking that all further 
communication about the case be made to Villafaña or her immediate supervisor, and reiterating 
that Acosta would not respond personally to counsel’s email or calls.  Sloman noted that the USAO 
had “bent over backwards to exhaustively consider and re-consider” Epstein’s objections, but 
“these objections have finally been exhausted.”  Sloman advised that the USAO would terminate 
the NPA unless Epstein complied with all of its terms by the close of business on  
June 2, 2008.   
B. 
May – June 23, 2008:  Review by the Office of the Deputy Attorney General 
Also on May 19, 2008, Starr and Whitley co-authored a letter to Deputy Attorney General 
Mark Filip asking for review “of the federal involvement in a quintessentially state matter.”169  In 
the letter, they acknowledged that CEOS had recently completed “a very limited review” of the 
Epstein case, but contended that “full review of all the facts is urgently needed at senior levels of 
the Justice Department.”  They argued that federal prosecution of Epstein was “unwarranted,” and 
that “the irregularity of conduct by prosecutors and the unorthodox terms of the [NPA] are beyond 
any reasonable interpretation of the scope of a prosecutor’s responsibilities.”  They followed up 
with a second letter on May 27, 2008, in which they asserted “the bedrock need for integrity in the 
enforcement of federal criminal laws” and “the profound questions raised by the unprecedented 
extension of federal laws . . . to a prominent public figure who has close ties to President...

 
109 
 
Division forwarded to Roth the prior defense submissions, describing them as “an enormous 
amount of material” regarding the Epstein matter.  On June 3, 2008, Sloman sent to Roth a lengthy 
letter from Sloman to the Deputy Attorney General, recounting in detail the history of negotiations 
with Epstein’s counsel culminating in the NPA, and addressing Epstein’s claims of professional 
misconduct.  Among the documents submitted with the letter were the prosecution memorandum, 
one of the proposed charging documents, and the NPA with its addendum and Acosta’s 
December 19, 2007 letter to Sanchez. 
As the review was ongoing in the Office of the Deputy Attorney General, State Attorney 
Krischer mentioned to the USAO’s West Palm Beach manager that Krischer and Epstein’s local 
defense attorney Jack Goldberger had arrived at a resolution of Epstein’s case that would involve 
a 90-day jail term, but Krischer provided no further information.  Upon learning of this, Villafaña 
wrote to her immediate supervisor:  “Please tell me that you are joking.  Maybe we should throw 
him [Epstein] a party and tell him we are sorry to have bothered him.”  Villafaña and her immediate 
supervisor later had phone and email exchanges with Krischer and with Epstein’s local counsel to 
insist that the state plea comply with the terms of the NPA, or “we will consider it a breach of the 
agreement and proceed accordingly.”171  
 
Deputy Attorney General Filip told OPR he had never heard of Epstein before receiving 
Starr’s letter.  Following the office’s standard protocol, Starr’s letter was handled by John Roth, 
an experienced senior federal prosecutor who had served some years before as an AUSA in the 
USAO.  Roth also told OPR that he had never before heard of Epstein.  Roth explained to OPR 
that he did not conduct an independent investigation, interview witnesses, or meet with Epstein’s 
counsel, and instead limited his review to written materials submitted by Epstein’s attorneys a...

 
110 
 
On Monday, June 23, 2008, Roth sent a brief letter to Starr and Lefkowitz informing them 
that the office had “completed a thorough review” of the USAO’s handling of the Epstein matter 
and did not believe intervention by the Deputy Attorney General was warranted in view of the 
“considerable discretion” vested by the Department in U.S. Attorneys.  He added, “Even if we 
were to substitute our judgment for that of the U.S. Attorney, we believe that federal prosecution 
of this case is appropriate.”   
Immediately after receiving a copy of Roth’s letter, Villafaña notified defense counsel that 
Epstein would have until close of business on Monday, June 30, 2008, to comply with the NPA 
by entering his guilty plea, being sentenced, and surrendering to begin serving his sentence.  On 
June 26, 2008, Roth alerted the Office of the Attorney General that Epstein’s counsel might try to 
contact the Attorney General to request additional review and urged the Attorney General not to 
take defense counsel’s calls.  Roth told OPR that he was concerned that Epstein’s team would try 
to take a further appeal in order to delay resolution of the case.   
 
Meanwhile, Starr sent a concluding email to Acosta, acknowledging they had reached “the 
end of a long and arduous road” and adding, “While I am obviously very unhappy at what I believe 
is the government’s treatment of my client, a man whom I have come to deeply admire, I recognize 
that we have filed and argued our ‘appellate motions’ and lost. . . .  I would like to have . . . some 
closure with you on this matter so that in the years to come, neither of us will harbor any ill will 
over the matter.” 
X. 
JUNE 2008 – JUNE 2009:  EPSTEIN ENTERS HIS PLEAS AND SERVES HIS 
CUSTODIAL SENTENCE 
 
On Friday, June 27, 2008, Villafaña renewed her requests to Epstein’s local attorneys 
Goldberger and Black for a copy of the state plea agreement reached with the State Attorney’s 
Office, noting that their failure to provide it ...

 
111 
 
The next day, Villafaña asked Goldberger to change the plea agreement by inserting the 
word “imprisoned” after “6 months,” and Goldberger agreed to do so.  Villafaña, however, did not 
ask that the agreement be amended to clarify that the reference to “the Palm Beach County 
Detention Facility” meant the jail, rather than the Stockade.  The final signed plea agreement form 
further clarified the sentence, providing that after serving 12 months in the Palm Beach County 
Detention Facility, Epstein would be “sentenced to 6 months in the Palm Beach County Detention 
Facility . . . to be served consecutive to the 12 month sentence,” followed by “12 months 
Community Control.”  The word “imprisoned” was hand written after “6 months” but then crossed 
out and replaced by “jail sentence.”173   
A. 
June 30, 2008:  Epstein Enters His Guilty Pleas in State Court 
 
Epstein, with his attorney Jack Goldberger, appeared in Palm Beach County court on  
June 30, 2008, and entered guilty pleas to the indictment charging him with one felony count of 
solicitation of prostitution and to a criminal information charging him with one felony count of 
procurement of a minor to engage in prostitution.174  At the plea hearing, which Villafaña and the 
FBI case agent attended as spectators, Assistant State Attorney Belohlavek did not proffer the facts 
of the case; instead she only recited the charging language in the indictment and the criminal 
information: 
[B]etween August 1, 2004 and October 31, 2005, the defendant in 
Palm Beach County did solicit or procure someone to commit 
[prostitution] on three or more occasions.  And . . . between  
August 1, 2004 and October 9, 2005, the defendant did procure a 
minor under the age of 18 to commit prostitution in Palm Beach 
County also.175 
The court found this to be “a sufficient factual basis to support the pleas,” and engaged in 
a colloquy with Belohlavek regarding Epstein’s victims: 
The Court:   
 
Are there more than one vic...

 
112 
 
The Court:   
Are all the victims in both these cases in 
agreement with the terms of the plea? 
Ms. Belohlavek:   
I have spoken to several myself and I have 
spoken to counsel, through counsel as to the 
other victim, and I believe, yes. 
The Court:   
And with regard to the victims under age 
eighteen, is that victim’s parents or guardian 
in agreement with the plea? 
Ms. Belohlavek:   
That victim is not under age 18 any more and 
that’s why we spoke with her counsel. 
The Court:   
 
And she is in agreement with the plea? 
Ms. Belohlavek:   
Yes.176 
When the court asked if the plea was “in any way tied to any promises or representations 
by any civil attorneys or other jurisdictions,” Goldberger and Belohlavek, with Epstein present, 
spoke with the judge at sidebar and disclosed the existence of the “confidential” non-prosecution 
agreement with the USAO, and the court ordered that a copy of it be filed under seal with the court.   
After the court accepted Epstein’s guilty pleas, and imposed sentence on him pursuant to 
the plea agreement, Epstein was taken into custody to begin serving his sentence immediately.   
In the aftermath of the plea, numerous individuals familiar with the investigation expressed 
positive reactions to the outcome, and Villafaña received several congratulatory messages.  
Oosterbaan wrote, “Congratulations, Marie—at long last!  Your work on this matter was truly 
exceptional, and you obtained a very significant result that will serve the victims well.”  One senior 
colleague who was familiar with the case noted, “This case only resolved with the filthy rich bad 
guy going to jail because of your dedication and determination.”  Another wrote, “If it had not 
been for you, he would have gotten away with it.”   The CEOS Trial Attorney who had worked 
briefly with Villafaña told her, “But for your tenacity, he’d be somewhere ruining another child’s 
life.”  One victim’s attorney stated, “[G]reat job of not letting this guy off....

 
113 
 
Dershowitz, Lefkowitz and Starr.”177  In that same later public statement, Acosta noted that he 
received communications from Dershowitz, Starr, and Lefkowitz, who “all sought to make peace” 
with him; Acosta referred to it as “a proud moment.”   
On July 7, 2008, an Epstein victim filed an emergency petition against the Department, in 
federal court in Miami, alleging violation of her rights under the CVRA; a second victim joined 
the petition soon thereafter.  The history of the litigation and issues relating to it are discussed in 
Chapter Three of this Report.   
B. 
Epstein Is Placed on Work Release 
 
A few days after Epstein’s guilty plea, Villafaña reported to Sloman that Epstein was 
incarcerated at the low-security Stockade, rather than the Main Detention Center where county 
prisoners were usually housed.  She also told Sloman that according to the Sheriff’s Office, Epstein 
was eligible for work release.  Although the USAO had made clear that it expected Epstein to be 
incarcerated 24 hours a day, every day, the subject of work release had not been addressed 
explicitly during the NPA negotiations, and the NPA itself was silent on the issue.  Epstein’s 
acceptance into the work release program as a convicted sexual offender was seen by many as 
another special benefit given to Epstein.  Because the decision to allow Epstein into the work 
release program was made by the Palm Beach Sheriff’s Office, OPR did not investigate whether 
any state, county, or Sheriff’s Office rules were violated.  OPR did examine the USAO’s 
consideration of work release prior to signing the NPA and its subsequent unsuccessful efforts to 
ensure that Epstein remained incarcerated 24 hours a day.     
The first specific reference to work release was made weeks after the NPA was signed, 
when Lefkowitz asserted, in his October 23, 2007 letter to Acosta, that, “so long as Mr. Epstein’s 
sentence does not explicitly violate the terms of the [NPA] he is entitled to any type...

 
114 
 
until after Epstein completed his sentence, but that Krischer would oppose such a petition “if it is 
in the agreement.”179  On November 16, 2007, the case agents met with Belohlavek and asked if 
the State Attorney’s Office would oppose a request that Epstein be granted work release.  
Belohlavek was noncommittal, and when the agents asked that she include language in the state’s 
plea agreement prohibiting Epstein from participating in work release, she responded that she 
would have to discuss the issue with the State Attorney.180  Krischer later told OPR that work 
release was “within the control of the Sheriff’s Office, not my office.”  The state’s plea agreement 
with Epstein did not address the issue of work release.   
The day after Epstein entered his June 30, 2008 plea, Villafaña and her immediate 
supervisor met with a Palm Beach Sheriff’s Office official to discuss work release.  According to 
Villafaña, the official told them, “Epstein would be eligible for work release and will be placed on 
work release,” a statement that contradicted the information the case agents had been given by a 
jail supervisor the previous November, as well as statements made by defense attorney Jack 
Goldberger to Villafaña just days before the plea was entered, when he “specifically told 
[Villafaña] that [Epstein] would not get work release.”  Villafaña alerted the Sheriff’s Office 
official that although Epstein told the court during his plea proceeding that he had worked “every 
day” for a “couple of years” at the “Florida Science Foundation,” that entity did not even exist 
until November 2007.181  Moreover, the address Epstein provided to the court for the “Florida 
Science Foundation” was the office of Epstein’s attorney Jack Goldberger.  Villafaña and her 
supervisor asked that the Sheriff’s Office notify the USAO if Epstein applied for work release.   
 
Acosta told OPR that he was aware Villafaña was trying to ensure that Epstein did not get 
work release,...

 
115 
 
for up to 12 hours per day, six days per week, to work at the “Florida Science Foundation” office 
in West Palm Beach.182  In mid-November 2008, Villafaña learned that Epstein was on work 
release.  She notified Acosta, Sloman, and the USAO Criminal Division Chief of this development 
in an email, and asked, “Can I indict him now?”   
On November 24, 2008, Villafaña sent defense attorney Black a letter, notifying him that 
the USAO believed Epstein’s application to and participation in the work release program 
constituted a material breach of the NPA.  Villafaña reminded Black that she had “more than a 
dozen e-mails” expressing the USAO’s “insistence” that Epstein be incarcerated for 18 months, 
and that her June 27, 2008 letter to counsel made clear that this meant “confinement for twenty-
four hours a day.”  Villafaña noted that Goldberger had not inserted the word “imprisoned” into 
the plea agreement, as he had agreed to do, but instead inserted the term “jail sentence.”  Villafaña 
told counsel: 
The [USAO’s] Agreement not to prosecute Mr. Epstein was based 
upon its determination that eighteen months’ incarceration (i.e., 
confinement twenty-four hours a day) was sufficient to satisfy the 
federal interest in Mr. Epstein’s crimes.  Accordingly, the U.S. 
Attorney’s Office hereby gives notice that Mr. Epstein has violated 
the [NPA] by failing to remain incarcerated twenty-four hours a day 
for the eighteen-month term of imprisonment.  The United States 
will exercise any and all rights it has under the [NPA] unless 
Mr. Epstein immediately ceases and desists from his breach of this 
agreement. 
According to Villafaña, the FBI case agent spoke with the Stockade’s work release 
coordinator and reported back that that the work release coordinator told her he had been led to 
believe the government knew Epstein had applied for the program, and that he had been threatened 
with legal action if he did not allow Epstein to participate in work release.    
...

 
116 
 
Florida law treated work release as part of confinement; and the Palm Beach County Sheriff’s 
Office had discretion to grant work release to any inmate.  Black also claimed that Acosta 
“recognized that Mr. Epstein might serve a portion of his sentence through the Work Release 
Program” and pointed out that the December 6, 2007 draft victim notification letter sent to 
Lefkowitz for review specifically referred to the victim’s right to be notified “if [Epstein] is 
allowed to participate in a work release program.”   
 
On December 3, 2008, in advance of a scheduled meeting with Black, Villafaña sent 
Sloman and Criminal Division Chief Senior an email about Epstein’s participation in the work 
release program: 
It appears that, since Day 1, Goldberger and Krisher [sic] . . . have 
been scheming to get Epstein out on work release.  For example, the 
indictment incorrectly charges Epstein for an offense that would 
have made him ineligible for work release if it had been charged 
correctly.  (Remember that Krisher [sic] also went along with letting 
us believe that Epstein was pleading to a registrable offense when 
Epstein’s folks and Krisher [sic] believed that . . . the offense was 
not registrable.)  Krisher [sic] and Goldberger also told us that 
Epstein would be housed at the Palm [Beach County] Jail, not the 
Stockade, but he would not have been eligible for work release if at 
the jail. . . .   
As part of his work release, Epstein has hired off-duty Sheriff’s 
deputies to provide him with “protection.”  It appears that he is 
paying between $3000 and $4100 per week for this service, despite 
the work release rules barring anyone from the Sheriff’s Office (and 
the Sheriff’s Office itself) from having “any business transactions 
with inmates . . . while they are in the custody or supervision of the 
Sheriff . . . .” 
Villafaña added that she and her immediate supervisor believed that the USAO “should not budge 
on the 24-hour-a-day incarceration” requ...

 
117 
 
the Sheriff’s Office that Epstein’s duties required him to work six days a week for 12 hours per 
day.  Finally, Villafaña pointed out that Epstein’s purported “supervisor”—who as the 
Foundation’s vice president was subordinate to Epstein, the Foundation’s president—had 
promised to alert the Sheriff’s Office if Epstein failed to comply with his work schedule, but the 
“supervisor” lived and worked in the New York metropolitan area and was unable to monitor 
Epstein’s activities on a day-to-day basis.  The Sheriff’s Office neither acknowledged nor 
responded to Villafaña’s letter. 
In March 2009, Sloman met in Miami with Dershowitz for, as Dershowitz characterized it 
in a subsequent email, “a relaxed drink and conversation,” which included a discussion of the 
Epstein case.  After that encounter, Dershowitz emailed Sloman, expressing appreciation for 
Sloman’s “assurance that the feds will not interfere with how the Palm Beach sheriff administers” 
Epstein’s sentence “as long as he is treated like any similarly situated inmate.”  Sloman responded: 
Regarding Mr. Epstein, the United States Attorney’s Office will not 
interfere with how the Palm Beach Sheriff’s Office administers the 
sentence imposed by the Court.  That being said, this does not mean 
that the USAO condones or encourages the PBSO to mitigate the 
terms and conditions of his sentence.  Furthermore, it does not mean 
that, if contacted for our position concerning alternative custody or 
in-home detention, we would not object.  To be clear, if contacted 
we will object.  Naturally, I also expect that no one on behalf of 
Mr. Epstein will use my assurance to you to affirmatively represent 
to PBSO that the USAO does not object to an alternative custody or 
home detention. 
A week later, Dershowitz emailed Sloman again, this time expressing appreciation for 
Sloman’s “willingness to call the sheriff and advise him that your office would take no position 
on how he handled Epstein’s sentence,” a...

 
118 
 
cooperation.186  When Villafaña spoke with attorneys in the Eastern District of New York, 
however, an AUSA there told Villafaña that “[t]hey had never heard of” Epstein, and he had not 
cooperated with the Bear Stearns case.187  During her OPR interview, Villafaña told OPR that to 
her knowledge, the rumor of Epstein’s cooperation was “completely false.”   
 
Villafaña and the USAO continued to monitor Epstein’s compliance with the terms of the 
NPA.  In August 2009, Villafaña alerted her supervisors that Epstein was in apparent violation of 
his home detention—he had been spotted walking on the beach, and when stopped by the police, 
he claimed that he was walking “to work” at an office nearly eight miles from his home.  Villafaña 
passed this information along to the Palm Beach County probation office.188  By letter dated 
September 1, 2009, Black wrote to Sloman seeking the USAO’s agreement to transfer supervision 
of the community control phase of Epstein’s sentence to the U.S. Virgin Islands, where Epstein 
maintained his “primary residence.”  In response, Villafaña notified Black that the USAO opposed 
such a request and would view it as a violation of the NPA.  Three months later, Sloman met with 
Dershowitz and, among other issues, informed him that the USAO opposed early termination of 
Epstein’s community control supervision and would object to a request to transfer Epstein’s 
supervision to the U.S. Virgin Islands.   
 
After serving his year on home detention in Florida, Epstein completed his sentence on 
July 21, 2010. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
186  
See “Out of Prison,” New York Post, July 23, 2009. 
187  
The New York AUSA had emailed Villafaña, “We’re the prosecutors in [the Bear Stearns case] . . . .  We 
saw the below article from the New York Post and wanted to ask you about this defendant, Epstein, who we had never 
heard of until this morning.  We’ve since learned that he is pretty unsavory.”  Villafaña...

 
119 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
PART TWO:  APPLICABLE STANDARDS 
 
I. 
OPR’S ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK  
 
OPR finds professional misconduct when an attorney intentionally violates or acts in 
reckless disregard of a known, unambiguous obligation imposed by law, rule of professional 
conduct, or Department regulation or policy.  In determining whether an attorney has engaged in 
professional misconduct, OPR uses the preponderance of the evidence standard to make factual 
findings. 
 
An attorney intentionally violates an obligation or standard when the attorney (1) engages 
in conduct with the purpose of obtaining a result that the obligation or standard unambiguously 
prohibits; or (2) engages in conduct knowing its natural or probable consequence, and that 
consequence is a result that the obligation or standard unambiguously prohibits.  An attorney acts 
in reckless disregard of an obligation or standard when (1) the attorney knows or should know, 
based on his or her experience and the unambiguous nature of the obligation or standard, of an 
obligation or standard; (2) the attorney knows or should know, based on his or her experience and 
the unambiguous applicability of the obligation or standard, that the attorney’s conduct involves a 
substantial likelihood that he or she will violate, or cause a violation of, the obligation or standard; 
and (3) the attorney nonetheless engages in the conduct, which is objectively unreasonable under 
all the circumstances.  Thus, an attorney’s disregard of an obligation is reckless when it represents 
a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that an objectively reasonable attorney would 
observe in the same situation.  
 
If OPR determines that an attorney did not engage in professional misconduct, OPR 
determines whether the attorney exercised poor judgment, engaged in other inappropriate conduct, 
made a mistake, or acted appropriately under all the circumstances.  An attorney exercises poor 
judgment when, faced with alternative c...

 
120 
 
affirmative steps the attorney reasonably believed were required to comply with an obligation or 
standard. 
II. 
APPLICABLE STANDARDS OF CONDUCT 
A. 
The United States Attorneys’ Manual  
 
Among its many provisions, the United States Attorneys’ Manual (USAM) includes 
general statements of principles that summarize appropriate considerations to be weighed, and 
desirable practices to be followed, by federal prosecutors when discharging their prosecutorial 
responsibilities.189  The goal of the USAM is to promote “the reasoned exercise of prosecutorial 
authority and contribute to the fair, evenhanded administration of the Federal criminal laws,” and 
to promote public confidence that important prosecutorial decisions will be made “rationally and 
objectively on the merits of each case.”  USAM § 9-27.001.  
Because the USAM is designed to assist in structuring the decision-making process of 
government attorneys, many of its principles are cast in general terms, with a view to providing 
guidance rather than mandating results.  Id.; see also USAM § 9-27.120, comment (“It is expected 
that each Federal prosecutor will be guided by these principles in carrying out his/her criminal law 
enforcement responsibilities . . . . However, it is not intended that reference to these principles will 
require a particular prosecutorial decision in any given case.”); USAM § 9-27.110, comment 
(“Under the Federal criminal justice system, the prosecutor has wide latitude in determining when, 
whom, how, and even whether to prosecute for apparent violations of Federal criminal law.”).  
However, USAM § 9-27.130 provides that AUSAs who depart from the principles of federal 
prosecution articulated in the USAM may be subject to internal discipline.  In particular, USAM 
§ 9-27.130 states that each U.S. Attorney should establish internal office procedures to ensure that 
prosecutorial decisions are made at an appropriate level of responsibility and are consistent with 
the pri...

 
121 
 
him/her by an agency unless a statute provides otherwise.”  Whenever a U.S. Attorney closes a 
case without prosecution, the file should reflect the action taken and the reason for it.  USAM 
§ 9-27.220 sets forth the grounds to be considered in making the decision whether to commence 
or decline federal prosecution.  A federal prosecutor should commence or recommend prosecution 
if he or she believes that admissible evidence will probably be sufficient to obtain and sustain a 
conviction of a federal offense, unless (1) the prosecution would serve no federal interest; (2) the 
person is subject to effective prosecution in another jurisdiction; or (3) there exists an adequate 
alternative to prosecution.  A comment to this provision indicates that it is the prosecutor’s task to 
determine whether these circumstances exist, and in making that determination, the prosecutor 
“should” consult USAM §§ 9-27.230, 9-27.240, or 9-27.250, as appropriate. 
 
USAM § 9-27.230 sets forth a non-exhaustive list of considerations that a federal 
prosecutor should weigh in determining whether a substantial federal interest would be served by 
initiating prosecution against a person: 
1. 
Federal law enforcement priorities;190 
2. 
The nature and seriousness of the offense;191 
3. 
The deterrent effect of prosecution; 
4. 
The person’s culpability in connection with the offense; 
5. 
The person’s history with respect to criminal activity; 
6. 
The person’s willingness to cooperate in the investigation 
 
or prosecution of others; and 
7. 
The probable sentence or other consequences if the person 
 
is convicted. 
 
The USAM contemplates that, on occasion, a federal prosecutor will decline to open a case 
in deference to prosecution by the state in which the crime occurred.  USAM § 9-27.240 directs 
that in evaluating the effectiveness of prosecution in another jurisdiction, the federal prosecutor 
should weigh “all relevant considerations,” including the strength of the other...

 
122 
 
Some offenses, even though in violation of Federal law, are of 
particularly strong interest to the authorities of the state or local 
jurisdiction in which they occur, either because of the nature of the 
offense, the identity of the offender or victim, the fact that the 
investigation was conducted primarily by state or local 
investigators, or some other circumstance.  Whatever the reason, 
when it appears that the Federal interest in prosecution is less 
substantial than the interest of state or local authorities, 
consideration should be given to referring the case to those 
authorities rather than commencing or recommending a Federal 
prosecution. 
Another comment cautions that in assessing whether to defer to state or local authorities, “the 
Federal prosecutor should be alert to any local conditions, attitudes, relationships or other 
circumstances that might cast doubt on the likelihood of the state or local authorities conducting a 
thorough and successful prosecution.” 
 
USAM § 9-27.260 identifies impermissible considerations relating to the decision whether 
to initiate or decline a federal prosecution.  Specifically, the decision may not be based on 
consideration of the person’s race, religion, sex, national origin, or political association, activities, 
or beliefs; the prosecutor’s “own personal feelings” about the person or the victim; or the possible 
effect of the decision on the prosecutor’s own professional or personal circumstances.  When 
opting to decline federal prosecution, the prosecutor should ensure that the reasons for that decision 
are communicated to the investigating agency and reflected in the office files.  USAM § 9-27.270. 
2. 
USAM § 9-2.031:  The Petite Policy 
 
Although the Constitution does not prohibit prosecutions of a defendant by both state and 
federal authorities, even when the conduct charged is identical in both charging jurisdictions, the 
Department has a long-standing policy, known as the Petite policy, g...

 
123 
 
that come within the national investigation and prosecution priorities established 
by the Department are more likely to satisfy this requirement than other matters. 
(2) 
The prior prosecution must have left the substantial federal interest “demonstrably 
unvindicated.”  In general, the Department presumes that a prior prosecution has 
vindicated federal interests, but that presumption may be overcome in certain 
circumstances.  As relevant here, the presumption may be overcome when the 
choice of charges in the prior prosecution was based on factors such as 
incompetence, corruption, intimidation, or undue influence.  The presumption may 
be overcome even when the prior prosecution resulted in a conviction, if the prior 
sentence was “manifestly inadequate in light of the federal interest involved and a 
substantially enhanced sentence—including forfeiture and restitution as well as 
imprisonment and fines—is available through the contemplated federal 
prosecution.” 
 
(3) 
The government must believe that the defendant’s conduct constitutes a federal
 
offense, and that the admissible evidence probably will be sufficient to obtain and
 
sustain a conviction. 
However, the satisfaction of the prerequisites does not require a prosecutor to proceed with a 
federal investigation or charges nor is the Department required to approve the proposed 
prosecution. 
 
The Petite policy cautions that whenever a matter involves overlapping federal and state 
jurisdiction, federal prosecutors should consult with their state counterparts “to determine the most 
appropriate single forum in which to proceed to satisfy the substantial federal and state interests 
involved.”  If a substantial question arises as to whether the Petite policy applies to a particular 
prosecution, the prosecutor should submit the matter to the appropriate Assistant Attorney General 
for resolution.  Prior approval from the appropriate Assistant Attorney General must be obtained 
before bringing...

 
124 
 
defendant’s criminal conduct, has an adequate factual basis, makes likely the imposition of an 
appropriate sentence and order of restitution, and does not adversely affect the investigation or 
prosecution of others.  USAM § 9-27.420 specifies:  
In determining whether it would be appropriate to enter into a plea 
agreement, the attorney for the government should weigh all 
relevant considerations, including: 
 
1. 
The defendant’s willingness to cooperate in the 
investigation or prosecution of others; 
2. 
The defendant’s history with respect to criminal 
activity; 
3. 
The nature and seriousness of the offense or offenses 
charged; 
 
4. 
The defendant’s remorse or contrition and his/her 
willingness to assume responsibility for his/her conduct; 
5. 
The desirability of prompt and certain disposition of 
the case; 
6. 
The likelihood of obtaining a conviction at trial; 
7. 
The probable effect on witnesses; 
8. 
The probable sentence or other consequences if the 
defendant is convicted; 
 
9. 
The public interest in having the case tried rather 
than disposed of by a guilty plea; 
10. 
The expense of trial and appeal; 
11. 
The need to avoid delay in the disposition of other 
pending cases; and 
 
12. 
The effect upon the victim’s right to restitution. 
4. 
USAM Provisions Relating to Non-Prosecution Agreements 
 
USAM § 9-27.600 authorizes government attorneys to enter into a non-prosecution 
agreement in exchange for a person’s cooperation.  The provision explains that a non-prosecution 
agreement is appropriate for this purpose when, in the prosecutor’s judgment, the person’s timely 
cooperation “appears to be necessary to the public interest and other means of obtaining the desired 
cooperation are unavailable or would not be effective.”  A comment to this provision explains that 
such “other means” include seeking cooperation after trial and conviction, bargaining for 

 
125 
 
cooperation as part of a plea agreement, or compelling cooperation under a “use immunity” order.  
The comment observes that these alternative means “are clearly preferable to permitting an 
offender to avoid any liability for his/her conduct” and “should be given serious consideration in 
the first instance.”  USAM §§ 9-27.620 and 9-27.630 set forth considerations a prosecutor should 
take into account when entering into a non-prosecution agreement.  Generally, the U.S. Attorney 
has authority to approve a non-prosecution agreement.  USAM § 9-27.600 comment.  However, 
USAM § 9-27.640 directs that a government attorney should not enter into a non-prosecution 
agreement in exchange for a person’s cooperation without first obtaining the approval of the 
appropriate Assistant Attorney General, or his or her designee, when the person is someone who 
“is likely to become of major public interest.”   
 
These USAM provisions do not address the uses of non-prosecution agreements in 
circumstances other than when needed to obtain cooperation. 
5. 
USAM Provisions Relating to Grants of Immunity 
 
Nothing in the USAM directly prohibits the government from using the criminal exposure 
of third parties in negotiating with a criminal defendant.  Instead, the provision that addresses 
immunity relates only to the exchange of limited immunity for the testimony of a witness who has 
asserted a Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.  See USAM §§ 9-23.100 et seq.   
6. 
USAM/C.F.R. Provisions Relating to Financial Conflicts of Interest 
 
Department employees are expected to be aware of, and to comply with, all ethics-related 
laws, rules, regulations, and policies.  See, generally, USAM § 1-4.000 et seq.  Specifically, a 
government attorney is prohibited by criminal statute from participating personally and 
substantially in any particular matter in which he has a financial interest or in which such an 
interest can be imputed to him.  See 18 U.S.C. § 208 ...

 
126 
 
prosecutors adhere to the principles and objectives” of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, the 
Sentencing Guidelines, and the PROTECT Act “in their charging, case disposition, and sentencing 
practices.”195 
 
The Ashcroft Memo directed that, “in all federal cases, federal prosecutors must charge 
and pursue the most serious, readily provable offense or offenses that are supported by the facts of 
the case,” except as authorized by an Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Attorney, or designated 
supervisory authority in certain articulated limited circumstances.  The Ashcroft Memo cautioned 
that a charge is not “readily provable” if the prosecutor harbors a good faith doubt, based on either 
the law or the evidence, as to the government’s ability to prove the charge at trial.  The Ashcroft 
Memo explains that the “basic policy” “requires federal prosecutors to charge and pursue all 
charges that are determined to be readily provable” and would yield the most substantial sentence 
under the Sentencing Guidelines.   
The policy set forth six exceptions, including a catch-all exception that permits a prosecutor 
to decline to pursue readily provable charges “in other exceptional circumstances” with the written 
or otherwise documented approval of an Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Attorney, or “designated 
supervisory attorney.”  As examples of circumstances in which such declination would be 
appropriate, the Ashcroft Memo cites to situations in which a U.S. Attorney’s Office is 
“particularly over-burdened,” the trial is expected to be of exceptionally long duration, and 
proceeding to trial would significantly reduce the total number of cases the office could resolve.  
The Ashcroft Memo specifically notes that “[c]harges may be declined . . . pursuant to a plea 
agreement only to the extent consistent” with the policies established by the Memo. 
 
On January 28, 2005, Deputy Attorney General James Comey issued a memorandum 
entitled “Department Policies and...

 
127 
 
flexibility to decline to bring a particular charge based on a “good faith doubt” that the law or 
evidence supports the charge. 
2. 
Department Policy Relating to Deportation of Criminal Aliens 
 
On April 28, 1995, the Attorney General issued a memorandum to all federal prosecutors 
entitled “Deportation of Criminal Aliens,” directing federal prosecutors to actively and directly 
become involved in the process of removing criminal aliens from the United States.  In pertinent 
part, this memorandum notes that prosecutors can make a major contribution to the expeditious 
deportation of criminal aliens by effectively using available prosecution tools for dealing with 
alien defendants.  These tools include (1) stipulated administrative deportation orders in 
connection with plea agreements; (2) deportation as a condition of supervised release under 
18 U.S.C. § 3853(d); and (3) judicial deportation orders pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252a(d).  The 
memorandum further directs: 
All deportable criminal aliens should be deported unless 
extraordinary circumstances exist.  Accordingly, absent such 
circumstances, Federal prosecutors should seek the deportation of 
deportable alien defendants in whatever manner is deemed most 
appropriate in a particular case.  Exceptions to this policy must have 
the written approval of the United States Attorney.  
See also USAM § 9-73.520.  A “criminal alien” is a foreign national who has been convicted of a 
crime.196 
 
Stipulated administrative deportation orders can be based “on the conviction for an offense 
to which the alien will plead guilty,” provided that the offense is one of those enumerated in 
8 U.S.C. § 1251 as an offense that causes an alien to be deported.  Under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1251(a)(2)(A)(i), any alien who is convicted of a crime of “moral turpitude” within five years 
after the date of entry (or 10 years in the case of an alien provided lawful permanent resident 
status), and is either sentenced to confinement or ...

 
128 
 
the prosecutor indicted him on more serious charges.  Hayes was thereafter convicted and 
sentenced under the new indictment.  The state court of appeals rejected Hayes’s challenge to his 
conviction, concluding that the prosecutor’s decision to indict on more serious charges was a 
legitimate use of available leverage in the plea-bargaining process.  Hayes filed for review of his 
conviction and sentence in federal court, and although Hayes lost at the district court level, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit concluded that the prosecutor’s conduct constituted 
impermissible vindictive prosecution. 
 
The Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit’s ruling.  The Court opined that “acceptance 
of the basic legitimacy of plea bargaining necessarily implies rejection of any notion that a guilty 
plea is involuntary in a constitutional sense simply because it is the end result of the bargaining 
process.”  Id. at 363.  A long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe a crime has been 
committed, “the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a 
grand jury, rests entirely in his discretion.”  Id. at 364 (emphasis added).  The Court explained that 
selectivity in enforcement of the criminal law is not improper unless based upon an unjustifiable 
standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.  Id. 
 
These principles were reiterated in Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985), a case 
involving the government’s policy of prosecuting only those individuals who reported themselves 
as having failed to register with the Selective Service system.  The petitioner in Wayte claimed 
that the self-reported non-registrants were “vocal” opponents of the registration program who were 
being punished for the exercise of their First Amendment rights.  The Supreme Court rejected this 
argument, stating that the government has “broad discretion” in deciding whom to prosecute, and 
that the limits of th...

 
129 
 
when prosecutors have used third parties as leverage in plea negotiations.  Numerous courts have 
made clear, however, that a plea is not invalid when entered under an agreement that includes a 
promise of leniency towards a third party or in response to a prosecutor’s threat to prosecute a third 
party if a plea is not entered.  See, e.g., United States v. Marquez, 909 F.2d 738, 741-42 (2d Cir. 
1990) (rejecting claim that plea was involuntary because of pressure placed upon a defendant by 
the government’s insistence that a defendant’s wife would not be offered a plea bargain unless he 
pled guilty); Martin v. Kemp, 760 F.2d 1244, 1248 (11th Cir. 1985) (in order to satisfy “heavy 
burden” of establishing that the government had not acted “in good faith,” a defendant challenging 
voluntariness of his plea on grounds that the prosecutor had threatened to bring charges against 
the defendant’s pregnant wife had to establish that government lacked probable cause to believe 
the defendant’s wife had committed a crime at the time it threatened to charge her); Stinson v. 
State, 839 So. 2d 906, 909 (Fla. App. 2003) (“In cases involving . . . a promise not to prosecute a 
third party, the government must act in good faith . . . [and] must have probable cause to charge 
the third party.”). 
 
The second context concerns situations in which courts have enforced prosecutors’ 
promises of leniency to third parties.  For example, in State v. Frazier, 697 So. 2d 944 (Fla. App. 
1997), as consideration for the defendant’s guilty plea, the prosecutor agreed and announced in 
open court that the government would dismiss charges against the defendant’s niece and nephew, 
who had all been charged as a result of the same incident.  When the state reneged and attempted 
to prosecute the niece and nephew, the trial court dismissed the charges against them, and the state 
appealed.  The appellate court affirmed the dismissal, concluding that under contract law 
principles, the ...

 
130 
 
is subject to all rules of the court.199  Attorney Admission Rule 6(b)(2)(A) makes clear that 
attorneys practicing before the court are subject to the Florida Bar’s Rules of Professional Conduct 
(FRPC).  Moreover, the choice-of-law provisions contained within the relevant state’s rules of 
professional conduct make the FRPC applicable to their conduct.   
1. 
FRPC 4-1.1 – Competence 
 
FRPC 4-1.1 requires that a lawyer provide competent representation to a client.200  
Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation 
reasonably necessary for the representation.  A comment to the rule clarifies that the factors 
relevant to determining a lawyer’s competence to handle a particular matter include “the relative 
complexity and specialized nature of the matter, the lawyer’s general experience, the lawyer’s 
training and experience in the field in question, the preparation and study the lawyer is able to give 
the matter, and whether it is feasible to refer the matter to, or associate or consult with, a lawyer 
of established competence in the field.”  The comment further notes that “[i]n many instances the 
required proficiency is that of a general practitioner.” With respect to particular matters, 
competence requires inquiry into and analysis of the factual and legal elements of the problem.  
The comment to Rule 4-1.1 explains that “[t]he required attention and preparation are determined 
in part by what is at stake; major litigation and complex transactions ordinarily require more 
extensive treatment than matters of lesser complexity and consequence.” 
2. 
FRPC 4-1.3 – Diligence 
 
FRPC 4-1.3 specifies that a lawyer should act with reasonable diligence and promptness in 
representing a client.  A comment to this rule explains, “A lawyer should pursue a matter on behalf 
of a client despite opposition, obstruction, or personal inconvenience to the lawyer and take 
whatever lawful and ethical measures are required...

 
131 
 
4. 
FRPC 4-8.4 – Conduct Prejudicial to the Administration of Justice 
 
FRPC 4-8.4(c) states that a lawyer shall not engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, 
deceit, or misrepresentation.   
 
FRPC 4-8.4(d) prohibits a lawyer from engaging in conduct in connection with the practice 
of law that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.   
 
In Florida Bar v. Frederick, 756 So. 2d 79, 87 (Fla. 2000), the court noted that FRPC 
4-8.4(d) is not limited to conduct that occurs in a judicial proceeding, but can be applied to 
“conduct in connection with the practice of law.”  In Florida Bar v. Shankman, 41 So. 3d 166, 172 
(Fla. 2010), for example, an attorney’s continuous hiring and firing of firms to assist in the client’s 
matter resulted in delayed resolution of the case and constituted a violation of FRPC 4-8.4(d) due 
to the delay in the administration of justice and the increased costs to the client.201 
 
 
                                                 
201  
OPR also examined FRPC 4-3.8, Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor.  Nothing in the text of that rule, 
however, was relevant to the issues addressed in this Report.  A comment to FRPC Rule 4-3.8 notes that Florida has 
adopted the American Bar Association (ABA) Standards of Criminal Justice Relating to the Prosecution Function.  
These “standards,” however, are not binding rules of conduct but rather provide guidance to prosecutors.  Indeed, the 
ABA has expressly stated that these standards “are not intended to serve as the basis for the imposition of professional 
discipline, to create substantive or procedural rights for accused or convicted persons, to create a standard of care for 
civil liability, or to serve as a predicate for a motion to suppress evidence or dismiss a charge.”  OPR does not consider 
the ABA standards as binding on the conduct of Department prosecutors.     

 
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CHAPTER TWO 
PART THREE:  ANALYSIS 
 
I. 
OVERVIEW 
Following the Miami Herald report in November 2018, media scrutiny of and public 
attention to the USAO’s handling of its Epstein investigation has continued unabated.  At the heart 
of the public’s concern is the perception that Epstein’s 18-month sentence, which resulted in a 13-
month term of actual incarceration, was too lenient and inadequately punished Epstein’s criminal 
conduct.  Although many records have been released as part of civil litigation stemming from 
Epstein’s conduct, the public has received only limited information regarding the decision-making 
process leading to the signed NPA.  As a result, questions have arisen about Acosta and his staff’s 
motivations for entering into the NPA.  Publicly released communications between prosecutors 
and defense counsel, the leniency of the sentence, and an unusual non-prosecution provision in the 
NPA have led to allegations that Acosta and the USAO gave Epstein a “sweetheart deal” because 
they were motivated by improper influences, such as their preexisting and personal relationships 
with his attorneys, or even corrupt influences, such as the receipt of personal benefits from Epstein.    
Through its investigation, OPR has sought to answer the following core questions:  (1) who 
was responsible for the decision to resolve the federal investigation through the NPA and for its 
specific terms; (2) did the NPA or any of its provisions violate Department policies or other rules 
or regulations; and (3) were any of the subjects motivated to resolve the federal investigation by 
improper factors, such as corruption or favoritism.  To the extent that available records and witness 
interviews shed light on these questions, OPR shows in detail the process that led to the NPA, from 
the initial complaint to the USAO through the intense and often confusing negotiation process.  
After a thorough and detailed examination of thousands of contemporaneous rec...

 
134 
 
different points in time, and regarding different decisions.  Menchel, for example, participated in 
formulating the USAO’s initial written offer to the defense, but he had no involvement with actions 
or decisions made after August 3, 2007.  Sloman was absent during part of the most intense 
negotiations in September 2007 and did not see the final, signed version of the NPA until he 
returned.  Villafaña and Lourie participated in the negotiations, and Lourie either made decisions 
during the September 12, 2007 meeting with the defense and State Attorney’s Office, or at least 
indicated agreement pending Acosta’s approval.  In any event, whatever the level of Sloman’s, 
Menchel’s, Lourie’s, and Villafaña’s involvement, they acted with the knowledge and approval of 
Acosta.   
Under OPR’s analytical framework, an attorney who makes a good faith attempt to 
ascertain the obligations and standards imposed on the attorney and to comply with them in a given 
situation does not commit professional misconduct.  Evidence that an attorney made a good faith 
attempt to ascertain and comply with the obligations and standards imposed can include, but is not 
limited to, the fact that the attorney consulted with a supervisor.202  In this regard, OPR’s 
framework is similar to a standard provision of the professional conduct rules of most state bars, 
which specify that a subordinate lawyer does not engage in misconduct if that lawyer acts in 
accordance with a supervisory lawyer’s reasonable resolution of an arguable question of 
professional duty.  See, e.g., FRPC 4-5.2(b).  Therefore, in addition to the fact that OPR did not 
find a violation of a clear and unambiguous standard as discussed below, OPR concludes that 
Menchel, Sloman, Lourie, and Villafaña did not commit professional misconduct with respect to 
any aspect of the NPA because they acted under Acosta’s direction and with his approval. 
III. 
OPR FOUND THAT NONE OF THE SUBJECTS VIOLATED A CLEAR AND 
UNAMB...

 
135 
 
unambiguous standard or engaged in professional misconduct in developing, negotiating, or 
entering into the NPA, including its addendum.  
A. 
U.S. Attorneys Have Broad Discretion to Resolve Investigations or Cases as 
They Deem Appropriate, and Acosta’s Decision to Decline to Prosecute 
Epstein Federally Does Not Constitute Professional Misconduct 
The U.S. Attorneys exercise broad discretion in enforcing the nation’s criminal laws.203    
As a general matter, federal prosecutors “are designated by statute as the President’s delegates to 
help him discharge his constitutional responsibility to ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed.’”  United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (quoting U.S. Const. art. II, 
§ 3).  Unless based on an impermissible standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary 
classification, a prosecutor’s charging decisions—including declinations—are not dictated by law 
or statute and are not subject to judicial review.  See United States v. LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751, 762 
(1997) (“Such discretion is an integral feature of the criminal justice system, and is appropriate, 
so long as it is not based upon improper factors.”).   
Department policy guidance in effect at the time the USAO was handling the Epstein case 
helped ensure “the reasoned exercise of prosecutorial authority,” but did not require “a particular 
prosecutorial decision in any given case.”  USAM §§ 9-27.001, 9-27.120 (comment).  Rather than 
mandating specific actions, the USAM identified considerations that should factor into a 
prosecutor’s charging decisions, including that the defendant was “subject to effective prosecution 
in another jurisdiction.”  USAM § 9-27.220.  Importantly, U.S. Attorneys had “plenary authority 
with regard to federal criminal matters” and could modify or depart from the principles set forth 
in the USAM as deemed necessary in the interest of fair and effective law enforcement within their 
individual judicial districts...

 
136 
 
 
As the U.S. Attorney, and in the absence of evidence establishing that his decision was 
motivated by improper factors, Acosta had the “plenary authority” under federal law and under the 
USAM to resolve the case as he deemed necessary and appropriate.  As discussed in detail below, 
OPR did not find evidence establishing that Acosta, or the other subjects, were motivated or 
influenced by improper considerations.  Because no clear and unambiguous standard required 
Acosta to indict Epstein on federal charges or prohibited his decision to defer prosecution to the 
state, OPR does not find misconduct based on Acosta’s decision to decline to initiate a federal 
prosecution of Epstein.     
B. 
No Clear and Unambiguous Standard Precluded Acosta’s Use of a 
Non-Prosecution Agreement to Resolve the Federal Investigation of Epstein  
 
OPR found no statute or Department policy that was violated by Acosta’s decision to 
resolve the federal investigation of Epstein through a non-prosecution agreement.   
The prosecutor’s broad charging discretion includes the option of resolving a case through 
a non-prosecution agreement or a related and similar mechanism, a deferred prosecution 
agreement.  United States v. Fokker Servs. B.V., 818 F.3d 733 (D.C. Cir. 2016).  These agreements 
“afford a middle-ground option to the prosecution when, for example, it believes that a criminal 
conviction may be difficult to obtain or may result in unwanted collateral consequences for a 
defendant or third parties, but also believes that the defendant should not evade accountability 
altogether.”  Id. at 738.  As with all prosecutorial charging decisions, the choice to resolve a case 
through a non-prosecution agreement or a deferred prosecution agreement “resides fundamentally 
with the Executive” branch.  Id. at 741. 
 
OPR found no clear and unambiguous standard in the USAM prohibiting the use of a non-
prosecution agreement in the circumstances presented in Epstein’s case.  The U...

 
137 
 
agreement that did not require Epstein’s cooperation nor did the USAM require Acosta to obtain 
Departmental approval before doing so.  
C.  
The NPA’s Individual Provisions Did Not Violate Any Clear and 
Unambiguous Standards  
 
Although Acosta, as U.S. Attorney, had discretion generally to resolve the case through a 
non-prosecution agreement that deferred prosecution to the state, OPR also considered whether a 
clear and unambiguous standard governed any of the individual provisions of the NPA.  
Specifically, OPR examined Acosta’s decision to permit Epstein to resolve the federal 
investigation by pleading guilty to state charges of solicitation of minors to engage in prostitution 
and solicitation to prostitution, with a joint, binding recommendation for an 18-month sentence of 
incarceration.  Because, as noted above, OPR found no clear guidance applicable to non-
prosecution agreements not involving cooperation, OPR examined Departmental policies relating 
to plea offers to assess the propriety of the NPA’s charge and sentence requirements.  OPR also 
examined the provision declining to prosecute Epstein’s unidentified “potential co-conspirators,” 
to determine whether that provision violated Departmental policy regarding grants of immunity.  
Finally, OPR considered whether there was a clear and unambiguous obligation under the 
Department’s policy regarding the deportation of criminal aliens, which would have required 
further action to be taken against the two Epstein assistants who were foreign nationals. 
 
After considering the applicable rules and policies, OPR finds that Acosta’s decision to 
resolve the federal investigation through the NPA did not violate any clear and unambiguous 
standards and that Acosta had the authority to resolve the federal investigation through a state plea 
and through the terms that he chose.  Accordingly, OPR concludes that Acosta did not commit 
professional misconduct in developing, negotiating, or approving t...

 
138 
 
Longstanding Department policy directs prosecutors to require the defendant to plead to the most 
serious readily provable charge consistent with the nature and extent of the defendant’s criminal 
conduct, that has an adequate factual basis, is likely to result in a sustainable conviction, makes 
likely the imposition of an appropriate sentence and restitution order, and does not adversely affect 
the investigation or prosecution of others.  See USAM §§ 9-27.430, 9-27-300, 9-27.400 
(comment).  The genesis of this policy, the Ashcroft Memo, specifically requires federal 
prosecutors to charge and pursue all readily provable charges that would yield the most substantial 
sentence under the Sentencing Guidelines.  However, the Ashcroft Memo articulates an important 
exception:  a U.S. Attorney or a “designated supervisory attorney” may authorize a plea that does 
not comport with this policy.207  Moreover, the Ashcroft Memo explains that a charge is not 
“readily provable” if the prosecutor harbors “a good faith doubt,” based on either the law or the 
evidence, as to the government’s ability to prove the charge at trial.   
 
By its plain terms, the NPA arguably does not appear to satisfy the “most serious readily 
provable charge” requirement.  The draft indictment prepared by Villafaña proposed charging 
Epstein with a variety of federal crimes relating to sexual conduct with and trafficking of minors, 
and Epstein’s sentencing exposure under the federal guidelines was in the range of 168 to 210 
months’ imprisonment.  The original “term sheet” presented to the defense proposed a “non-
negotiable” requirement that Epstein plead guilty to three state offenses, in addition to the original 
state indictment, with a joint, binding recommendation for a two-year term of incarceration. 
Instead, Epstein was permitted to resolve his federal criminal exposure with a plea to the state 
indictment and only one additional state offense, and an 18-month sentence. 
As di...

 
139 
 
authority to deviate from the Ashcroft Memo’s “most serious readily provable offense” 
requirement. 
 
Although Acosta could not recall specifically how or by whom the decision was made to 
allow Epstein to plead to only one of the three charges identified on the original term sheet, or how 
or by whom the decision was made to reduce the sentencing requirement from two years to 18 
months, Acosta was aware of these changes.  He reviewed and approved the final NPA before it 
was signed.  Department policy gave him the discretion to approve the agreement, notwithstanding 
any arguable failure to comply with the “most serious readily provable offense” requirement.  
Furthermore, the Ashcroft Memo does not appear to preclude a U.S. Attorney from deferring to a 
state prosecution, so it is not clear that the Memo’s terms apply to a situation involving state 
charges.  Accordingly, OPR concludes that the negotiation of an agreement that allowed Epstein 
to resolve the federal investigation in return for the imposition of an 18-month state sentence did 
not violate a clear and unambiguous standard and therefore does not constitute professional 
misconduct. 
2. 
The USAO’s Agreement Not to Prosecute Unidentified “Potential 
Co-Conspirators” Did Not Violate a Clear and Unambiguous 
Department Policy 
 
Several witnesses told OPR that they believed the government’s agreement not to prosecute 
unidentified “potential co-conspirators” amounted to “transactional immunity,” which the 
witnesses asserted is prohibited by Department policy.  Although “use immunity” protects a 
witness only against the government’s use of his or her immunized testimony in a prosecution of 
the witness, and is frequently used by prosecutors, transactional immunity protects a witness from 
prosecution altogether and is relatively rare.  
 
OPR found no policy prohibiting a U.S. Attorney from declining to prosecute third parties 
or providing transactional immunity.  One section of the USAM re...

 
140 
 
3. 
The NPA Did Not Violate Department Policy Relating to Deportation 
of Criminal Aliens  
 
  During the negotiations, the USAO rejected a defense-offered provision prohibiting the 
USAO from “request[ing], initiat[ing], or in any way encourag[ing] immigration authorities to 
institute immigration proceedings” against two female assistants.  However, OPR considered 
whether the April 28, 1995 memorandum imposed any obligation on the USAO to prosecute 
Epstein’s two female assistants who were known to be foreign nationals—as Villafaña urged in 
her prosecution memorandum—and thus trigger their removal, or conversely, whether it precluded 
the USAO from agreeing not to prosecute them as part of a negotiated resolution.  OPR found 
nothing in the policy that created a clear and unambiguous standard in either regard.    
 
The Attorney General’s April 28, 1995 memorandum regarding “Deportation of Criminal 
Aliens” directed federal prosecutors to become involved actively and directly in the process of 
removing criminal aliens from the United States, and, along with USAM § 9-73.520, provided that 
“[a]ll deportable criminal aliens should be deported unless extraordinary circumstances exist.”  
However, Epstein’s two assistants were not “deportable” unless and until convicted of a crime that 
would have triggered their removal.  But neither the policy memorandum nor the USAM imposed 
an obligation on the USAO to prosecute or secure a conviction against a foreign national nor did 
either provision preclude the USAO from declining to prosecute an alien using the same broad 
discretion that otherwise applies to charging decisions. 
   
The policy guidance also requires “prompt and close coordination” with immigration 
officials in cases involving alien defendants and specifies that prosecutors must notify immigration 
authorities before engaging in plea negotiations with alien defendants.  OPR learned during its 
investigation that an ICE agent participated in the...

 
141 
 
to prosecute all of Epstein’s co-conspirators.  These factors are analyzed in the following 
discussions throughout this Section of the Report.   
As a threshold matter, OPR’s investigation of the subjects’ decisions and actions in the 
Epstein matter uncovered no evidence of corruption such as bribery, gratuity, or illegal political or 
personal consideration.  In addition, OPR examined the extensive contemporaneous documentary 
record, interviewed witnesses, and questioned the subject attorneys.  The evidence shows three 
sets of issues influenced Acosta’s decision to resolve the case through the NPA.  The first—of 
main concern to Acosta—involved considerations of federalism and deference to state authority.  
The second arose from an assessment by Acosta’s senior advisers—Sloman, Menchel, and 
Lourie—that the case carried substantial litigation risks, including both witness issues and what 
some viewed as a novel application of certain federal statutes to the facts of the Epstein case.208  
The third was Acosta’s aim of obtaining a greater measure of justice for victims of Epstein’s 
conduct and for the community than that proposed by the state.    
Although the NPA and the process for reaching it can be criticized, as OPR does, OPR did 
not find evidence supporting a conclusion that the subjects were motivated by a desire to benefit 
Epstein for personal gain or because of other improper considerations, such as Epstein’s wealth, 
status, or associations.  That is not to say that Epstein received no benefit from his enormous 
wealth.  He was able to hire nationally known attorneys who had prestige, skill, and extensive 
experience in federal and state criminal law and in conducting negotiations.  He had the resources 
to finance an aggressive approach to the case that included the preparation of multiple written 
submissions reflecting extensive research and analysis, as well as multiple in-person meetings 
involving several of his attorneys and USAO pe...

 
142 
 
OPR was attentive to any evidence that any of the subjects was motivated by bribes, gratuities, or 
other illegal political or personal considerations, and found no such indication.209  Witnesses, 
including law enforcement officials, were specifically asked whether they had any information 
indicating such corruption, and all—notwithstanding the harsh criticism by some of those same 
witnesses of the Epstein matter’s outcome—stated that they did not.  Specifically, the FBI case 
agent told OPR that she did not believe there had been any illegal influence, and that if she had 
perceived any, she “would have gone screaming” to the FBI’s public corruption unit.  The co-case 
agent and the FBI supervisors up through the Special Agent in Charge likewise told OPR that they 
were unaware of any indication that a prosecutor acted in the matter because of illegal factors such 
as a gratuity or bribe or other corrupt influence, and that any such indication would immediately 
have been referred for criminal investigation by the FBI.  
B. 
Contemporaneous Written Records and Witness and Subject Interviews Did 
Not Reveal Evidence Establishing That the Subjects Were Improperly 
Influenced by Epstein’s Status, Wealth, or Associations  
 
Although Epstein’s name is now nationally recognized, in 2006 and 2007, he was not a 
familiar national figure or even particularly well known in Florida.  All five subjects told OPR that 
when they first learned of the investigation, they had not heard of Epstein.  Similarly, the FBI case 
agent told OPR that when the investigation began, no one in the FBI appeared to have heard of 
Epstein, and other witnesses also told OPR that they were initially unfamiliar with Epstein.  
However, news reports about Epstein’s July 2006 arrest on the state indictment, which were 
contemporaneous with the beginning of the federal investigation, identified him as a wealthy Palm 
Beach resident with influential contacts, including William Clinton, Dona...

 
143 
 
narrative of Epstein’s philanthropic activities, rather than presented as a suggestion that Epstein’s 
association to the former President warranted leniency and, in any case, the USAO rejected the 
defense argument that the matter should be left entirely to the state’s discretion.212  The defense 
submission to the Deputy Attorney General contained a direct reference to Epstein’s connection 
to former President Clinton, but that submission was made well after the NPA was negotiated and 
signed, and in it, counsel contended that the USAO had treated Epstein too harshly because of his 
association with the former President.213   
2. 
The Subjects Asserted That They Were Motivated by Reasonable 
Strategic and Policy Considerations, Not Improper Influences 
 
In addition to reviewing the documentary evidence, OPR questioned the five subject 
attorneys, all of whom denied being personally influenced by Epstein’s wealth or status in making 
decisions regarding the investigation, in the decision to resolve the case through an NPA, or in 
negotiating the NPA.  Villafaña, in particular, was concerned from the outset of the federal 
investigation that Epstein might try to employ against the USAO the same pressure that she 
understood had been used with the State Attorney’s Office, and she proactively took steps to 
counter Epstein’s possible influence by meeting with Acosta and Sloman to sensitize them to 
Epstein’s tactics.  Both Acosta and Sloman told OPR that the USAO had handled cases involving 
wealthy, high-profile defendants before, including the Abramoff case.  Acosta told OPR, “[W]e 
tried to treat [the case] fairly, not looking at . . . how wealthy is he, but also not saying we need to 
do this because he is so wealthy.”  Menchel expressed a similar view, telling OPR that he did not 
believe “it’s appropriate to go after somebody because of their status one way or the other.”  Lourie 
told OPR that Epstein’s status may have generated more “front office” in...

 
144 
 
considered that the USAO’s most pivotal decisions—to resolve the case through an NPA requiring 
Epstein to serve time in jail, register as a sexual offender, and provide monetary damages to 
victims—had been made by July 31, 2007, when the USAO presented its “term sheet” to the 
defense.  This was before Acosta had ever met with defense counsel and when he had not indicated 
any plans to do so.  It also was well before Acosta’s October 12, 2007 breakfast meeting with 
defense counsel Lefkowitz, which received strong public and media criticism.  OPR also 
considered significant the fact that although the USAO made numerous concessions in the course 
of negotiating the final NPA, the USAO did not accede to the defense request that the USAO end 
federal involvement altogether and return the matter to the state authorities to handle as they saw 
fit, and the USAO refused to eliminate its requirement that Epstein register as a sexual offender, 
despite a strong push by the defense that it do so.    
3. 
Subject and Witness Interviews and Contemporaneous Records 
Identified Case-Specific Considerations Relating to Evidence, Legal 
Theories, Litigation Risk, and a Trial’s Potential Impact on Victims 
 
Acosta, Sloman, Menchel, and Lourie told OPR that they did not recall the specific content 
of discussions about the challenges presented by a potential federal prosecution or reasons for 
Acosta’s decision to resolve the federal investigation through the NPA, but they and Villafaña 
identified for OPR several case-specific factors, unrelated to Epstein’s wealth or associations, that 
either did or likely would have been included in those discussions and that OPR concludes likely 
influenced Acosta’s decision-making.  These considerations included assessment of the 
evidentiary risks and the potential impact of a trial on the victims.  For the most part, however, 
these factors appear more aptly to pertain to the decision to resolve the case through a pre-charge 
di...

 
145 
 
and guaranteed sexual offender registration by Epstein . . . were 
among the factors [that led to the NPA].215 
During her OPR interview, Villafaña similarly described the victims’ general reluctance to 
go forward with a trial: 
[W]hen we would meet with victims, we would ask them how they 
wanted the case to be resolved.  And most of them wanted the case 
to be resolved via a plea.  Some of them wanted him not to be 
prosecuted at all.  Most of them did not want to have to come to 
court and testify.  They were very worried about their privacy 
rights.216   
In his written response to OPR, Lourie stated that although he did not specifically recall 
the issues Villafaña set forth in her declaration, he believed they would have been important to the 
USAO in 2007.  Lourie also told OPR that he generally recalled concerns within the USAO about 
the charges and a potential trial: 
[M]y vague recollection is that I and others had concerns that there 
was a substantial chance we would not prevail at both trial and on 
appeal after a conviction, resulting in no jail time, no criminal 
                                                 
215   
Doe v. United States, No. 9:08-cv-80736 (S.D. Fla.), Declaration of A. Marie Villafaña in Support of 
Government’s Response and Opposition to Petitioners’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Cross-Motion for 
Summary Judgment at 8-9 (June 2, 2017). 
216  
These concerns are also reflected in a 2017 declaration filed by the FBI case agent in the CVRA litigation, 
in which she stated, “During interviews conducted from 2006 to 2008, no victims expressed a strong opinion that 
Epstein be prosecuted.”  She further described the concerns of some of the victims:   
Throughout the investigation, we interviewed many [of Epstein’s] victims . . . .  
A majority of the victims expressed concern about the possible disclosure of their 
identities to the public.  A number of the victims raised concerns about having to 
testify and/or th...

 
146 
 
record, no restitution, no sex offender status, publication at a trial of 
the names of certain victims that didn’t want their names revealed 
and the general difficulties of a trial for the victims and their 
families. 
Although his emails showed that, at the time, he advocated for prosecution of Epstein, 
Lourie told OPR it was also his general recollection that “everybody at the USAO working on the 
matter had expressed concerns at various times about the long-term viability of a federal 
prosecution of Epstein due to certain factual and legal hurdles, as well as issues with the 
cooperation and desires of the victims.”  
 
Similarly, Menchel—who had experience prosecuting sexual assault crimes—recalled 
understanding that many of the victims were unwilling to go forward and would have experienced 
additional trauma as a result of a trial, and some had made statements exonerating Epstein.  
Menchel told OPR he believed that if the USAO had filed the proposed charges against Epstein, 
Epstein would have elected to go to trial.  In Menchel’s view, the USAO therefore had to weigh 
the risk of losing at trial, and thereby re-traumatizing the victims, against the benefits gained 
through a negotiated result, which ensured that Epstein served time in jail, registered as a sexual 
offender, and made restitution to his victims.   
Sloman also recalled witness challenges and concerns about the viability of the 
government’s legal theories.  He told OPR:   
[I]t seemed to me you had a tranche of witnesses who were not going 
to be reliable.  You had a tranche [of] witnesses who were going to 
be severely impeached.  People who loved Jeffrey Epstein who 
thought he was a Svengali . . . who were going to say I told him I 
was 18 years old.   
You had witnesses who were scared to death of the public light 
being shown on them because their parents didn’t even know -- had 
very vulnerable victims. You had all of these concerns. 
 
 
Acosta told OPR that he recalled di...

 
147 
 
d[id]n’t want to have to relive what happened to them.”217  The co-case agent told OPR that one 
of the “strategies” for dealing with the victims’ fear was “to keep them off the stand,” and he 
generally remembered discussions about resolving the Epstein case in a way that protected the 
victims’ identities.  In addition, the CEOS Trial Attorney who briefly worked with Villafaña on 
the case after the NPA was signed told OPR that in her meetings with some of the victims, she 
formed the impression that they were not interested in the prosecution going forward.  The CEOS 
Trial Attorney told OPR that “[the victims] would have testified,” but would have required an 
extensive amount of “victim management” because they were “deeply embarrassed” about 
potentially being labeled as prostitutes.  The CEOS Trial Attorney also told OPR that “there were 
obvious weaknesses in the case,” from an evidentiary perspective.218 
 
The contemporaneous records also reflect discussions of, or references to, various legal 
and factual issues or other concerns about the case.  For example, in an early email to Menchel, 
Lourie noted that two key issues raised by Villafaña’s proposed charges were whether the USAO 
could prove that Epstein traveled for the purpose of engaging in sex acts, and the fact that some 
minor victims had told Epstein they were 18.  He later opined to Acosta and Menchel that “there 
is some risk on some of the statutes [proposed in Villafaña’s prosecution memorandum] as this is 
uncharted territory to some degree.”  In his July 5, 2007 email to Villafaña, Menchel cited Acosta’s 
and Sloman’s “concerns about taking this case because of [the P]etit policy and a number of legal 
issues” and Acosta’s concerns about “hurting Project Safe Childhood.”  Defense counsel raised 
myriad legal and factual challenges in their voluminous letters to the USAO.  Defense submissions 
attacked the legal theories for a federal prosecution and detailed factors that could hav...

 
148 
 
 
The USAO might have been able to surmount the evidentiary, legal, and policy issues 
presented by a federal prosecution of Epstein.  Villafaña, in particular, believed she could have 
prevailed had she taken the case to trial, and even after the NPA was negotiated, she repeatedly 
recommended declaring Epstein in breach and proceeding with an indictment, because she 
continued to have confidence in the case.220  Oosterbaan and others also believed that the 
government would succeed at trial.  Furthermore, the victims were not a uniform group.  Some of 
them were afraid of testifying or having their identities made public; others wanted Epstein 
prosecuted, but even among those, it is not clear how many expressed a willingness to testify at a 
trial; and still others provided information favorable to Epstein.  In the end, Acosta assumed 
responsibility for deciding how to resolve the Epstein investigation and weighing the risks and 
benefits of a trial versus those of a pre-charge disposition.  His determination that a pre-charge 
disposition was appropriate was not unreasonable under the circumstances.   
Although evidentiary and witness issues explain the subject supervisors’ concerns about 
winning a potential trial and why the USAO would have sought some sort of pre-charge 
disposition, they do not fully explain why Acosta decided to pursue a state-based resolution as 
opposed to a traditional federal plea agreement.  OPR did not find in the contemporaneous records 
a memorandum or other memorialization of the reasoning underlying Acosta’s decision to offer a 
state-based resolution or the terms offered to the defense on July 31, 2007.   
According to Acosta, “In 2006, it would have been extremely unusual for any United States 
Attorney’s Office to become involved in a state solicitation case, even one involving underage 
teens,” because solicitation was “the province of state prosecutors.”  Acosta told OPR that he 
developed “a preference for deferrin...

 
149 
 
been concerned about policy and federalism issues.221  Sloman told OPR that although he did not 
remember specific conversations, he generally recalled that Acosta had been “sensitive to” Petite 
policy and federalism concerns, which Sloman described as whether the USAO was “overstepping 
our bounds by taking what is a traditional state case that was in the State Attorney’s Office that 
was resolved by the State Attorney’s Office at some level.”  During his OPR interview, Menchel 
remembered that Acosta approached the case from “a broader policy perspective” and was worried 
about “the impact that taking the case in federally may have on . . . other programs,” although 
Menchel did not recall specifically what those programs were.   
C. 
Other Significant Factors Are Inconsistent with a Conclusion That the 
Subjects’ Actions Were Motivated by Improper Influences 
OPR considered additional aspects of the Epstein case that were inconsistent with a 
suggestion that Acosta’s decision to offer the July 31, 2007 terms was driven by corruption, a 
desire to provide an improper benefit to Epstein, or other improper influences.   
First, OPR considered highly significant the fact that if Acosta’s primary motivation was 
to benefit Epstein, he had an option even more favorable to Epstein available to him.  The NPA 
required Epstein to serve time in jail and register as a sexual offender, and provided a mechanism 
for the victims to seek monetary damages—outcomes unlikely if the matter had been abandoned 
and sent back to the state for whatever result state authorities deemed appropriate.  Epstein’s 
attorneys had vehemently argued to the USAO that there was no federal interest in the investigation 
and that his conduct was exclusively a matter of state concern.  If the USAO had declined to 
intervene in the case, as Epstein’s counsel repeatedly and strongly argued it should, the state would 
have meted out the sole punishment for his behavior.  Under the state’s orig...

 
150 
 
reconsider the provision.  Acosta could certainly have modified or eliminated the provision entirely 
if his motivation was to benefit Epstein or Epstein’s attorneys.     
 
Second, Epstein himself was not satisfied with the NPA.  Immediately after signing the 
agreement, he sought to have the Department nullify it by declaring federal involvement in the 
investigation inappropriate.  In addition to repeatedly attacking the NPA in his submissions to the 
Department, Epstein added to his evidentiary challenges and federalism claims allegations of 
misconduct and improper bias on the part of specific USAO personnel.  Epstein’s dissatisfaction 
with the NPA, and his personal attacks on individual prosecutors involved in negotiating the 
agreement, appear inconsistent with a conclusion that the subjects designed the NPA for Epstein’s 
benefit.   
D. 
OPR Does Not Find That the Subjects’ Preexisting Relationships with Defense 
Counsel, Decisions to Meet with Defense Counsel, and Other Factors 
Established That the Subjects Acted from Improper Influences or Provided 
Improper Benefits to Epstein  
In evaluating the subjects’ conduct, OPR considered various other factors featured in media 
accounts to show that the subjects provided improper benefits to Epstein or which purportedly 
suggested that the subjects acted from improper influences.  OPR examined these factors but did 
not find that they supported a finding that the subjects were influenced by favoritism, bias, or other 
improper motivation.    
1. 
The Evidence Does Not Establish That the Subjects Extended Any 
Improper Benefit to Epstein because of Their Preexisting Relationships 
with His Attorneys 
 
Epstein’s wealth enabled him to hire multiple attorneys who had preexisting personal 
connections to some of the government attorneys involved in his case, in the State Attorney’s 
Office, in the USAO, and elsewhere in the Department.  Based on the attorneys Epstein selected 
to represent him, a reasonabl...

 
151 
 
[O]ne of the issues in the case was the . . . defense’s ability to 
describe the case or characterize the case as being legally complex.  
It was not as legally complex as they made it out to be.  But because 
they were able to convince members of our office that it was 
somehow extremely novel and legally complex, the issue became 
who was likely to succeed in arguing these legal issues.  And 
because of that, the legal prowess, if you will, of the attorneys [ ] 
[became] something to consider. 
 
. . . . 
 
I think that the ability of Alan Dershowitz and Ken Starr and Jay 
Lefkowitz to convince Alex Acosta that I didn’t know what I was 
talking [about] also, all came into play.  So I think there were a 
number of factors and it all came together. 
Although Villafaña was critical of Acosta’s consideration of the defense arguments, she 
conceded that the defense team’s tactics demonstrated effective advocacy.  Certainly, throughout 
the case, Epstein’s attorneys prepared lengthy memoranda analyzing the evidence and arguing 
nuanced legal points concerning federalism, the elements of numerous federal criminal statutes, 
and the evidence relevant to those statutes, but it is not unusual or unreasonable for prosecutors to 
carefully consider well-crafted legal arguments from defense counsel.   
 
There is little question that Epstein’s extensive team of attorneys was able to obtain 
negotiated benefits for Epstein—although the USAO never wavered from its three core 
requirements, it did agree to a reduction in prison time from its original offer, and it granted Epstein 
certain other concessions during the negotiations.  Epstein’s wealth provided him with skilled, 
experienced negotiators who continually sought various incremental concessions, and with 
attorneys who knew how to obtain Department review of a USAO matter, thereby delaying 
undesired outcomes for as long as possible.223  Despite Epstein’s evident intentions, however, OPR 
did not find evidence w...

 
152 
 
friendships or associations with any of Epstein’s attorneys.  In fact, Menchel told OPR that he and 
his USAO colleagues viewed Epstein’s attempt to exert influence through his choice of counsel as 
“ham-fisted” and “clumsy.”  
 
Sloman told OPR that although he became aware that Lourie was friends with Guy Lewis 
and Lewis’s law partner, he was unaware of personal relationships between any of his other 
colleagues and any of Epstein’s attorneys, but that in any event his attitude regarding cases 
involving former colleagues “was that we would give them process, but we didn’t pull any punches 
with them.”  In Sloman’s view, preexisting relationships with defense counsel did not “change the 
equation” because as AUSAs, he and his colleagues were motivated by what they perceived to be 
best for the case.   
 
Lourie told OPR that his preexisting associations with Epstein’s attorneys “didn’t influence 
anything.”  Notably, at the outset of the Epstein case, Lourie sought guidance from the USAO’s 
Professional Responsibility Officer about the propriety of his role as a supervisor in the 
investigation, because of his acquaintance with Lewis and long-time friendship with Lewis’s law 
partner.  OPR considered Lourie’s caution in seeking and obtaining the Professional Responsibility 
Officer’s advice as an indication that he was alert to his ethical responsibilities regarding 
relationships with defense counsel, including avoiding the appearance of a conflict of interest.   
Acosta said during his OPR interview that he “developed” the three criteria reflected on 
the term sheet—a sentence of incarceration, sexual offender registration, and monetary damages 
for the victims—before he engaged directly with any of Epstein’s attorneys and before Epstein 
added Starr and Lefkowitz, the Kirkland & Ellis attorneys, to his team.  Acosta pointed out that 
the USAO continued to insist on a resolution that satisfied all three of those criteria even after 
Kirkland & Ellis be...

 
153 
 
 
In its review of the documentary record, OPR examined an email written by Villafaña in 
2018, more than a decade after the NPA was negotiated, in which she suggested that the two-year 
sentence requirement in the initial “term sheet” provided to the defense was developed by Menchel 
as a favor to defense attorney Sanchez.  OPR examined the facts surrounding this allegation and 
determined that there was no merit to it.  Specifically, in December 2018, after the Miami Herald 
investigative report renewed public attention to the case, Villafaña recounted in an email to a 
supervisory AUSA, a conversation she recalled having had with Sloman about the case.225  In the 
email, Villafaña stated that she had not been a participant in discussions that led to Acosta’s 
decision to offer a two-year plea deal, but she added the following:  “Months (or possibly years) 
later, I asked former First Assistant Jeff Sloman where the two-year figure came from.  He said 
that Lily [sic] Ann Sanchez (attorney for Epstein) asked Mr. Menchel to ‘do her a solid’ and 
convince Mr. Acosta to offer two years.”   
OPR questioned both Villafaña and Sloman about the purported “do her a solid” remark.  
Villafaña told OPR that she had been aware that Menchel and Sanchez were friends.  During her 
OPR interview, Villafaña explained:   
[A] lot later, I asked Jeff.  I said, you know, “Jeff, where did this two 
years come from?”  And he said, “Well, I always figured that . . . 
Lilly asked Matt to do her a solid,” which I thought was such a 
strange term, . . . “and to get her a good deal so that she would be in 
Epstein’s good graces” and that that’s where the two years came 
from.  Although strangely enough, then several years after that, Jeff 
Sloman asked me where the two years came from, and I had to 
remind him of that conversation.  So Jeff doesn’t know where the 
two years came from. 
Because the email had been expressed in more definitive terms, OPR asked Villafaña 
whether Slom...

 
154 
 
 
Menchel told OPR that when he and Sanchez were in the USAO, they had a social 
relationship, which included, in 2003, “a handful of dates over a period of two to three weeks.  We 
decided that . . . this was probably best not to pursue, and we mutually agreed to not do that.”226  
Apart from that, he stated they were “close” and “hung out,” and he asserted that this was known 
in the office at the time.  Menchel said that his relationship with Sanchez “changed dramatically” 
when she left the office for private practice, and that by the time he became involved in the Epstein 
investigation, he had dated and married his wife, and his contact with Sanchez would “most likely” 
have been at office events and when she attended his wedding.227  Menchel added, “[T]hat was 
three and a half years [prior] for a very brief period of time, and I don’t think I gave it a moment’s 
thought.”  
When asked by OPR about the basis for the decision to make an offer of a two-year term 
of incarceration, Menchel said that he did not recall discussions about the two-year offer and did 
not recall how the office arrived at that figure.  In response to OPR’s question, Menchel stated that 
his relationship with Sanchez did “[n]ot at all” affect his handling of the Epstein case.  Moreover, 
Menchel asserted that the contemporaneous documentary record supports a conclusion that it was 
Acosta, not Menchel, who made the decision to resolve the case with the two-year term.   
OPR carefully considered the documentary record on this point, as well as the statements 
to OPR from Menchel, Villafaña, Sloman, and Acosta, and concludes that there is no evidence 
supporting the suggestion that the plea was instigated by Menchel as a favor to defense counsel.  
The USAO’s first plea overture to defense counsel, which took place sometime before June 26, 
2007, occurred when Menchel spoke with Sanchez about the possibility of resolving the federal 
case with a state plea that required jail time...

 
155 
 
accept the two-year proposal when it was made, but instead continued to press for a sentence of 
home confinement, suggesting that the defense had not requested the two-year term as a favor and 
did not view it as such.  The defense had previously rejected the state’s offer of a sentence of 
probation, and there is no indication in the contemporaneous records that Epstein viewed any jail 
sentence favorably and certainly that did not appear to be the view of the defense team in the early 
stages of the negotiations.     
 
As discussed below, after extensive questioning of the subjects about the basis for the two-
year offer, and a thorough review of the documentary record, OPR was unable to determine the 
reasoning underlying the decision to offer two years as the term of incarceration, as opposed to 
any other term of years.  Nonetheless, OPR concludes from the evidence that Acosta was aware of 
and approved the initial offer to the defense, which included the two-year term of incarceration.  
The only evidence suggesting that the offer of two years stemmed from an improper motivation of 
Menchel’s was a single second-hand statement in an email drafted many years later.  Sloman, the 
purported declarant, told OPR that he could not recall whether he made the statement, but he firmly 
disputed that the email accurately reflected either the reason for the two-year proposal or his 
understanding of that reason.  Villafaña herself could remember little about the critical 
conversation with Sloman, including whether she had recorded accurately what Sloman had said.  
Given the lack of any corroborating evidence, and the evidence showing Epstein’s vigorous 
resistance to the proposal, OPR concludes that there is no evidence to support the statement in 
Villafaña’s 2018 email that Menchel had extended a two-year plea deal as a favor to one of 
Epstein’s attorneys.  
E. 
The Evidence Does Not Establish That the Subjects’ Meetings with Defense 
Counsel Were Imprope...

including one called by the USAO to off er the NP A term sheet resolution-and a sixth meeting 
together with the State Attorney and the lead state prosecutor to discuss the state plea. Acosta 
attended only one pre-NP A meeting. After the NP A was signed and before Epstein entered his 
state guilty pleas, the subject supervisors and the defense team had one substantive meeting, one 
unscheduled meeting on a procedural matter, and a meeting with one defense attorney in 
preparation for a conference call; in addition, Acosta had the breakfast meeting with Lefkowitz. 229 
Date 
USAO Participants 
Defense 
Topic/Purpose 
Participants 
Pre-NPA 
Feb. 1, 2007 
Lourie / Villafana 
Lefcomt / Sanchez 
Defense presents investigation 
improprieties and federal 
jurisdiction issues 
Feb.20, 2007 
Lourie / Villafana 
Lefcomt / Sanchez 
Defense presents witness issues 
June 26, 2007 
Sloman / Menchel / 
Dershowitz / Black 
Defense presents legal issues, 
Lourie / Villafana 
/ Lefcomt / Sanchez investigation improprieties, and 
federal jurisdiction issues 
July 31, 2007 
Sloman / Menchel / 
Black / Lefcomt / 
USAO presents NP A te1m sheet 
Lourie / Villafana 
Sanchez 
Sept. 7, 2007 
Acosta / Oosterbaan / 
Stan / Lefkowitz / 
Defense presents counteroffer 
Sloman / Villafana / 
Sanchez 
Villafana's co-counsel 
Sept. 12, 2007 Lourie / Lourie 
Lefkowitz/ Lefcomt 
Joint meeting with Krischer / 
successor / Villafana 
/ Goldberger 
Belohlavek re state plea 
provision of NP A 
Post-NPA 
Oct. 12, 2007 
Acosta 
Lefkowitz 
Defense discussion of NPA 
te1ms and likely appeal to 
Depaitment 
Nov. 21, 2007 Sloman (possibly 
Lefkowitz (possibly Defense discussion of victims' 
( unscheduled) 
Acosta) 
Dershowitz) 
attorney representative 
procedure 
Dec. 14, 2007 
Acosta I Sloman / 
StaiT / Weinberg / 
Defense presents federal 
Villafana / another 
Dershowitz I 
jurisdiction issues, legal issues, 
senior AUSA 
Lefcomt 
and request for de nova review 
Jan. 7,2008 
(1) Acosta I Sloman 
(1) Sanchez ...

 
157 
 
OPR explored the subject supervisors’ reasoning for accommodating the defense requests 
for in-person meetings and whether such accommodation was unusual.  OPR questioned each of 
the four supervisory subject attorneys about his rationale for engaging in multiple meetings with 
the defense.   
Lourie could not recall his reasoning for meeting with Epstein’s defense counsel, but he 
told OPR that his general practice was to meet with defense counsel when asked to do so.  Lourie 
recognized that some prosecutors—like Villafaña—viewed meeting with the defense as a sign of 
“weakness,” but in Lourie’s view, “information is power,” and as long as the USAO did not share 
information with the defense but rather listened to their arguments, meetings were “all power to 
us.”  Lourie explained that by meeting with the defense, “[Y]ou’re getting the information that 
they think is important; that they’re going to focus on.  The witnesses that they think are liars . . . .  
And so you can form all of that into your strategy.”  Lourie also told OPR that giving defense 
counsel the opportunity to argue the defense position is an important “part of the process” that 
helped ensure procedural fairness, allowing them to “believe that they are getting heard.”  When 
asked whether he afforded the same access to all defendants, Lourie responded, “I don’t recall ever 
getting . . . so many requests for meetings . . . and so many appeals and so many audiences that 
[Epstein’s attorneys] got.  But this was I think the first time that that’s really happened.”   
Menchel, too, told OPR that his general view was that “ethically it’s appropriate” to give a 
defense attorney “an audience,” and there was no real “downside” to doing so.  Menchel added, 
“[W]hat happens a lot of times is the government will carve around those points that are being 
raised by the defense, and it’s good to know” what the defense will be.   
During his OPR interview, Acosta rejected the notion that his meet...

 
158 
 
preparing a “short” charging document “with only ‘clean’ victims that they have not dirtied up 
already.”230  The fact that Lourie apparently used information gleaned from the defense about the 
victims’ credibility to formulate his charging recommendation supported his statements to OPR 
that such meetings were, in his experience, a useful source of information that could be factored 
into the government’s charging strategy.      
 
The two February 2007 Villafaña/Lourie-level meetings focused on witness issues and 
claims of misconduct by state investigators, but in late May 2007, defense attorneys requested 
another meeting—this time with higher-level supervisors Menchel and Sloman—to make a 
presentation concerning legal deficiencies in a potential federal prosecution.  The request was 
granted after Lourie recommended to Menchel and Sloman that “[i]t would probably be helpful to 
us . . . to hear their legal arguments in case we have missed something.”  The requested meeting 
took place on June 26, 2007.  Before the meeting, at Menchel’s direction, Villafaña provided to 
the defense a list of statutes the USAO was considering as the basis for federal charges.  Defense 
counsel used that information to prepare a 19-page letter, submitted to the USAO the day before 
the June 26 meeting, as “an overview” of the defense position.  In an email to his colleagues, 
Lourie evaluated the defense submission, noting its weaker and stronger arguments.  A 
contemporaneous email indicates that Menchel, Lourie, and Villafaña viewed the meeting itself as 
primarily a “listening session.”231  After the meeting, Epstein’s team submitted a second lengthy 
letter to the USAO detailing Epstein’s “federalism” arguments that the USAO should let the state 
handle the matter.   
 
Menchel apparently scheduled the next meeting with defense counsel, on July 31, 2007, to 
facilitate the USAO’s presentation to the defense team of the “term sheet” describing the proposed 
terms of ...

 
159 
 
The meeting of USAO representatives and Epstein’s defense attorneys, together with the 
State Attorney and the lead state prosecutor on September 12, 2007, was a necessary part of the 
NPA negotiation process.   
 
Even after the NPA was signed, the defense continued to request meetings and reviews of 
the case, both within the USAO and by the Department’s Criminal Division and the Deputy 
Attorney General.  Although limited reviews were granted, during this period there was only one 
substantive meeting with Acosta, on December 14, 2007.232  This meeting occurred in lieu of the 
meeting Starr had requested of Assistant Attorney General Fisher, most likely because the defense 
submissions to the Department’s Criminal Division had raised issues not previously raised with 
the USAO and the Department determined that Acosta should address those in the first instance.233  
Acosta told OPR that he did not ask for the Department review, but he also did not want to appear 
as if he “fear[ed]” that review.  Acosta’s nuanced position, however, was not clear to the 
Department attorneys who responded to Epstein’s appeals and who perceived Acosta to be in favor 
of a Department review, rather than merely tolerant of it.  Notably, though, none of those meetings 
or reviews resulted in the USAO abandoning the NPA, and Epstein gained no substantial 
advantage from his continued entreaties.   
In sum, in evaluating the subjects’ conduct, OPR considered the number of meetings, their 
purpose, the content of the discussions, and decisions made afterwards.  OPR cannot say that the 
number of meetings, particularly those occurring before the NPA was signed, was so far outside 
the norm—for a high profile case with skilled defense attorneys—that the quantity of meetings 
alone shows that the subjects were motivated by improper favoritism.  In evaluating the subjects’ 
conduct, OPR considered that the meetings were held with different levels of USAO managers and 
that the expla...

 
160 
 
2. 
The Evidence Does Not Establish That Acosta Negotiated a Deal 
Favorable to Epstein over Breakfast with Defense Counsel   
 
OPR separately considered the circumstances of one specific meeting that has been the 
subject of media attention and public criticism.  The Miami Herald’s November 2018 reporting on 
the Epstein investigation opened with an account of the October 12, 2007 breakfast meeting that 
defense counsel Jay Lefkowitz arranged to have with Acosta at the West Palm Beach Marriott 
hotel.  According to the Miami Herald article, “a deal was struck” at the meeting to allow Epstein 
to serve “just 13 months” in the county jail in exchange for the shuttering of the federal 
investigation, and Acosta also agreed to “conceal” the full extent of Epstein’s crimes from the 
victims and the public.234  Although public criticism of the meeting has focused on the fact that 
the meeting occurred in a hotel far from Acosta’s Miami office, the evidence shows that Acosta 
traveled to West Palm Beach on October 11 for a press event and stayed overnight at the hotel, 
near the USAO’s West Palm Beach office, because at midday on October 12 he was to speak at 
the Palm Beach County Bench Bar Conference.  After carefully considering the evidence 
surrounding the breakfast meeting, including contemporaneous email communications and witness 
accounts, OPR concludes that Acosta did not negotiate the NPA, or make any significant 
concessions relating to it, during or as a result of the October breakfast meeting.   
 
Epstein and his attorneys signed the NPA on September 24, 2007—more than two weeks 
before the October 12 breakfast meeting.  The signed NPA contained all of the key provisions 
resulting from the preceding weeks of negotiations between the parties, and despite a later 
addendum and ongoing disputes about interpreting the damages provision of the agreement, those 
key provisions remained in place thereafter.  Acosta told OPR that throughout the negotiati...

 
161 
 
proof that this led to the breakfast meeting, email exchanges between Lefkowitz and Acosta show 
that it was under discussion at the time they were scheduling the meeting.  Shortly after the 
breakfast meeting, Sloman, in Miami, sent an email to Lefkowitz (copying Acosta and Villafaña), 
noting that he “just got off the phone with Alex” and offering a slightly revised portion of the 
addendum relating to the mechanism for selection of the attorney representative.  Sloman later 
clarified for Villafaña that “Jay’s suggested revision has been rejected.”     
A second area of continuing negotiation arose from the defense claim that Epstein’s 
obligation under the NPA to pay the attorney representative’s fees did not obligate him to pay the 
fees and costs of contested litigation filed against him.  Although this was at odds with the USAO’s 
interpretation of the provision, the USAO and defense counsel reached agreement and clarified the 
provision in the NPA addendum that was finalized several weeks after the October breakfast 
meeting.  Although the revised provision was to Epstein’s advantage, the revision concerned 
attorney’s fees and did not materially impede the victims’ ability to seek damages from Epstein 
under § 2255.    The fact that the negotiations continued after the breakfast meeting indicates that 
Acosta did not make promises at the meeting that resolved the issue. 
 
OPR found limited contemporaneous evidence concerning the discussion between Acosta 
and Lefkowitz.  In a letter sent to Acosta on October 23, 2007, two weeks after the breakfast 
meeting, Lefkowitz represented that Acosta made three significant concessions during the meeting.  
Specifically, Lefkowitz claimed that Acosta had agreed (1) not to intervene with the State 
Attorney’s Office’s handling of the case, (2) not to contact any of the victim-witnesses or their 
counsel, and (3) not to intervene regarding the sentence Epstein received.  Acosta told OPR that 
he did not rememb...

 
162 
 
promise equates to the imposition of a gag order.  Our Office cannot 
and will not agree to this.   
It is the intent of this Office to treat this matter like any other case. 
Acosta told OPR that this was a polite way of chastising Lefkowitz for mischaracterizing 
what Acosta said during the breakfast meeting.  Although OPR could not find evidence that the 
letter was sent to Lefkowitz, OPR nonetheless considers it persuasive evidence that Acosta, shortly 
after the breakfast meeting, disagreed with Lefkowitz’s description of their discussions and had 
discussed those disagreements with Sloman.   
 
Nevertheless, OPR examined the three specific concessions that Lefkowitz described in 
the October 23 letter, to determine whether evidence reflected that Acosta had made them during 
the breakfast meeting.  First, Lefkowitz claimed that Acosta agreed during the breakfast meeting 
that he did not intend to interfere with the state’s handling of the case.  Contemporaneous 
documents show that well before the breakfast meeting, Acosta had expressed the view that he did 
not want to “dictate” actions to the State Attorney or the state court.  For example, during the NPA 
negotiations, Acosta asked Villafaña to “soften” certain language that appeared to require the State 
Attorney’s Office or the state court to take specific actions, such as requiring that Epstein enter his 
guilty plea or report to begin serving his sentence by a certain date.  Although Acosta may have 
made a statement during the breakfast meeting expressing his disinclination to interfere with the 
state’s proceedings, such a statement would have been a reiteration of his prior position on the 
subject, rather than any new concession.   
 
Lefkowitz also claimed in his October 23, 2007 letter that Acosta agreed not to contact any 
of the victims or potential witnesses or their counsel.  For the reasons discussed more fully in 
Chapter Three, OPR concludes that the decision not to notify the vict...

 
163 
 
sentence of incarceration, and the USAO would consider a plea that differed from that requirement 
a breach of the NPA and would “proceed accordingly.”   
 
The guilty plea Epstein entered in state court in June 2008 was consistent with the dictates 
of the NPA, and pursuant to that plea, the court imposed a sentence of 18 months’ incarceration.  
Epstein, however, applied for and was accepted into the work release program, and was able to 
serve a substantial portion of his sentence outside of the jail.  The NPA did not reference work 
release nor authorize Epstein to receive such benefits during his tenure at the Palm Beach County 
Stockade.  Moreover, Villafaña received assurances from defense counsel that Epstein would serve 
his entire sentence of confinement “in custody.”  Responsibility for the decision to afford Epstein 
work release privileges during his incarceration rested with state officials, who had the sole 
authority for administering the work release program.  
After considering the substantial record documenting the decisions made after Acosta’s 
October 12, 2007 breakfast meeting with Lefkowitz, OPR found nothing in the record to suggest 
that the meeting resulted in a material change to the NPA, affected the sentence Epstein served 
pursuant to the NPA, or contributed to state officials’ decision to permit him to participate in work 
release.   
F. 
Villafaña’s Emails with Defense Attorney Lefkowitz during the NPA 
Negotiations Do Not Establish That Villafaña, or Other Subjects, Intended to 
Give Epstein Preferential Treatment or Were Motivated by Favoritism or 
Other Improper Influences  
 
During the CVRA litigation, the petitioners obtained from Epstein’s attorney, and filed 
under seal, a redacted series of email exchanges between Epstein attorney Lefkowitz and Villafaña 
(and others with Acosta and Sloman) during September 2007 when the NPA was being finalized, 
and thereafter.  These emails had been redacted to delete most of Lefko...

 
164 
 
 
OPR asked Villafaña about these emails and about the tenor of her interactions with 
Lefkowitz during the NPA negotiations and with other defense attorneys generally.  Villafaña 
acknowledged that their tone was collegial and collaborative, and explained that generally, the 
tone of these emails reflected her personality and her commitment to complete the task her 
supervisors had assigned to her:  
[I]f you were to pull all my e-mails on every case, you would find 
that that is how I communicate with people.  I’m a Minnesota girl, 
and I prefer not to be confrontational until I have to be.  And I can 
be when I need to be.  But my instructions from my supervisors were 
to engage in these negotiations and to complete them.  So I felt that 
given that task, the best way to complete them was to reach the 
agreement and, keeping in mind the terms that . . . our office had 
agreed to, and do that in a way that is civil.  So . . . although my 
language in the kind of introductory or prefatory communications 
with Mr. Lefkowitz was casual and was friendly, when you look at 
the terms and when he would come back to me asking for changes, 
my response was always, “No, I will not make that change.”  
 
Villafaña denied any intention to keep the victims uninformed about the NPA or to provide 
an improper benefit for Epstein, and she explained the context of the emails in question.  The email 
in which Villafaña expressed reluctance to “highlight for the judge all of the other crimes and all 
of the other persons that we could charge” was written in response to a defense proposal to include 
in the federal plea agreement the parties were then considering a promise by the government not 
to prosecute Epstein’s assistants and other employees.  Lefkowitz had proposed that the plea 
agreement state, “Epstein’s fulfilling the terms and conditions of the Agreement also precludes the 
initiation of any and all criminal charges which might otherwise in the future be brought...

 
165 
 
 
With regard to her comment about “avoid[ing] the press,” Villafaña told OPR that her goal 
was to protect the anonymity of the victims.  She said that the case was far more likely to be 
covered by the Palm Beach press, which had already written articles about Epstein, than in Miami, 
and “if [the victims] wanted to attend [the plea hearing], I wanted them to be able to go into the 
courthouse without their faces being splashed all over the newspaper.” 
 
In evaluating the emails, OPR reviewed all the email exchanges between Villafaña, as well 
as Sloman and Acosta, and Lefkowitz and other defense counsel, including the portions redacted 
from the publicly released emails (except for a few to or from Acosta, copies of which OPR did 
not locate in the USAO records).  OPR also considered the emails in the broader context of 
Villafaña’s overall conduct during the federal investigation of Epstein.  The documentary record, 
as well as witness and subject interviews, establishes that Villafaña consistently advocated in favor 
of prosecuting Epstein and worked for months toward that goal.  She repeatedly pressed her 
supervisors for permission to indict Epstein and made numerous efforts to expand the scope of the 
case.  She opposed meetings with the defense team, and nearly withdrew from the case because 
her supervisors agreed to those meetings.  Villafaña objected to the decision to resolve the case 
through a guilty plea in state court, and she engaged in a lengthy and heated email exchange with 
Menchel about that subject.  When she was assigned the task of creating an agreement to effect 
that resolution, Villafaña fought hard during the ensuing negotiations to hold the USAO’s position 
despite defense counsel’s aggressive tactics.    
 
OPR also considered statements of her supervisors regarding her interactions with defense 
counsel.  Sloman, in particular, told OPR that reports that Villafaña “was soft on Epstein . . . 
couldn’t have been further from ...

 
166 
 
entitled to significant weight, and OPR credits them.  OPR finds, therefore, that the emails in 
question do not themselves establish that Villafaña (or any other subject) acted to improperly 
benefit Epstein, was motivated by favoritism or other improper influences, or sought to silence 
victims.  
G. 
The Evidence Does Not Establish That Acosta, Lourie, or Villafaña Agreed to 
the NPA’s Provision Promising Not to Prosecute “Potential Co-conspirators” 
in Order to Protect Any of Epstein’s Political, Celebrity, or Other Influential 
Associates  
 
OPR examined the decision by the subjects who negotiated the NPA—Villafaña, Lourie, 
and Acosta—to include in the agreement a provision in which the USAO agreed not to prosecute 
“any potential co-conspirators of Epstein,” in addition to four named individuals, to determine 
whether that provision resulted from the subjects’ improper favoritism towards Epstein or an 
improper effort to shield from prosecution any of Epstein’s known associates.  Other than various 
drafts of the NPA and of a federal plea agreement, OPR found little in the contemporaneous 
records mentioning the provision and nothing indicating that the subjects discussed or debated it—
or even gave it much consideration.  Drafts of the NPA and of the federal plea agreement show 
that the final broad language promising not to prosecute “any potential co-conspirators of Epstein” 
evolved from a more narrow provision sought by the defense.  The provision expanded as Villafaña 
and defense counsel exchanged drafts of, first, a proposed federal plea agreement and, then, of the 
NPA, with apparently little analysis and no substantive discussion within the USAO about the 
provision.237   
 
 
As the NPA drafting process concluded, Villafaña circulated to Lourie and another 
supervisor a draft that contained the non-prosecution provision, telling Lourie it was “some of 
[defense counsel’s] requested language regarding promises not to prosecute other people...

 
167 
 
Villafaña had raised (defense counsel’s attempt to insert an immigration waiver into the 
agreement), but Lourie did not comment on the provision promising not to prosecute co-
conspirators or ask Villafaña to explain why she believed the provision did not harm the 
government’s interests.  In a subsequent email about the draft NPA, Villafaña asked Lourie for 
“[a]ny other thoughts,” but there is no indication that he provided further input.  OPR found no 
document that suggested Villafaña and Lourie discussed the provision further, or that the other 
individuals who were copied on Villafaña’s email referencing the provision—her immediate 
supervisor, the supervisor designated to succeed Lourie as manager of the West Palm Beach office, 
and Villafaña’s co-counsel—commented on or had substantive discussions about it.  Villafaña told 
OPR that because none of the three supervisors responded to her observation that the non-
prosecution provision “doesn’t hurt us,” Villafaña assumed that they agreed with her assessment. 
 
Villafaña told OPR that she could not recall a conversation specifically about the provision 
agreeing not to prosecute “any potential co-conspirators,” but she remembered generally that 
defense counsel told her Epstein wanted “to make sure that he’s the only one who takes the blame 
for what happened.”  Villafaña told OPR that she and her colleagues believed Epstein’s conduct 
was his own “dirty little secret.”  Villafaña said that press coverage at the time of Epstein’s 2006 
arrest did not allege that any of his famous contacts participated in Epstein’s illicit activity and that 
none of the victims interviewed by the case agents before the NPA was signed told the investigators 
about sexual activity with any of Epstein’s well-known contacts about whom allegations arose 
many years later.238  Villafaña acknowledged that investigators were aware of Epstein’s longtime 
relationship with a close female friend who was a well-known socialite, ...

 
168 
 
Lourie described the promise not to prosecute “potential co-conspirators” as “unusual,” and told 
OPR that he did not know why it was included in the agreement, but added that it would be “unlike 
me if I read that language to just leave it in there unless I thought it was somehow helpful.”  Lourie 
posited that victims who recruited other underage girls to provide massages for Epstein 
“theoretically” could have been charged as co-conspirators.  He told OPR that when he saw the 
provision, he may have understood the reference to unnamed “co-conspirators” as “a message to 
any victims that had recruited other victims that there was no intent to charge them.”  
 
Acosta did not recall any discussions about the non-prosecution provision.  But he told 
OPR that Epstein was always “the focus” of the federal investigation, and he would have viewed 
the federal interests as vindicated as long as Epstein was required to face “meaningful 
consequences” for his actions.  Acosta told OPR that when he reviewed the draft NPA, “[t]o the 
extent I reviewed this co-conspirator provision, I can speculate that my thinking would have been 
the focus is on Epstein[ ] . . . going to jail.  Whether some of his employees go to jail, or other, 
lesser involved [individuals], is not the focus of this.”  Acosta also told OPR that he assumed 
Villafaña and Lourie had considered the provision and decided that it was appropriate.  Finally, 
Sloman, who was not involved in negotiating the NPA, told OPR that in retrospect, he understood 
the non-prosecution provision was designed to protect Epstein’s four assistants, and it “never 
dawned” on him that it was intended to shield anyone else. 
 
This broad provision promising not to prosecute “any potential co-conspirators” is 
troubling and, as discussed more fully later in this Report, OPR did not find evidence showing that 
the subjects gave careful consideration to the potential scope of the provision or whether it was 
warranted given...

 
169 
 
investigation.243  Media reports in mid-2009 suggested Epstein was released from his state 
incarceration “early” because he was assisting in a financial crimes investigation in the Eastern 
District of New York involving Epstein’s former employer, Bear Stearns.  At the time, Villafaña 
was notified by the AUSAs handling the matter that they “had never heard of” Epstein and he was 
providing “absolutely no cooperation” to the government.  In 2011, Villafaña reported to senior 
colleagues that “this is urban myth.  The FBI and I looked into this and do not believe that any of 
it is true.”  Villafaña told OPR that the rumor that Epstein had cooperated with the case in New 
York was “completely false.”  Acosta told OPR that he did not have any information about Epstein 
cooperating in a financial investigation or relating to media reports that Epstein had been an 
“intelligence asset.”244   
In addition to the contemporaneous record attesting that Epstein was not a cooperating 
witness in a federal matter, OPR found no evidence suggesting that Epstein was such a cooperating 
witness or “intelligence asset,” or that anyone—including any of the subjects of OPR’s 
investigation—believed that to be the case, or that Epstein was afforded any benefit on such a 
basis.  OPR did not find any reference to Epstein’s purported cooperation, or even a suggestion 
that he had assisted in a different matter, in any of the numerous communications sent by defense 
counsel to the USAO and the Department.  It is highly unlikely that defense counsel would have 
omitted any reason warranting leniency for Epstein if it had existed.   
Accordingly, OPR concludes that none of the subjects of OPR’s investigation provided 
Epstein with any benefits on the basis that he was a cooperating witness in an unrelated federal 
investigation, and OPR found no evidence establishing that Epstein had received benefits for 
cooperation in any matter. 
V. 
ACOSTA EXERCISED POOR JUDGMENT BY RESOLVIN...

 
170 
 
successful federal prosecution, Acosta prematurely decided to resolve the case without adequately 
addressing ways in which a federal case potentially could have been strengthened, such as by 
obtaining Epstein’s missing computer equipment.  Finally, a lack of coordination within the USAO 
compounded Acosta’s flawed reasoning and resulted in insufficient oversight over the process of 
drafting the NPA, a unique document that required more detailed attention and review than it 
received.  These problems were, moreover, entirely avoidable because federal prosecution, and 
potentially a federal plea agreement, existed as viable alternatives to the NPA resolution.   
In evaluating Acosta’s conduct, OPR has considered and taken into account the fact that 
some of Epstein’s conduct known today was not known in 2007 and that other circumstances have 
changed in the interim, including some victims’ willingness to testify.  OPR has also evaluated 
Acosta’s decisions in a framework that recognizes and allows for decisions that are made in good 
faith, even if the decision in question may not have led to the “best” result that potentially could 
have been obtained.  Nonetheless, after considering all of the available evidence and the totality 
of the then-existing circumstances, OPR concludes that Acosta exercised poor judgment in that he 
chose an action or course of action that was in marked contrast to that which the Department would 
reasonably expect of an attorney exercising good judgment.  
A. 
Acosta’s Decision to Resolve the Federal Investigation through a State Plea 
under Terms Incorporated into the NPA Was Based on a Flawed Application 
of the Petite Policy and Federalism Concerns, and Failed to Consider the 
Significant Disadvantages of a State-Based Resolution  
 
The Department formulated the Petite policy in response to a series of Supreme Court 
opinions holding that the Constitution does not deny state and federal governments the power to 
prosecute ...

 
171 
 
Notably, in the early 2000s, the Department had begun pursuing specific initiatives to combat child 
sex trafficking, including Project Safe Childhood, and Congress had then recently passed the 
PROTECT Act.  Acosta himself told OPR that the exploitation of minors was “an important federal 
interest,” which in Epstein’s case was compounded by the “sordidness” of the acts involved and 
the number of victims.   
 
It is also clear that because the state case against Epstein was still pending and had not 
reached a conviction, acquittal, or other decision on the merits, the Petite policy did not apply and 
certainly did not preclude a federal prosecution of Epstein.  He had been charged with one state 
charge of solicitation to prostitution on three occasions, involving one or more other persons 
without regard to age—a charge that would have addressed only a scant portion of the conduct 
under federal investigation.  Acosta acknowledged to OPR that the Petite policy “on its face” did 
not apply.  Moreover, the State Attorney did not challenge the federal government’s assumption 
of prosecutorial responsibility, and despite having obtained an indictment, held back on proceeding 
with the state prosecution in deference to the federal government’s involvement.  In these 
circumstances, the USAO was free to proceed with a prosecution sufficient to ensure vindication 
of the federal interest in prosecuting a man who traveled interstate repeatedly to prey upon minors.  
The federal government was uniquely positioned to fully investigate the conduct of an individual 
who engaged in repeated criminal conduct in Florida but who also traveled extensively and had 
residences outside of Florida.  Even if the Petite policy had applied, OPR has little doubt that the 
USAO could have obtained authorization from the Department to proceed with a prosecution under 
the circumstances of this case.245   
 
Despite the undeniable federal interest in prosecuting Epstein, the fact ...

 
172 
 
[The prosecution] was going forward on the part of the state, and so 
here is the big bad federal government stepping on a sovereign . . . 
state, saying you’re not doing enough, [when] to my mind . . . the 
whole idea of the [P]etite policy is to recognize that the []state . . . 
is an independent entity, and that we should presume that what 
they’re doing is correct, even if we don’t like the outcome, except 
in the most unusual of circumstances. 
Acosta told OPR that “absent USAO intervention,” the state’s prosecution of Epstein 
would have become final, and accordingly, it was “prudent” to employ Petite policy analysis.  In 
Acosta’s view, “the federal responsibility” in this unique situation was merely to serve as a “back-
stop [to] state authorities to ensure that there [was] no miscarriage of justice.”247  Acosta told OPR 
that he understood the PBPD would not have brought Epstein to the FBI’s attention if the State 
Attorney had pursued charges that required Epstein’s incarceration.  Acosta therefore decided that 
the USAO could avert a “manifest injustice” by forcing the state to do more and require Epstein 
to serve time in jail and register as a sexual offender.   
 
Acosta’s reasoning was flawed and unduly constricted.  Acosta’s repeated references to a 
“miscarriage of justice” or “manifest injustice” echoes the “manifestly inadequate” language used 
in the Petite policy to define the circumstances in which the federal government may proceed with 
a criminal case after a completed state prosecution.  Nothing in the Petite policy, however, requires 
similar restraint when the federal government pursues a case in the absence of a completed state 
prosecution, even if the state is already investigating the same offense.  The goal of the Petite 
policy is to prevent multiple prosecutions for the same offense, not to compel the federal 
government to defer to a parallel state interest in a case, particularly one in which state officials 
involved in...

 
173 
 
depart from the Ashcroft Memo.  He told OPR, however, that he did not recall discussing the 
Ashcroft Memo with his colleagues and nothing in the contemporaneous documentary record 
suggests that he made a conscious decision to depart from it when he decided to resolve the federal 
investigation through the NPA.  Instead, it appears that Acosta simply failed to consider the tension 
between federal charging policy and the strong federal interest in this case, on the one hand, and 
his broad reading of the Petite policy and his general concerns about “federalism,” on the other 
hand.  OPR concludes that Acosta viewed the federal government’s role in prosecuting Epstein 
too narrowly and through the wrong prism. 
 
Furthermore, Acosta’s federalism concerns about intruding on the state’s autonomy 
resulted in an outcome—the NPA—that intruded far more on the state’s autonomy than a decision 
to pursue a federal prosecution would have.249  By means of the NPA, the federal government 
dictated to the state the charges, the sentence, the timing, and certain conditions that the state had 
to obtain during the state’s own prosecution.  Acosta acknowledged during his OPR interview that 
his “attempt to backstop the state here[] rebounded, because in the process, it . . . ended up being 
arguably more intrusive.”     
Acosta’s concern about invading the state’s authority led to additional negative 
consequences.  Acosta revised the draft NPA in several respects to “soften” its tone, by substituting 
provisions requiring Epstein to make his “best efforts” for language that appeared to dictate certain 
actions to the state.  In so doing, however, Acosta undermined the enforceability of the agreement, 
making it difficult later to declare Epstein in breach when he failed to comply.  
 
OPR found no indication that when deciding to resolve the federal prosecution through a 
mechanism that relied completely on state action, Acosta considered the numerous disadvantages 
of ...

 
174 
 
 
The sexual offender registration provision is yet another example of how Acosta’s decision 
to create an unorthodox mechanism that relied on state procedures to resolve the federal 
investigation led to unanticipated consequences benefitting Epstein.  Acosta told OPR that one of 
the core aspects of the NPA was the requirement that Epstein plead guilty to a state charge 
requiring registration as a sexual offender.  He cited it as a provision that he insisted on from the 
beginning and from which he never wavered.  However, the USAO failed to anticipate certain 
factors that affected the sexual offender registration requirement in other states where Epstein had 
a residence.  In selecting the conduct for the factual basis for the crime requiring sexual offender 
registration, the state chose conduct involving a victim who was at least 16 at the time of her 
interactions with Epstein, even though Epstein also had sexual contact with a 14-year old victim.  
The victim’s age made a difference, as the age of consent in New Mexico, where Epstein had a 
residence, was 16; therefore, Epstein was not required to register in that state.  As a 2006 letter 
from defense counsel Lefcourt to the State Attorney’s Office made clear, the defense team had 
thoroughly researched the details and ramifications of Florida’s sexual offender registration 
requirement; OPR did not find evidence indicating similar research and consideration by the 
USAO.          
 
Finally, Acosta was well aware that the PBPD brought the case to the FBI’s attention 
because of a concern that the State Attorney’s Office had succumbed to “pressure” from defense 
counsel.  Villafaña told OPR that she informed both Acosta and Sloman of this when she met with 
them at the start of the federal investigation.  Although Acosta did not remember the meeting with 
Villafaña, he repeatedly told OPR during his interview that he was aware that the PBPD was 
dissatisfied with the State Attorney’s Office’s hand...

 
175 
 
Epstein’s state guilty plea.250  As U.S. Attorney, Acosta had the authority to resolve the case in 
this manner, but OPR concludes that in light of all the surrounding circumstances, his decision to 
do so reflected poor judgment.  Acosta’s application of Petite policy principles was too expansive, 
his view of the federal interest in prosecuting Epstein was too narrow, and his understanding of 
the state system was too imperfect to justify the decision to use the NPA.251   
B. 
The Assessment of the Merits of a Potential Federal Prosecution Was 
Undermined by the Failure to Obtain Evidence or Take Other Investigative 
Steps That Could Have Changed the Complexion of the Case 
The leniency resulting from Acosta’s decision to resolve the case through the NPA is also 
troubling because the USAO reached agreement on the terms of the NPA without fully pursuing 
evidence that could have changed the complexion of the case or afforded the USAO significant 
leverage in negotiating with Epstein.  Acosta told OPR that his decision to resolve the federal 
investigation through the NPA was, in part, due to concerns about the merits of the case and 
concerns about whether the government could win at trial.  Yet, Acosta made the decision to 
resolve the case through a state-based resolution and extended that proposal to Epstein’s defense 
attorneys before the investigation was completed.  As the investigation progressed, the FBI 
continued to locate additional victims, and many had not been interviewed by the FBI by the time 
of the initial offer.  In other words, at the time of Acosta’s decision, the USAO did not know the 
full scope of Epstein’s conduct; whether, given Epstein’s other domestic and foreign residences, 
his criminal conduct had occurred in other locations; or whether the additional victims might 
implicate other offenders.  In addition, Villafaña planned to approach the female assistants to 
attempt to obtain cooperation, but that step had not been taken....

 
176 
 
search warrant was executed on that property, the computer equipment associated with those 
cameras had been removed.  Villafaña knew who had possession of the computer equipment.  
Surveillance images might have shown the victims’ visits, and photographic evidence of their 
appearance at the time of their encounters with Epstein could have countered the anticipated 
argument that Epstein was unaware these girls were minors.  The surveillance video might have 
shown additional victims the investigators had not yet identified.  Such images could have been 
powerful visual evidence of the large number of girls Epstein victimized and the frequency of their 
visits to his home, potentially persuasive proof to a jury that this was not a simple “solicitation” 
case.   
Epstein’s personal computers possibly contained even more damning evidence.  Villafaña 
told OPR that the FBI had information that Epstein used hidden cameras in his New York residence 
to record his sexual encounters, and one victim told agents that Epstein’s assistant photographed 
her in the nude.  Based on this evidence, and experience in other sex cases involving minors, 
Villafaña and several other witnesses opined to OPR that the computers might have contained 
child pornography.  Moreover, Epstein lived a multi-state lifestyle; it was reasonable to assume 
that he may have transmitted still images or videos taken at his Florida residence over the internet 
to be accessed while at one of his other homes or while traveling.  The interstate transmission of 
child pornography was a separate, and serious, federal crime that could have changed the entire 
complexion of the case against Epstein.253  Villafaña told OPR, “[I]f the evidence had been what 
we suspected it was . . . [i]t would have put this case completely to bed.  It also would have 
completely defeated all of these arguments about interstate nexus.”   
 
Because she recognized the potential significance of this evidence, Villafaña at...

 
177 
 
the federal investigation in exchange for a plea in state court to a charge that carried a two-year 
sentence.  The FBI co-case agent told OPR that, in a meeting to discuss the resolution, at which 
the FBI was present, the co-case agent specifically suggested that the USAO wait to pursue a 
resolution until after the litigation was resolved, but this suggestion was “pushed under the rug” 
without comment.  Although the co-case agent could not recall who was present, the case agent 
recalled that Menchel led the meeting, which occurred while the litigation was still pending. 
 
Even after the NPA two-year state plea resolution was presented to the defense, Villafaña 
continued to press ahead to have the court resolve the issue concerning the defense production of 
the computer equipment.  On August 10, 2007, she asked Lourie for authorization to oppose 
Epstein’s efforts to stay the litigation until after an anticipated meeting between the USAO and the 
defense, informing Lourie that a victim interviewed that week claimed she started seeing Epstein 
at age 14 and had been photographed in the nude.  A few days later, Villafaña told defense counsel 
that she had “conferred with the appropriate people, and we are not willing to agree to a stay.”  
Defense counsel then contacted Lourie, who agreed to postpone the hearing until after the 
upcoming meeting with Acosta.  After the meeting, and when the court sought to reschedule the 
hearing, Villafaña emailed Sloman to ask if she should “put it off”; he replied, “Yes,” and the 
hearing was re-set for September 18, 2007.  As negotiations towards the NPA progressed, 
however, the hearing was postponed indefinitely.  Ultimately the NPA itself put the issue to rest 
by specifying that all legal process would be held in abeyance unless and until Epstein breached 
the agreement.   
 
Villafaña told OPR that she had learned through law enforcement channels that the defense 
team had reviewed the contents of Epstein’s co...

 
178 
 
with one of Epstein’s defense attorneys about it.  Sloman told OPR during his interview that he 
“vaguely” remembered the computer issue.  The documentary evidence confirms that he had at 
least some contemporaneous knowledge of the issue—when asked by Villafaña whether to put off 
a September 12, 2007 hearing on the litigation, he told her to do so.  Finally, as noted previously, 
the FBI co-case agent proposed at a meeting with USAO personnel that the USAO wait until the 
litigation was resolved before pursuing plea negotiations.     
 
Contemporaneous records show that Acosta was likely aware before the NPA was signed 
of the USAO’s efforts to obtain custody of Epstein’s computers and that after the NPA was signed, 
he was informed about the use of legal process for obtaining the computer equipment.  The NPA 
itself provides that “the federal . . . investigation will be suspended, and all pending [legal process] 
will be held in abeyance,” that Epstein will withdraw his “motion to intervene and to quash certain 
[legal process],” and, further, that the parties would “maintain . . . evidence subject to [legal 
process] that have been issued, and including certain computer equipment, inviolate” until the 
NPA’s terms had been fully satisfied, at which point the legal process would be “deemed 
withdrawn.”  (Emphasis added.)  Acosta’s numerous edits on the NPA’s final draft suggest that he 
gave it a close read, and OPR expects that Acosta would not have approved the agreement without 
understanding what legal process his office was agreeing to withdraw, or why the only type of 
evidence specified was “certain computer equipment.”  In addition, Acosta told OPR that he 
worked closely with Sloman and Menchel, consulted with them, and relied on their counsel about 
the case.  Among other things, Acosta said he discussed with them concerns about the law and the 
evidentiary issues presented by a federal criminal trial.  Therefore, although it is possible that 
...

 
179 
 
To be clear, OPR is not suggesting that prosecutors must obtain all available evidence 
before reaching plea agreements or that prosecutors cannot reasonably determine that reaching a 
resolution is more beneficial than continuing to litigate evidentiary issues.  Every case is different 
and must be judged on its own facts.  In this case, however, given the unorthodox nature of the 
state-based resolution, the fact that Acosta’s decision to pursue it set the case on a wholly different 
track than what had been originally contemplated by his experienced staff, the nature and scope of 
Epstein’s criminal conduct, the circumstances surrounding the removal of the computers from 
Epstein’s residence, and the potential for obtaining evidence revealing serious additional criminal 
conduct, Acosta had a responsibility to ensure that he was fully informed about the consequences 
of pursing the course of action that he proposed and particularly about the consequences flowing 
from the express terms of the NPA.  In deciding to resolve the case pre-charge, Acosta lost sight 
of the bigger picture that the investigation was not completed and viable leads remained to be 
pursued.  The decision to forgo the government’s efforts to obtain the computer evidence and to 
pursue significant investigative steps should have been made only after careful consideration of 
all the costs and benefits of the proposed action.  OPR did not find evidence that Acosta fully 
considered the costs of ending the investigation prematurely.255    
C. 
OPR Was Unable to Determine the Basis for the Two-Year Term of 
Incarceration, That It Was Tied to Traditional Sentencing Goals, or That It 
Satisfied the Federal Interest in the Prosecution  
The heart of the controversy surrounding the Epstein case is the apparent undue leniency 
afforded him concerning his sentence.  After offering a deal that required a “non-negotiable” 
24-month term of incarceration, Acosta agreed to resolve it for an 18-mo...

 
180 
 
“I’m reconstructing memories of . . . 12 years ago.  I can speculate that at some point, the matter 
came up, and I or someone else said . . . what would the original charges have likely brought?  And 
someone said this amount.”  Acosta told OPR that he could not recall who initially proposed this 
method, but he believed that it likely did not result from a single specific discussion but rather 
from conversations over a course of time.  Acosta could not recall specifically with whom he had 
these discussions, other than that it would have been Lourie, Menchel, or Sloman.  Villafaña was 
not asked for her views on a two-year sentence, and she had no input into the decision before it 
was made.  Villafaña told OPR that she examined the state statutes and could not validate that a 
state charge would have resulted in a 24-month sentence.  OPR also examined applicable state 
statutes and the Florida sentencing guidelines, but could not confirm that Epstein was, in fact, 
facing a potential two-year sentence under charges contemplated by the PBPD. 
 
 On the other hand, during his OPR interview, Lourie “guess[ed]” that “somehow the 
defense conveyed . . . we’re going to trial if it’s more than two years.”  Menchel similarly told 
OPR that he did not know how the two year sentence was derived, but “obviously it was a number 
that the office felt was palatable enough that [Epstein] would take” it.  Sloman told OPR that he 
had no idea how the two-year sentence proposal was reached.   
The contemporaneous documentary record, however, provides no indication that Epstein’s 
team proposed a two-year sentence of incarceration or initially suggested, before the USAO made 
its offer, that Epstein would accept a two-year term of incarceration.  As late as July 25, 2007—
only days before the USAO provided the term sheet to defense counsel—Epstein’s counsel 
submitted a letter to the USAO arguing that the federal government should not prosecute Epstein 
at all.  Furthermo...

 
181 
 
indictment.  Given Epstein’s continued insistence that federal charges were not appropriate and 
defense counsel’s efforts to minimize the amount of time Epstein would spend in jail, it is 
questionable whether Epstein would have accepted such a plea offer, but the USAO did not even 
extend the offer to determine what his response to it would be.   
 
Weighed against possible loss at trial were some clear advantages to a negotiated resolution 
that ensured a conviction, including sexual offender registration and the opportunity to establish a 
mechanism for the victims to recover damages.  These advantages, added to Acosta’s concern 
about intruding on the state’s authority, led him to the conclusion that a two-year state plea would 
be sufficient to prevent manifest injustice.  Menchel told OPR, “I don’t believe anybody at the 
time that this resolution was entered into was looking at the two years as a fair result in terms of 
the conduct.  I think that was not the issue.  The issue was whether or not if we took this case to 
trial, would we risk losing everything?”  
 
During the course of negotiations over a potential federal plea, the USAO agreed to accept 
a plea for an 18-month sentence, a reduction of six months from the original “non-negotiable” two-
year term.  The subjects did not have a clear memory of why this reduction was made.  Villafaña 
attributed it to a conversation between Acosta and Lefkowitz, but Acosta attributed it to a decision 
made during the negotiating process by Villafaña and Lourie, telling OPR that he understood his 
attorneys needed flexibility to reach a final deal with Epstein.  
 
OPR found no contemporaneous documents showing the basis for the two-year term.  
Despite extensive subject interviews and review of thousands of contemporaneous records, OPR 
was unable to determine who initially proposed the two-year term of incarceration or why that 
term, as opposed to other possible and lengthier terms, was settled on for ...

 
182 
 
D. 
Acosta’s Decisions Led to Difficulties Enforcing the NPA  
After the agreement was reached, the collateral attacks and continued appeals raised the 
specter that the defense had negotiated in bad faith.  At various points, individual members of the 
USAO team became frustrated by defense tactics, and in some instances, consideration was given 
to whether the USAO should declare a unilateral breach.  Indeed, on November 24, 2008, the 
USAO gave notice that it deemed Epstein’s participation in work release to be a breach of the 
agreement but ultimately took no further action.  Acosta told OPR:  “I was personally very 
frustrated with the failure to report on October 20, and had I envisioned that entire collateral attack, 
I think I would have looked at this very differently.”  
Once the NPA was signed, Acosta could have ignored Epstein’s requests for further review 
by the Department and, if Epstein failed to fulfill his obligations under the NPA to enter his state 
guilty plea, declared Epstein to be in breach and proceeded to charge him federally.  When 
questioned about this issue, Acosta explained that he believed the Department had the “right” to 
address Epstein’s concerns.  He told OPR that because the USAO is part of the Department of 
Justice, if a defendant asks for Departmental review, it would be “unseemly” to object.  During his 
OPR interview, Sloman described Acosta as very process-oriented, which he attributed to Acosta’s 
prior Department experience.  Sloman, however, believed the USAO gave Epstein “[t]oo much 
process,” a result of the USAO’s desire to “do the right thing” and to the defense team’s ability to 
keep pressing for more process without triggering a breach of the NPA.  Furthermore, Epstein’s 
defense counsel repeatedly and carefully made clear they were not repudiating the agreement.  
Acosta told OPR that the USAO would have had to declare Epstein in breach of the NPA in order 
to proceed to file federal charges, and Epstei...

 
183 
 
the defendant faced decades in prison for sexual crimes against minors with such an insignificant 
term of incarceration, and made numerous other concessions to the defense.  As OPR has set forth 
in substantial detail in this Report, OPR did not find evidence to support allegations that the 
prosecutors sought to benefit Epstein at the expense of the victims.  Instead, the result can more 
appropriately be tied to Acosta’s misplaced concerns about interfering with a traditionally state 
crime and intruding on state authority.  Acosta was also unwilling to abandon the path that he had 
set, even when Villafaña and Lourie advocated to end the negotiations and even though Acosta 
himself had learned that the state authorities may not have been a reliable partner.   
Many of the problems that developed might have been avoided had Acosta engaged in 
greater consultation with his staff before making key decisions.  The contemporaneous records 
revealed problems with communication and coordination among the five key participants.  Acosta 
was involved to a greater extent and made more decisions than he did in a typical case.  Lourie 
told OPR that it was “unusual to have a U.S. Attorney get involved with this level of detail.”  
Menchel told OPR, “I know we would have spoken about this case a lot, okay?  And I’m sure with 
Jeff as well, and there were conversations -- a meeting that I had with Marie and Andy as well.”  
Lourie similarly told OPR: 
Well, . . . he would have been talking to Jeff and Matt, talking to me 
to the extent that he did, he would have been looking at the Pros 
Memo and . . . the guidance from CEOS, he would have been 
reading the defense attorney’s letters, maybe talking to the State 
Attorney, I don’t know, just . . . all these different sources of 
information he was -- I’m comfortable that he knew the case, you 
know, that he was, he was reading everything.  Apparently, he, you 
know, read the Pros Memo, he read all the stuff . . . .   ...

 
184 
 
which Villafaña and Lourie believed that the state had intentionally failed to aggressively pursue 
a broader state indictment.   
One example illustrates this communication gap.  In a September 20, 2007 email to Lourie 
asking him to read the latest version of the proposed “hybrid” federal plea agreement (calling for 
Epstein to plead to both state and federal charges), Acosta noted, “I don’t typically sign plea 
agreements.  We should only go forward if the trial team supports and signs this agreement.  I 
didn’t even sign the public corruption or [C]ali cartel agreements, so this should not be the first.”  
(Emphasis added.)  In his email to Villafaña, Lourie attached Acosta’s email and instructed 
Villafaña to “change the signature block to your name and send as final to Jay [Lefkowitz].”  
(Emphasis added.)  Villafaña raised no objection to signing the agreement.  Acosta told OPR that 
he wanted to give the “trial team” a chance to “speak up and let him know” if they did not feel 
comfortable with the agreement.  Villafaña, however, told OPR that she did not understand that 
she was being given an opportunity to object to the agreement; rather, she believed Acosta wanted 
her to sign it because he was taking an “arm’s length” approach and signaling this “was not his 
deal.”  The fact that the top decision maker believed he was giving the line AUSA an opportunity 
to reflect and stop the process if she believed the deal was inappropriate, but the line AUSA 
believed she was being ordered to sign the agreement because her boss wanted to distance himself 
from the decision, reflects a serious communication gap.   
  
As another example, at one point, Villafaña, frustrated and concerned about the decisions 
being made concerning a possible resolution, requested a meeting with Acosta; in a sternly worded 
rebuke, Menchel rejected the request.  Although Menchel told OPR that he was not prohibiting 
Villafaña from speaking to Acosta, Villafaña interpreted Men...

 
185 
 
managers required more effort than in other offices, where a line AUSA can more easily just stop 
by a supervisor’s office to discuss a case.257   
Second, key personnel were absent at varying times.  Menchel’s last day in the office was 
August 3, 2007, the day he sent to the defense his letter making the initial offer, and presumably 
in the immediate period before his departure date, Menchel would have been trying to wrap up his 
outstanding work.  Yet, this was also the time when Acosta was deciding how to resolve the matter.  
Similarly, in the critical month of September, the NPA and plea negotiations intensified and the 
NPA evolved significantly, with the USAO having to consider multiple different options as key 
provisions were continuously added or modified while Villafaña pressed to meet her late-
September deadline.  Although Lourie was involved with the negotiations during this period, he 
was at the same time transitioning not only to a new job but to one in Washington, D.C., and was 
traveling between the two locations.  Sloman was on vacation in the week preceding the signing, 
when many significant changes were made to the agreement, and he did not participate in drafting 
or reviewing the NPA before it was signed.  Accordingly, during the key negotiation period for a 
significant case involving a unique resolution, no one involved had both a thorough understanding 
of the case and full ownership of the decisions that were being made.  Villafaña certainly felt that 
during the negotiations, she was only implementing decisions made by Acosta.  Acosta, however, 
told OPR that when reviewing the NPA, “I would have reviewed this for the policy concerns.  Did 
it do the . . . bullet points, and my assumption, rightly or wrongly, would have been that Andy and 
Marie would have looked at this, and that this was . . . appropriate.”    
The consequences flowing from the lack of ownership and effective communication can 
be seen in the NPA itself.  A...

 
186 
 
parties.258  The rush to reach a resolution should not have led the USAO to agree to such a 
significant provision without a full consideration of the potential consequences and justification 
for the provision.  It is highly doubtful that the USAO’s refusal to agree to that term would have 
itself caused the negotiations to fail; the USAO’s rejection of the defense proposal concerning 
immigration consequences did not affect Epstein’s willingness to sign the agreement.  The 
possibility that individuals other than Epstein’s four female assistants could have criminal 
culpability for their involvement in his scheme could have been anticipated and should have caused 
more careful consideration of the provision.          
Similarly, the confidentiality provision was also accepted with little apparent consideration 
of the implications of the provision for the victims, and it eventually became clear that the defense 
interpreted the provision as precluding the USAO from informing the victims about the status of 
the investigation.  Agreeing to a provision that restricted the USAO’s ability to disclose or release 
information as it deemed appropriate mired the USAO in disputes about whether it was or would 
be violating the terms of the NPA by disclosing information to victims or the special master. 
Decisions about disclosure of information should have remained within the authority and province 
of the USAO to decide as it saw fit.     
There is nothing improper about a U.S. Attorney not having a meeting with the line AUSA 
or other involved members of the prosecution team before he or she makes a decision in a given 
case; indeed, U.S. Attorneys often make decisions without having direct input from line AUSAs.  
And Acosta did have discussions with Menchel, and possibly Sloman, before making the critical 
decision to resolve the matter through a state plea, although the specifics of those discussions could 
not be recalled by the participants due to the passa...

 
187 
 
from Villafaña and others, but given the highly unusual procedure being considered, his decision 
should have been made only after a full consideration of all of the possible ramifications and 
consequences of pushing the matter into the state court system, with which neither Villafaña nor 
the other subjects had experience, along with consideration of the legal and evidentiary issues and 
possible means of overcoming those issues.  OPR did not find evidence indicating that such a 
meeting or discussion with the full team was held before the decision was made to pursue the 
state-based resolution, before the decision was made to offer a two-year term of incarceration, or 
before the NPA, with its unusual terms, was signed.  As Acosta later recognized and told OPR,  
“And a question that I think is a valid one in my mind is, did the focus on, let’s just get this done 
and get a jail term, mean that we didn’t take a step back and say, let’s evaluate how this train is 
moving?” 
Many features of the NPA were given inadequate consideration, including core provisions 
like the term of incarceration and sexual offender registration, with the result that Epstein was able 
to manipulate the process to his benefit.  Members of his senior staff held differing opinions about 
some of the issues that Acosta felt were important and that factored into his decision-making.  
There does not seem to be a point, however, at which those differing opinions were considered 
when forming a strategy; rather, Acosta seems to have made a decision that everyone beneath him 
followed and attempted to implement but without a considered strategy beyond attaining the three 
core elements.  As the U.S. Attorney, Acosta had authority to proceed in this manner, but many of 
the problems that developed with the NPA might have been avoided with a more thoughtful 
approach.  As Acosta belatedly recognized, “[I]f I was advising a fellow U.S. Attorney today, I 
would say, think it through.”259 ...

 
188 
 
[Page Intentionally Left Blank] 
 
 

 
189 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
ISSUES RELATING TO THE GOVERNMENT’S INTERACTIONS  
AND COMMUNICATIONS WITH VICTIMS 
PART ONE: FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
 
I. 
OVERVIEW 
 
Chapter Three describes the events pertaining to the federal government’s interactions and 
communications with victims in the Epstein case, and should be read in conjunction with the 
factual background set forth in Chapter Two, Part One.  This chapter sets forth the pertinent legal 
authorities and Department policies and practices regarding victim notification and consultation, 
as well as OPR’s analysis and conclusions.  OPR discusses key events relating to the USAO’s and 
the FBI’s interactions with victims before and after the signing of the NPA, beginning with the 
FBI’s initial contact with victims through letters informing them that the FBI had initiated an 
investigation.  A timeline of key events is provided on the following page. 
II. 
THE CVRA, 18 U.S.C. § 3771 
A. 
History 
In December 1982, the President’s Task Force on Victims of Crime issued a final report 
outlining recommendations for the three branches of government to improve the treatment of crime 
victims.  The Task Force concluded that victims have been “overlooked, their pleas for justice 
have gone unheeded, and their wounds—personal, emotional and financial—have gone 
unattended.”260  Thereafter, the government enacted various laws addressing victims’ roles in the 
criminal justice system:  the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, the Victims of Crime Act 
of 1984, the Victims’ Rights and Restitution Act of 1990 (VRRA), the Violent Crime Control and 
Law Enforcement Act of 1994, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, the 
Victim Rights Clarification Act of 1997, and the Justice for All Act of 2004.261      
The CVRA, enacted on October 30, 2004, as part of the Justice for All Act, was designed 
to protect crime victims and to make them “full participants in the criminal justice system.”262  The 
CVRA resulted f...

190
Aug 10 FBI 
begins mterv,ev. mg 
\'ICtlmS 
Aug 24 - Villafana e-mail 
to supervisors indicating 
that she sent victim 
notification letters to ··all 
of the girls" 
Aug 28 
FBI begins 
sending Vl\"S Jeners 
to victims 
Time line of Key Events for Crime Victims' Rights Act Analysis 
July 9 - USAO begins 
sending leucrs to victims 
concerning resolution of 
federal investigation 
Aug 
Sep Dec 
.IH 
- .Ju■ 
I 
--------1111111.!l 
2006 
Oct - FBI agents meet with 3 
victims to infonn them of the 
NPA, but then raise 
impeachment concerns 
Oct - Nov - FBI agent~ 
mtcn ,cw add1t1onal 
victuns for the first tune 
Feb 19 - Villafada 
completes third update 10 
prosecution memorandum 
Feb 28 - USAO nmifies DOJ 
Civli Rights Division that 
Epstem investigation is ongoing 
Additional Key Dates 
Dec 17.2010 - DOJ 
Office of Legal 
Counsel issues opinion 
regarding CVRA 
Oct 20 I I - DOJ revises 
AG Guidelines 
May 29, 2015 - CVRA 
amended to include two 
new rights 
Feb 21, 2019- Dist. Ct. 
issues opinion finding 
U.S. violated the 
CVRA 
Jul 6. 2019 - Epstein 
arrested on SONY 
charges 
Aug 10, 2019 - Epstein 
dies in custody 
Sep 16, 2019 - Dist. Ct. 
closes CVRA case and 
denies petitioners' 
reqi,est for remedies 
Apr 14. 2020 - llth 
Cfrcuit Coun of 
Appeals denies 
Mandamus petition 
Aug 7. 2020-
Pctitioners' petition for 
rehearing en bane 
gramed 

 
191 
 
Bill of Rights in the VRRA.263  Following multiple Senate Judiciary Committee subcommittee 
hearings and various revisions of the proposed amendment, the Senators determined that such an 
amendment was unlikely to be approved and, instead, they presented the CVRA as a compromise 
measure.264   
B. 
Enumerated Rights 
The CVRA defines the term “crime victim” as “a person directly and proximately harmed 
as a result of the commission of a Federal offense or an offense in the District of Columbia.”265  
Initially, and at the time relevant to the federal Epstein investigation, the CVRA afforded crime 
victims the following eight rights: 
(1) The right to be reasonably protected from the accused.  
 
(2) The right to reasonable, accurate, and timely notice of any public 
court proceeding, or any parole proceeding, involving the crime or 
of any release or escape of the accused.  
 
(3) The right not to be excluded from any such public court 
proceeding, unless the court, after receiving clear and convincing 
evidence, determines that testimony by the victim would be 
materially altered if the victim heard other testimony at that 
proceeding.  
 
(4) The right to be reasonably heard at any public proceeding in the 
district court involving release, plea, sentencing, or any parole 
proceeding.  
 
(5) The reasonable right to confer with the attorney for the 
Government in the case.  
                                                 
263  
See 150 Cong. Rec. S4260-01 at 1, 5 (2004).  The VRRA identified victims’ rights to (1) be treated with 
fairness and with respect for the victim’s dignity and privacy; (2) be reasonably protected from the accused offender; 
(3) be notified of court proceedings; (4) be present at all public court proceedings that relate to the offense, unless the 
court determines that testimony by the victim would be materially affected if the victim heard other testimony at trial; 
(5) confer with an attorney for the Government in the case; (6)...

 
192 
 
(6) The right to full and timely restitution as provided in law.  
 
(7) The right to proceedings free from unreasonable delay.  
 
(8) The right to be treated with fairness and with respect for the 
victim’s dignity and privacy. 
Although many of the rights included in the CVRA already existed in federal law as part 
of the VRRA, the CVRA afforded crime victims standing to assert their rights in federal court or 
by administrative complaint to the Department, and obligated the court to ensure that such rights 
were afforded.  The passage of the CVRA repealed the rights portion of the VRRA (42 U.S.C. 
§ 10606), but kept intact the portion of the VRRA directing federal law enforcement agencies to 
provide certain victim services, such as counseling and medical care referrals (42 U.S.C. 
§ 10607(c)).  Department training emphasizes that the VRRA obligates the Department to provide 
victim services, which attach upon the detection of a crime, while the CVRA contains court-
enforceable rights that attach upon the filing of a charging instrument.   
In 2015, Congress amended the CVRA and added the following two rights:266 
 
(9) The right to be informed in a timely manner of any plea bargain 
or deferred prosecution agreement.  
 
(10) The right to be informed of the rights under this section and the 
services described in section 503(c) of the Victims’ Rights and 
5HVWLWXWLRQ $FW RI   86& F DQG SURYLGHG FRQWDFW
information for the Office of the Victims’ Rights Ombudsman of the 
Department of Justice. 
 
III. 
THE DEPARTMENT’S INTERPRETATION OF THE CVRA’S DEFINITION OF 
“CRIME VICTIM” AT THE TIME OF THE EPSTEIN INVESTIGATION 
A. 
April 1, 2005 Office of Legal Counsel “Preliminary Review” 
 
In 2005, Department management requested informal guidance from the Department’s 
Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) regarding interpretation of the CVRA’s definition of “crime 
victim.”267  On April 1, 2005, OLC provided “preliminary and informal” guidance by em...

 
193 
 
 
OLC concluded that because the CVRA defines “‘crime victim’ as a ‘person directly and 
proximately harmed by the commission of a Federal offense,’ . . . the definition of victim is thus 
tethered to the identification of a ‘Federal offense,’ an event that occurs with the filing of a 
complaint.”  OLC further concluded that because the House Report stated that the CVRA codifies 
the “‘rights of crime victims in the Federal judicial system’” and a complaint “commences the 
‘judicial process’ and places an offense within the ‘judicial system,’” the legislature must have 
intended for CVRA rights to commence upon the filing of a complaint.   
 
 
OLC also found that the language of the CVRA rights supported its interpretation.  For 
example, the first right grants a victim protection from “the accused,” not a suspect.  Additionally, 
the second, third, and fourth rights refer to “victim notification, and access to, public proceedings 
involving release, plea, sentencing or parole—none of which commence prior to the filing of a 
complaint.” 
 
B. 
2005 Attorney General Guidelines for Victim and Witness Assistance 
In May 2005, the Department updated its Attorney General Guidelines for Victim and 
Witness Assistance (2005 Guidelines) to include the CVRA.269  The 2005 Guidelines specifically 
cited the CVRA requirement that agencies “engaged in the detection, investigation, or prosecution 
of crime shall make their best efforts to see that crime victims are notified of, and accorded” their 
CVRA rights, which in 2005 encompassed the initial eight CVRA rights.   
The 2005 Guidelines provided detail regarding implementation of the Department’s CVRA 
duties and divided criminal cases into an “investigation stage,” a “prosecution stage,” and a 
“corrections stage.”  The individuals responsible for notifying crime victims of their CVRA rights 
varied depending on the stage of the proceedings.   
During the “investigation stage” of cases in which the FBI was the inves...

 
194 
 
information about available services for victims.  Therefore, even 
though [the Department] may not afford CVRA rights to victims if 
charges have not been filed in their cases, the [D]epartment may 
provide certain services to victims that may serve the same function 
as some CVRA rights.270 
The 2005 Guidelines stated that the “prosecution stage” of the case began when “charges 
are filed and continue[d] through postsentencing legal proceedings.”  The “U.S. Attorney in whose 
district the prosecution is pending” was responsible for making “best efforts to see that crime 
victims are notified” of their rights under the CVRA.   
During the prosecution stage, the 2005 Guidelines required the U.S. Attorney, or a 
designee, to notify crime victims of case events, such as the filing of charges; the release of an 
offender; the schedule of court proceedings; the acceptance of a guilty plea or nolo contendere or 
rendering of a verdict; and any sentence imposed.  The 2005 Guidelines required the responsible 
official to “provide the victim with reasonable, accurate, and timely notice of any public court 
proceeding . . . that involves the crime against the victim.”   
The 2005 Guidelines specifically required federal prosecutors to “be available to consult 
with victims about [their] major case decisions,” such as dismissals, release of the accused, plea 
negotiations, and pretrial diversion.  In particular, the 2005 Guidelines required the responsible 
official to make reasonable efforts to notify identified victims of, and consider victims’ views 
about, prospective plea negotiations.  Nevertheless, the 2005 Guidelines cautioned prosecutors to 
“consider factors relevant to the wisdom and practicality of giving notice and considering [the 
victim’s] views” in light of various factors such as “[w]hether the proposed plea involves 
confidential information or conditions” and “[w]hether the victim is a possible witness in the case 
and the effect that relaying any...

 
195 
 
victim/witness staff were “ready to assist you with the details of victim notification, and other 
areas for which United States Attorney[’]s Offices are now explicitly responsible under the act.”  
The USAO’s Victim Witness Program Coordinator told OPR that the USAO provided annual 
mandatory office-wide training on victim/witness issues and training for new employees.  
B. 
The Automated Victim Notification System 
 
Both the FBI and the USAO manage contacts with crime victims through the Victim 
Notification System (VNS), an automated system maintained by the Executive Office for United 
States Attorneys.  The 2005 Guidelines mandated that “victim contact information and notice to 
victims of events . . . shall, absent exceptional circumstances (such as cases involving juvenile or 
foreign victims), be conducted and maintained using VNS.”  The VNS is separate from agency 
case management systems maintained by the FBI and the USAO.  Both the FBI and the USAO 
use the VNS to generate form letters to victims at various points in the investigation and the 
prosecution of a criminal case.  Although each form letter can be augmented to add some limited 
individual matter-specific content, the letters contain specific language concerning the purpose of 
the contact that cannot be removed (such as the arrest of the defendant or the scheduling of a 
sentencing hearing).271   
 
In the usual course of a criminal case, the FBI collects victim contact information during 
the investigation stage, which it stores in its case management system.  The FBI’s Victim Specialist 
exports the victim information data from the FBI’s case management system into the VNS 
database.  Victim information stored in the VNS is linked to the investigation’s VNS case number.  
At the time of the Epstein investigation, the FBI’s Victim Specialist could use the VNS to generate 
seven different form notification letters:  (1) initial notification; (2) case is under investigation; 
(3) arres...

 
196 
 
C. 
FBI Victim Notification Pamphlets 
 
The 2005 Guidelines recommended that “victims be given a printed brochure or card that 
briefly describes their rights and available services . . . and [contact information for] the victim-
witness coordinator or specialist . . . .”  At the time of the Epstein investigation, FBI agents 
nationwide routinely followed a practice of providing victims with pamphlets entitled, “Help for 
Victims of Crime” and “The Department of Justice Victim Notification System.”  The “Help for 
Victims of Crime” pamphlet contained a listing of the eight CVRA rights.  The pamphlet stated:  
“Most of these rights pertain to events occurring after the indictment of an individual for the crime, 
and it will be the responsibility of the prosecuting United States Attorney’s Office to ensure you 
are afforded those rights.”  The case agent in the Epstein investigation told OPR that she provided 
victims with the FBI pamphlet upon the conclusion of an interview.  The pamphlet entitled “The 
Department of Justice Victim Notification System” provided an overview of the VNS and 
instructions on how to access the system.      
V. 
THE INTRODUCTORY USAO AND FBI LETTERS TO VICTIMS 
A. 
August 2006:  The FBI Victim Notification Letters 
 
On August 8, 2006, shortly after the FBI opened its investigation into Epstein, the Victim 
Specialist for the West Palm Beach FBI office, under the case agent’s direction, prepared a “Victim 
Notification Form” naming 30 victims in the Epstein investigation and stating that “additional 
pertinent information” about them was available in the VNS.273  Thereafter, the Victim Specialist 
entered individual victim contact information she received from the case agent into the VNS 
whenever the case agent directed the Victim Specialist to generate an initial letter to a particular 
victim.  The FBI case agent told OPR that formal victim notification was “always handled by the 
[FBI’s Victim Specialist].”274    
 
According...

197
Auvust 28, 2006 
U.S. D•p1rlrn1nl of JuiOte 
Pcdcnl Bureau ortnvc.:1tl~1tLJou 
FBI · West Pahn !leach 
SujteS00 
SOS Sou1h Flogl•r Drivt 
Wo,t Polm llc=h, FL 33401 
Phone (S61) 833-7517 
Fax: (561) tll-7970 
Your name wu rere:red to tho FBl'll Vlcll,n Asslsiance Program as being a i:osslblc victim ot a fcdeml 
crime. We appreciate your assistance and cooperation while we are investigating this cas.e. We would like to 
make you awm of the victim services that may be available to you and to a."\Swer any questions you may have 
r<garding !he criminal justie< process lluoughout the inves1igation. Our program is part of the FBl's effort to 
ensure the victims ere treated with respect and are provided infonnatlon about 1he:r rights un<lcr federal law. 
Tho,e rlghlS Include nod6cation of the status of the case. Th• enclosed brochures provide Information about the 
PB l's Victim Autstanc<> Proaram, resources and Instructions for aocessl111 tho Victim Notlncallon Syr.em 
(VNS). VNS ls dcslgnC<i 10 p,ovldo you wkh lnfomiatlon rogordlng tho ttarus of your oase. 
This case Is Cl!1Tel1dy unde, lnvestlptlon. This can be • lengthy process and we request your condnuecl 
patience while we CX)ltduct a thorough investigation. 
As• crime viclim, you have tl10 following ri&h" undor 18 United State:$ C<xk) § 3771: (1) The: right to be 
rca:10111Wly protoctcsd from d,o IIC'-113cd; (2) Tho rliht tu n::a.wm,bh:s, 11ocu111tc, u.nd timely not.lco urtiny publlo 
court p1occcd.lng. or any parole prococ:dlng, lnvolvlng the crime or of any rclcuc or escape of the accused; (3) 
Tho right not lo be excluded from nny such public court proccedlng, unlou the court, after receMng clear and 
convincing ovidcno&, determines that te3C-imony by tile viotim would be nio.tcric.Jly altered if the victim heo.rd 
other teitimoay at that prooof>din,g; (4) The right to lie rcuoono.bly heard at aoy public proceeding in the distriot 
court invotviog release, plea, .sentencing. or any parole proceedJngi (5) Tho ...

198
VNS data logs, correspondence maintained in the FBI’s case management system, and FBI 
interview reports for the Epstein investigation reflect that, during the Epstein investigation, the 
FBI generally issued its victim notification letters after the victim had been interviewed by FBI 
case agents, but its practice was not uniform.275
B.
August 2006:  The USAO’s Letters to Victims
During the time that the FBI Victim Specialist was preparing and sending FBI victim 
notification letters, Villafaña was also preparing her own introductory letter in anticipation of 
meeting with each victim receiving the letter.  Villafaña told OPR that she was “generally aware 
that the FBI sends letters” but believed the FBI’s “process didn’t . . . have anything to do with my
process.”  Villafaña told OPR the “FBI had their own victim notification system and their own 
guidelines for when information had to be provided and what information had to be provided.”  
Moreover, Villafaña “didn’t know when [FBI] letters went out” or “what they said.”276
Nevertheless, Villafaña told OPR that she did not intend for the letters she drafted to interfere with 
the FBI’s notification responsibilities.   
In August 2006, Villafaña drafted her letters to victims who had been initially identified 
by the FBI based on the PBPD investigative file.  Villafaña told OPR that she “made the decision 
to make contact with victims early,” and she composed the introductory letter and determined to 
whom they would be sent.  Although these letters contained CVRA rights information, Villafaña 
mainly intended to use them as a vehicle to “introduce” herself and let the victims know the federal 
investigation “would be a different process” from the State Attorney’s Office investigation in 
which “the victims felt they had not been particularly well-treated.”  Villafaña told OPR that in a 
case in which she “needed to be talking to young girls frequently and asking them really intimate 
275
OPR found no uniformi...

 
199 
 
questions,” she wanted to “make sure that they . . . feel like they can trust me.”  Villafaña directed 
the FBI case agents to hand deliver the letters “as they were conducting interviews.”  Villafaña 
told OPR that the USAO had “no standardized way to do any victim notifications prior to” the 
filing of federal charges, and therefore Villafaña did not use a template or VNS-generated letter 
for content, but instead used a letter she “had created and crafted [herself] for another case.”277   
 
The letters contained contact information for Villafaña, the FBI case agent, and the 
Department’s Office for Victims of Crime in Washington, D.C., and itemized the CVRA rights.  
The USAO letters described the case as “under investigation” and stated that the victim would be 
notified “[i]f anyone is charged in connection with the investigation.”  The letters stated that, in 
addition to their rights under the CVRA, victims were entitled to counseling, medical services, and 
potential restitution from the perpetrator, and that, upon request, the government would provide a 
list of counseling and medical services.278  Lastly, the letters advised that investigators for the 
defense might contact the victims and those who felt threatened or harassed should contact 
Villafaña or the FBI case agent.   
Although the USAO letters did not contain any language limiting CVRA rights to the post-
arrest or indictment stage, Villafaña told OPR that she did not intend for the letters to activate the 
USAO’s CVRA obligations, which she believed attached only after the filing of a criminal charge.  
Villafaña told OPR that she did not think that victims potentially receiving both an FBI letter and 
a USAO letter would be confused about their CVRA rights because the USAO letter “was coming 
with an introduction from the agents [who were hand delivering them].”  Later, in the course of 
the CVRA litigation, Villafaña stated that she and the investigative team “adopted an approach of ...

 
200 
 
[A]s Chief of the Criminal Division of the USAO, I did not consider 
it to be within my purview to ensure that appropriate victim 
notifications occurred in every matter investigated or brought by the 
Office.  I also recall that the USAO employed one or more victim-
witness coordinators to work with line prosecutors to ensure that 
appropriate victim notifications occurred in every matter 
investigated or brought by the Office.  
C. 
USAO and FBI Letters Are Hand Delivered  
 
The FBI case agent told OPR that the FBI made its notifications “at the time that we met 
[with] the girls.”  The case agent recalled that she hand delivered the USAO letters and FBI letters 
to some victims following in-person interviews, and in the instances when she did not provide a 
victim with a letter, she provided an FBI pamphlet containing CVRA rights information similar to 
that set forth in the FBI letters.280  The co-case agent also recalled that he may have delivered “a 
few” letters to victims.  The FBI Victim Specialist told OPR that she mailed some FBI letters to 
victims and she provided some FBI letters to the case agent for hand delivery. 
   
Nevertheless, the case agent told OPR that she “did not sit there and go through every 
right” with the victims.  She stated, however, “[I]n the beginning whether it was through [the FBI 
Victim Specialist] giving the letter, me giving a letter, the pamphlet, I believed that the girls knew 
that they were victims and had rights, and they had a resource, [the FBI Victim Specialist], that 
they could call for that.”  The FBI case agent further explained that once the case agents connected 
the FBI Victim Specialist with each victim, the Victim Specialist handled the victims’ “rights and 
resources.”   
VI. 
AUGUST 2006 – SEPTEMBER 2007:  FBI AND USAO CONTACTS WITH 
VICTIMS BEFORE THE NPA IS SIGNED 
 
 
Early in the investigation, Villafaña informed her supervisors that, up to that point, 
“everyone whom the agents have spoken w...

 
201 
 
government informed any victim about the potential for resolving the federal investigation through 
a state plea.   
A. 
The Case Agents and Villafaña Solicit Some Victims’ Opinions about 
Resolving the Federal Investigation  
 
Villafaña told OPR that when she and the case agents met with victims, “we would ask 
them how they wanted the case to be resolved.”281 
And most of them wanted the case to be resolved via a plea.  Some 
of them wanted him not to be prosecuted at all.  Most of them did 
not want to have to come to court and testify.  They were very 
worried about their privacy rights.  Some of them wanted him to go 
to jail.  But . . . [s]ome of them talked about bad experiences with 
the State Attorney’s Office.  And so, I felt like sending them back to 
the State Attorney’s Office was not something that they would have 
supported.    
Villafaña told OPR that she also recalled that some victims “expressed . . . concern about 
their safety,” and were worried that Epstein would find out about their participation in the 
investigation.  In her 2017 declaration submitted in the CVRA litigation, Villafaña stated that the 
two CVRA petitioners “never communicated [their] desires to me or the FBI case agents and my 
role was to evaluate the entire situation, consider the input received from all of the victims, and 
allow the Office to exercise its prosecutorial discretion accordingly.”282  She also noted that some 
victims “fear[ed] having their involvement with Epstein revealed and the negative impact it would 
have on their relationships with family members, boyfriends, and others.”   
In the FBI case agent’s 2017 declaration filed in the CVRA litigation, she stated, “During 
interviews conducted from 2006 to 2008, no victims expressed a strong opinion that Epstein be 
prosecuted.”  She further described the concerns of some of the victims:   
Throughout the investigation, we interviewed many [of Epstein’s] 
victims . . . .  A majority of the victims ex...

 
202 
 
for some victims, learning of the Epstein investigation and possible 
exposure of their identities caused them emotional distress.  Overall, 
many of the victims were troubled about the existence of the 
investigation.  They displayed feelings of embarrassment and 
humiliation and were reluctant to talk to investigators.  Some 
victims who were identified through the investigation refused even 
to speak to us.  Our concerns about the victims’ well-being and 
getting to the truth were always at the forefront of our handling of 
the investigation. 
 
The case agent told OPR that although she encountered victims who were “strong” and 
“believable,” she did not encounter any who vigorously advocated for the prosecution of Epstein.  
Rather, “they were embarrassed,” “didn’t want their parents to know,” and “wanted to forget.”283   
 
As of September 24, 2007, the date the NPA was signed, Villafaña informed Epstein 
attorney Lefkowitz that she had compiled a preliminary list of victims including “34 confirmed 
minors” and 6 other potential minor victims who had not yet been interviewed by the FBI.284  
Although the government had contacted many victims before the NPA was signed, Villafaña 
acknowledged during the CVRA litigation that “individual victims were not consulted regarding 
the agreement.”  
B. 
Before the NPA Is Signed, Villafaña Expresses Concern That Victims Have 
Not Been Consulted 
 
Before the NPA was signed, Villafaña articulated to her supervisors concerns about the 
government’s failure to consult with victims.  
1. 
July 2007:  Villafaña’s Email Exchanges with Menchel 
In July 2007, Villafaña learned that Menchel had discussed with defense counsel Sanchez 
a possible state resolution to the federal investigation of Epstein.  Villafaña was upset by this 
information, and sent a strongly worded email to Menchel voicing her concerns.  (A full account 
of their email exchange is set forth at Chapter Two, Part One, Section IV.A.2.)  In that email, s...

 
203 
 
various iterations of the victims’ rights legislation.”285  Villafaña explained to OPR her reference 
to the victims:   
[M]y concern was that [Menchel] was violating the CVRA which 
requires the attorneys for the government, which[] includes me[,] to 
confer with the victims, and the [VRRA], which requires the agents 
to keep the victims apprised of what’s happening with the case.  So 
in essence, I felt like he was exposing both myself and the agents to 
allegations of not abiding by our obligations by engaging in these 
plea negotiations without letting us know about it.286  
In his reply to Villafaña’s email, and after noting that he found her email “totally 
inappropriate,” Menchel denied that he had violated any Departmental policy, and he noted that 
“[a]s Chief of the Criminal Division, I am the person designated by the U.S. Attorney to exercise 
appropriate discretion in deciding whether certain pleas are appropriate and consistent with” 
Departmental policy.  Perceiving Menchel’s rebuke as a criticism of her judgment, Villafaña 
responded, “[R]aising concerns about the forgotten voices of victims in this case should not be 
classified as a lapse in judgment” and that her “first and only concern in this case . . . is the victims.”   
Menchel told OPR that he did not view his conversation with Sanchez as a plea offer, 
asserted that he was not obligated to consult with victims during preliminary settlement 
negotiations, and noted that he left the USAO before the NPA was fully negotiated or signed.  
Menchel told OPR that “you have discussions . . . with [the] defense all the time, and the notion 
that even just having a general discussion is something that must be vetted with victims . . . is not 
even . . . in the same universe as to how I think about this.”  Menchel also observed that on the 
very day that Villafaña criticized him for engaging in settlement negotiations without consulting 
her, the FBI, or the victims, Villafaña had herself sent ...

 
204 
 
2. 
Villafaña Asserts That Her Supervisors Gave Instructions Not to 
Consult Victims about the Plea Discussions, but Her Supervisors Do 
Not Currently Recall Such Instructions 
 
Villafaña told OPR that during an “early” meeting with Acosta, Sloman, and Menchel, 
which took place when “we were probably just entering into plea negotiations,” she raised the 
government’s obligation to confer with victims.288  Initially, Villafaña told OPR she was 
instructed, “Don’t talk to [the victims].  Don’t tell them what’s happening,” but she was not told 
why she should not speak to the victims, and she could not recall who gave her this instruction.  In 
a subsequent OPR interview, Villafaña recalled that when she raised the issue of notification 
during the meeting, she was told, “Plea negotiations are confidential.  You can’t disclose them.”289  
Villafaña remained uncertain who gave her this instruction, but believed it may have been Acosta.   
 
Neither Acosta, Sloman, nor Menchel recalled a meeting at which Villafaña was directed 
not to notify the victims.  Acosta told OPR that the decision whether to solicit the victims’ view 
“is something [that] I think was the focus of the trial team and not something that I was focused 
on at least at this time,” and he did not “recall discussions about victim notification until after the 
NPA was signed.”  Sloman also told OPR that he did not recall a meeting at which victim 
notification was discussed.  Menchel wrote in his response to OPR, “I have no recollection of any 
discussions or decisions regarding whether the USAO should notify victims of its intention to enter 
into a pre-charge disposition of the Epstein matter.”  Furthermore, Menchel told OPR he could not 
think of a reason why the issue of victim notification would have arisen before he left the USAO, 
because “we were way off from finalizing or having anything even close to a deal,” and it would 
have been “premature” to consider notification.290   
 
3. 
Se...

 
205 
 
Chief wanted to know if the victims had been consulted about the deal.”291  Sloman forwarded this 
email to Acosta.  Villafaña recalled that Sloman responded to her email by telephone, possibly 
after he had spoken to Acosta, and stated, “[Y]ou can’t do that now.”  Villafaña did not recall 
Sloman explaining at the time the reason for that instruction. 
 
Villafaña told OPR that shortly before the NPA was signed, Sloman told her, “[W]e’ve 
been advised that . . . pre-charge resolutions do not require victim notification.”  Sloman did not 
recall any discussions, before the NPA was signed, about contacting the victims or conferring with 
them regarding the potential resolution of the case.  Sloman told OPR that he “did not think that 
we had to consult with victims prior to entering into the NPA,” and “we did not have to seek 
approval from victims to resolve a case.  We did have an obligation to notify them of the resolution 
in . . . filed cases.”  Sloman said that no one other than Villafaña raised the notification issue, and 
because the USAO envisioned a state court resolution of the matter, Sloman “did not think that we 
had to consult with victims prior to entering into the NPA.”  Lourie told OPR that he had no 
memory of Villafaña being directed not to speak to the victims about the NPA.292  Similarly, the 
attorney who assumed Lourie’s supervisory duties after Lourie transitioned to his detail in the 
Department told OPR that he did not recall any discussions regarding victim notification and he 
“assumed that was being handled.”293     
 
Acosta did not recall the September 6, 2007 email, but told OPR that “there is no 
requirement to notify [the victims], because it’s not a plea, it’s deferring in favor of a state 
prosecution.”  Acosta told OPR that he could not recall any “pre-NPA discussions” regarding 
victim notification or any particular concern that factored into the decision not to consult with the 
victims before entering into the NPA.294...

 
206 
 
disagreement” regarding the CVRA’s requirements.295  Oosterbaan’s disagreement was based on 
policy considerations, and he told OPR that “from a policy perspective,” CEOS would not “take a 
position that you wouldn’t consult with [the victims].”  Oosterbaan also told OPR that whether or 
not the law required it, the victims should have been given an opportunity “to weigh in directly,” 
but he did not fault the USAO’s motivations for failing to provide that opportunity:   
The people I know, Andy [Lourie], Jeff [Sloman], . . . were trying 
to do the right thing. . . . [T]hey weren’t acting unethically.  I just 
disagree with the outcome . . . but the point is they weren’t trying 
. . . to do anything improper . . . it was more of this question of . . . 
you can let the victims weigh in on this, you can get their input on 
this and maybe it doesn’t sway you.  You still do what you’re going 
to do but . . . it’s hard to say it was a complete, completely clean 
exercise of . . . prosecutorial discretion when [the USAO] didn’t 
really know what [the victims] would say.   
Sloman told OPR, “I don’t think we had a concern about entering into the NPA at that point 
in terms of notifying victims. . . . I was under the perception that once the NPA was entered into 
and [Epstein] was going to enter a guilty plea in state court that we were going to notify the 
victims.”    
VII. 
SEPTEMBER 24, 2007 – JUNE 30, 2008:  AFTER THE NPA IS SIGNED, THE 
USAO MAKES VARIOUS VICTIM NOTIFICATION DECISIONS 
The contemporaneous emails make clear that once the NPA was signed, Villafaña and the 
case agents planned to inform the victims about the resolution of the federal investigation.  
However, the emails also show that the USAO was unclear about how much information could be 
given to the victims in light of the NPA’s nondisclosure provision and consulted with Epstein’s 
defense counsel regarding victim notifications.296  As a result, although the expectation in the 
USAO was tha...

 
207 
 
A. 
September – October 2007:  The Case Agents Notify Some Victims about the 
NPA, but Stop When the Case Agent Becomes Concerned about Potential 
Impeachment  
 
In transmitting the signed NPA to Villafaña on September 24, 2007, defense attorney 
Lefkowitz asked Villafaña to “do whatever you can to prevent [the NPA] from becoming 
public.”297  Villafaña forwarded this email to Acosta, Lourie, and the new West Palm Beach 
manager noting that, “I don’t intend to do anything with it except put it in the case file.”  Acosta 
responded that he “thought the [NPA] already binds us not to make [it] public except as required 
by law or [FOIA]” and noted that because the USAO would not proactively inform the media 
about the NPA, “this is the State Attorney[’]s show.”298  Acosta added, “In other words, what more 
does he want?”  Villafaña responded, “My guess is that if we tell anyone else (like the police chief 
or FBI or the girls), that we ask them not to disclose.”  Lourie agreed, noting that “there really is 
no reason to tell anyone all the details of the non pros or provide a copy.  The [PBPD] Chief was 
only concerned that he not get surprised by all this.”299  Acosta responded that he would set up a 
call on September 26, 2007, to talk “about who we can tell and how much.”300   
 
Also on September 24, 2007, Villafaña emailed the new West Palm Beach manager to 
inform him that once the attorney representative was appointed for the victims, she planned to 
“meet with the girls myself to explain how the system [for obtaining relief under 18 U.S.C. § 2255] 
will work.”  Villafaña also emailed Lefkowitz stating that she planned to discuss with him “what 
I can tell [the attorney representative] and the girls about the agreement,” and she assured 
Lefkowitz that her office “is telling Chief Reiter not to disclose the outcome to anyone.”  Villafaña 
also provided Lefkowitz with a list of potential candidates for the attorney representative position 
and advocated...

 
208 
 
involved in such notifications.  According to Villafaña, Sloman then directed her to have the case 
agents make the victim notifications. 
 
Accordingly, Villafaña directed the case agents to “meet with the victims to provide them 
with information regarding the terms of the [NPA] and the conclusion of the federal investigation.”  
The case agent told OPR, “[T]here was a discussion that Marie and I had as  
to . . . how we would tell them, and what we would tell them, and what that was I don’t recall, but 
it was the terms of the agreement.”  Villafaña believed that if “victims were properly notified of 
the terms [of the NPA] that applied to them, regarding their right to seek damages from [Epstein], 
and he paid those damages, that the rest of the [NPA] doesn’t need to be disclosed.”  Villafaña 
“anticipated that [the case agents] would be able to inform the victims of the date of the state court 
change of plea [hearing], but that date had not yet been set by state authorities at the time the first 
victims were notified [by the FBI].”  Villafaña told OPR that it was her belief that because the 
USAO had agreed to a confidentiality clause, the government could not disclose the NPA to the 
general public, but victims could be informed “because by its terms they needed to be told what 
the agreement was about.”  Villafaña told OPR that no one in her supervisory chain expressed a 
concern that if victims learned of the NPA, they would try to prevent Epstein from entering a plea.       
 
  
 
Within a week after the NPA was signed, news media began reporting that the parties had 
reached a deal to resolve the Epstein case.  For example, on October 1, 2007, the  
New York Post reported that Epstein “has agreed to plead guilty to soliciting underage prostitutes 
at his Florida mansion in a deal that will send him to prison for about 18 months,” and noted that 
Epstein would plead guilty in state court and that “the feds have agreed to drop their probe into 
p...

 
209 
 
During this meeting, the Agents did not explain that an agreement 
had already been signed that precluded any prosecution of Epstein 
for federal charges against me.  I did not get the opportunity to meet 
or confer with the prosecuting attorneys about any potential federal 
deal that related to me or the crimes committed against me. 
My understanding of the agents’ explanation was that the federal 
investigation would continue.  I also understood that my own case 
would move forward towards prosecution of Epstein. 
In addition, the case agent spoke to two other victims and relayed their reactions to 
Villafaña in an email: 
Jane Doe #14 asked me why [Epstein] was receiving such a lite [sic] 
jail sentence and Jane Doe #13 has asked for our Victim Witness 
coordinator to get in touch with her so she can receive some much 
needed [p]rofessional counseling.  Other than that, their response 
was filled with emotion and grateful to the Federal authorities for 
pursuing justice and not giving up.303     
The case agent told OPR that when she informed one of these victims, that individual cried and 
expressed “a sense of relief.”  Counsel for “Jane Doe #13” told OPR that while his client recalled 
meeting with the FBI on a number of occasions, she did not recall receiving any information about 
Epstein’s guilty plea.  In a letter to OPR, “Jane Doe #14’s” attorney stated that although her client 
recalled speaking with an FBI agent, she was not told about the NPA or informed that Epstein 
would not face federal charges in exchange for his state court plea.   
After meeting with these three victims, the FBI case agent became concerned that, if 
Epstein breached the NPA and the case went to federal trial, the defense could use the victims’ 
knowledge of the NPA’s monetary damages provision as a basis to impeach the victims.304  The 
case agent explained to OPR that she became “uncomfortable” talking to the victims about the 
damages provision, and that as the lead i...

 
210 
 
for [victims] to enhance their stories” and that the defense would try to have Villafaña or the case 
agents removed from the case.   
Both the lead case agent and Villafaña told OPR that after the FBI raised with Villafaña 
the concern that notifying the victims would create potential impeachment material in the event of 
a breach and subsequent trial, they contacted the USAO’s Professional Responsibility Officer for 
advice.  Villafaña recalled that during a brief telephone consultation, the Professional 
Responsibility Officer advised her and the case agent that “it’s not really that big a concern, but if 
you’re concerned about it then you should stop making the notification.”305  In her 2017 CVRA 
declaration, the case agent stated that after conferring with the USAO, the case agents stopped 
notifying victims about the NPA.   
B. 
October 2007:  Defense Attorneys Object to Government Victim Notifications  
 
While the case agents and Villafaña considered the impact that notifying the victims about 
the resolution of the case might have on a potential trial, defense counsel also raised concerns 
about what the victims could be told about the NPA.  As discussed in Chapter Two, after the NPA 
was signed on September 24, 2007, the USAO proposed using a special master to select the 
attorney representative for the victims, which led to further discussions about the § 2255 provision.  
On October 5, 2007, when defense attorney Lefkowitz sent Villafaña a letter responding to the 
USAO’s proposal to use a special master, he cautioned that “neither federal agents nor anyone 
from your Office should contact the identified individuals to inform them of the resolution of the 
case” because such communications would “violate the confidentiality of the agreement” and 
would prevent Epstein from having control over “what is communicated to the identified 
individuals at this most critical stage.”  Lefkowitz followed this communication with an October 
10, 2007 lette...

 
211 
 
and thanking Acosta for agreeing on October 12, 2007, not to “contact any of the identified 
individuals, potential witnesses, or potential civil claimants and their respective counsel in this 
matter.”307  Shortly thereafter, Sloman drafted a response to Lefkowitz’s letter, which Acosta 
revised to clarify the “inaccurate” representations made by Lefkowitz, in particular noting that 
Acosta did not agree to a “gag order” with regard to victim contact.  The draft response, as revised 
by Acosta, stated:   
You 
should 
understand, 
however, 
that 
there 
are 
some 
communications that are typical in these matters.  As an example, 
our Office has an obligation to contact the victims to inform them 
that either [the Special Master], or his designee, will be contact[ing] 
them.  Rest assured that we will continue to treat this matter as we 
would any similarly situated case.308 
 
In a November 5, 2007 letter, Sloman complained to Lefkowitz that private investigators 
working for Epstein had been contacting victims and asking whether government agents had 
discussed financial settlement with them.  Sloman noted that the private investigators’ “actions are 
troublesome because the FBI agents legally are required to advise the victims of the resolution of 
the matter, which includes informing them that, as part of the resolution, Mr. Epstein has agreed 
to pay damages in some circumstances.”  The same day, Villafaña emailed Sloman expressing her 
concern that “if we [file charges] now, cross-examination will consist of- ‘and the government told 
you that if Mr. Epstein is convicted, you are entitled to a large amount of damages, right?’”309   
C. 
October – November 2007:  The FBI and the USAO Continue to Investigate, 
and the FBI Sends a Notice Letter to One Victim Stating That the Case is 
“Under Investigation” 
 
Although Villafaña and the FBI case agents decided to stop informing victims about the 
NPA, the FBI continued its investigation of the case, which ...

 
212 
 
NPA.310  The FBI reports of the victim interviews do not mention the NPA or indicate that the 
victims were asked for their input regarding the resolution of the case.  Villafaña acknowledged 
that she and the case agents did not tell any of the “new” post-NPA-signing victims about the 
agreement because “at that point we believed that the NPA was never going to be performed and 
that we were in fact going to be [charging] Mr. Epstein.”  
 
On October 12, 2007, the FBI Victim Specialist sent a VNS form notice letter to a victim 
the case agents had interviewed two days earlier.  This letter was identical to the VNS form notice 
letter the FBI Victim Specialist sent to other victims before the NPA was signed, describing the 
case as “under investigation” and requesting the victim’s “patience.”  The letter listed the eight 
CVRA rights, but made no mention of the NPA or the § 2255 provision.  Villafaña told OPR she 
was unaware the FBI sent the letter, but she knew “there were efforts to make sure that we had 
identified all victims of the crimes under investigation.”  In response to OPR’s questions about the 
accuracy of the FBI letter’s characterization of the case as “under investigation,” Villafaña told 
OPR that the NPA required Epstein to enter a plea by October 26, 2008, and “at this point we 
weren’t actively looking for additional charges,” but “the investigation wasn’t technically 
suspended until he completed all the terms of the NPA.” 
D. 
The USAO Informs the Defense That It Intends to Notify Victims by Letter 
about Epstein’s State Plea Hearing and the Resolution of the Federal 
Investigation, but the Defense Strongly Objects to the Notification Plan 
 
In anticipation of Epstein’s state court plea, Villafaña reported on November 16, 2007, to 
Acosta, Sloman, and other supervisors that she had learned, from FBI agents who met with 
Assistant State Attorney Belohlavek, that the State Attorney’s Office wanted the USAO to notify 
victims of the sta...

 
213 
 
she would inform victims of the terms of the resolution of the federal case, including Epstein’s 
agreement to plead guilty to state charges and serve 18 months in county jail, and the victims’ 
ability to seek monetary damages against Epstein.  The letter also would invite victims to appear 
at the state court hearing and make a statement under oath or provide a written statement to be 
filed by the State Attorney’s Office.  Sloman and Villafaña exchanged edits on the draft victim 
notification letter, and Villafaña also informed Sloman that “[t]here are a few girls who didn’t 
receive the original letters, so I will need to modify the introductory portion of the letter for 
those.”312   
Sloman informed Lefkowitz of the government’s need to meet its “statutory obligation 
(Justice for All Act of 2004) to notify the victims of the anticipated upcoming events and their 
rights associated with the agreement” and his intent to “notify the victims by letter after COB 
Thursday, November 29.”  Lefkowitz objected to the proposal to notify the victims, asserting that 
it was “incendiary and inappropriate” and not warranted under the Justice for All Act of 2004.  He 
argued that the defense “should have a right to review and make objections to that submission 
prior to it being sent to any alleged victims.”  He also insisted that if any notification letters were 
sent to “victims, who still have not been identified to us, it should happen only after Mr. Epstein 
has entered his plea” and that the letter should come from the attorney representative rather than 
the government.  On November 28, 2007, at Sloman’s instruction, Villafaña provided Lefkowitz 
with the draft victim notification letter, which would advise victims that the state court plea was 
to occur on December 14, 2007.313  
In a November 29, 2007 letter to Acosta, Lefkowitz strongly objected to the proposed draft 
notification letter, arguing that the government was not obligated to send any letter to...

 
214 
 
the USAO’s interpretation of the agreement and “the use of Section 2255.”  The Starr and 
Lefkowitz letter asserted it was “wholly inappropriate” for the USAO to send the proposed victim 
notification letter “under any circumstances,” and “strongly urg[ed]” Acosta to withhold the 
notification letter until after the defense was able “to discuss this matter with Assistant Attorney 
General Fisher.”  
 
The following day, Sloman sent a letter to Lefkowitz, with copies to Acosta and Villafaña, 
asserting that the VRRA obligated the government to notify victims of the 18 U.S.C. § 2255 
proceedings as “other relief” to which they were entitled.  Sloman also stated that the VRRA 
obligated the government to provide the victims with information concerning restitution to which 
they may be entitled and “the earliest possible” notice of the status of the investigation, the filing 
of charges, and the acceptance of a plea.314  (Emphasis in original).  Sloman added: 
Just as in 18 U.S.C. § 3771 [the CVRA], these sections are not 
limited to proceedings in a federal district court.  Our Non-
Prosecution Agreement resolves the federal investigation by 
allowing Mr. Epstein to plead to a state offense.  The victims 
identified through the federal investigation should be appropriately 
informed, and our Non-Prosecution Agreement does not require the 
U.S. Attorney’s Office to forego [sic] its legal obligations.315 
Sloman also addressed the defense objection to advising the victims to contact Villafaña or the 
FBI case agent with questions or concerns:  “Again, federal law requires that victims have the 
‘reasonable right to confer with the attorney for the Government in this case.’”  Sloman advised 
the defense:  “The three victims who were notified prior to your objection had questions directed 
to Mr. Epstein’s punishment, not the civil litigation.  Those questions are appropriately directed to 
law enforcement.” 
Along with this letter, Sloman forwarded to Lefkowitz f...

 
215 
 
in Courtroom 11F at the Palm Beach County Courthouse, 205 North 
Dixie Highway, West Palm Beach, Florida.  Pursuant to Florida 
Statutes Sections 960.001(1)(k) and 921.143(1), you are entitled to 
be present and to make a statement under oath.  If you choose, you 
can submit a written statement under oath, which may be filed by 
the State Attorney’s Office on your behalf.  If you elect to prepare a 
written statement, it should address the following:   
the facts of the case and the extent of any harm, including 
social, psychological, or physical harm, financial losses, loss 
of earnings directly or indirectly resulting from the crime for 
which the defendant is being sentenced, and any matter 
relevant to an appropriate disposition and sentence.  Fl[a]. 
Stat. [§] 921.143(2).    
Sloman told OPR that he was “proceeding under the belief that we were going to notify [the 
victims], even though it wasn’t a federal case.  Whether we were required or not.”  Sloman also 
told OPR that while “we didn’t think that we had an obligation to send them victim notification 
letters . . . I think . . . Marie and . . . the agents . . . were keeping the victims apprised at some 
level.” 
  
On December 7, 2007, Villafaña prepared letters containing the above information to be 
sent to multiple victims and emailed Acosta and Sloman, requesting permission to send them.316  
Sloman, however, had that day received a letter from Sanchez, advising that Epstein’s plea hearing 
was scheduled for January 4, 2008, and requesting that the USAO “hold off” sending the victim 
notification letters until “we can further discuss the contents.”  Also that day, Starr and Lefkowitz 
submitted to Acosta the two lengthy “independent ethics opinions” supporting the defense 
arguments against the federal investigation and the NPA’s use of 18 U.S.C. § 2255.  Sloman 
responded to Villafaña’s request with an email instructing her to “Hold the letter.”317  Sloman told 
OPR that he “wanted to push t...

 
216 
 
her a victim for purposes of the federal charges, and continued to treat her as a victim because she 
wanted “to go above and beyond in terms of caring for the victims.”318 
E. 
December 19, 2007:  Acosta Advises the Defense That the USAO Will Defer to 
the State Attorney the Decision Whether to Notify Victims of the State Plea 
Hearing, but the USAO Would Notify Them of the Federal Resolution, “as 
Required by Law”  
 
On December 11, 2007, Starr transmitted to Acosta two lengthy submissions authored by 
Lefkowitz presenting substantive challenges to the NPA and to “the background and conduct of 
the investigation” into Epstein.  Regarding issues relevant to victim notification, in his transmittal 
letter, Starr asserted that the “latest episodes involving [§] 2255 notification to the alleged victims 
put illustratively in bold relief our concerns that the ends of justice, time and time again, are not 
being served.”  By way of example, Starr complained the government had recently inappropriately 
provided “oral notification of the victim notification letter” to one girl’s attorney, even though it 
was clear from the girl’s recorded FBI interview that she “did not in any manner view herself as a 
victim.”   
 
In his submissions, Lefkowitz argued that the government was not required to notify 
victims of the § 2255 provision: 
 
Villafaña’s decision to utilize a civil remedy statute in the place of 
a restitution fund for the alleged victims eliminates the notification 
requirement under the Justice for All Act of 2004, a federal law that 
requires federal authorities to notify victims as to any available 
restitution, not of any potential civil remedies.  Despite this fact, 
[she] proposed a Victims Notification letter to be sent to the alleged 
federal victims.   
 
Lefkowitz also argued that a victim trust fund would provide a more appropriate 
mechanism for compensating the victims than the government’s proposed use of 18 U.S.C. § 2255, 
and a trust fu...

 
217 
 
informed victims “of their right to collect damages prior to a thorough investigation of their 
allegations against Mr. Epstein”: 
None of the victims were informed of the right to sue under 
Section 2255 prior to the investigation of the claims.  Three victims 
were notified shortly after the signing of the [NPA] of the general 
terms of that Agreement.  You raised objections to any victim 
notification, and no further notifications were done.  Throughout 
this process you have seen that I have prepared this case as though 
it would proceed to trial.  Notifying the witnesses of the possibility 
of damages claims prior to concluding the matter by plea or trial 
would only undermine my case.  If my reassurances are insufficient 
the fact that not a single victim has threatened to sue Mr. Epstein 
should assure you of the integrity of the investigation. 
 
On December 14, 2007, Villafaña forwarded to Acosta the draft victim notification letter 
previously sent to the defense, along with two draft letters addressed to State Attorney Krischer; 
Villafaña’s transmittal email to Acosta had the subject line, “The letters you requested.”  One of 
the draft letters to Krischer, to be signed by Villafaña, was to advise that the USAO had sent an 
enclosed victim notification letter to specified identified victims and referred to an enclosed “list 
of the identified victims and their contact information, in case you are required to provide them 
with any further notification regarding their rights under Florida law.”319  The second draft letter 
to Krischer, for Acosta’s signature, requested that Krischer respond to defense counsel’s 
allegations that the State Attorney’s Office was not comfortable with the proposed plea and 
sentence because it believed that the case should be resolved with probation and no sexual offender 
registration.  OPR found no evidence that these letters were sent to Krischer.320   
 
A few days later, in an apparent effort to move forward wit...

 
218 
 
review the appropriateness of the potential federal charges and the government’s “unprecedentedly 
expansive interpretation” of 18 U.S.C. § 2255.   
In a December 19, 2007 response to the defense team, Acosta offered to revise two 
paragraphs in the NPA to resolve “disagreements” with the defense and to clarify that the parties 
intended Epstein’s § 2255 liability to “place these identified victims in the same position as they 
would have been had Mr. Epstein been convicted at trial.  No more; no less.”  Acosta also advised 
that although the USAO intended to notify the victims of the resolution of the federal investigation, 
the USAO would leave to the State Attorney the decision whether to notify victims about the state 
proceedings:  
I understand that the defense objects to the victims being given 
notice of [the] time and place of Mr. Epstein’s state court sentencing 
hearing.  I have reviewed the proposed victim notification letter and 
the statute.  I would note that the United States provided the draft 
letter to the defense as a courtesy.  In addition, First Assistant United 
States Attorney Sloman already incorporated in the letter several 
edits that had been requested by defense counsel.  I agree that [the 
CVRA] applies to notice of proceedings and results of investigations 
of federal crimes as opposed to the state crime.  We intend to provide 
victims with notice of the federal resolution, as required by law.  We 
will defer to the discretion of the State Attorney regarding whether 
he wishes to provide victims with notice of the state proceedings, 
although we will provide him with the information necessary to do 
so if he wishes.   
 
Acosta told OPR that he “would not have sent this letter without running it by [Sloman], if 
not other individuals in the office,” and records show he sent a draft to Sloman and Villafaña.  
Acosta explained to OPR that he was not concerned about deferring to Krischer on the issue of 
whether to notify the vic...

 
219 
 
have “notified [the victims] that that was an all-encompassing plea, that that state court sentence 
would also mean that the federal government was not proceeding.”   
Sloman told OPR that he thought Acosta and Criminal Division Deputy Assistant Attorney 
General Sigal Mandelker had agreed that the decision whether to notify the victims of the state 
court proceedings should be “left to the state.”323  Mandelker, however, had no memory of advising 
Acosta to defer the decision to make notifications to the State Attorney, and she noted that the 
“correspondence [OPR] provided to me from that time period” discussing such a decision 
“demonstrates that all of the referenced language came from Mr. Acosta and/or his team, and that 
I did not provide, suggest, or edit the language.”  Sloman told OPR that he initially believed that 
“the victims were going to be notified at some level, especially because they had restitution rights 
under § 2255”; but, his expectations changed after “there was an agreement made that we were 
going to allow the state, since it was going to be a state case, to decide how the victims were going 
to be notified.”   
 
Assistant State Attorney Belohlavek told OPR that she did not at any time receive a victim 
list from the USAO.  She further said she did not receive any request from the USAO with regard 
to contacting the victims. 
 
In response to Acosta’s December 19, 2007 letter, Lefkowitz asserted that the FBI should 
not communicate with the victims, and that the state, not the USAO, should determine who can be 
heard at the sentencing hearing:  
[Y]our letter also suggests that our objection to your Office’s 
proposed victims notification letter was that the women identified 
as victims of federal crimes should not be notified of the state 
proceedings.  That is not true, as our previous letter clearly states.  
Putting aside our threshold contention that many of those to whom 
[CVRA] notification letters are intended are in fac...

 
220 
 
decision as to who can be heard at a state sentencing is, amongst 
many other issues, properly within the aegis of state decision 
making.324 
Following a conversation between Acosta and Lefkowitz, in which Acosta asked that the 
defense clarify its positions on the USAO proposals regarding, among other things, notifications 
to the victims, Lefkowitz responded with a December 26, 2007 letter to Acosta, objecting again to 
notification of the victims.  Lefkowitz argued that CVRA notification was not appropriate because 
the Attorney General Guidelines defined “crime victim” as a person harmed as a result of an 
offense charged in federal district court, and Epstein had not been charged in federal court.  
Nevertheless, Lefkowitz added that, despite their objection to CVRA notification, “[W]e do not 
object (as we made clear in our letter last week) that some form of notice be given to the alleged 
victims.”  Lefkowitz requested both that the defense be given an opportunity to review any notice 
sent by the USAO, and that “any and all notices with respect to the alleged victims of state offenses 
should be sent by the State Attorney rather than [the USAO],” and he agreed that the USAO 
“should defer to the discretion of the State Attorney regarding all matters with regard to those 
victims and the state proceedings.”   
 
Months later, in April 2008, Epstein’s attorneys complained in a letter to Mandelker that 
Sloman and Villafaña committed professional misconduct by threatening to send a “highly 
improper and unusual ‘victim notification letter’ to all” victims.  
 
F. 
January – June 2008:  While the Defense Presses Its Appeal to the Department 
in an Effort to Undo the NPA, the FBI and the USAO Continue Investigating 
Epstein 
As described in Chapter Two of this Report, from the time the NPA was signed through 
the end of June 2008, the defense employed various measures to delay, or avoid entirely, 
implementation of the NPA.  Ultimately, defense counsel...

 
221 
 
“federal authorities are expected to drop their probe into whether Epstein broke any federal 
laws.”325   
 
Nevertheless, as Epstein’s team continued to argue to higher levels of the Department that 
there was no appropriate federal interest in prosecuting Epstein and thus no basis for the NPA, and 
with his attorneys asserting that “the facts had gotten better for Epstein,” Villafaña came to believe 
that Epstein would likely breach the NPA.326  In January 2008, Villafaña informed her supervisors 
that the FBI “had very tight contact with the victims several months ago when we were prepared 
to [file charges], but all the shenanigans over the past few months have resulted in no contact with 
the vast majority of the victims.”  Villafaña then proposed that the FBI “re-establish contact with 
all the victims so that we know we can rely on them at trial.”327  Villafaña told OPR that at this 
point, “[w]hile the case was being investigat[ed] and prepared for indictment, I did not prepare or 
send any victim notification letters—there simply was nothing to update.  I did not receive any 
victim calls during this time.” 
2. 
The FBI Uses VNS Form Letters to Re-Establish Contact with Victims 
 
On January 10, 2008, the FBI Victim Specialist mailed VNS generated victim notification 
letters to 14 victims articulating the eight CVRA rights and inviting recipients to update their 
contact information with the FBI in order to obtain current information about the matter.328  The 
case agent informed Villafaña in an email that the Victim Specialist sent a “standard form [FBI] 
letter to all the remaining identified victims.”  These 2008 letters were identical to the FBI form 
letters the Victim Specialist had sent to victims between August 28, 2006, and October 12, 2007.  
Like those previous letters, most of which were sent before the NPA was signed on September 24, 
2007, the 2008 letters described the case as “currently under investigation” and noted that “[t]his 
...

 
222 
 
We will make our best efforts to ensure you are accorded the rights 
described.  Most of these rights pertain to events occurring after the 
arrest or indictment of an individual for the crime, and it will become 
the responsibility of the prosecuting United States Attorney’s Office 
to ensure you are accorded those rights.  You may also seek the 
advice of a private attorney with respect to these rights.   
The FBI case agent informed Villafaña that the Victim Specialist sent the letters and would follow 
up with a phone call “to offer assistance and ensure that [the victims] have received their letter.”   
A sample letter is shown on the following pages.   
Villafaña told OPR that she did not recall discussing the content of the letters at the time 
they were sent to the victims, or reviewing the letters until they were collected for the CVRA 
litigation, sometime after July 2008.  Rather, according to Villafaña, “The decision to issue the 
letter and the wording of those letters were exclusively FBI decisions.”  Nevertheless, Villafaña 
asserted to OPR that from her perspective, the language regarding the ongoing investigation “was 
absolutely true and, despite being fully advised of our ongoing investigative activities, no one in 
my supervisory chain ever told me that the case was not under investigation.”  Villafaña identified 
various investigative activities in which she engaged from “September 2007 until the end of June 
2008,” such as collecting and reviewing evidence; interviewing new victims; re-interviewing 
victims; identifying new charges; developing new charging strategies; drafting supplemental 
prosecution memoranda; revising the charging package; and preparing to file charges.  Similarly, 
the FBI case agent told OPR that at the time the letters were sent the “case was never closed and 
the investigation was continuing.”  The co-case agent stated that the “the case was open . . . it’s 
never been shut down.” 
Victim Courtney Wild received...

223
Jan1Jary 10, 2008 
Re: case Number. 
Dear 
u.s. Department of JusUce 
Federal Bureau of Investigation 
FBI - West Palm Beach 
Suite 600 
506 South Flagler Drive 
West Palm Beach, Fl 
33401 
Phone; (561) 833-7517 
Fax: (561) 833-7970 
This case Is currently under invesllgallon. This can be a lengthy process and we request your 
contlnu&d patience while we conduct a thorough inveslfgation. 
As a crime victim, y•ou have the following rights under 18 United States C-Ode § 3771: (1) The right to 
be reasonably protected from Uie accused;· (2) The right to reasonable, accurate, and timely nollce of any 
publlc court proceeding, or any parole proceedl119, lnvoMng the crime or of any 1relaasa or escape of the 
accused; (3) The right not to be excluded from any such publfo oourt prooeedin9, unless Iha court, after 
receMng cteer and oonvlnclng evidence, determfnes that testimony by the vlctlm would be materlall;' altered if 
the ,,1011111 h9ard olht!f l11sUmony !ii ltuit p1oceedlng; (4) Thet right to be reuonably heard at ilny publiv 
proceeding In lhe dl~lrlct co·urt involving release. plea, sentencing, or any parola· proc1:1eding; (5) Tha 
reasonable right to confer with the altomey for tho Government In the case; (6) The right to full and timely 
restitution as provided In law: (7) The rlght to proceedings free from unraasonab'la delay; (8) The right to be 
treated wfth fairness and wllh respect ror the victim's dignity and privacy. 
We wi!I make our best efforts to ensure you aro aooorded Iha rights described. Most or these rights 
pertain to events occurring after the airest or Indictment of an lndlvlduaf for the crime, ~nd It will become the 
responslbiUly of the prosec1.1ting United Stat&s Attorney'~ Office to ensure you are accorded those rights. You 
may also seek the advlce of II private attorney with respect to theee right&, 
The Vfotim Notl1lcaNon Syetem (VNS) Is designed to provide you wilh direct information regarding the 
case as It prooeecls through !he c...

224
3.
Villafaña, the FBI, and the CEOS Trial Attorney Interview Victims
As Villafaña resumed organizing the case for charging and trial, the FBI case agent 
provided Villafaña with a list of “the 19 identified victims we are planning on using in” the federal
charges and noted that she and her co-case agent wanted to further evaluate some additional 
victims.330  In Washington, D.C., CEOS assigned a Trial Attorney to the Epstein case in order to 
bring expertise and “a national perspective” to the matter.331    
On January 18, 2008, one attorney representing a victim and her family contacted Sloman 
by telephone, stating that he planned to file civil litigation against Epstein on behalf of his clients,
who were “frustrated with the lack of progress in the state’s investigation” of Epstein.  The attorney
asked Sloman if the USAO “could file criminal charges even though the state was looking into the 
matter,” but Sloman declined to answer his questions concerning the investigation.332  In late 
January, the New York Post reported that the attorney’s clients had filed a $50 million civil suit 
against Epstein in Florida and that “Epstein is expected to be sentenced to 18 months in prison 
when he pleads guilty in March to a single charge of soliciting an underage prostitute.”333  
Between January 31, 2008, and May 28, 2008, the FBI, with the prosecutors, interviewed 
additional victims and reinterviewed several who had been interviewed before the NPA was 
signed.334  In late January 2008, as Villafaña and the CEOS Trial Attorney prepared to participate 
330
The case agent also informed Villafaña that she expected to ask for legal process soon in order to obtain 
additional information. 
331
The CEOS Trial Attorney told OPR that she was under the impression that she was brought in to help prepare 
for the trial because the “plea had fallen through.”   
332
Because Sloman and the attorney were former legal practice partners, Sloman reported the interaction to 
Acosta, a...

 
225 
 
in FBI interviews of Wild and other victims, Villafaña informed CEOS Chief Oosterbaan that she 
anticipated the victims “would be concerned about the status of the case.”   
 
On January 31, 2008, Villafaña, the CEOS Trial Attorney, and the FBI interviewed three 
victims, including Wild.  Prior to the interview, Wild had received the FBI’s January 10, 2008 
letter stating that the case was under investigation; however, according to the case agent, Wild and 
two other victims had also been told by the FBI, in October 2007, that the case had been resolved.  
In her 2015 CVRA-case declaration, Wild stated that after receiving the FBI letter, she believed 
that the FBI was investigating the case, and she was not told “about any [NPA] or any potential 
resolution of the federal criminal investigation I was cooperating in.  If I had been told of a[n 
NPA], I would have objected.”  In Villafaña’s 2017 declaration in the CVRA litigation, Villafaña 
recalled interviewing Wild on January 31, 2008, along with FBI agents, and Villafaña told OPR 
she “asked [Wild] whether she would be willing to testify if there were a trial.”  Villafaña recalled 
Wild responding that she “hoped Epstein would be prosecuted and that she was willing to 
testify.”335   
 
 
After the first three victim interviews on January 31, 2008, Villafaña described for Acosta 
and Sloman the toll that the case had taken on two of the victims: 
One girl broke down sobbing so that we had to stop the interview 
twice . . . she said she was having nightmares about Epstein coming 
after her and she started to break down again so we stopped the 
interview. 
The second girl . . . was very upset about the 18 month deal she had 
read about in the paper.336  She said that 18 months was nothing and 
that she had heard that the girls could get restitution, but she would 
rather not get any money and have Epstein spend a significant time 
in jail.337      
Villafaña closed the email by requesting that Acosta and S...

 
226 
 
for him, as U.S. Attorney, to attend witness interviews, and further, that no one in the USAO “was 
questioning the pain or the suffering of the victims.”  Sloman told OPR that he himself had “never 
gone to a line assistant’s victim or witness interview.”    
 
Villafaña told OPR that although three of the victims interviewed during this period had 
been notified by the FBI in October 2007 about the resolution of the case, at this point Villafaña 
did not specifically tell these victims that “there was a signed non-prosecution agreement that had 
these terms.”  Villafaña also told OPR she “didn’t talk about money” because she “didn’t want 
there to be an allegation at the time of trial . . . that [the victims] were either exaggerating their 
claims or completely making up claims in order to increase their damages amount.”  Rather, 
according to Villafaña, she told the three victims that “an agreement had been reached where 
[Epstein] was going to be entering a guilty plea, but it doesn’t look like he intends to actually 
perform . . . [and] now it looks like this may have to be charged, and may have to go to trial.”  
Villafaña recalled “explaining that the case was under investigation,” that they “were preparing 
the case [for charging] again,” and “expressing our hope that charges would be brought.”  Villafaña 
recalled one victim “making a comment about the amount of [imprisonment] time and why was it 
so low” and Villafaña answered, “that was the agreement that the office had reached.”339   
With regard to the victims Villafaña interviewed who had not received an FBI notification 
in October 2007, Villafaña recalled discussing one victim’s safety concerns but not whether they 
discussed the agreement.  She recalled telling another victim that “we thought we had reached an 
agreement with [Epstein] and then we didn’t,” but was “pretty sure” that she did not mention the 
agreement during the interview of the third victim.  Villafaña explained that she li...

 
227 
 
prosecutors and did not recall learning any information about Epstein’s guilty plea until after the 
plea was entered on June 30, 2008.   
 
 
When asked whether she was concerned that her statements would mislead the victims, 
Villafaña told OPR: 
From my perspective we were conducting an investigation and it 
was an investigation that was going to lead to an indictment.  You 
know, I was interviewing witnesses, I was issuing [legal 
process], . . .  I was doing all [these] things to take the case to a 
federal indictment and a federal trial.  So to me, saying to a victim 
the case is now back under investigation is perfectly accurate. 
4. 
February – March 2008:  Villafaña Takes Additional Steps to Prepare 
for a Prosecution of Epstein, Arranges for Pro Bono Attorneys for 
Victims, and Cautions about Continued Delay 
 
In February 2008, Villafaña revised the prosecution memorandum and supplemental 
memorandum.  Villafaña removed some victims known to Epstein from the PBPD investigation 
and others subject to impeachment as a result of civil suits they filed against Epstein, added newly 
discovered victims, and made changes to the proposed indictment.   
  
While the defense appealed the USAO’s decision to prosecute Epstein to higher levels of 
the Department, Villafaña sought help for victims whom defense investigators were harassing and 
attempting to subpoena for depositions as part of Epstein’s defense in civil lawsuits that some 
victims had brought against him, as well as purportedly in connection with the state criminal case.  
Villafaña reported to her supervisors that she was able to locate a “national crime victims service 
organization” to provide attorneys for the victims, and the FBI Victim Specialist contacted some 
victims to provide contact information for the attorneys.341  During this period, an attorney from 
the victims service organization was able to help Courtney Wild avoid an improper deposition.  
Villafaña also informed her superv...

 
228 
 
camera memory cards seized by the PBPD in order to have them forensically examined for deleted 
images that could contain child pornography.342   
 
By early April 2008, as the defense pursued its appeal to the Department’s Criminal 
Division, Acosta predicted in an email to Villafaña and Sloman that federal charges against Epstein 
were “more and more likely.”  Villafaña asked Oosterbaan for help to “move this [Criminal 
Division review] process along,” noting that the defense continued to undermine the government’s 
case by deposing the victims “under the guise of ‘trial prep’ for the state case” and that the “agents 
and the victims” were “losing their patience.”   
 
On April 24, 2008, Villafaña emailed Sloman and USAO Criminal Division Chief Senior 
asking whether she had the “green light” to file charges and raising the same concerns she had 
expressed to Oosterbaan.  Villafaña further cautioned that, although she was planning to file 
charges on May 6, if that was not going to happen, “then we all need to meet with the victims, the 
agents, and the police officers to decide how the case will be resolved and to provide them with an 
explanation for the delay.”  Because the Department’s Criminal Division did not conclude its 
review of Epstein’s appeal by May 6, however, Villafaña did not file charges that day.  
VIII. USAO SUPERVISORS CONSIDER CVRA OBLIGATIONS IN AN UNRELATED 
MATTER AND IN LIGHT OF A NEW FIFTH CIRCUIT OPINION 
During the period after the NPA was signed, and before Epstein complied with the NPA 
by entering his state guilty pleas, the USAO supervisors were explicitly made aware of a conflict 
between the Department’s position that CVRA’s victims’ rights attached upon the filing of a 
criminal charge and a new federal appellate ruling to the contrary.  The contemporaneous 
communications confirm that in 2008, Acosta and Sloman were aware of the Department’s policy 
regarding the issue.   
  
Unrelated to the Epstein investigation, on A...

 
229 
 
CVRA rights attach prior to the filing of criminal charges.344  The Appellate Division Chief noted 
that, although the holding conflicted with the 2005 Guidelines, the “court’s opinion makes sense.” 
 
Dean involved a federal prosecution arising from a 2005 explosion at an oil refinery 
operated by BP Products North America, Inc. (BP) that killed 15 people and injured more than 
170.  Before bringing criminal charges, the government negotiated a guilty plea with BP without 
notifying the victims.  The government filed a sealed motion, alerting the district court to the 
potential plea and claiming that consultation with all the victims was impractical and that such 
notification could result in media coverage that would undermine the plea negotiations.  The court 
then entered an order prohibiting the government from notifying the victims of the pending plea 
agreement until after it had been signed by the parties.  Thereafter, the government filed a criminal 
information, the government and BP signed the plea agreement, and the government mailed notices 
of the plea hearing to the victims informing them of their right to be heard.  One month later, 12 
victims asked the court to reject the plea because it was entered into in violation of their rights 
under the CVRA.  The district court denied their motion, but concluded that the CVRA rights to 
confer with the prosecutor in the case and to be treated with fairness and respect for the victim’s 
dignity and privacy vested prior to the initiation of charges.345  The district court noted that the 
legislative history reflected a view that “the right to confer was intended to be broad,” as well as 
being a “mechanism[]” to ensure that victims were treated with fairness.   
 
 
In denying the victims relief, the Fifth Circuit nevertheless concluded that the district court 
“failed to accord the victims the rights conferred by the CVRA.”346  In particular, the Fifth Circuit 
cited the district court’s acknowledg...

 
230 
 
an instance in which Wild “asked a question that wasn’t answered” of anyone in the USAO or of 
the FBI case agents.  
 
Edwards contacted Villafaña by email and telephone in mid-June, stating that he had 
“information and concerns that [he] would like to share.”348  In his affidavit, Edwards alleged that 
during multiple telephone calls with Villafaña, he “asked very specific questions about what stage 
the investigation was in,” and Villafaña replied that she could not answer his questions because 
the matter “was an on-going active investigation[.]”  Edwards attested that Villafaña gave him “the 
impression that the Federal investigation was on-going, very expansive, and continuously growing, 
both in the number of identified victims and [in] complexity.”349   
In her written response to OPR, Villafaña said that she “listened more than [she] spoke” 
during these interactions with Edwards, which occurred before the state court plea: 
Given the uncertainty of the situation – Epstein was still challenging 
our ability to prosecute him federally, pressing allegations of 
prosecutorial misconduct, and trying to negotiate better plea terms, 
while the agents, my supervisors, and I were all moving towards 
[filing charges] – I did not feel comfortable sharing any information 
about the case.  It is also my practice not to talk about status before 
the grand jury.   
In her 2017 declaration in the CVRA litigation, Villafaña explained that during these 
exchanges, Villafaña did not inform Edwards of the existence of the NPA because she “did not 
know whether the NPA remained viable at that time or whether Epstein would enter the state court 
guilty plea that would trigger the NPA.”350  Villafaña told OPR that she did not inform Edwards 
                                                 
also had interactions with other victims’ attorneys.  For example, another attorney informed OPR that he spoke to 
Villafaña two to five times concerning the status of the case and ...

 
231 
 
about the NPA because it was “confidential” and because the case was under “investigation and 
leading towards” the filing of charges.  Villafaña recalled mentioning the conversation to her 
supervisors and the case agents because she “thought he was somebody who could be of assistance 
to us and . . . could perhaps persuade Alex Acosta that this was a case that was meritorious and 
should be prosecuted.”  
 
Nevertheless, when OPR asked Villafaña why she did not inform Edwards of the same 
information that the FBI and she had provided to Wild in October 2007 and January 2008, 
Villafaña explained that she felt “prohibited”: 
At the time that I spoke with him, you know, there had been all of 
this . . . letter writing or all of these concerns and instructions that I 
had been given by Alex [Acosta] and Jeff [Sloman] not to disclose 
things further and not to have any involvement in victim 
notification, and so I felt like that prohibited me from telling him 
about the existence of the NPA. 
X. 
JUNE 2008:  EFFORTS TO NOTIFY VICTIMS ABOUT THE JUNE 30, 2008 PLEA 
HEARING 
 
The Epstein team’s appeals through the Department ended on June 23, 2008, when the 
Deputy Attorney General determined that “federal prosecution of this case is appropriate” and 
Epstein’s allegations of prosecutorial misconduct did not rise to a level that would undermine such 
a decision.  Immediately thereafter, at Sloman’s instruction, Villafaña notified Lefkowitz that 
Epstein had until “the close of business on Monday, June 30, 2008, to comply with the terms and 
conditions of the agreement . . . including entry of a guilty plea, sentencing, and surrendering to 
begin his sentence of imprisonment.”  That same day, Villafaña made plans to file charges on July 
1, 2008, if Epstein did not enter his guilty plea by the June 30 deadline. 
On Friday, June 27, 2008, Villafaña received a copy of the proposed state plea agreement 
and learned that the plea hearing was scheduled for 8:30 a.m. ...

 
232 
 
 
Villafaña told OPR that before the state plea hearing, she sent Reiter a list of the victims, 
including their telephone numbers, to notify and asked him to destroy the list.  Villafaña recalled 
that Reiter told her that he would “try to contact as many as he could” and that he would destroy 
the list afterwards.  Villafaña did not recall being “asked [to] provide a list of all our victims to the 
State Attorney’s Office.” 
 
In his 2009 deposition, Reiter stated that Villafaña sent him a letter “around the time of 
sentencing,” listing the victims in the federal investigation, and that she asked him to destroy the 
letter after he reviewed it.  Reiter recalled that he requested the list because he was aware that the 
state grand jury’s indictment of Epstein did not include all of the victims that the PBPD had 
identified and he “wanted to make sure that some prosecution body had considered all of our 
victims.”353 
 
In her 2017 declaration in the CVRA litigation, Villafaña stated that she and the PBPD 
“attempted to notify the victims about [the June 30] hearing in the short time available to us.”354  
In her 2008 declaration, however, Villafaña conceded that “all known victims were not notified.”    
 
Villafaña told OPR that Edwards was the only victim attorney she was authorized to 
contact—she thought probably by Sloman—about the June 30, 2008 plea hearing because Edwards 
“had expressed a specific interest in the outcome.”  Villafaña recalled, “I was told that I could 
inform [Edwards] of [the plea date], but I still couldn’t inform him of the NPA.”355  In her 2008 
declaration in the CVRA litigation, Villafaña stated that she called Edwards and informed him of 
the plea hearing scheduled for Monday; Villafaña stated that Edwards told her that he could not 
attend the hearing but “someone” would be present.  In a later filing in the CVRA litigation, 
however, Edwards asserted that Villafaña told him only that “Epstein was pleading guilty to state ...

 
233 
 
[M]y expectation of what was going [to] happen at the plea was that 
it would be like a federal plea where there would be a factual proffer 
that was read, and where the judge would ask if there were any 
victims present who wanted to be heard, and that at that point if Brad 
Edwards wanted to address the court or if his clients wanted to 
address the court, they would be given the opportunity to do so.357 
 
 
Sloman told OPR that he did not recall directing Villafaña to contact anyone about the plea 
hearing or directing her specifically not to contact anyone about it.  Acosta told OPR that he 
believed the state would notify the victims of the “all-encompassing plea” resolving the federal 
case “and [the victims would] have an opportunity to speak up at the state court hearing.”  
Nevertheless, Acosta did not know whether the state victims overlapped with the federal victims 
or whether the USAO “shared that list with them.”  Villafaña told OPR that she and Acosta 
“understood that the state would notify the state victims” but that neither of them were aware “that 
the state only believed they had one victim.”358  Villafaña told OPR that there was “very little” 
communication between the USAO and the State Attorney’s Office, and although she discussed a 
factual proffer with the State Attorney’s Office and “the fact that . . . the federal investigation had 
identified additional victims,” she did not recall discussing “who the specific people were that they 
considered victims in the state case.”359 
 
Sloman told OPR that the “public perception . . . that we tried to hide the fact of the results 
of this resolution from the victims” was incorrect.  He explained: 
 
[E]ven though we didn’t have a legal obligation, I felt that the 
victims were going to be notified and the state was going . . . to 
fulfill that obligation, and even as another failsafe, [the victims] 
would be notified of . . . the restitution mechanism that we had set 
up on their behalf....

 
234 
 
When asked why the USAO did not simply notify the victims of the change of plea hearing, 
Sloman responded that he “was more focused on the restitution provisions.  I didn’t get the sense 
that the victims were overly interested in showing up . . . at the change of plea.”   
 
 
Also, in late June, Villafaña drafted a victim notification letter concerning the June 30, 
2008 plea.360  Villafaña told OPR that, because “Mr. Acosta had agreed in December 2007 that we 
would not provide written notice of the state change of plea, the written victim notifications were 
prepared to be sent immediately following Epstein’s guilty plea.”361  As she did with prior draft 
victim notification letters, Villafaña provided the draft to the defense for comments.362   
 
Although Epstein’s plea hearing was set for June 30, 2008, Villafaña took steps to facilitate 
the filing of federal charges on July 1, 2008, in the event he did not plead guilty in state court.  
 
OPR reviewed voluminous Epstein-related files that the State Attorney’s Office made 
available online, but OPR was unable to locate any document establishing that before the hearing 
date, the state informed victims of the June 30, 2008 plea.  On March 12, 2008, the State Attorney’s 
Office issued trial subpoenas to three victims and one non-law enforcement witness commanding 
the individuals to “remain on call” during the week of July 8, 2008.  However, the Palm Beach 
County Sheriff was unable to serve one of the victims in person because the victim was “away [at] 
college.”       
 
XI. 
JUNE 30, 2008:  EPSTEIN ENTERS HIS GUILTY PLEAS IN A STATE COURT 
HEARING AT WHICH NO VICTIMS ARE PRESENT 
 
On June 30, 2008, Epstein appeared in state court in West Palm Beach, with his attorney 
Jack Goldberger, and pled guilty to an information charging him with procuring a person under 18 
for prostitution, as well as the indictment charging him with felony solicitation of prostitution.  The 
information charged that betw...

 
235 
 
yes.”  The court also asked Belohlavek if the juvenile victim’s parents or guardian agreed with the 
plea, and Belohlavek stated that because the victim was no longer under age 18, Belohlavek spoke 
with the victim’s counsel, who agreed with the plea agreement.363   
 
Both Villafaña and the FBI case agent were present in the courtroom gallery to observe the 
plea hearing.  Later that day, Villafaña met with Goldberger and gave him the list of 31 individuals 
the government was prepared to name as victims and to whom the § 2255 provision applied.   
 
In her 2015 CVRA case declaration, Wild stated that, “I did not have any reason to attend 
that hearing because no one had told me that this guilty plea was related to the FBI’s investigation 
of Epstein’s abuse of me.”  She stated that she “would have attended and tried to object to the 
judge and prevent that plea from going forward,” had she known that the state plea “had some 
connection to blocking the prosecution of my case.”  Similarly, CVRA petitioner Jane Doe #2 
stated that “no one notified me that [Epstein’s] plea had anything to do with my case against him.”   
 
An attorney who represented several victims, including one whom the state had 
subpoenaed for the potential July trial, told OPR that he was present in court on June 30, 2008, in 
order to serve a complaint upon Epstein in connection with a civil lawsuit brought on behalf of 
one of his clients.  The USAO had not informed him about the plea hearing.364  Moreover, the 
attorney informed OPR that, although one of the victims he represented had been interviewed in 
the PBPD’s investigation and had been deposed by Epstein’s attorneys in the state case (with the 
Assistant State Attorney present), he did not recall receiving any notice of the June 30, 2008 plea 
hearing from the State Attorney’s Office.365  Similarly, another of the victims the state had 
subpoenaed for the July trial told OPR through her attorney that she received subpoenas fr...

 
236 
 
civil suits that were pending against Epstein.366  Villafaña also emailed one of the pro bono 
attorneys she had engaged to help victims avoid defense harassment, informing him that the federal 
investigation had been resolved through a state plea and that Epstein had an “agreement” with the 
USAO “requir[ing] him to make certain concessions regarding possible civil suits brought by the 
victims.”  Villafaña advised Goldberger:  “The FBI has received several calls regarding the [NPA].  
I do not know whether the title of the document was disclosed when the [NPA] was filed under 
seal, but the FBI and our Office are declining comment if asked.” 
B. 
July 7, 2008:  The CVRA Litigation Is Initiated 
 
On July 3, 2008, victims’ attorney Edwards spoke to Villafaña by telephone about the 
resolution of the state case against Epstein “and the next stage of the federal prosecution.”367  In 
his 2017 affidavit filed in the CVRA litigation, Edwards asserted that during this conversation, 
Villafaña did not inform him of the NPA, but that during the call, he sensed that the USAO “was 
beginning to negotiate with Epstein concerning the federally identified crimes.”  However, in an 
email Villafaña sent after the call, she informed Sloman that during the call, Edwards stated that 
“his clients can name many more victims and wanted to know if we can get out of the deal.”  
Villafaña told Sloman that after she told Edwards that the government was bound by the 
agreement, assuming Epstein completed it, Edwards asked that “if there is the slightest bit of 
hesitation on Epstein’s part of completing his performance, that he and his [three] clients be 
allowed to consult with [the USAO] before making a decision.”368   
 
That same day, Edwards wrote a letter to Villafaña, complaining that Epstein’s state court 
sentence was “grossly inadequate for a predator of this magnitude” and urged Villafaña to “move 
forward with the traditional indictments and criminal prosecution comm...

 
237 
 
no federal charges filed against Epstein as a result of the government’s agreement in mid-2007 to 
defer prosecution to the state.370  
C. 
July 2008:  Villafaña Prepares and Sends a Victim Notification Letter to Listed 
Victims 
 
On July 8, 2008, Villafaña provided Goldberger with an updated victim list for 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2255 purposes, noting that she had inadvertently left off one individual in her June 30, 2008 
letter.  Villafaña also informed the defense that, beginning the following day, she would distribute 
notifications to each of the 32 victims and their counsel informing them that Epstein’s attorney 
would be the contact for any civil litigation, if the victim decided to pursue damages.  Finally, the 
letter informed the defense that the government would consider a denial by Epstein that any “one 
of these victims is entitled to proceed under 18 U.S.C. § 2255” to be considered a breach of the 
terms of the NPA. 
 
 
After exchanging emails and letters with the defense concerning the content of the notice 
letter, Villafaña drafted a letter she sent, on July 9 and 10, to nine victims who had previously 
retained counsel.  The letter informed the victims and their counsel that, “[i]n light of” Epstein’s 
June 30, 2008 state court plea to felony solicitation of prostitution and procurement of minors to 
engage in prostitution, and his sentence of a total of 18 months’ imprisonment followed by 12 
months’ community control, “the United States has agreed to defer federal prosecution in favor of 
this state plea and sentence, subject to certain conditions.”  The letter included a reference to the 
18 U.S.C. § 2255 provision of the NPA, and although the defense had never agreed to it, used 
language from Acosta’s December 19, 2007 letter to Epstein defense attorney Sanchez clarifying 
the damages provision.  The paragraph below was described as “[o]ne such condition to which 
Epstein has agreed”: 
Any person, who while a minor, was a victim of a violati...

 
238 
 
18 U.S.C. § 2255 and again listing the 32 “individuals whom the United States was prepared to 
name as victims of an enumerated offense.” 371  The same day, Villafaña sent Goldberger a second 
letter, noting that the defense would receive copies of all victim notifications on a rolling basis.   
 
Villafaña informed her managers that the FBI case agents would reach out by telephone to 
the listed victims who were unrepresented, to inform them that the case was resolved and to 
confirm their addresses for notification by mail.  With regard to the content of the telephone calls, 
Villafaña proposed the following language to the case agents: 
We are calling to inform you about the resolution of the Epstein 
investigation and to thank you for your help. 
Mr. Epstein pled guilty to one child sex offense that will require him 
to register as a sex offender for life and received a sentence of 18 
months imprisonment followed by one year of home confinement.  
Mr. Epstein also made a concession regarding the payment of 
restitution.   
All of these terms are set out in a letter that AUSA Villafaña is going 
to send out.  Do you have a lawyer?  Get name or address.  If not[,] 
where do you want [the] letter sent?  If you have questions when 
you receive the letter, please understand that we cannot provide 
legal advice but the lawyers at the following victim rights 
organizations are able to help you at no cost to you.  (Provide names 
and phone numbers) 
Also ask about counseling and let them know that counseling is still 
available even though the investigation is closed.  
On July 21, 2008, Villafaña sent the letter to the 11 unrepresented victims whose addresses 
the FBI had by that time confirmed.  Villafaña provided Epstein’s defense counsel with a copy of 
the letter sent to each victim, directly or though counsel (with the mailing addresses redacted).   
 
D. 
July – August 2008:  The FBI Sends the Victim Notification Letter to Victims 
Residing Outside of t...

 
239 
 
letter was substantially identical to the previous FBI victim notification letter the FBI had sent to 
victims (in 2006, 2007, and 2008) in that it identified each recipient as “a possible victim of a 
federal crime” and listed her eight CVRA rights.   
 
The letter did not indicate that Epstein had pled guilty in state court on June 30, 2008, or 
that the USAO had resolved its investigation by deferring federal prosecution in favor of the state 
plea.  Rather, like the previous FBI VNS-generated letter, the letter requested the victims’ 
“assistance and cooperation while we are investigating the case.”  
 
For each of the two victims residing outside of the United States, Villafaña also drafted a 
notification letter concerning the June 30, 2008 plea and the 18 U.S.C. § 2255 process, which were 
to be hand delivered along with the FBI’s letters.  However, FBI records do not reflect whether 
the USAO’s letter was delivered to the two victims.     
E. 
August – September 2008:  The Federal Court Orders the USAO to Disclose 
the NPA to Victims, and the USAO Sends a Revised Victim Notification Letter  
 
On August 1, 2008, the petitioners in the CVRA litigation filed a motion seeking access to 
the NPA.  The USAO opposed the motion by relying on the confidentiality portion of the NPA.372  
On August 21, 2008, the court ordered the government to provide the petitioners with a copy of 
the NPA subject to a protective order.  In addition, the court ordered the government to produce 
the NPA to other identified victims upon request: 
(d) If any individuals who have been identified by the USAO as 
victims of Epstein and/or any attorney(s) for those individuals 
request the opportunity to review the [NPA], then the USAO shall 
produce the [NPA] to those individuals, so long as those individuals 
also agree that they shall not disclose the [NPA] or its terms to any 
third party absent further court order, following notice to and an 
opportunity for Epstein’s counsel ...

 
240 
 
obligated to amend her prior letter to victims to correct the reference to the December letter.376  
Accordingly, the September letter contained no information about the parties’ intent in 
implementing 18 U.S.C. § 2255, but merely referred to the NPA language concerning Epstein’s 
waiver of his right to contest liability under the provision.  In addition, the September letter 
described the appointment of a special master, the special master’s selection of an attorney to 
represent the victims in their 18 U.S.C. § 2255 litigation against Epstein, and Epstein’s agreement 
to pay the attorney representative’s fees arising out of such litigation.  The letter also clarified that 
Epstein’s agreement to pay for attorneys’ fees did not extend to contested litigation against him.   
 
The government also intended for the letter to comply with the court’s order concerning 
providing victims with copies of the NPA.  The initial draft included a paragraph advising the 
victims that they could receive a copy of the NPA:   
In addition, a judge has ordered that the United States make 
available to any designated victim (and/or her attorney) a copy of 
the actual agreement between Mr. Epstein and the United States, so 
long as the victim (and/or her attorney) reviews, signs, and agrees to 
be bound by a Protective Order entered by the Court.  If [the victim] 
would like to review the Agreement, please let me know, and I will 
forward a copy of the Protective Order for her signature.  
The government shared draft versions of the September letter with Epstein’s counsel and 
responded to criticism of the content of the proposed letter.  For example, in response to the above 
language regarding the August 21, 2008 court order in the CVRA litigation, the defense argued 
that there was “no court order requiring the government to provide the alleged ‘victims’ with notice 
that the [NPA] is available to them upon request and doing so is in conflict with the confidentiality 
pr...

 
241 
 
F. 
2010 – 2011:  Department and Congressional Actions Regarding 
Interpretation of the CVRA 
 
In connection with the Department’s 2010 effort to update its 2005 Guidelines, the Office 
of the Deputy Attorney General convened a Victim of Crimes Working Group that asked OLC to 
revisit its 2005 preliminary review concerning the definition of “crime victim” under the CVRA 
and solicited input concerning the issue from Department components and federal law enforcement 
agencies.  In response, OLC issued a December 17, 2010 opinion entitled, The Availability of 
Crime Victims’ Rights Under the Crime Victims’ Rights Act of 2004.  Based on the CVRA’s 
language, relevant case law, and memoranda opinions from Department components, OLC 
reaffirmed its 2005 conclusion that CVRA rights do not vest until a criminal charge has been filed 
(by complaint, information, or indictment) and the rights cease to be available if “all charges are 
dismissed either voluntarily or on the merits (or if the [g]overnment declines to bring formal 
charges after the filing of a complaint).”378   
 
After OLC issued its opinion, the Department revised the 2005 Guidelines in October 2011 
but did not change its fundamental position that the CVRA rights did not vest until after criminal 
charges were filed.  The 2011 revision did, however, add language concerning victim consultation 
before a defendant is charged:  “In circumstances where plea negotiations occur before a case has 
been brought, Department policy is that this should include reasonable consultation prior to the 
filing of a charging instrument with the court.”379  The use of the word “should” in the 2011 
Guidelines indicates that “personnel are expected to take the action . . . unless there is an 
appropriate, articulable reason not to do so.”380  Nevertheless, the required consultation “may be 
general in nature” and “does not have to be specific to a particular plea offer.”381  The revisions 
also specified that AUSAs w...

 
242 
 
Department had made its “best efforts in thousands of federal and District of Columbia cases to 
assert, support, and defend crime victims’ rights.”  The response also referenced OLC’s December 
2010 opinion concluding that CVRA rights apply when criminal proceedings are initiated, noting 
that “the new AG Guidelines go further and provide that Department prosecutors should make 
reasonable efforts to notify identified victims of, and consider victims’ views about, prospective 
plea negotiations, even prior to the filing of a charging instrument with the court.”383 
 
 
In 2015, Congress amended the CVRA, and added the following two rights: 
(9) The right to be informed in a timely manner of any plea bargain 
or deferred prosecution agreement.  
 
(10) The right to be informed of the rights under this section and the 
services described in section 503(c) of the Victims’ Rights and 
Restitution Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 10F DQG SURYLGHG FRQWDFW
information for the Office of the Victims’ Rights Ombudsman of the 
Department of Justice. 
 
G. 
The CVRA Litigation Proceedings and Current Status  
 
While the CVRA litigation was pending in the Southern District of Florida, numerous 
federal civil suits against Epstein, brought in the same district, were transferred to the same judge 
as “related cases,” as a matter of judicial economy pursuant to the Local Rules.  As the parties 
agreed on settlements in those civil cases, they were dismissed.384  Several of the victims who had 
settled their civil cases filed a pleading in the CVRA litigation asking the court to “maintain their 
anonymity” and not “further disseminate[]” their identities to the CVRA petitioners.385    
 
 
In the CVRA case, the petitioners claimed that the government violated their CVRA rights 
to confer by (1) negotiating and signing the NPA without victim input; (2) sending letters to the 
victims claiming that the matter was “under investigation” after the NPA was already signed; and 
(3) ...

 
243 
 
letters to victims sent after the NPA was signed were not misleading in stating that the matter was 
“under investigation” because the government continued to investigate given its uncertainty that 
Epstein would plead guilty; and (3) Villafaña contacted the petitioners’ attorney prior to Epstein’s 
state plea to advise him of the hearing.  Nonetheless, Villafaña told OPR that, while there were 
valid reasons for the government’s position that CVRA rights do not apply pre-charge, “[T]his is 
a case where I felt we should have done more than what was legally required.  I was obviously 
prepared to spend as much time, energy and effort necessary to meet with each and every [victim].” 
 
Over the course of the litigation, the district court made various rulings interpreting the 
provisions of the CVRA, including the court’s key conclusion that victim CVRA rights “attach 
before the Government brings formal charges against a defendant.”  The court also held that 
(1) “the CVRA authorizes the rescission or ‘reopening’ of a prosecutorial agreement, including a 
non-prosecution agreement, reached in violation of a prosecutor’s conferral obligations under the 
statute”; (2) the CVRA authorizes the setting aside of pre-charge prosecutorial agreements”; 
(3) the CVRA’s “reasonable right to confer” “extends to the pre-charge state of criminal 
investigations and proceedings”; (4) the alleged federal sex crimes committed by Epstein render 
the Doe petitioners “victims” under the CVRA; and (5) “questions pertaining to [the] equitable 
defense[s] are properly left for resolution after development of a full evidentiary record.”   
 
On February 21, 2019, the district court granted the petitioners’ Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment, ruling that “once the Government failed to advise the victims about its 
intention to enter into the NPA, a violation of the CVRA occurred.”  The government did not 
dispute the fact that it did not confer with the petitioners prior to signi...

 
244 
 
the 2005 Guidelines was inconsistent with positions the USAO had taken in correspondence with 
Epstein’s attorneys, in which the government acknowledged that “it had obligations to notify the 
victims.”  The court ordered the parties to submit additional briefs regarding the appropriate 
remedies.  Accordingly, the petitioners requested multiple specific remedies, including rescission 
of the NPA; a written apology to all victims from the government; a meeting with Acosta, 
Villafaña, and her supervisors; access to government records, including grand jury materials; 
training for USAO employees; and monetary sanctions and attorneys’ fees.387  
 
 
Following Epstein’s indictment on federal charges in New York and subsequent death 
while in custody, on September 16, 2019, the district judge presiding over the CVRA case denied 
the petitioners’ motion for remedies and closed the case, stating that Epstein’s death “rendered the 
most significant issue that was pending before the Court, namely, whether the Government’s 
violation of Petitioners’ rights under the CVRA invalidated the NPA, moot.”388  The court did not 
order the government to take corrective measures, but stated that it “fully expects the Government 
will honor its representation that it will provide training to its employees about the CVRA and the 
proper treatment of crime victims.”389  The court also denied the petitioners’ request for attorneys’ 
fees, finding that the government did not act in bad faith, because, “[a]lthough unsuccessful on the 
merits of the issue of whether there was a violation of the CVRA, the Government asserted 
legitimate and legally supportable positions throughout this litigation.”   
 
On September 30, 2019, Wild appealed the district court’s rejection of the requested 
remedies, through a Petition for a Writ of Mandamus filed with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit.390  In its responsive brief, the government expressed sympathy for Wild and 
“regre...

 
245 
 
victims deserve to be treated with fairness and respect, and to be conferred with on the criminal 
case, not just because the CVRA requires it, but because it’s the right thing to do.”  During oral 
argument on January 16, 2020, the government apologized for the USAO’s treatment of Wild:    
The issue is whether or not the office was fully transparent with 
Ms. Wild about what it is that was going on with respect to the NPA, 
and they made a mistake in causing her to believe that the case was 
ongoing when in fact the NPA had been signed.  The government 
should have communicated in a straightforward and transparent way 
with Ms. Wild, and for that, we are genuinely sorry.393 
 
On April 14, 2020, a divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit denied 
Wild’s petition for a writ of mandamus, concluding that “the CVRA does not apply before the 
commencement of criminal proceedings—and thus, on the facts of this case, does not provide the 
petitioner here with any judicially enforceable rights.”394  The court conducted a thorough analysis 
of the language of the statute, the legislative history, and previous court decisions.  The court 
distinguished In re Dean as “dictum” consisting of a “three-sentence discussion . . . devoid of any 
analysis of the CVRA’s text, history, or structural underpinnings.”  The court noted that its 
interpretation of the CVRA was consistent with the Department’s 2010 OLC opinion concerning 
victim standing under the CVRA and the Department’s efforts in “implementing regulations.”  
Finally, the court raised separation of powers concerns with Wild’s (and the dissenting judge’s) 
interpretation of victim standing under the CVRA, noting that such an interpretation would 
interfere with prosecutorial discretion.    
 
Nevertheless, the court was highly critical of the government’s conduct in the underlying 
case, stating that the government “[s]eemingly . . . defer[red] to Epstein’s lawyers” regarding 
information it...

 
246 
 
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247 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
PART TWO:  APPLICABLE STANDARDS 
 
I. 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Pertinent sections of the CVRA and the VRRA, applicable during the relevant time period, 
are set forth below. 
 
A. 
The CVRA, 18 U.S.C. § 3771  
 
 
(a)  Rights of Crime Victims. —A crime victim has the following rights:  
 
(1)  The right to be reasonably protected from the accused.  
(2)  The right to reasonable, accurate, and timely notice of any public court proceeding, or any 
parole proceeding, involving the crime or of any release or escape of the accused.  
(3)  The right not to be excluded from any such public court proceeding, unless the court, after 
receiving clear and convincing evidence, determines that testimony by the victim would be 
materially altered if the victim heard other testimony at that proceeding.  
(4)  The right to be reasonably heard at any public proceeding in the district court involving 
release, plea, sentencing, or any parole proceeding.  
(5)  The reasonable right to confer with the attorney for the Government in the case.  
(6)  The right to full and timely restitution as provided in law.  
(7)  The right to proceedings free from unreasonable delay.  
(8)  The right to be treated with fairness and with respect for the victim’s dignity and privacy.  
 
. . . . 
 
(c)  Best Efforts To Accord Rights.—  
 
(1)  Government.—Officers and employees of the Department of Justice . . . shall make their 
best efforts to see that crime victims are notified of, and accorded, the rights described in 
subsection (a). 
 
. . . . 
 
 (e)  Definitions.   
 
. . . . 
 
(2)  Crime victim.—  
 
(A)  In general. —The term “crime victim” means a person directly and proximately 
harmed as a result of the commission of a Federal offense or an offense in the District of 
Columbia. 
 

 
248 
 
B. 
The Victims’ Rights and Restitution Act of 1990 (VRRA), 34 U.S.C. § 20141, 
Services to Victims (formerly cited as 42 USCA § 10607) 
(b)  Identification of victims 
 
At the earliest opportunity after the detection of a crime at which it may be done without 
interfering with an investigation, a responsible official shall— 
 
(1)  identify the victim or victims of a crime; 
(2)  inform the victims of their right to receive, on request, the services described in subsection 
(c); and 
(3)  inform each victim of the name, title, and business address and telephone number of the 
responsible official to whom the victim should address a request for each of the services 
described in subsection (c). 
 
(c)  Description of services 
 
(1) A responsible official shall— 
(A)  inform a victim of the place where the victim may receive emergency medical and 
social services; 
(B)  inform a victim of any restitution or other relief to which the victim may be entitled 
under this or any other law and manner in which such relief may be obtained; 
(C)  inform a victim of public and private programs that are available to provide counseling, 
treatment, and other support to the victim; and 
(D)  assist a victim in contacting the persons who are responsible for providing the services 
and relief described in subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C). 
 
(2)  A responsible official shall arrange for a victim to receive reasonable protection from a 
suspected offender and persons acting in concert with or at the behest of the suspected offender. 
 
(3)  During the investigation and prosecution of a crime, a responsible official shall provide a 
victim the earliest possible notice of— 
 
(A)  the status of the investigation of the crime, to the extent it is appropriate to inform the 
victim and to the extent that it will not interfere with the investigation; 
(B)  the arrest of a suspected offender; 
(C)  the filing of charges against a suspected offender; 
(D)  the scheduling of each c...

 
249 
 
(4)  During court proceedings, a responsible official shall ensure that a victim is provided a 
waiting area removed from and out of the sight and hearing of the defendant and defense 
witnesses. 
 
. . . . 
 
(e)  Definitions 
 
. . . . 
 
(2)  the term “victim” means a person that has suffered direct physical, emotional, or pecuniary 
harm as a result of the commission of a crime . . . . 
 
II. 
DEPARTMENT POLICY:  THE 2005 ATTORNEY GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR 
VICTIM AND WITNESS ASSISTANCE (2005 GUIDELINES) 
 
In 2005, the Department revised its guidelines for victim and witness assistance in order to 
incorporate the provisions of the CVRA.  The purpose of the 2005 Guidelines was “to establish 
guidelines to be followed by officers and employees of Department of Justice investigative, 
prosecutorial, and correctional components in the treatment of victims of and witnesses to crime.”    
The relevant portions of the 2005 Guidelines are as follows: 
 
Article IV:  Services to Victims and Witnesses 
 
A. Investigation Stage 
The investigative agency’s responsibilities begin with the report of the crime and extend 
through the prosecution of the case. In some instances, when explicitly stated, the 
investigative agency’s responsibility for a certain task is transferred to the prosecuting 
agency when charges are filed. 
 
 
. . . . 
 
 
2.  Identification of Victims. At the earliest opportunity after the detection of a crime at 
 
which it may be done without interfering with an investigation, the responsible official of 
 
the investigative agency shall identify the victims of the crime.  
 
 
 
 
3.  Description of Services. 
 
 
     a.  Information, Notice, and Referral 
 
(1)  Initial Information and Notice. Responsible officials must advise a victim 
pursuant to this section at the earliest opportunity after detection of a crime at which 
it may be done without interfering with an investigation.  To comply with this 
requirement, it is recommended that vic...

 
250 
 
service providers, and lists the names and telephone numbers of the victim-witness 
coordinator or specialist and other key officials.  A victim must be informed of— 
(a)  His or her rights as enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a).  
 
(b)  His or her right entitlement, on request, to the services listed in 42 U.S.C. 
§ 10607(c).  
 
(c)  The name, title, business address, and telephone number of the responsible 
official to whom such a request for services should be addressed.  
 
(d)  The place where the victim may receive emergency medical or social 
services.  
 
(e)  The availability of any restitution or other relief (including crime victim 
compensation programs) to which the victim may be entitled under this or any 
other applicable law and the manner in which such relief may be obtained.  
 
(f)  Public and private programs that are available to provide counseling, 
treatment, and other support to the victim.  
 
 
. . . .  
 
(i)  The availability of services for victims of domestic violence, sexual assault, 
or stalking.  
 
 
(j)  The option of being included in VNS.  
 
 
(k)  Available protections from intimidation and harassment.  
 
 
. . . . 
 
(3) Notice during the investigation. During the investigation of a crime, a 
responsible official shall provide the victim with the earliest possible notice 
concerning— 
 
(a)  The status of the investigation of the crime, to the extent that it is 
appropriate and will not interfere with the investigation.  
 
(b)  The arrest of a suspected offender.  
 
 
B.  Prosecution Stage 
 
The prosecution stage begins when charges are filed and continues through postsentencing 
legal proceedings, including appeals and collateral attacks. 
 

 
251 
 
1.  Responsible Officials. For cases in which charges have been instituted, the responsible 
official is the U.S. Attorney in whose district the prosecution is pending.  
 
2.  Services to Crime Victims 
 
 
. . . . 
 
 
 
b.  Information, Notice, and Referrals 
 
(1)  Notice of Rights. Officers and employees of the Department of Justice shall 
make their best efforts to see that crime victims are notified of the rights enumerated 
in 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a).  
 
(2)  Notice of Right To Seek Counsel. The prosecutor shall advise the crime victim 
that the crime victim can seek the advice of an attorney with respect to the rights 
described in 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a).  
 
(3)  Notice of Right To Attend Trial. The responsible official should inform the 
crime victim about the victim’s right to attend the trial regardless of whether the 
victim intends to make a statement or present any information about the effect of 
the crime on the victim during sentencing.  
 
(4)  Notice of Case Events. During the prosecution of a crime, a responsible official 
shall provide the victim, using VNS (where appropriate), with reasonable notice 
of— 
 
(a)  The filing of charges against a suspected offender.  
 
(b)  The release or escape of an offender or suspected offender.  
 
(c)  The schedule of court proceedings. 
 
(i)  The responsible official shall provide the victim with reasonable, 
accurate, and timely notice of any public court proceeding or parole 
proceeding that involves the crime against the victim. In the event of an 
emergency or other last-minute hearing or change in the time or date of a 
hearing, the responsible official should consider providing notice by 
telephone or expedited means. This notification requirement relates to 
postsentencing proceedings as well.  
 
(ii)  The responsible official shall also give reasonable notice of the 
scheduling or rescheduling of any other court proceeding that the victim or 
witness is required or entitled to attend.  
 
(d...

 
252 
 
 
(e)  If the offender is convicted, the sentence and conditions of supervised 
release, if any, that are imposed.  
 
 
. . . . 
 
(6)  Referrals. Once charges are filed, the responsible official shall assist the victim 
in contacting the persons or offices responsible for providing the services and relief 
[previously identified]. 
 
c.  Consultation With a Government Attorney 
 
(1)  In General. A victim has the reasonable right to confer with the attorney for the 
Government in the case.  The victim’s right to confer, however, shall not be 
construed to impair prosecutorial discretion.  Federal prosecutors should be 
available to consult with victims about major case decisions, such as dismissals, 
release of the accused pending judicial proceedings (when such release is for 
noninvestigative purposes), plea negotiations, and pretrial diversion.  Because 
victims are not clients, may become adverse to the Government, and may disclose 
whatever they have learned from consulting with prosecutors, such consultations 
may be limited to gathering information from victims and conveying only 
nonsensitive data and public information. Consultations should comply with the 
prosecutor’s obligations under applicable rules of professional conduct. 
 
Representatives of the Department should take care to inform victims that neither 
the Department’s advocacy for victims nor any other effort that the Department 
may make on their behalf constitutes or creates an attorney-client relationship 
between such victims and the lawyers for the Government. 
 
Department personnel should not provide legal advice to victims. 
  
(2)  Prosecutor Availability. Prosecutors should be reasonably available to consult 
with victims regarding significant adversities they may suffer as a result of delays 
in the prosecution of the case and should, at the appropriate time, inform the court 
of the reasonable concerns that have been conveyed to the prosecutor. 
 
(3)  Proposed Plea Agreem...

 
253 
 
(d) Whether the proposed plea involves confidential information or conditions. 
(e)  Whether there is another need for confidentiality. 
(f)  Whether the victim is a possible witness in the case and the effect that 
relaying any information may have on the defendant’s right to a fair trial. 
 
III. 
FLORIDA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT  
A. 
FRPC 4-4.1 – Candor in Dealing with Others 
 
FRPC 4-4.1 prohibits a lawyer from knowingly making a false statement of material fact 
or law to a third person during the course of representation of a client.  A comment to this rule 
explains that “[m]isrepresentations can also occur by partially true but misleading statements or 
omissions that are the equivalent of affirmative false statements,” and “[w]hether a particular 
statement should be regarded as one of fact can depend on the circumstances.” 
 
B. 
FRPC 4-8.4 – Conduct Prejudicial to the Administration of Justice 
 
FRPC 4-8.4(c) states that a lawyer shall not engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, 
deceit, or misrepresentation.   
 
 
FRPC 4-8.4(d) prohibits a lawyer from engaging in conduct in connection with the practice 
of law that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.   
 
 
As previously noted, courts have determined that FRPC 4-8.4(d) is not limited to conduct 
that occurs in a judicial proceeding, but can be applied to “conduct in connection with the practice 
of law.”  Frederick, 756 So. 2d at 87; see also Shankman, 41 So. 3d at 172. 
 
 

 
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CHAPTER THREE 
PART THREE:  ANALYSIS 
 
 
I. 
OVERVIEW 
In addition to criticism of Acosta’s decision to end the federal investigation by means of 
the NPA, public and media attention also focused on the government’s treatment of victims.  In 
the CVRA litigation and in more recent media reports, victims complained that they were not 
informed about the government’s intention to end its investigation of Epstein because the 
government did not consult with victims before the NPA was signed; did not inform them of 
Epstein’s state plea hearing and sentencing, thereby denying them the opportunity to attend; and 
actively misled them through statements that the federal investigation was ongoing.  The district 
court overseeing the CVRA litigation concluded that the government violated the Crime Victims’ 
Rights Act and “misl[ed] the victims to believe that federal prosecution was still a possibility” and 
that “[i]t was a material omission for the Government to suggest to the victims that they have 
patience relative to an investigation about which it had already bound itself not to prosecute.”395  
The government’s conduct, which involved both FBI and USAO actions, led to allegations that 
the prosecutors had purposefully failed to inform victims of the NPA to prevent victims from 
complaining publicly or in state court.   
OPR examined the government’s course of conduct when interacting with the victims, 
including the lack of consultation with the victims before the NPA was signed; Acosta’s decision 
to defer to state authorities the decision to notify victims of Epstein’s state plea; and the decision 
to delay informing victims about the NPA until after Epstein entered his plea on June 30, 2008.  
OPR considered whether letters sent to victims by the FBI after the NPA was signed contained 
false or misleading statements.  OPR also evaluated representations Villafaña made to victims in 
January and February 2008, and to an attorney for a victim in June 2008....

 
256 
 
 
As discussed below, OPR concludes that none of the subject attorneys violated a clear and 
unambiguous duty under the CVRA because the USAO resolved the Epstein investigation without 
a federal criminal charge.  In September 2007, when the NPA was signed, the Department did not 
interpret CVRA rights to attach unless and until federal charges had been filed, and the federal 
courts had not established a clear and unambiguous standard applying the CVRA before criminal 
charges were brought.  Pursuant to OPR’s established analytical framework, OPR does not find 
professional misconduct unless a subject attorney intentionally or recklessly violated a clear and 
unambiguous standard.  Accordingly, OPR finds that the subject attorneys’ conduct did not rise to 
the level of professional misconduct.  OPR nevertheless concludes that the lack of consultation 
was part of a series of government interactions with victims that ultimately led to public and court 
condemnation of the government’s treatment of the victims, reflected poorly on the Department as 
a whole, and is contradictory to the Department’s mission to “minimize the frustration and 
confusion that victims of a crime endure in its wake.”396  
A. 
At the Time, No Clear and Unambiguous Standard Required the USAO to 
Notify Victims Regarding Case-Related Events until after the Filing of 
Criminal Charges 
Although the rights enumerated in the CVRA are clear on their face, the threshold issue of 
whether an individual qualifies as a victim to whom CVRA rights attach was neither clear nor 
unambiguous at the time the USAO entered into the NPA with Epstein in September 2007.  At that 
time, the Department interpreted the CVRA in a way that differed markedly from the district 
court’s later interpretation in the CVRA litigation.  
 
The CVRA defines a “crime victim” as “a person directly and proximately harmed as a 
result of the commission of a Federal offense or an offense in the District of Columbia.”  On ...

 
257 
 
and consider victims’ views about, prospective plea negotiations.398  The “prosecution stage” 
began when charges were filed and continued through all post-sentencing legal proceedings.399     
 
At the time the parties signed the NPA in September 2007, few courts had addressed victim 
standing under the CVRA.  Notably, district courts in New York and South Carolina had ruled that 
standing attached only upon the filing of federal charges.400  Two cases relied upon by the court 
in its February 2019 opinion—Dean and its underlying district court opinion, BP Products—were 
decided after the NPA was signed.  
 
The CVRA litigation and proposed federal legislation—both pending as of the date of this 
Report—show that the interpretation of victim standing under the CVRA continues to be a matter 
of debate.401  In a November 21, 2019 letter to Attorney General William Barr, a Congressional 
Representative stated that she had recently introduced legislation specifically to “[c]larify that 
victims of federal crimes have the right to confer with the Government and be informed about key 
pre-charging developments in a case, such as . . . non-prosecution agreements.”402  The CVRA 
litigation arising from the Epstein case shows the lack of clarity regarding when CVRA rights 
apply:  the district court concluded that CVRA rights applied pre-charge, but a sharply divided 
panel of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals came to a contrary conclusion, a decision that has 
now been vacated while the entire court hears the case en banc.   
Because the Supreme Court had not addressed the issue of when CVRA rights apply, the 
lower courts had reached divergent conclusions, and the Department had concluded that CVRA 
rights did not apply pre-charge, OPR concludes that the subjects’ failure to consult with victims 
before signing the NPA did not constitute professional misconduct because at that time, the CVRA 
did not clearly and unambiguously require prosecutors to consult wi...

 
258 
 
 
In Wild, the Eleventh Circuit panel compared the language of the CVRA to the language 
of the VRRA, noting that the VRRA “clearly extends victim-notice rights into the pre-charge 
phase” and opining that the government “may well have violated” the VRRA with regards to its 
investigation of Epstein.  As a predecessor to the CVRA, the VRRA afforded victims various rights 
and services; however, it provided no mechanism for a victim to assert such rights in federal court 
or by administrative complaint.  Like the CVRA, the rights portion of the VRRA established the 
victims’ right to be treated with fairness and respect and the right to confer with an attorney for 
the government.  However, the rights portion of the VRRA was repealed upon passage of the 
CVRA and was not in effect at the time of the Epstein investigation.  
The portion of the VRRA directing federal law enforcement agencies to provide certain 
victim services such as counseling and medical care referrals remained in effect following passage 
of the CVRA.  Furthermore, two of the VRRA requirements—one requiring a responsible official 
to “inform a victim of any restitution or other relief to which the victim may be entitled,” and 
another requiring that a responsible official “shall provide a victim the earliest possible notice of 
the status of the investigation of the crime, to the extent it is appropriate to inform the victim and 
to the extent that it will not interfere with the investigation”—may have applied to the Epstein 
investigation.  However, the VRRA did not create a clear and unambiguous obligation on the part 
of the subject attorneys, as the 2005 Guidelines assigned the duty of enforcing the two 
requirements to the investigative agency rather than to prosecutors.  Moreover, the VRRA did not 
require notice to victims before the NPA was signed because, at that point, the case remained 
“under investigation,” and the victims did not become entitled to pursue monetary damages und...

 
259 
 
did not find evidence showing that the subjects intended to silence victims or to prevent them from 
having input into the USAO’s intent to resolve the federal investigation.    
Although the contemporaneous records provide some information about victim notification 
decisions made after the NPA was signed on September 24, 2007, the records contain little about 
the subjects’ views regarding consultation with victims before the NPA was signed.  In a 
September 6, 2007 email primarily addressing other topics, as the plea negotiations were beginning 
in earnest and almost three weeks before the NPA was signed, Villafaña raised the topic of victim 
consultation with Sloman:  “The agents and I have not reached out to the victims to get their 
approval, which as [CEOS Chief Oosterbaan] politely reminded me, is required under the law. . . . 
[A]nd the [PBPD] Chief wanted to know if the victims had been consulted about the deal.”404  
Sloman forwarded the email to Acosta with a note stating, “fyi.”  Villafaña recalled that after she 
sent the email, Sloman told her by telephone, “[Y]ou can’t do that now.”405  Villafaña also told 
OPR that shortly before the NPA was signed, Sloman told her, “[W]e’ve been advised that . . . pre-
charge resolutions do not require victim notification.”  Villafaña also recalled a discussion with 
Acosta, Menchel, and Sloman, during which she stated that she would need to get victims’ input 
on the terms being proposed to the defense, and she was told, “Plea negotiations are confidential.  
You can’t disclose them.”406    
 
 
None of the other subjects recalled a specific discussion before the NPA was signed about 
the USAO’s CVRA obligations.  Menchel told OPR he believed the USAO was not required to 
consult with victims during the preliminary “general discussion” phase of settlement negotiations; 
moreover, he left the USAO before the terms of the NPA were fully developed.   
 
Sloman told OPR that he “did not think that we had to c...

 
260 
 
   
Acosta told OPR that there was no requirement to notify the victims because the NPA was 
“not a plea, it’s deferring in favor of a state prosecution.”  Acosta said, “[W]hether or not victims’ 
views were elicited is something I think was the focus of the trial team and not something that I 
was focused on at least at this time.”  Acosta could not recall any particular concern that factored 
into the decision not to consult with the victims before entering into the NPA, but he acknowledged 
to OPR, “[C]learly, given the way it’s played out, it may have been much better if we had 
[consulted with the victims].”407 
As indicated, the contemporaneous records reflect little about decisions made regarding 
victim consultation prior to when the NPA was signed.  Villafaña raised the issue in writing to her 
supervisors in early September, but there is no evidence showing whether her supervisors 
affirmatively rejected Villafaña’s contention that the USAO was obligated to consult with victims, 
ignored the suggestion, or failed to address it for other reasons, possibly because of the extended 
uncertainty as to whether Epstein would ever agree to the government’s plea proposal.  OPR notes 
that its subject interviews were conducted more than a decade after the NPA was signed, and the 
passage of time affected the recall of each individual OPR interviewed.  Although Villafaña 
recalled discussions with her supervisors about notifying victims, her supervisors did not, and 
Menchel contended that Villafaña’s recollection is inaccurate.  Assuming the discussions occurred, 
the timing is unclear.  Sloman was on vacation before the NPA was signed, so a call with Villafaña 
about victim notification at that point in time appears unlikely.  Any discussion involving Menchel 
necessarily occurred before August 3, 2007, when it was unclear whether the defense would agree 
to the government’s offer.  Supervisors could well have decided that at such an early stage, there 
wa...

 
261 
 
require victim approval of the prosecutors’ plans, but it allows victims the opportunity to express 
their views and to be heard before a final decision is made.  The lack of consultation in this case 
denied the victims that opportunity.408   
 
III. 
LETTERS SENT TO VICTIMS BY THE FBI WERE NOT FALSE STATEMENTS 
BUT RISKED MISLEADING VICTIMS ABOUT THE STATUS OF THE 
FEDERAL INVESTIGATION 
After the NPA was signed on September 24, 2007, Villafaña and the FBI separately 
communicated with numerous victims and victims’ attorneys, both in person and through letters.  
Apart from three victims who likely were informed in October or November 2007 about a 
resolution ending the federal investigation, victims were not informed about the NPA or even more 
generally that the USAO had agreed to end its federal criminal investigation of Epstein if he pled 
guilty to state charges until after Epstein entered his guilty plea in June 2008.  Despite the 
government’s agreement on September 24, 2007, to end its federal investigation upon Epstein’s 
compliance with the terms of the NPA, the FBI sent to victims in October 2007, January 2008, and 
May 2008, letters stating that the case was “currently under investigation.”  In its February 21, 
2019 opinion in the CVRA case, the district court found those letters “misl[ed] the victims to 
believe that federal prosecution was still a possibility” and that “[i]t was a material omission for 
the Government to suggest to the victims that they have patience relative to an investigation about 
which it had already bound itself not to prosecute.”409   
 
In the discussions throughout this section, OPR examines the government’s course of 
conduct with victims after the NPA was signed.  As set forth in the previous subsection, OPR did 
not find evidence supporting a finding that Acosta, Sloman, or Villafaña acted with the intent to 
silence victims.  Nonetheless, after examining the full scope and context of the government’s 
interact...

 
262 
 
breach, however, Epstein would enter his state guilty plea and the federal investigation would end.  
Thus, the statement that the case was “currently under investigation” was literally true, but the 
omission of important contextual information about the existence of the NPA deprived the victims 
of important information about the exact status of the investigation.   
A. 
The USAO Was Not Responsible for Victim Notification Letters Sent by the 
FBI in October 2007, January 2008, and May 2008 Describing the Status of 
the Case as “Under Investigation”  
 
The 2005 Guidelines charged the FBI with informing the victims of CVRA rights and 
available services during the “investigative stage” of a case.  During the Epstein investigation, the 
FBI case agents complied with the agency’s notification obligation by hand delivering pamphlets 
to victims following their interviews and through computer-generated letters sent to the victims by 
the FBI’s Victim Specialist.  The FBI’s notification process is independent of the USAO’s.  The 
USAO has its own Victim Witness Specialist who assumes the responsibility for victim 
notification after an indictment or complaint moved the case into the “prosecution stage.”   
 
The FBI’s Victim Specialist used the VNS to prepare the October 2007, January 2008, and 
May 2008 letters, a system the FBI regularly employs to comply with its obligations under the 
2005 Guidelines to inform the victims of their rights and other services during the “investigative 
stage.”  The stock language of that letter, however, was generic and failed to communicate the 
unique case-specific status of the Epstein investigation at that time.  The FBI Victim Specialist 
who sent the letters acted at the case agent’s direction and was not aware of the existence of the 
NPA at the time she created the letters.410  Neither FBI case agent reviewed any of the letters sent 
by the FBI’s Victim Specialist.411  According to Villafaña, “The decision to issue th...

 
263 
 
B. 
Because the Federal Investigation Continued after the NPA Was Signed, the 
FBI Letters Were Accurate but Risked Misleading Victims regarding the 
Status of the Federal Investigation 
 
As described previously, given Epstein’s appeal to the Department and continued delay 
entering his guilty plea, Villafaña and other subjects came to believe that Epstein did not intend to 
comply with the NPA and that the USAO would ultimately file charges against Epstein.  By April 
2008, Acosta predicted in an email that charging Epstein was “more and more likely.”  As a result, 
Villafaña and the case agents continued their efforts to prepare for a likely trial with additional 
investigative steps.  Among other actions, Villafaña, her supervisors, CEOS, and the case agents 
engaged in the following investigative activities:  
 
x The FBI interviewed victims in October and November 2007 and between January and 
May 2008, and discovered at least six new victims.   
x In January 2008, CEOS assigned a Trial Attorney to bring expertise and “a national 
perspective” to the matter. 
x In January and February 2008, Villafaña and the CEOS Trial Attorney participated in 
victim interviews. 
x Villafaña revised the prosecution memorandum to focus “on victims who are unknown to 
Epstein’s counsel.”   
x The USAO informed the Department’s Civil Rights Division “pursuant to USAM 
[§] 8-3.120,” of the USAO’s “ongoing investigation of a child exploitation matter” 
involving Epstein and others.  
x Villafaña secured pro bono legal representation for victims whose depositions were being 
sought by Epstein’s attorneys in connection with the Florida criminal case.413 
x Villafaña prepared a revised draft indictment. 
x Villafaña sought and obtained approval to provide immunity to a potential government 
witness in exchange for that witness’s testimony. 
x Even after Epstein’s state plea hearing was set for June 30, 2008, Villafaña took steps to 
facilitate the filing of federal charges o...

 
264 
 
continuing.”  The co-case agent also told OPR that, as of the time of his OPR interview in 2019, 
the “the case was open . . . it’s never been shut down.”   
 
OPR found no evidence that the FBI’s victim letters were drafted with the intent to mislead 
the victims about the status of the federal investigation.  The “ongoing investigation” language 
generated by the VNS was generic template language in use nationwide at the time and identical 
to that contained in standard form notification letters the FBI generated and distributed from 
August 2006 through the 2007 signing of the NPA.414  Nevertheless, the FBI’s letters omitted 
important information about the status of the case because they failed to notify the victims that a 
federal prosecution would go forward only if Epstein failed to fulfill his obligations under an 
agreement he had reached with the USAO.  Victims receiving the FBI’s letter would logically 
conclude that the federal government was continuing to gather evidence to support a federal 
prosecution.  CVRA petitioner Wild stated during the CVRA litigation that her “understanding of 
this letter was that [her] case was still being investigated and the FBI and prosecutors were moving 
forward on the Federal prosecution of Epstein for his crimes against” her.  Furthermore, when the 
fact that the USAO had agreed to end its federal investigation in September 2007 eventually came 
to light, the statement in the subsequent letters contributed to victims’ and the public’s conclusions 
that the government had purposefully kept victims in the dark.   
 
In sum, OPR concludes that the statement in the FBI victim letters that the matter was 
“currently under investigation” was not false because the USAO and the FBI did continue to 
investigate and prepare for a prosecution of Epstein.  The letters, however, risked misleading the 
victims, and contributed to victim frustration and confusion, because the letters did not provide 
important information t...

 
265 
 
IV. 
ACOSTA’S 
DECISION 
TO 
DEFER 
TO 
THE 
STATE 
ATTORNEY’S 
DISCRETION WHETHER TO NOTIFY VICTIMS ABOUT EPSTEIN’S STATE 
COURT PLEA HEARING DID NOT VIOLATE A CLEAR OR UNAMBIGUOUS 
STANDARD; HOWEVER, ACOSTA EXERCISED POOR JUDGMENT BY 
FAILING TO ENSURE THAT VICTIMS IDENTIFIED IN THE FEDERAL 
INVESTIGATION WERE ADVISED OF THE STATE PLEA HEARING 
As set forth in the factual discussion, within a few weeks of the NPA’s signing, it became 
clear that the defense team disagreed with, and strongly objected to, the government’s plan to 
inform victims of their ability to recover monetary damages from Epstein, under the 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2255 provision of the NPA, and about Epstein’s state court plea hearing.  The USAO initially 
took the position that it was obligated to, and intended to, inform victims of both the NPA, 
including the § 2255 provision, and Epstein’s change of plea hearing and sentencing, so that 
victims who wanted to attend could do so.   
In November and December 2007, Epstein’s attorneys challenged the USAO’s position 
regarding victim notification.  Ultimately, Acosta made two distinct decisions concerning victim 
notifications.  Consistent with Acosta’s concerns about intruding into state actions, Acosta elected 
to defer to state authorities the decision whether to notify victims about the state’s plea hearing 
pursuant to the state’s own victim’s rights requirements.  Acosta also determined that the USAO 
would notify victims about their eligibility to obtain monetary damages from Epstein under § 2255, 
a decision that was implemented by letters sent to victims after Epstein entered his state pleas.  
This decision, which postponed notification of the NPA until after Epstein entered his guilty pleas, 
was based, at least in part, on Villafaña’s and the case agents’ strategic concerns relating to 
preserving the victims’ credibility and is discussed further in Section V, below.   
In this section, OPR analyzes Acosta’s decision to defer to the s...

 
266 
 
strongly objected to the government’s plan to notify victims of the state proceedings, which he 
described as “highly inappropriate” and an “intrusion into state affairs, when the identified 
individuals are not even victims of the crime for which Mr. Epstein is being sentenced.”  
 
Thereafter—at a time when the USAO believed Epstein’s plea to be imminent—Villafaña 
drafted, and Sloman signed, the December 6, 2007 letter to Lefkowitz rejecting the defense 
arguments regarding notification and reiterating the USAO’s position that the victims identified in 
the federal investigation be invited to appear at the state plea hearing.  The letter took an expansive 
view of the applicable statutes by contending that both the CVRA and the VRRA required the 
USAO to notify the victims of the state proceedings: 
[T]hese sections are not limited to proceedings in a federal district 
court.  Our Non-Prosecution Agreement resolves the federal 
investigation by allowing Mr. Epstein to plead to a state offense.  
The victims identified through the federal investigation should be 
appropriately informed, and our Non-Prosecution Agreement does 
not require the U.S. Attorney’s Office to forego [sic] its legal 
obligations.416 
The letter also asserted that the VRRA obligated the USAO to provide the victims with 
information concerning restitution to which they may be entitled and “the earliest possible” notice 
of the status of the investigation, the filing of charges, and the acceptance of a plea.  Along with 
the letter, Sloman forwarded a revised draft victim notification letter to Lefkowitz for his 
comments.  This draft victim notification letter stated that the federal investigation had been 
completed, Epstein would plead guilty in state court, the parties would recommend 18 months of 
imprisonment at sentencing, and Epstein would compensate victims for monetary damages claims 
brought under 18 U.S.C. § 2255.  The draft victim notification letter provided specific inf...

 
267 
 
Thereafter, in his December 19, 2007 letter to defense counsel mainly addressing other 
matters, Acosta informed the defense that the USAO would defer to the State Attorney’s discretion 
the responsibility for notifying victims about Epstein’s state plea hearing: 
I understand that the defense objects to the victims being given 
notice of [the] time and place of Mr. Epstein’s state court [plea and] 
sentencing hearing.  I have reviewed the proposed victim 
notification letter and the statute.  I would note that the United States 
provided the draft letter to the defense as a courtesy.  In addition, 
First Assistant United States Attorney Sloman already incorporated 
in the letter several edits that had been requested by defense counsel.  
I agree that Section 3771 applies to notice of proceedings and results 
of investigations of federal crimes as opposed to the state crime.  We 
intend to provide victims with notice of the federal resolution, as 
required by law.  We will defer to the discretion of the State Attorney 
regarding whether he wishes to provide victims with notice of the 
state proceedings, although we will provide him with the 
information necessary to do so if he wishes.   
(Emphasis added.) 
Acosta told OPR that he “would not have sent this [letter] without running it by [Sloman], 
if not other individuals in the office.”  Acosta explained that it was “not for me to direct the State 
Attorney, or for our office to direct the State Attorney’s Office on its obligations with respect to 
the state outcome.”  Acosta acknowledged that the USAO initially had concerns about the state’s 
handling of the case, but he told OPR, “that doesn’t mean that they will not fulfill whatever 
obligation they have.  Let’s not assume. . . that the State Attorney’s office is full of bad actors.” 
Sloman initially believed that “the victims were going to be notified at some level, especially 
because they had restitution rights under [§] 2255”; but his expectations ...

 
268 
 
particular charges and victims at issue.  Once the hearing was scheduled, Sloman told Villafaña to 
contact PBPD Chief Reiter about notifying the victims, and on June 28, 2008, she reported back 
to Sloman that Reiter “is going to notify victims about the plea.”418  Villafaña recalled that she 
sent Reiter a list of the girls identified as victims during the federal investigation, and Reiter said 
he would “contact as many as he could.”  The contemporaneous records do not show how many 
or which victims, if any, Reiter contacted, and no victims were present in the courtroom.  No victim 
who provided information to OPR, either in person or through her attorney, recalled receiving 
notice of the plea hearing from federal or state officials.  At the time Epstein pled guilty in state 
court, no one in the USAO knew exactly who, if anyone, Reiter or the State Attorney’s Office had 
notified about the proceeding.  Accordingly, Villafaña, who was present in the courtroom for the 
hearing, had no knowledge to whom Belohlavek referred when she told the court that the victims 
were “in agreement with the terms of this plea.”419   
OPR considered whether Acosta’s decision to defer to the State Attorney’s Office the 
decision to notify victims of the scheduled date for Epstein’s plea hearing constituted professional 
misconduct.  OPR could not conclude that the CVRA or VRRA provisions in question, requiring 
notice of any public proceeding involving the crime against the victim or that the victim is entitled 
to attend, unambiguously required federal prosecutors to notify victims of state court proceedings.  
Furthermore, as discussed previously, OLC had issued guidance stating that the CVRA did not 
apply to cases in which no federal charges had been filed.420  Moreover, the section of the VRRA 
requiring notice of court proceedings that the victim is “entitled to attend” referred specifically to 
proceedings under 42 U.S.C. § 10606(b)(4), which, at the time of the Ep...

 
269 
 
B. 
Acosta Exercised Poor Judgment When He Failed to Ensure That Victims 
Identified in the Federal Investigation Were Informed of the State Plea 
Hearing  
Although Acosta (or the USAO) was not required by law or policy to notify victims of the 
state’s plea hearing, he also was not prohibited by law or policy from notifying the victims that 
the federal investigation had been resolved through an agreement that included pleas to state 
charges.  As the contemporary records indicate, Acosta consistently expressed hesitancy to 
interfere in the state’s processes or to “dictate” actions to the State Attorney.  His decision that the 
USAO refrain from notifying victims about the state plea hearing and defer to the State Attorney’s 
judgment regarding whether and whom to notify was consistent with this view.  However, OPR 
found no evidence that Acosta’s decision to defer victim notification “to the discretion of the State 
Attorney” was ever actually communicated to any state authorities or that Acosta recognized that 
the state, absent significant coordination with federal authorities, was unlikely to contact all of the 
victims identified in the state and federal investigations or that the state would inform the victims 
that it did notify that the state plea hearing was part of an agreement that resolved the federal 
investigation into their own cases.423 
Even taking into account Acosta’s views on principles of federalism and his reluctance to 
interfere in state processes, Acosta should have recognized the problems that would likely stem 
from passing the task of notifying victims to the State Attorney’s Office and made appropriate 
efforts to ensure that those problems were minimized.  Appropriate notification would have 
included advising victims identified in the federal investigation that the USAO had declined to 
bring charges and that the matter was being handled by the State Attorney, and, at a minimum, 
provided the victims with Belohlavek’s conta...

 
270 
 
the PBPD during its investigation into Epstein’s conduct.  Absent information from the USAO, 
the state would not have been in a position to notify those additional victims of the state plea 
proceeding, even if the State Attorney had decided to include other victims identified during the 
state investigation.  Furthermore, at the time he made his decision, Acosta had already been advised 
by Villafaña that Belohlavek, in November 2007, had requested that the USAO notify victims, 
presumably those identified during the federal investigation, about the state plea hearing. 
Acosta told OPR that it had been his understanding at the time of Epstein’s plea that the 
victims would be made aware of the proceeding and would have an opportunity to speak.  Acosta 
also told OPR that he expected the state would have “notified [the victims] that that was an all-
encompassing plea, that the state court sentence would also mean that the federal government was 
not proceeding.”  There is no evidence, however, that he verified this understanding with Sloman 
or Villafaña, let alone the State Attorney.  OPR found no indication that Acosta ever 
communicated, or directed Sloman or Villafaña to communicate, his decision to the State Attorney 
or to provide the State Attorney’s Office with a complete list of victims identified during the 
federal investigation.  OPR located a draft letter to the State Attorney’s Office that Villafaña 
prepared and forwarded to Acosta in December 2007, which did provide such information, but 
OPR found no evidence that the letter was ever sent, and it was not among materials publicly 
released from the State Attorney’s Office.424  OPR also found evidence that both Sloman and 
Villafaña interacted with the State Attorney’s Office in the months leading up to the June 30, 2008 
plea hearing, but there is no indication that they discussed victim notification issues with that 
office, and Villafaña’s last minute request to PBPD Chief Reiter to notif...

 
271 
 
investigation.  Because the state indictment and information appeared to pertain to far fewer than 
the total victims identified in either the state or the federal investigation, and no one at the USAO 
was certain which victims were covered by the state charges, it should have been apparent to 
Acosta that without advance planning between the USAO and the State Attorney’s Office, there 
was a substantial risk that most of the victims identified in the federal investigation would not 
receive notice of the hearing.425  Notification to the broadest possible number of identified victims 
could only have been successful if there was appropriate communication between the USAO and 
the state prosecutors, communication that had previously been lacking regarding other significant 
issues relating to Epstein.  Villafaña and Sloman’s hastily arranged effort to enlist in the 
notification process PBPD Chief Reiter, who likely played little role in complying with the state’s 
victim notification obligations in a typical case, was not an adequate substitute for careful planning 
and coordination with the State Attorney’s Office.426   
Even if the State Attorney’s Office had notified all of the identified victims of the upcoming 
plea hearing, there was no guarantee that such notification would have included information that 
the state plea was resolving not just the state’s investigation of Epstein, but the federal investigation 
as well.  The State Attorney was not obligated by state statutes to inform the victims of the status 
of the federal investigation, and there was little reason to assume Krischer, or one of his staff, 
would voluntarily do so, thereby putting the State Attorney’s Office in the position of fielding 
victim questions and concerns about the outcome.  Furthermore, as both the USAO and the defense 
had differing views as to who could lawfully participate in the state plea hearing, there is no 
indication that Acosta, Sloman, or Villafaña took steps...

 
272 
 
argued that Acosta should have been able to rely on his staff to accomplish the victim notification 
task, and thus had no responsibility to personally confirm that Chief Reiter would notify the 
victims of the hearing.428  Acosta is correct that under usual circumstances, USAO management 
played no role in the victim notification process; however, in this case, the issue of victim 
notification had been elevated from a rote administrative task to a major area of dispute with the 
defense.  Acosta personally involved himself by resolving the notification dispute with defense 
counsel in his December 19, 2007 letter.  Villafaña provided Acosta with a draft letter to state 
officials that would have opened a dialogue concerning the notification of all the victims identified 
in the federal investigation.  OPR found no evidence, however, that Acosta sent the letter or any 
similar communication to the State Attorney’s Office or that he provided Villafaña and Sloman 
with instructions concerning victim notification other than those contained in his December 19, 
2007 letter.  Having inserted himself into the notification process, Acosta had a responsibility to 
ensure that his expectation that the victims would be notified could be accomplished through the 
state process.             
Many victims only learned of Epstein’s state court pleas when they later received a letter 
from the USAO informing them that those pleas had resolved the federal investigation, and some 
victims only learned of the state court pleas and sentencing from the news media.  In the end, 
although Villafaña and Sloman hastily attempted to ensure victim notification through Chief 
Reiter, their effort was too little and too late to ensure that victims had the opportunity to attend 
the plea hearing or were given sufficient information about its significance to their own cases.429  
Although Acosta may have conferred with others about the decision to defer the responsibility for 
notifyin...

 
273 
 
resolution of the case to ensure Epstein’s victims were given an opportunity to attend the plea 
hearing, and to possibly speak about the impact of Epstein’s crimes, presented a glaring contrast 
with Acosta’s responsiveness to the demands of Epstein’s attorneys, which included the unusual 
courtesy of allowing them to preview and respond to the USAO’s draft victim notifications.  This 
contrast added to the victims’ perception that they had been treated unfairly, a view shared by the 
public.   
Nothing in the documentary record suggests that Acosta thought through the issue of 
determining which victims would be notified by the state, or that he took any steps to ensure that 
all of the known federal victims received information about the state plea hearing.  Instead, as with 
his decision to resolve the federal investigation through a state-based resolution, Acosta exercised 
poor judgment when he made critical decisions affecting the federal investigation and the victims, 
but also failed to consider the full consequences of those decisions or what was needed to 
implement them.  Acosta’s failure to consider these issues before simply leaving the responsibility 
for making notifications entirely to the State Attorney’s discretion reflected poorly on the USAO 
and the Department as a whole.  It left victims in the dark about an important proceeding that 
resolved the federal investigation, an investigation about which the USAO had communicated with 
victims for months.  It also ultimately created the misimpression that the Department intentionally 
sought to silence the victims by keeping them uninformed about the NPA and the resulting state 
proceeding.  Acosta failed to ensure that victims were afforded an opportunity to attend a hearing 
that was related to their own cases and thus failed to ensure that victims were treated with 
forthrightness and dignity.  
V. 
VILLAFAÑA DID NOT COMMIT PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT IN HER 
ORAL COMMUNICATIONS TO VICTIMS A...

 
274 
 
agent and Villafaña consulted with the USAO’s Professional Responsibility Officer about the 
matter, and thereafter stopped notifying the victims about the NPA and their ability to pursue 
monetary damages according to its terms.  
 
Villafaña advised Sloman by email of her concerns regarding the potential impeachment 
evidence, telling him, “One thing I am concerned about is that, if we [file charges] now, cross-
examination will consist of- ‘and the government told you that if Mr. Epstein is convicted, you are 
entitled to a large amount of damages right?’”  Explaining the decision in her later CVRA 
declaration, Villafaña said that after Epstein’s attorneys “complained that the victims were 
receiving an incentive to overstate their involvement with Mr. Epstein in order to increase their 
damages claims,” she “concluded that informing additional victims could compromise the 
witnesses’ credibility at trial if Epstein reneged on the agreement.”  Acosta was aware of these 
concerns as he referred to them in an August 2008 email, “[W]e also believed that contacting the 
victims would compromise them as potential witnesses.  Epstein argued very forcefully that they 
were doing this for the money, and we did not want to discuss liability with them, which was [a] 
key part of [the] agree[ment].”   
 
The case agents interviewed victims in October and November 2007, but did not inform 
them about the NPA.431  On January 31, 2008, the FBI agents, Villafaña, and the CEOS Trial 
Attorney interviewed three victims, including Courtney Wild, and they interviewed at least one 
more victim the next day.432  Wild and two others had been contacted by the FBI in the fall of 
2007 and may have been informed about the resolution of the federal investigation.   
 
Villafaña told OPR that during the January 31, 2008 interviews, she did not specifically 
tell the victims that “there was a signed non-prosecution agreement that had these terms.”  She 
stated that she would not u...

 
275 
 
the federal investigation I was cooperating in.  If I had been told of a[n NPA], I would have 
objected.”  Wild further stated in her declaration that, “Based on what the FBI had been telling me, 
I thought they were still investigating my case.”    
Neither the CEOS Trial Attorney nor the FBI case agent recalled the specifics of the victim 
interviews.  The FBI reports memorializing each interview primarily addressed the facts elicited 
from the victim regarding Epstein’s abuse and did not describe any discussion about the status of 
the case or the victim’s view about the prosecution of Epstein.433   
 
When asked whether she was concerned that failing to tell victims about the NPA when 
she was interviewing them would mislead victims, as previously noted, Villafaña told OPR that 
she believed she and the agents were conducting an investigation because they continued 
“interviewing witnesses” and “doing all these things” to file charges and prepare for a federal trial.  
As Villafaña stated, “So to me, saying to a victim the case is now back under investigation is 
perfectly accurate.” 
Villafaña was also aware that some victims were represented by counsel in connection with 
civil lawsuits against Epstein, but did not proactively inform the victims’ attorneys about the NPA.  
In a 2017 affidavit filed in the CVRA litigation, victims’ attorney Bradley Edwards alleged that 
during telephone calls with Villafaña, he “asked very specific questions about what stage the 
investigation was in,” and Villafaña replied that she could not answer his questions because the 
matter “was an on-going active investigation.”  Edwards stated that Villafaña gave him “the 
impression that the Federal investigation was on-going, very expansive, and continuously growing, 
both in the number of identified victims and complexity.”  Edwards also stated, “A fair 
characterization of each call was that I provided information and asked questions and Villafaña 
listened and expressed...

 
276 
 
not plead guilty in October 2007 as the USAO expected, it was a “very open question” whether 
the case would go to trial, and Acosta thought that “where there is no legal requirement[,] [t]here 
has to be discretion to judge how much you can tell the victims and when.”   
 
Epstein’s attorneys’ conduct during the period between the signing of the NPA and 
Epstein’s entry of his state guilty pleas illustrated the risk that Acosta, Sloman, and Villafaña all 
identified.  As Epstein’s counsel deposed victims related to the state court criminal charges and 
civil cases against Epstein, counsel suggested that the victims were motivated to testify against 
Epstein by the government’s promises of financial gain.  For example, during a February 20, 2008 
state deposition of a victim, defense counsel asked her whether the federal prosecutors or FBI 
agents told her that she was entitled to receive money from Epstein.435  In her 2017 declaration in 
the CVRA litigation, Villafaña identified that line of questioning as a motivating factor in the 
government’s decision to stop notifying the victims about the potential for 18 U.S.C. § 2255 
recovery.    
 
On June 27, 2008, the Friday before Epstein’s Monday, June 30, 2008 state court guilty 
plea hearing, Villafaña contacted Edwards to inform him about that upcoming hearing.  Villafaña 
told OPR she “was not given authorization to contact” any victim’s attorney other than Edwards 
about the scheduled state plea hearing.436  In his 2017 affidavit prepared for the CVRA litigation, 
Edwards stated that Villafaña “gave the impression that she was caught off-guard herself that 
Epstein was pleading guilty or that this event was happening at all.”   
 
Edwards said in a 2016 court filing that Villafaña told him only that “Epstein was pleading 
guilty to state solicitation of prostitution charges involving other victims—not Mr. Edward’s 
clients nor any of the federally-identified victims.”  Villafaña stated in her 2017 decla...

 
277 
 
attend the hearing.  In his affidavit, Edwards asserted, “[T]here was no possible way I could have 
believed that this state plea could affect the federal investigation or the rights of my clients in that 
federal investigation.”      
 
In Wild, the Eleventh Circuit panel stated that the government “seemingly” deferred to 
Epstein’s attorneys’ requests not to notify the victims about the NPA, and that in sending the 
January and May 2008 FBI letters, the government’s efforts “seem to have graduated from passive 
nondisclosure to (or at least close to) active misrepresentation.”437  Although both the appellate 
court and district court focused on the FBI’s letters for which OPR concludes that neither Villafaña, 
Sloman, nor Acosta was responsible, OPR considered the courts’ analyses in evaluating whether 
similar representations Villafaña made to the victims whom she interviewed on January 31 and 
February 1, 2008, and to Edwards, were misleading.  Therefore, OPR considered whether 
Villafaña’s statements that the matter was “under investigation” and her failure to inform all of the 
victims whom she interviewed or Edwards about the NPA violated FRPC 4-4.1(a), 4-8.4(c), or 
4-8.4(d). 
FRPC 4-4.1(a) prohibits an attorney from “knowingly mak[ing] a false statement of 
material fact or law to a third person” during the representation of a client.  The FRPC defines 
“knowingly” as “denot[ing] actual knowledge of the fact in question” and states that such 
knowledge may be “inferred from circumstances.”438  The comment to FRPC 4-4.1 states that 
“[m]isrepresentations can also occur by partially true but misleading statements or omissions that 
are the equivalent of affirmative false statements.”  The comment references FRPC 4-8.4 “[f]or 
dishonest conduct that does not amount to a false statement.”  Like FRPC 4-4.1(a), Rule 4-8.4(c) 
requires evidence that the attorney knew the statement in question was false.  Under FRPC 
4-8.4(c), the intent requirement can be...

 
278 
 
previously noted, there is some contemporaneous evidence supporting her assertion.  Villafaña’s 
mention of the agreement, even if not described in specific terms, would have been sufficient to 
apprise those victims of the status of the federal investigation.   
Nevertheless, Villafaña did not recall discussing the NPA specifically or in general terms 
with other victims interviewed at that time, nor did she do so with Edwards or any other victim’s 
attorney.  OPR therefore considered whether the omission of information about the existence of 
the NPA during these interactions rose to the level of professional misconduct in violation of FRPC 
4-4.1 or 4-8.4.441   
OPR evaluated Villafaña’s conduct in light of the comment to FRPC 4-4.1:   
A lawyer is required to be truthful when dealing with others on a 
client’s behalf, but generally has no affirmative duty to inform an 
opposing party of relevant facts.  A misrepresentation can occur if 
the lawyer incorporates or affirms a statement of another person that 
the lawyer knows is false. Misrepresentations can also occur by 
partially true but misleading statements or omissions that are the 
equivalent of affirmative false statements.   
The victims and their attorneys were certainly not “opposing part[ies]” to the USAO, but the 
comment indicates that the rule recognizes that omissions made during discussions with third 
parties, even of relevant facts, are not always treated as false statements.   
Here, the evidence does not show that Villafaña knowingly made an affirmative false 
statement to the victims or Edwards or that her omissions were “the equivalent of affirmative false 
statements” about material facts.  First, Villafaña told OPR that she believed the investigation was 
ongoing and her statement to that effect truthful, and as discussed earlier in this Chapter, the 
evidence shows that Villafaña and the agents did continue to investigate the case until Epstein 
entered his guilty plea in state c...

 
279 
 
and they often cannot fully reveal either the facts or the status of an investigation, even with 
victims.  The 2005 Guidelines advise that in consulting with a victim, prosecutors may be limited 
in their disclosures:  “Because victims are not clients, may become adverse to the Government, 
and may disclose whatever they have learned from consulting with prosecutors, such consultations 
may be limited to gathering information from victims and conveying only nonsensitive data and 
public information.”443   
Villafaña’s concern about generating potential impeachment evidence by informing 
victims of their potential to recover monetary damages from Epstein was not unreasonable.  
Indeed, the case agents initially raised the impeachment issue, and after considering the problem, 
Villafaña agreed with the agents’ concerns.  Villafaña raised those concerns with the USAO’s 
Professional Responsibility Officer in October 2007 after the agents brought the issue to her 
attention, and she ultimately raised the issue with Sloman and Acosta as well, neither of whom 
advised her that those concerns were improper or unsound.  OPR also considered that although 
Villafaña had sought to notify the victims in writing of the NPA soon after it was signed, her 
supervisor, the U.S. Attorney, had decided otherwise.  When authorized to inform Edwards of the 
scheduled change of plea hearing, she did so.  Although she did not inform Edwards that the plea 
was part of a global resolution that would end the federal investigation, the evidence does not show 
that Villafaña acted for the purpose of deceiving Edwards or preventing him from attending the 
hearing.  Had she sought to exclude him from the state proceedings, she could have elected not to 
inform Edwards at all, or she could have discouraged him from attending the state proceedings.  
Rather, as Edwards confirmed, Villafaña told him the hearing was “important.”  Villafaña sought 
to strike a difficult balance of securing E...

 
280 
 
intentionally concealing information from them and was part of a series of interactions with 
victims that led to condemnation of the government’s treatment of victims.445   
VI. 
THE GOVERNMENT FAILED TO TREAT VICTIMS FORTHRIGHTLY AND 
WITH SENSITIVITY WHEN IT FAILED TO TIMELY PROVIDE VICTIMS 
WITH IMPORTANT INFORMATION ABOUT THE RESOLUTION OF THE 
FEDERAL INVESTIGATION   
 
Although OPR does not conclude that any of the subjects committed professional 
misconduct, either by failing to consult with the victims before the NPA was signed or in 
interactions afterwards, OPR’s findings are not an endorsement of the government’s course of 
action.  The government’s interactions with victims confused and frustrated many of the victims, 
particularly the two CVRA petitioners and the two victims who had unsuccessfully attempted to 
join in the CVRA litigation.  As a result, the victims’ and the public’s perception of the matter is 
that the prosecutors worked with Epstein’s attorneys to disenfranchise and silence the victims.  It 
is unfortunate, and appears fundamentally unfair to the victims, that Acosta and Sloman (after 
Menchel and Lourie departed) took the unusual step of deciding to vet the USAO victim 
notification letters with the defense after the NPA was signed, but failed to go beyond the 
requirements of the CVRA or the 2005 Guidelines to consult with the victims before the NPA was 
signed.  This result is contrary to the Department’s intent, as set forth in the 2005 Guidelines, that 
Department employees work to “minimize the frustration and confusion that victims of crime 
endure in its wake.”  When considering the entirety of the government’s interactions with victims, 
OPR concludes that victims were not treated with the forthrightness and sensitivity expected by 
the Department. 
 
Wild’s criticisms of the government’s conduct were based on interactions that are similar 
to and generally representative of the government’s interactions with other ...

 
281 
 
Villafaña informed Edwards about the state plea, but did not mention the NPA or the fact that the 
state pleas would resolve the federal investigation.  Edwards then filed the CVRA petition and 
learned about the NPA signed months earlier and that the federal investigation of Epstein had 
concluded with Epstein’s state guilty pleas.  Wild only received access to the NPA when a judge 
permitted it in August 2008 pursuant to a protective order.  After considering this series of 
interactions, it is not surprising that Wild came away from the experience feeling confused and 
believing she had been misled.   
 
OPR did not find evidence supporting a conclusion that Villafaña, Acosta, Sloman, 
Menchel, or Lourie opted not to consult with the victims in order to protect Epstein or shield the 
NPA from public scrutiny.  Although neither Sloman nor Acosta could recall a specific discussion 
of CVRA obligations before the NPA was signed, both recalled knowing that victim consultation 
was not required, and Menchel also told OPR that consultation was not required, at least not up to 
the point when he left the USAO.  The evidence is clear that Villafaña sought at various points to 
consult with and to notify victims about the details of the NPA but was constrained before the 
NPA was signed by managers who either made a decision to not consult victims or did not address 
the issue after it was raised, and after the signing by her own concern about creating possible 
impeachment evidence that would damage the victims’ credibility at a possible trial.    
 
Nonetheless, a more open and straightforward approach with the victims, both before and 
after the signing of the NPA, would have been the better practice.  Before the NPA was signed, 
victims could have been asked for their views about the general terms the USAO was 
contemplating offering, including that a plea to state charges was one of the options being 
considered; asked for their views in general about a guil...

 
282 
 
to be paid to the FBI’s communications to ensure that the victims were receiving accurate and 
timely information that was consistent with the status of the case and with the USAO’s 
communications with victims.447   
The decision not to inform victims and their attorneys about the existence of the NPA gave 
victims and the public the misimpression that the government had colluded with Epstein’s counsel 
to keep the agreement secret from the victims.  Moreover, the lack of openness about the NPA 
gave the impression that the USAO lacked sensitivity for the victims in resolving the matter and 
undercut public confidence in the legitimacy of the resulting plea agreement.  The overall result of 
the subjects’ anomalous handling of this case left at least some of the victims feeling ignored and 
frustrated, failed to promote their healing process, and resulted in extensive public criticism.  
Although OPR credits Villafaña’s statements that she wanted to go beyond her obligations in 
dealing with victims, the end result nonetheless was that communications with victims were not 
prioritized by the USAO.  In part this was due to the fact that interactions with victims are generally 
handled by staff in the USAO and the FBI who are trained and have expertise in dealing with 
victims and other witnesses.  However, decisions made by Acosta, Sloman, and Villafaña also 
contributed to the problems.  The government, as it ultimately acknowledged in the CVRA 
litigation, could have, and should have, engaged with the victims in a more transparent and unified 
fashion.         
OPR recognizes that the Epstein investigation occurred soon after the passage of the 
CVRA.  In the years since, the Department’s prosecutors and personnel have become more familiar 
with its provisions.  OPR encourages the Department as a whole to take the issues discussed above 
into account when providing training and direction to its employees regarding victims’ rights to 
ensure that in the fu...

 
283 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
In November 2018, the Miami Herald published an extensive investigative report about 
state and federal criminal investigations initiated more than 12 years earlier into allegations that 
Jeffrey Epstein, a wealthy financier with residences in Florida, New York, and other United States 
and foreign locations, had coerced girls into engaging in sexual activity with him at his Palm 
Beach, Florida estate.  The Miami Herald reported that in 2007, the U.S. Attorney for the Southern 
District of Florida, R. Alexander Acosta, entered into an “extraordinary” deal with Epstein that 
permitted Epstein to avoid federal prosecution and a potentially lengthy prison sentence by 
pleading guilty in state court to “two prostitution charges,” immunized from prosecution Epstein’s 
co-conspirators, and concealed from Epstein’s victims the terms of the NPA.   
  
Following the Miami Herald’s report, and after receiving a Congressional request to 
investigate, OPR initiated an investigation into the allegations that prosecutors in the USAO 
improperly resolved the federal investigation into the criminal conduct of Jeffrey Epstein by 
negotiating and executing the NPA.  OPR subsequently included in its investigation allegations 
stemming from judicial criticism of the government’s conduct relating to federal prosecutors’ and 
law enforcement agents’ interactions with Epstein’s victims.  In July 2008, a victim, later joined 
by a second victim, filed in federal court in the Southern District of Florida an emergency petition 
for enforcement of her rights under the CVRA.  In February 2019, the district court found that the 
government violated the CVRA by failing to advise victims about its intention to enter into the 
NPA.  The court also found that letters the government sent to victims after the NPA was signed, 
describing the investigation as ongoing, were misleading. 
 
During the course of its investigation, OPR obtained and reviewed hundreds of thousands 
o...

 
284 
 
OPR evaluated the conduct of each subject based on his or her individual role in various 
decisions and events and assessed that conduct pursuant to OPR’s analytical framework.  OPR 
found that Acosta made the pivotal decision to resolve the federal investigation of Epstein through 
a state-based plea and either developed or approved the terms of the initial offer to the defense that 
set the beginning point for the subsequent negotiations that led to the NPA.  Although Acosta did 
not sign the NPA, he participated in its drafting and approved it, with knowledge of its terms.  
Therefore, OPR considers Acosta to be responsible for the NPA and for the actions of the other 
subjects who implemented his decisions.  
 
Based on its extensive investigation, OPR concludes that the subjects did not commit 
professional misconduct with respect to the development, negotiation, and approval of the NPA.  
Under OPR’s framework, professional misconduct requires a finding that a subject attorney 
intentionally or recklessly violated a clear and unambiguous standard governing the conduct at 
issue.  OPR found no clear and unambiguous standard that required Acosta to indict Epstein on 
federal charges or that prohibited his decision to defer prosecution to the state.  Furthermore, none 
of the individual terms of the NPA violated Department or other applicable standards.  
As the U.S. Attorney, Acosta had the “plenary authority” under established federal law and 
Department policy to resolve the case as he deemed necessary and appropriate, as long as his 
decision was not motivated or influenced by improper factors.  Acosta’s decision to decline to 
initiate a federal prosecution of Epstein was within the scope of his authority, and OPR did not 
find evidence that his decision was based on corruption or other impermissible considerations, 
such as Epstein’s wealth, status, or associations.  Evidence shows that Acosta resisted defense 
efforts to have the matter returned t...

 
285 
 
principles was too expansive, his view of the federal interest in prosecuting Epstein was too 
narrow, and his understanding of the state system was too imperfect to justify the decision to use 
the NPA.  Furthermore, because Acosta assumed a significant role in reviewing and drafting the 
NPA and the other three subjects who were supervisors left the USAO, were transitioning to other 
jobs, or were absent at critical junctures, Acosta should have ensured more effective coordination 
and communication during the negotiations and before approving the final NPA.  The NPA was a 
unique resolution, and one that required greater oversight and supervision than Acosta provided.     
OPR further concludes that none of the subject attorneys committed professional 
misconduct with respect to the government’s interactions with victims.  The subjects did not 
intentionally or recklessly violate a clear and unambiguous duty under the CVRA by entering into 
the NPA without consulting with victims, because the USAO resolved the Epstein investigation 
without a federal criminal charge.  Significantly, at the time the NPA was signed, the Department 
did not interpret CVRA rights to attach unless and until federal charges had been filed, and the 
federal courts had not established a clear and unambiguous standard applying the CVRA before 
criminal charges were brought.  In addition, OPR did not find evidence that the lack of consultation 
was for the purpose of silencing victims.  Nonetheless, the lack of consultation was part of a series 
of government interactions with victims that ultimately led to public and court condemnation of 
the government’s treatment of the victims, reflected poorly on the Department as a whole, and is 
contradictory to the Department’s mission to minimize the frustration and confusion that victims 
of a crime endure.  
 OPR determined that none of the subjects was responsible for communications sent to 
certain victims after the NPA was signed th...

 
286 
 
OPR concludes that the decision to postpone notifying victims about the terms of the NPA 
after it was signed and the omission of information about the NPA during victim interviews and 
conversations with victims’ attorneys in 2008 do not constitute professional misconduct.  
Contemporaneous records show that these actions were based on strategic concerns about creating 
impeachment evidence that Epstein’s victims had financial motives to make claims against him, 
evidence that could be used against victims at a trial, and were not for the purpose of silencing 
victims.  Nonetheless, the failure to reevaluate the strategy prior to interviews of victims and 
discussions with victims’ attorneys occurring in 2008 led to interactions that contributed to 
victims’ feelings that the government was intentionally concealing information from them.      
After examining the full scope and context of the government’s interactions with victims, 
OPR concludes that the government’s lack of transparency and its inconsistent messages led to 
victims feeling confused and ill-treated by the government; gave victims and the public the 
misimpression that the government had colluded with Epstein’s counsel to keep the NPA secret 
from the victims; and undercut public confidence in the legitimacy of the resulting agreement.  The 
overall result of the subjects’ anomalous handling of this case understandably left many victims 
feeling ignored and frustrated and resulted in extensive public criticism.  In sum, OPR concludes 
that the victims were not treated with the forthrightness and sensitivity expected by the 
Department.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

 
287 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
A. 
Document Review 
As referenced in the Executive Summary, OPR obtained and reviewed hundreds of 
thousands of pages of documents from the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of 
Florida (USAO), other U.S. Attorney’s offices, the FBI, and other Department components, 
including the Office of the Deputy Attorney General, the Criminal Division, and the Executive 
Office for U.S. Attorneys (EOUSA).  The categories of documents reviewed by OPR, and their 
sources, are set forth below. 
 
1. 
USAO Records 
The USAO provided OPR with access to all of its records from its handling of the Epstein 
investigation and the CVRA litigation.  The records included, but were not limited to, boxes of 
material that Villafaña updated and maintained through the course of both actions, which contained 
pleadings from the Epstein investigation, the CVRA litigation, and other related cases; extensive 
compilations of internal and external correspondence, including letters and emails; evidence such 
as telephone records, FBI reports, material received from the state investigation, and other 
confidential investigative records; court transcripts; investigative transcripts; prosecution team 
handwritten notes; research material; and draft and final case documents such as the NPA, 
prosecution memoranda, and federal indictments.   
 
The USAO also provided OPR with access to filings, productions, and privileged material 
in the CVRA litigation; Outlook data collected to respond to production requests in that case; a set 
of Epstein case documents maintained by Acosta and Sloman; computer files regarding the Epstein 
case collected by Sloman; Villafaña’s Outlook data; Acosta’s hard drive; and the permanently 
retained official U.S. Attorney records of Acosta held by the Federal Records Center.   
 
2. 
EOUSA Records 
EOUSA provided OPR with Outlook data from all five subjects and six additional 
witnesses.  This information, dating back to 2005, included...

 
288 
 
Attorney’s Offices was migrated to EOUSA’s centralized system to be maintained.  The USAO’s 
data was migrated between March and June 2008.    
   
EOUSA and OPR separately confirmed with the USAO that it was unable to locate any 
additional emails.  OPR questioned Acosta, as well as numerous administrative staff, about the 
email gap.  Acosta and the witnesses denied having any knowledge of the problem, or that they or, 
to their knowledge, anyone else made any efforts to intentionally delete the emails.  In addition, at 
OPR’s request, EOUSA conducted an analysis of records migrated from four other U.S. Attorney’s 
Offices and found that each office provided data that also contained significant gaps in their U.S. 
Attorney email records, although the time periods varied for each office.  OPR found no evidence 
indicating that the gap in Acosta’s emails was caused by any intentional act or for the purpose of 
concealing evidence relating to the Epstein investigation and concludes that it was most likely the 
result of a technological error.   
 
Although a gap in Acosta’s email inbox from May 26, 2007, through April 2, 2008, 
remained, OPR was nonetheless able to examine a significant number of Acosta’s emails from this 
time due to the extensive case files kept by the USAO; the availability of Acosta’s sent email, 
which did not contain a similar gap; and the availability of emails of other USAO subjects and 
witnesses who were included on emails with Acosta.   
 
3. 
Federal Bureau of Investigation Records 
OPR worked with the FBI’s Palm Beach Office, including with two case agents and the 
Victim Witness Specialist who worked on the Epstein matter, to obtain relevant FBI documents.  
In addition, the FBI searched its Automated Case Support system and also provided documentation 
concerning its victim notification system.   
 
4. 
Criminal Division Records 
The Office of the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division provided OPR with 
Outlook ...

 
289 
 
6. 
U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Middle District of Florida Records 
The U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Middle District of Florida provided OPR with records 
related to its review of evidence against Epstein, after he concluded his Florida state sentence, 
when the Department recused the USAO in August 2011 from “all matters, to include the 
investigation and potential prosecution, relating to Jeffrey Epstein’s alleged sexual activities with 
minor females,” and assigned the matter to the Middle District of Florida U.S. Attorney’s Office 
for further consideration.  The records included a declination of the matter due to the NPA.  
 
7. 
U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of Georgia Records 
The U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of Georgia provided OPR with records 
related to its work on the CVRA litigation after the recusal of the USAO.   
 
8. 
Public Records 
OPR obtained and reviewed a variety of public records, including publicly released records 
of the Palm Beach Police Department, the State Attorney’s Office for the 15th Judicial Circuit, 
and the Palm Beach Sheriff’s Office; documents pertaining to the CVRA litigation and other court 
proceedings involving Epstein and related individuals; and books and media reports.    
 
B. 
Information from Subjects, Witnesses, and Victims 
1. 
Subjects 
OPR requested that all five subjects provide written responses detailing their involvement 
in the federal investigation of Epstein, the drafting and execution of the NPA, and decisions 
relating to victim notification and consultation.  In addition, OPR conducted extensive interviews 
of each subject under oath and before a court reporter.  Each subject was represented by counsel 
and had access to relevant contemporaneous documents before the subject’s OPR interview.  The 
subjects reviewed and provided comments on their interview transcripts and on OPR’s draft report.   
    
2. 
Witnesses 
OPR conducted more than 60 interviews...

 
290 
 
the victims to provide OPR with information regarding their contacts with, and notification 
received from, the FBI and USAO, during the period before the NPA was signed or before 
Epstein’s state plea hearing, about the status of the federal investigation, about Epstein’s state plea, 
or about the NPA.  OPR received information from or pertaining to 13 victims.   

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A TRUE BILL 0/o-' Cff.5JtU:')~~ ~ 
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lN THE NAME OF AND BY THE AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF FL~ig A ~ 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL 
CIRCUIT OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA 
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For Palm Beach County, at the Spring Term thereof, in the year of our Lord Two Tho~j(id and Six, to-wit: 
The Grand Jurors of the State of Florida, inquiring in and for the body of said County of Palm Beach, upon their 
oaths do present that JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN in the County of Palm Beach aforesaid, in the Circuit and State 
aforesaid, 
COUNT ONE 
FELONY SOLICITATION OF PROSTITUTION 
on or about or between the 1st day of August in the year of our Lord Two Thousand and Four and October 31, 
2005, did solicit, induce, entice, or procure another to commit prostitution lewdness, or assignation, contrary to 
Florida Statute 796.07(1) on three or more occasions between August 01, 2004 and October 31, 2005, 
contrary to Florida Statute 796.07(2)(f) and (4)(c}. (3 DEG FEL)(LEVEL 1) 
against the form of the statute, to the evil example of all others, and against the peace and dignity of the State 
of Florida. 
Jeffrey E. Epstein, Race: White, Sex: Male, DOB: 
Issue Warrant 

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3DJH 1 RI 4 
IN RE: 
INVESTIGATION OF  
JEFFREY EPSTEIN 
___________________________/ 
NON-PROSECUTION AGREEMENT 
IT APPEARING that Jeffrey Epstein (hereinafter “Epstein”) is reported to have 
committed offenses against the United States from in or around 2001 through in or around 
October 2005, including: 
(1)
knowingly and willfully conspiring with others known and unknown to commit
an offense against the United States, that is, to use a facility or means of interstate
or foreign commerce to knowingly persuade, induce, or entice minor females to
engage in prostitution, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section
2422(b); all in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 371;
(2)
knowingly and willfully conspiring with others known and unknown to travel in
interstate commerce for the purpose of engaging in illicit sexual conduct, as
defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2423(f), with minor females, in violation of Title 18,
United States Code, Section 2423(b); all in violation of Title 18, United States
Code, Section 2423(e);
(3)
using a facility or means of interstate or foreign commerce to knowingly
persuade, induce, or entice minor females to engage in prostitution; in violation of
Title 18, United States Code, Sections 2422(b) and 2;
(4)
traveling in interstate commerce for the purpose of engaging in illicit sexual
conduct, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2423(f), with minor females; in violation of
Title 18, United States Code, Section 2423(b); and
(5)
knowingly, in and affecting interstate and foreign commerce, recruiting, enticing,
and obtaining by any means a person, knowing that the person had not attained
the age of 18 years and would be caused to engage in a commercial sex act as
defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1591(c)(1); in violation of Title 18, United States Code,
Sections 1591(a)(1) and 2; and
IT APPEARING that Epstein has accepted responsibility for his behavior by his 

3DJH 2 RI 4 
signature on this Agreement; and 
IT APPEARING, after an investigation of the offenses and Epstein’s background, that 
the interest of the United States and Epstein’s own interest and the interest of justice will be 
served by the following procedure;  
THEREFORE, on the authority of R. Alexander Acosta, United States Attorney for the 
Southern District of Florida, prosecution in this District for these offenses shall be deferred in 
favor of prosecution by the State of Florida, provided that Epstein abides by the following 
conditions and the requirements of this Agreement set out below.  
Should Epstein violate any of the conditions of this Agreement, the United States 
Attorney may at any time initiate prosecution against Epstein for any offense.  In this case, the 
United States Attorney will furnish Epstein with notice specifying the conditions of the 
Agreement which he has violated.  
After timely fulfilling all the terms and conditions of the Agreement, no prosecution for 
the offenses set out on page 1 of this Agreement will be instituted in this District, and the 
charges against Epstein if any, will be dismissed.  
Neither this Agreement nor any other document filed with the United States Attorney as 
part of this Agreement will be used against Epstein, except for impeachment purposes, in 
connection with any prosecution for the above-described offenses.  
Terms of the Agreement: 
1.
Epstein shall plead guilty (not nolo contendere) to an Information filed by
the State Attorney’s Office for the 15th Judicial Circuit in and for Palm
Beach County (hereinafter, the “State Attorney’s Office”) charging
violations of the following Florida Statutes:
(a)
lewd and lascivious battery on a child, in violation of Fl. Stat.
800.04(4);
(b)
solicitation of minors to engage in prostitution, in violation of Fl.
Stat. 796.03; and
(c)
engaging in sexual activity with minors at least sixteen years of
age, in violation of Fl. Stat. 794.05.
2.
Epstein and the State...

3DJH 3 RI 4 
3.
Epstein shall waive all challenges to the Information filed by the State
Attorney’s Office and shall waive the right to appeal his conviction and
sentence.
4.
Epstein agrees that, if any of the victims identified in the federal
investigation file suit pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2255, Epstein will not
contest the jurisdiction of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of Florida over his person and/or the subject matter, and Epstein will not
contest that the identified victims are persons who, while minors, were
victims of violations of Title 18, United States Code, Sections(s) 2422
and/or 2423.
5.
The United States shall provide Epstein’s attorneys with a list of the
identified victims, which will not exceed forty, after Epstein has signed
this agreement and entered his guilty plea.  The United States shall make
a motion with the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida for the appointment of a guardian ad litem for the identified
victims and Epstein’s counsel may contact the identified victims through
that counsel.
6.
Epstein shall enter his guilty plea and be sentenced not later than
September 28, 2007, and shall begin service of his sentence not later than
October 15, 2007.
By signing this agreement, Epstein asserts and certifies that each of these terms is 
material to this agreement and is supported by independent consideration and that a breach of 
any one of these conditions allows the United States to elect to terminate the agreement and to 
investigate and prosecute Epstein for any and all federal offenses. 
By signing this agreement, Epstein asserts and certifies that he is aware of the fact that 
the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides that in all criminal 
prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial.  Epstein further is 
aware that Rule 48(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that the Court may 
dismiss an indictment, informatio...

3DJH 4 RI 4 
agreement.  Epstein further asserts and certifies that he understands that the Fifth Amendment 
and Rule 7(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that all felonies must be charged 
in an indictment presented to a grand jury.  Epstein hereby agrees and consents that, if a 
prosecution against him is instituted, it may be by way of an Information signed and filed by the 
United States Attorney, and hereby waives his right to be indicted by a grand jury. 
By signing this agreement, Epstein asserts and certifies that the above has been read and 
explained to him.  Epstein hereby states that he understands the conditions of this 
non-Prosecution Agreement and agrees to comply with them.  
Dated: ___________ 
____________________________________ 
Jeffrey Epstein 
Dated: ___________ 
____________________________________ 
Roy Black, Esq. 
Counsel to Jeffrey Epstein 
R. ALEXANDER ACOSTA
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY
Dated: ___________ 
____________________________________ 
By: 
A. Marie Villafaña 
Assistant United States Attorney 

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INRE: 
INVESTIGATION OF 
JEFFREY EPSTEIN 
------------'' 
NON-PROSECUTION AGREEMENT 
IT APPEARING that the City of Palm Beach Police Department and the State 
Attorney's Office for the 15th Judicial Circuit in and for Palm Beach County (hereinafter, 
the "State Attorney's Office") have conducted an investigation into the conduct of Jeffrey 
Epstein (hereinafter "Epstein"); 
IT APPEARING that the State Attorney's Office has charged Epstein by indictment 
with solicitation of prostitution, in violation of Florida Statutes Section 796.07; 
IT APPEARING that the United States Attorney's Office and the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation have conducted their own investigation into Epstein's background and any 
offenses that may have been committed by Epstein against the United States from in or 
around 2001 through in or around September 2007, including: 
(1) 
knowingly and willfully conspiring with others known and unknown to 
commit an offense against the United States, that is, to use a facility or means 
of interstate or foreign commerce to knowingly persuade, induce, or entice 
minor females to engage in prostitution, in violation of Title 18, United States 
Code, Section 2422(b ); all in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 
371; 
(2) 
knowingly and willfully conspiring with others known and unknown to travel 
in interstate commerce for the purpose of engaging in illicit sexual conduct, as 
defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2423(f), with minor females, in violation of Title 18, 
United States Code, Section 2423(b ); all in violation of Title 18, United States 
Code, Section 2423(e); 
(3) 
using a facility or means of interstate or foreign commerce to knowingly 
persuade, induce, or entice minor females to engage in prostitution; in 
violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 2422(b) and 2; 
( 4) 
traveling in interstate commerce for the purpose of engaging in illicit sexual 
conduct, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2423(f), with minor females; in violation 
Page...

of Title 18, United States Code, Section 2423(b ); and 
(5) 
knowingly, in and affecting interstate and foreign commerce, recruiting, 
enticing, and obtaining by any means a person, knowing that the person had 
not attained the age of 18 years and would be caused to engage in a 
commercial sex act as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1591(c)(l); in violation of Title 
18, United States Code, Sections 1591(a)(l) and 2; and 
IT APPEARING that Epstein seeks to resolve globally his state and federal criminal 
liability and Epstein understands and acknowledges that, in exchange for the benefits 
provided by this agreement, he agrees to comply with its terms, including undertaking certain 
actions with the State Attorney's Office; 
IT APPEARING, after an investigation of the offenses and Epstein's background by 
both State and Federal law enforcement agencies, and after due consultation with the State 
Attorney's Office, that the interests of the United States, the State of Florida, and the 
Defendant will be served by the following procedure; 
THEREFORE, on the authority of R. Alexander Acosta, United States Attorney for 
the Southern District of Florida, prosecution in this District for these offenses shall be 
deferred in favor of prosecution by the State of Florida, provided that Epstein abides by the 
following conditions and the requirements of this Agreement set forth below. 
If the United States Attorney should determine, based on reliable evidence, that, 
during the period of the Agreement, Epstein willfully violated any of the conditions of this 
Agreement, then the United States Attorney may, within ninety (90) days following the 
expiration of the term of home confinement discussed below, provide Epstein with timely 
notice specifying the condition( s) of the Agreement that he has violated, and shall initiate its 
prosecution on any offense within sixty (60) days' of giving notice of the violation. Any 
notice provided to Epstein pursuant to this paragraph shall be provi...

Terms of the Agreement: 
1. 
Epstein shall plead guilty (not nolo contendere) to the Indictment as 
currently pending against him in the 15th Judicial Circuit in and for 
Palm Beach County (Case No. 2006-cf-009495AXXXMB) charging 
one (1) count of solicitation of prostitution, in violation of Fl. Stat. § 
796.07. In addition, Epstein shall plead guilty to an Information filed 
by the State Attorney's Office charging Epstein with an offense that 
requires him to register as a sex offender, that is, the solicitation of 
minors to engage in prostitution, in violation of Florida Statutes Section 
796.03; 
2. 
Epstein shall make a binding recommendation that the Court impose a 
thirty (30) month sentence to be divided as follows: 
(a) 
Epstein shall be sentenced to consecutive terms of twelve (12) 
months and six (6) months in county jail for all charges, without 
any opportunity for withholding adjudication or sentencing, and 
without probation or community control in lieu of 
imprisonment; and 
(b) 
Epstein shall be sentenced to a term of twelve (12) months of 
community control consecutive to his two terms in county jail 
as described in Term 2(a), supra. 
3. 
This agreement is contingent upon a Judge of the 15th Judicial Circuit 
accepting and executing the sentence agreed upon between the State 
Attorney's Office and Epstein, the details of which are set forth in this 
agreement. 
4. 
The terms contained in paragraphs 1 and 2, supra, do not foreclose 
Epstein and the State Attorney's Office from agreeing to recommend 
any additional charge(s) or any additional term(s) of probation and/or 
incarceration. 
5. 
Epstein shall waive all challenges to the Information filed by the State 
Attorney's Office and shall waive the right to appeal his conviction and 
sentence, except a sentence that exceeds what is set forth in paragraph 
(2), supra. 
6. 
Epstein shall provide to the U.S. Attorney's Office copies of all 
Page 3 of 7 

proposed agreements with the State Attorney's Office prior to entering 
into those agreements. 
7. 
The United States shall provide Epstein's attorneys with a list of 
individuals whom it has identified as victims, as defined in 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2255, after Epstein has signed this agreement and been sentenced. 
Upon the execution of this agreement, the United States, in consultation 
with and subject to the good faith approval of Epstein's counsel, shall 
select an attorney representative for these persons, who shall be paid for 
by Epstein. Epstein's counsel may contact the identified individuals 
through that representative. 
8. 
If any of the individuals referred to in paragraph (7), supra, elects to 
file suit pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2255, Epstein will not contest the 
jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the Southern District 
of Florida over his person and/or the subject matter, and Epstein waives 
his right to contest liability and also waives his right to contest damages 
up to an amount as agreed to between the identified individual and 
Epstein, so long as the identified individual elects to proceed 
exclusively under 18 U.S.C. § 2255, and agrees to waive any other 
claim for damages, whether pursuant to state, federal, or common law. 
Notwithstanding this waiver, as to those individuals whose names 
appear on the list provided by the United States, Epstein's signature on 
this agreement, his waivers and failures to contest liability and such 
damages in any suit are not to be construed as an admission of any 
criminal or civil liability. 
9. 
Epstein's signature on this agreement also is not to be construed as an 
admission of civil or criminal liability or a waiver of any jurisdictional 
or other defense as to any person whose name does not appear on the 
list provided by the United States. 
10. 
Except as to those individuals who elect to proceed exclusively under 
18 U.S.C. § 2255, as set forth in paragraph (8), supra, neither Epstein's 
si...

sentenced not later than October 26, 2007. The United States has no 
objection to Epstein self-reporting to begin serving his sentence not 
later than January 4, 2008. 
12. 
Epstein agrees that he will not be afforded any benefits with respect to 
gain time, other than the rights, opportunities, and benefits as any other 
inmate, including but not limited to, eligibility for gain time credit 
based on standard rules and regulations that apply in the State of 
Florida. At the United States' request, Epstein agrees to provide an 
accounting of the gain time he earned during his period of 
incarceration. 
13. 
The parties anticipate that this agreement will not be made part of any 
public record. If the United States receives a Freedom of Information 
Act request or any compulsory process commanding the disclosure of 
the agreement, it will provide notice to Epstein before making that 
disclosure. 
Epstein understands that the United States Attorney has no authority to require the 
State Attorney's Office to abide by any terms of this agreement. Epstein understands that 
it is his obligation to undertake discussions with the State Attorney's Office and to use his 
best efforts to ensure compliance with these procedures, which compliance will be necessary 
to satisfy the United States' interest. Epstein also understands that it is his obligation to use 
his best efforts to convince the Judge of the 15th Judicial Circuit to accept Epstein's binding 
recommendation regarding the sentence to be imposed, and understands that the failure to 
do so will be a breach of the agreement. 
In consideration of Epstein's agreement to plead guilty and to provide compensation 
in the manner described above, if Epstein successfully fulfills all of the terms and conditions 
of this agreement, the United States also agrees that it will not institute any criminal char es 
against any potential co-conspirators of Epstein, including but not limited to 
Further, upon execution of this 
agreem...

By signing this agreement, Epstein asserts and certifies that each of these terms is 
material to this agreement and is supported by independent consideration and that a breach 
of any one of these conditions allows the United States to elect to terminate the agreement 
and to investigate and prosecute Epstein and any other individual or entity for any and all 
federal offenses. 
By signing this agreement, Epstein asserts and certifies that he is aware of the fact that 
the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides that in all criminal 
prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial. Epstein further 
is aware that Rule 48(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that the Court 
may dismiss an indictment, information, or complaint for unnecessary delay in presenting 
a charge to the Grand Jury, filing an information, or in bringing a defendant to trial. Epstein 
hereby requests that the United States Attorney for the Southern District of Florida defer such 
prosecution. Epstein agrees and consents that any delay from the date of this Agreement to 
the date of initiation of prosecution, as provided for in the terms expressed herein, shall be 
deemed to be a necessary delay at his own request, and he hereby waives any defense to such 
prosecution on the ground that such delay operated to deny him rights under Rule 48(b) of 
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States to a speedy trial or to bar the prosecution by reason of the running of the statute 
of limitations for a period of months equal to the period between the signing of this 
agreement and the breach of this agreement as to those offenses that were the subject of the 
grand jury's investigation. Epstein further asserts and certifies that he understands that the 
Fifth Amendment and Rule 7(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that all 
felonies must be charged in an ...

By signing this agreement, Epstein asserts and certifies that the above has been read 
and explained to him. Epstein hereby states that he understands the conditions of this Non-
Prosecution Agreement and agrees to comply with them. 
Dated: -----
DatedM 
Dated: -----
Dated: -----
By: 
R. ALEXANDER ACOSTA 
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY 
A. MARIE VILLAFANA 
ASSISTANT U.S. ATTORNEY 
GERALD LEFCOURT, ESQ. 
COUNSEL TO JEFFREY EPSTEIN 
LILLY ANN SANCHEZ, ESQ. 
ATTORNEY FOR JEFFREY EPSTEIN 
Page 7 of 7 

By signing this agreement, Epstein asserts and certifies that the above has been read 
and explained to him. Epstein hereby states that he understands the conditions of this Non-
Prosecution Agreement and agrees to comply with them. 
Dated: q/2._7 /o7 
Dated: -----
Dated: 7 /'-4 / 0? 
Dated: - ----
By: 
R. ALEXANDER A COST A 
UNITED STA TES A 1TORNEY 
, 
ASSISTANT U.S. ATTORNEY 
LIL,L YANN SANCHEZ, ESQ. 
ATTORNEY FOR JEFFREY EPSTEIN 
Page 7 of 7 

By signing this agreement, Epstein asserts and certifies that the above has been read 
and explained to him. Epstein hereby states that he understands the conditions of this Non-
Prosecution Agreement and agrees to comply with them. 
Dated: -----
Dated: --- --
Dated: - ----
By: 
R. ALEXANDER ACOSTA 
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY 
A. MARIE VILLAFANA 
ASSIST ANT U.S. A TIORNEY 
JEFFREY EPSTEIN 
GERALD LEFCOUR.T, ESQ. 
COUNSEL TO JEFFREY EPSTEIN 
ANN 
Z,ESQ. 
A TIORNEY FOR JEFFREY EPSTEIN 
Page 7 of 7 

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By signing th.,s Addendum, Epstein asserts and certifies that the above has been read and 
explained to him. •. Epste!n. herebY. states that he understands the clarifications to the Non• 
Prosecution ·,A,gi;eementartd agrees fo comply with them. 
Dated: / o/4 o lo 7 
Dated: ___ _ 
Dated: _......_ __ 
R. ALEXANDER ACOSTA 
UNrtE!) ~TA TES ATTORNEY 
By: 'r/•'-ff-tf~~ FillJcf/t 
-Ii, A. MARIE VlLLAPAf.rA 
ASSISTANT U.S. ATTORNEY 
GERALD LEFCOURT, ESQ . • 
COUNSEL TO JEFFREY EPSTEIN 
LILLY ANN SANCHEZ, ESQ. 
A 'ITORNEY FOR JEFFREY EPSTETN 

By signing this Addendum, Epstein asserts and certifies that the above has been read and 
explained to him. Epstein hereby states that he understands the clarifications to the Non-
Prosecution Agreement and agrees to comply with them. 
Dated: ID /2 fJ /01 
Dated: ----
Dated: ----
R. ALEXANDER AGOSTA 
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY 
By, wt· 1-'()/4,.,,,__ f!IVSA 
cq A. MARIE V LAFA~A 
ASSISTANT U.S. ATTORNEY 
JEFFREY EPSTEIN 
LILLY ANN SANCHEZ, ESQ. 
ATTORNEY FOR JEFFREY EPSTEIN 

1·----·-... ·-· . ---. -····. ··"···--·-···- ... --··-··· ·--···-.. ·- .. ·-· . ...... . .. . .. ...... .. ---·--·--· --....... -.. . 
By signing this Addendum, Epstein asserts and certifies that the above has been read and 
explained to him. Epstein hereby states that he understands the clarifications to the Non-
Prosecution Agreement and agrees to comply with them. 
Dated: ID /3 olo 7 . 
Dated: ----
Dated: ----
Dated: }fr~ '(fr 
R. ALEXANDER ACOSTA 
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY 
By: - y-~~a-- ri1WA 
,1' A. MARIE 
LAF~A 
ASSISTANT U.S. ATTORNEY 
JEFFREY EPSTEIN • 
GERALD LEFCOURT, ESQ. 
COUNSEL TO JEFFREY EPSTEIN 
~ 
ATTORNEY FOR JEFFREY EPSTEIN 

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IN THE CIRCUI~OURT OF THE FIFTEENTH JUD IC~ CIRCUIT 
IN AND FOR PALM BEACH COUNTY, STATE OF FLORIDA 
CRIMINAL DIVISION "W" (LB) 
() ~ c_f 9 32' / 
ST A TE OF FLORIDA 
ARISES FROM BOOKING NO.: 
2006036744 
vs. 
JEFFREY E EPSTEIN, W/M, 
I 
- - - - - - - -----------
,, 
INFORMATION FOR: 
--~ -:-·, . 
.. .... ... 
1) 
PROCURING PERSON UNDER 18 FOR PROSTITUION 
·- ==· 
• · ·-- -:: 
-0 
.... ..... 
::::.: 
.. :..:~ w 
In the Name and by Authority of the State of Florida: 
. 2:<~ 
~ 
BARRY E. KRISCHER, State Attorney for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach <;aiiity~lorida, by and 
through his undersigned Assistant State Attorney, charges that JEFFREY E EPSTEIN on or about or between 
the 1
st day of August in the year of our Lord Two Thousand and Four and October 9, 2005, did knowingly and 
unlawfully procure for prostitution, or caused to be prostituted,·
• a person under the age of 18 years, 
contrary to Florida Statute 796.03. (2 DEG FEL) 
ST A TE OF FLORIDA 
COUNTY OF PALM BEACH 
vfA, 
4 ;/1/IJ&i 
(~K'---. 
FL. BAR NO. 0776726 
Assistant State Attorney 
Appeared before me, LANNA BELOHLA VEK Assistant State Attorney for Palm Beach County, 
Florida, personally known to me, who, being first duly sworn, says that the allegations as set forth in the 
foregoing information are based upon facts that have been sworn to as true, and which, if true, would constitute 
the offense therein charged, that this prosecution is instituted in good faith, and certifies that testimony under 
oalh has been received from the material witness or wi'."'t9' ::?z¾ 
~ 
LB/dp 
Assistant State Attorney 
Sworn to and subscribed to before me th~U~ay of June, 2008. 
, ..... .,,, 
Damaris Pm 
--~~,. 
-~~I•·j ·• 
f.{ 
:.) MYCOMMISSIOH# 005e0798 EXPIRES 
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,·'£: 
August 2. 201 O 
',,;f;;.-'6,cr,:,o 
80IO:D1HRUTIOYFAN~ INC 
.,. . 
.,,. 
FCIC REFERENCE NUMBERS: 
I) FELONY SOLICITATION OF PROSTITUTION 3699 

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Surrounding text: August 28, 2006

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Surrounding text: Re: Case Number: Dear

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Surrounding text: you with direct information regarding the tain current information about this matter on inter at ddition, you may use the Call Center or about participation in the notification address VNS will send information to that

Size: 215 x 11 pixels

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Size: 215 x 11 pixels

Surrounding text: The Victim Notification System (VNS) IS designed to provide case as it proceeds through the criminal justice system. You may obta the Internet at WWW.Notify.USDOJ.GOV or from the VNS Call Cen In add Internet to update your contact information and/or change your decisio program. If you update your in

Size: 215 x 11 pixels

Surrounding text: The Victim Notification System (VNS) IS designed to provide case as it proceeds through the criminal justice system. You may obta the Internet at WWW.Notify.USDOJ.GOV or from the VNS Call Cen In add Internet to update your contact information and/or change your decisio program. If you update your in

Size: 38 x 8 pixels

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Size: 23 x 7 pixels

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Size: 79 x 38 pixels

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Size: 40 x 7 pixels

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Size: 129 x 20 pixels

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Size: 157 x 17 pixels

Surrounding text: Internet site, you will be prompted to enter your last name (or NS. The name you should enter is

Size: 129 x 55 pixels

Surrounding text: Sincerely, Victim Specialist

Size: 80 x 12 pixels

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Size: 130 x 13 pixels

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Size: 159 x 56 pixels

Surrounding text: Sincerely, Victim Specialist

Size: 90 x 23 pixels

Surrounding text: DB:

Size: 90 x 23 pixels

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Size: 65 x 25 pixels

Surrounding text: S#: Issu

Size: 128 x 16 pixels

Size: 22 x 14 pixels

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